Howard Street Jewelers, Inc. v. Wegad

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge. Howard Street Jewelers, Inc., appellant, sued its accountant, Gilbert Wegad, appellee, a CPA, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for professional malpractice, alleging his failure to discover defalcations by one of appellant’s employees. Appellee defended on the basis that appellant was contributorily negligent. By special verdict, the jury determined both that appellee was negligent and appellant was contributorily negligent and, so, judgment was entered in favor of appellee.

Appellant appeals from that judgment, presenting a single question: Did the trial court err in refusing to give a requested instruction that a client’s reliance on his accountant is not contributorily negligent in an action against the accountant for malpractice? ³⁵³ We answer the question in the affirmative and, thus, reverse and remand for new trial. The jury’s verdict finding appellee guilty of professional malpractice is not challenged on this appeal. The facts pertinent to our resolution of the issue presented on appeal are either not disputed or conceded. 1 In view of appellee’s failure to file a cross-appeal with respect to the jury’s verdict as to him, it is conclusively established, for purposes of this appeal, that appellee was negligent “by failpng] to exercise reasonable care and skill in his perform ³⁵⁴ anee of accounting services for [appellant] which negligence was a direct cause of economic damage to [appellant].” Moreover, it is not disputed that appellee had been appellant’s accountant since at least 1948, first as an employee of an accounting firm and later as the principal of his own firm. Furthermore, it is undisputed that appellant began to experience financial problems, characterized by cash flow difficulties, in 1983 and that those problems persisted until the fact that its cashier was embezzling from it was fortuitously discovered in 1985.

Throughout this period, appellee was fully aware of appellant’s financial problems and the manner in which they manifested themselves. Indeed, the parties agreed that the store’s financial difficulties were discussed with appellee at each year end meeting. Appellant’s theory was that, despite appellee’s awareness of its financial difficulties, he did not, at any time, suggest how the source of the cash shortages could be discovered. It contended, and presented evidence at trial to show, that it followed such advice and suggestions as appellee gave.

Appellee’s response was, and is, that his advice, upon which appellant may have relied, did not cause the harm, rather, the damages were caused by appellant’s failure to act on information it had, independent of appellee, which led to the conclusion that an employee was stealing from the company. Thus, he says that the record reveals that, as early as 1983, appellant recognized and, in fact, was told of, the possibility that theft was the source of the cash shortages. 2 Appellant acknowledges that, in 1983, it sought to guard against theft by salesmen. The parties agree that in 1984, Lore Levi, the wife of appellant’s founder, became suspicious of appellant’s cashier; her husband, however, did not believe that the employee was stealing. Nevertheless, Mrs. Levi, consistent with ³⁵⁵ appellee’s advice, kept her eyes open, continuing to watch the cashier and to go over her paperwork.

Eventually, a month’s worth of work papers prepared by the cashier was given to appellee, who reviewed them and found nothing. 3 Prior to the jury being instructed, appellant submitted, inter alia, alternative contributory negligence instructions, both numbered 18, which it asked the court to give. The first paragraph of each instruction was identical, containing a rather standard contributory negligence instruction: A person is contributorily negligent when he fails to exercise ordinary and reasonable care for his own protection by doing something that a person of ordinary prudence would not do or failing to do something that a person of ordinary prudence would do, under the same circumstances. To be held contributorily negligent, a person must actually have been aware or should have appreciated the risks involved and then failed to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for his protection. The burden of proving contributory negligence is on the defendant.

Though both proposed instructions focus on a client’s reliance on its accountant’s advice, the second paragraphs were different. Each contained an alternative formulation of the contributory negligence standard when the client relies upon its accountant. The alternative formulations of the standard are as follows: (1) If you find that the Levi’s relied upon the skills of Gilbert Wegad, a certified public accountant and that Mr. Wegad made material adjustment to their financial records without informing them, and he did not advise ³⁵⁶ them of any steps to take to detect the theft problem they cannot be found to have been contributorily negligent. (2) The client can rely on the accountant’s knowledge and skill.

It is not contributorily negligent for a client to follow an accountant’s instructions, or rely on his advice, or to fail to consult with another accountant or to discover the source of a financial problem itself where the client has no reason to suspect his accountant’s advice and instructions are wrong. The court rejected both formulations and, instead, gave an instruction as follows: Now, the plaintiff cannot recover if his or her or its, in this case we are talking about a corporation, own negligence is the cause of the plaintiff’s damage or injury. Since the plaintiff in this case is a corporation, the issue of contributory negligence as it is called is to be considered in relation to the acts or omissions on the part of the corporation’s principals or agents. So, in this case the issue relates to the consideration of acts or omissions on the part of either Julius Levi, Lore Levi or Alvin Levi.

