Howard County Department of Social Services v. Linda J.

KRAUSER, J. Linda J., 1 appellee, was charged with two counts of second degree assault for striking her eight-year-old foster daughter with a belt, causing welts to form on her forearm and thigh. Following an investigation of this incident, the Howard County Department of Social Services, appellant, found Linda J. “responsible” for “indicated child abuse.” That meant that Ms. J.’s name would be placed in the agency’s central registry of suspected child abusers. Challenging the Department’s finding, Linda J. requested a “contested case hearing.” Declining to rule on that request until the criminal charges against Ms. J. were resolved, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) of the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) stayed all further administrative proceedings pending a final disposition of those charges. That occurred when Linda J. pleaded guilty to one count of second degree assault and received a probation before judgment (“PBJ”).

Based upon that disposition, the ALJ concluded that Ms. J. had been ⁴⁰⁵ “found guilty” of a criminal charge arising out of the alleged abuse and, in accordance with Maryland law, 2 denied her request for a contested case hearing. That decision was, in turn, reversed by the Circuit Court for Howard County and the case was remanded by that court to the OAH for a contested case hearing. Seeking to overturn the circuit court’s decision granting Ms. J. a contested case hearing, appellant presents one question for our review: Did the administrative law judge properly dismiss Linda. J.’s request for a contested case hearing pursuant to F.L. § 5-706.1(b)(3)(ii) because, notwithstanding the grant of probation before judgment, she was found guilty of a criminal charge arising out of the alleged abuse?

We conclude that the ALJ did properly dismiss Linda J.’s request for a contested case hearing for the reasons set forth below and shall therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court. Background On October 26, 2001, Linda J. was charged with two counts of second degree assault for repeatedly hitting her eight-year-old foster daughter, Tiasha, with a belt, leaving her with welts on her forearm and rear thigh. Three days later, appellant sent Ms. J. a letter notifying her that it had completed an investigation of the incident and had found her “responsible” for “indicated child abuse” and that she could appeal the finding by requesting a contested case hearing. The letter also informed Linda J. that, if she failed to appeal the finding, was unsuccessful in her appeal, or was found guilty of any criminal charge arising out of the alleged abuse, she could be identified as “responsible for indicated child abuse” in a cen ⁴⁰⁶ tral registry that is part of the Howard County Department of Social Services’ confidential computerized database.

When Linda J. requested a contested case hearing to appeal the finding, the ALJ stayed the proceedings pending the resolution of the criminal charges that “ar[ose] out of the alleged abuse.” On March 11, 2002, Linda J. pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court for Howard County to one charge of second degree assault. She was given a suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment, and was ordered to have no contact with the victim, to participate in an anger management program, and to complete thirty-five hours of community service. The court advised Ms. J. that it would consider modifying her sentence if she filed a motion for reconsideration or modification. On March 26, 2001, Linda J. filed a petition for reduction or modification of sentence requesting that the court “strike” the finding of guilt and enter a probation before judgment.

On April 29, 2002, appellant advised the OAH that Ms. J. had pleaded guilty to a charge of second degree assault “arising] out of the same facts at issue in the contested case hearing” pending before the OAH and that under Maryland law Ms. J. was no longer entitled to a contested case hearing to appeal the “indicated child abuse” finding. Appellant then moved to dismiss Linda J.’s contested case hearing on the ground that Maryland law requires the OAH dismiss the contested case hearing of an individual “found guilty of any criminal charge arising out of the alleged abuse.” Linda J. opposed the motion, arguing that there was no “final disposition of the criminal charge[s]” until the circuit court ruled on the pending motion for modification of sentence. The ALJ agreed and denied appellant’s motion to dismiss. Appellant later filed a second motion to dismiss Ms. J.’s contested case hearing on the ground that Ms. J. was collaterally estopped from challenging the agency’s abuse finding.

That motion was also denied. On April 21, 2003, Linda J.’s counsel notified the OAH that the circuit court had granted appellee’s request to have her ⁴⁰⁷ criminal sentence modified to probation before judgment. Thereafter, on July 2, 2003, the ALJ dismissed Linda J.’s request for a contested case hearing, finding that the grant of probation before judgment was a “final disposition of the criminal charge” and the requirements for dismissal of a contested case hearing under Maryland law were satisfied. That prompted Linda J. to petition the Circuit Court for Howard County for judicial review.

After hearing oral arguments, the circuit court reversed the ALJ’s decision and remanded the matter to the OAH for a contested case hearing. The circuit court found that “[pjrobation before judgment is not a verdict of guilt” as required by Maryland law and, thus, Ms. J. was entitled to a contested case hearing under the statute. Appellant then noted this appeal. Standard of Review When reviewing an administrative agency decision, our role “is precisely the same as that of the circuit court.” Dep’t Of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Shrieves, 100 Md.App. 283, 303-04 , 641 A.2d 899 (1994).

We review only the decision of the administrative agency itself. Ahalt v. Montgomery County, 113 Md.App. 14, 20 , 686 A.2d 683 (1996). We “do not evaluate the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the circuit court.” Consumer Prot. Div. v. Luskin’s, Inc., 120 Md.App. 1, 22 , 706 A.2d 102 (1998), rev’d in part on other grounds, 353 Md. 335 , 726 A.2d 702 (1999). “Thus, whether the circuit court applied the wrong standard of review is of no consequence if our own review satisfies us that the Board’s decision was proper.” (Giant Food, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 124 Md.App. 357, 363 , 722 A.2d 398 (1999), rev’d on other grounds, 356 Md. 180 , 738 A.2d 856 (1999).

To conduct a proper inquiry of an administrative agency’s decision, we “ ‘must be able to discern from the record the facts found, the law applied, and the relationship between the two.’ ” Sweeney v. Montgomery County, 107 Md.App. 187, 197 , 667 A.2d 922 (1995) (quoting Forman v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 332 Md. 201, 221 , 630 A.2d 753 (1993)). ⁴⁰⁸ Discussion Appellant contends that the ALJ properly dismissed Linda J.’s request for a contested case hearing