Housing Authority for Prince George's County v. Williams

⁹² DAVIS, Judge. Appellant Housing Authority for Prince George’s County filed in the District Court of Maryland for Prince George’s County a suit against appellee Deborah Williams for breach of lease. The case was removed to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, but the parties entered into a settlement agreement before a show cause hearing could be held. Thereafter, appellant filed a Motion for Judgment of Possession, alleging that appellee had breached the settlement agreement.

The court dismissed the motion. Appellant timely filed this appeal, presenting one question, which we rephrase as follows: Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of possession? PROLOGUE This appeal presents the troubling question of how the legislative purposes and objectives of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(2001) can best be achieved. Congress has sought to insure that those members of the citizenry with inadequate means to pay for the bare necessities should not be relegated to substandard housing because of lack of resources.

Moreover, Congress has recognized that one’s income should not be' determinative of whether such housing should be in a crime-infested neighborhood or one free of the criminal element. We are asked, in this appeal, to decide whether appellant was entitled to evict its tenant because of the criminal activity of two members of the household. Exacerbating the legal quandary here presented is that the two household members who engaged in illegal activity were minors for whom the tenant was responsible and thus had a legal duty to provide necessities, including shelter. Any impediment to the ability of an agency to evict tenants who house those engaged in criminal activity — in this case distribution and possession of illicit drugs — renders the provisions of § 1437d(l) nugatory.

In other words, if the member or members of the household repeatedly engage in criminal activity on an ongoing basis, appellant would have no way to ⁹³ curtail such criminal activity because the tenant may interpose his or her ignorance of such activity or set up as a bar to eviction the fact that the offender is a juvenile. The logical extension of the inability to remove a tenant, regardless of the tenant’s complicity or knowledge of the criminal activity, would be the uncontrolled and uncontrollable proliferation of that criminal activity throughout the public housing project. Such a result is clearly not what Congress intended. Consequently, we are constrained, in our ultimate disposition in this case, to consider the competing interests of the law-abiding tenants who are entitled to live in a crime-free public housing project and the tenant whose household members engage in criminal activity in violation of the terms of the tenant’s lease agreement.

We answer the question raised by appellant in the affirmative and therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court; however, on remand, we direct the circuit court to make findings of fact consistent with this opinion, which we believe should be the basis upon whether appellant should successfully be able to go forward with eviction proceedings. FACTUAL SUMMARY On June 30, 1993, appellant and appellee entered into a leasehold agreement for the premises known as 9246 Cherry Lane in Laurel, Maryland. The residence was located in a public housing project known as Kimberly Gardens. Appel-lee’s sons, Dion and Antoine Cauley, and her daughter, Demi-ca Cauley, were listed as occupants in the lease.

A rider to the lease, executed on the same date, provided: A public housing tenant, member of tenant’s household, guest or other person under the tenant’s control engaged in criminal activity, including but not limited to “drug-related criminal activity,” on or near public housing premises, while the tenant resides in public housing, such activity shall be cause for termination or tenancy. The term “drug-related criminal activity ” includes but is not limited to the illegal manufacture, sale, distribution, use, ⁹⁴ or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute, or use, of a controlled substance. ... Violation of the provisions of the Rider shall be considered a material violation to the Lease and grounds for termination of the Lease. Dion was arrested on January 9, 1998 after he introduced an undercover police officer to a man who sold the officer cocaine.

It appears that Dion was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine, although no documents detailing the charges or the disposition of the case are contained in the record. The alleged drug sale occurred in Kimberly Gardens. Appellant notified appellee on January 20, 1998 that her lease had been terminated and, on May 15,1998, it filed an amended complaint against appellee in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. The complaint alleged that Dion’s arrest constituted a material breach of the lease and that appellee had failed to vacate the premises, despite a notice of termination.

The parties entered into a Settlement Agreement (Agreement) on May 10, 1999. Paragraph two of the Agreement provided: Without admitting any allegation of [appellant], and without admitting any past wrongful acts, [appellee] agrees: A. That [appellee], member’s [sic] of [appellee’s] household, and any guests under [appellee’s] control, will not engage in criminal activity, including but not limited to “drug-related criminal activity,” on or near [appellee]’s premises at 9246 Cherry Lane, Laurel MD 20708. B. That [appellee] and member’s [sic] of [appellee’s] household will abide by all other provisions of [appellee’s] current lease with [appellant]. The Agreement further provided that, if within one year of the Agreement appellee failed to comply with paragraph two, appellant could file a Motion for Judgment of Possession.

Antoine was arrested on March 1, 2000 and charged with possession of marijuana. The arrest report indicates that a ⁹⁵ police officer observed Antoine loitering in Kimberly Gardens. When Antoine became aware of the officer’s presence, he tossed several objects on the ground, including a baggie containing marijuana. Antoine was fourteen years old at the time of his arrest.

On March 21, 2000, appellant notified appellee that Antoine’s conduct constituted a violation of the Agreement and that it would take legal action against appellee to regain possession of the premises if she did not vacate them by April 5, 2000. On May 9, 2000, appellant filed a Motion for Judgment of Possession in the circuit court. A show cause hearing was held on August 18, 2000, at which the court denied appellant’s motion. The court noted that, although the parties’ Agreement stated that any criminal activity by appel-lee or members of her household would result in eviction, it did “not define criminal activity as including activity participated in by a juvenile....” It reasoned that “a juvenile is not involved in criminal activity per se because, although it’s alleged that he [or she] may commit a crime, it’s still — it’s handled in a juvenile proceeding which is, by its very nature, not criminal.” Antoine’s possession of marijuana, the court concluded, did not constitute a breach of the Agreement. 1 LEGAL DISCUSSION I Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of possession.

It argues that the lease and Agreement were valid contracts between the parties that should be enforced. The fact that Antoine is a juvenile is not relevant, appellant maintains, because the basis for eviction is not his actions, but appellee’s failure to prevent those actions. ⁹⁶ “ ‘Courts look with favor upon the compromise or settlement of law suits in the interest of efficient and economical administration of justice and the lessening of friction and acrimony.’ A valid settlement agreement is a type of contract.” Calabi v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 353 Md. 649, 653 , 728 A.2d 206 (1999) (citations omitted). Neither party disputes the validity of the Agreement signed May 10, 1999; therefore, we apply contract principles to determine whether appellee breached the Agreement.

The “paramount