And negligence, as I instructed you a moment ago, is doing something that a person using ordinary care would not do or not doing something that a person using ordinary care would do. Ordinary care being that caution, or attention or skill that a reasonable person would use under similar circumstances. And so with respect to the issue of contributory negligence the defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence, which I will explain later, that the plaintiff’s negligence was a cause of the plaintiff’s damage or loss. So that means that if you find from the evidence that one or more of the plaintiff’s principals was guilty of negligence which was a direct cause of the plaintiff’s loss or damage, then your verdict must be for the defendant.

And that would be regardless of whether you find that the defendant was also negligent and regardless of whose negligence was greater. ³⁵⁷ After the jury had been instructed, appellant’s counsel stated its exceptions to the court’s instructions. Pertinent to the case sub judice, counsel stated: Your Honor, I except to the instructions that I requested and did not get---- Plaintiff’s 18 was submitted today on contributory negligence, which has the standards and speaks to the issue of what contributory negligence should be for a professional relationship with clients, the reliance a plaintiff may have on a defendant who is a professional. If it is a correct statement of the law and supported by the evidence, each party to litigation is entitled to have his, her, or its theory of the case submitted to the jury. See Maryland Rule 2-520(c), which provides: (c) How given. — The court may instruct the jury, orally or in writing or both, by granting requested instructions, by giving instructions on its own, or by combining any of these methods.

The court need not grant a requested instruction if the matter is fairly covered by instructions actually given. See also The Sergeant Company v. Pickett, 285 Md. 186, 194 , 401 A.2d 651 (1979), quoting Levine v. Rendler, 272 Md. 1, 13 , 320 A.2d 258 (1974); Myers v. Alessi, 80 Md.App. 124, 131 , 560 A.2d 59 , cert. denied, 317 Md. 640 , 566 A.2d 101 (1989); Zeller v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 67 Md.App. 75, 80 , 506 A.2d 646 (1986). Moreover, when an appellate court reviews the propriety of a requested instruction, in addition to determining whether the requested instruction contains a correct statement of the law, based on evidence presented, the court also determines whether it was fairly covered by instructions actually given. Myers, 80 Md.App. at 132 , 560 A.2d 59 ; Zeller, 67 Md.App. at 83, 86-87 , 506 A.2d 646 .

Before proceeding to the merits of the question presented by appellant — the propriety of the court’s refusal to give appellant’s requested instructions, in either of the alternative forms — , we must address appellee’s argument that the issue is not properly before us. Appellee main ³⁵⁸ tains, that although appellant excepted to the court's instructions, its exception was incomplete. Specifically, he says, “Indeed, there is no objection stated. Appellant’s counsel merely identified the instruction he desired, he did not provide any grounds for his objection, much less a clear or particularized statement of the grounds for his exception.” For the reasons that follow, we reject that argument.

Maryland Rule 2-520(e) provides: (e) Objection. — No' party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection. Upon request of any party, the court shall receive objections out of the hearing of the jury. The Rule quite clearly requires, not only a prompt objection to the court’s instructions, but a statement of the basis for that objection as well. Thus, because “the rule demands clarity and particularization both in the assignment of error and the reasons therefor”, its “... obvious purpose ... is to give the trial judge an opportunity to correct or add to his instructions____” (Citations omitted).

Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 74 Md.App. 539, 548 , 539 A.2d 239 (1988). Appellee relies upon Belt’s Wharf Warehouses, Inc. v. International Products Corp., 213 Md. 585 , 132 A.2d 588 (1957) and Murphy v. Board of County Commissioners, 13 Md.App. 497 , 284 A.2d 261 (1971). In Belt’s Wharf, the Court of Appeals, applying Rule 544(d), the predecessor to Rule 2-520(e), held that an objection that merely gives the number of the requested instruction and nothing more, is insufficient to preserve an objection to the court’s instructions for appellate review. 213 Md. at 592 , 132 A.2d 588 . This is so because the mere statement of the number of the requested instruction does not sufficiently specify the grounds for the objection.

We reached a similar result in ³⁵⁹ Murphy v. Board of County Commissioners, where counsel, in addition to giving the court the number of the instruction also provided an explanation as follows, “the County having a higher degree of care than an ordinary traveler, and also the legal proposition if a hole is there for a length of time, there can be a presumption arising from the existence of the hole.” 13 Md.App. at 506 , 284 A.2d 261 . We determined that that explanation was not a sufficient statement of the grounds for the exception as to preserve the issue for appellate review. Id. On the other hand, where the reference to the request number and the explanation is coupled with circumstances which indicate that the court is aware of the rationale for the requested instruction, a different result will be reached.

See, e.g., Sergeant Company, et al. v. Pickett, 283 Md. 284, 288-89 , 388 A.2d 543 (1978). In that case, the record reflected that, after it and counsel had discussed a requested instruction, both by number and by content, the trial court indicated that it was not applicable to the case. Finding the circumstances to support preservation of the objection, the Court of Appeals stated: [AJppellants did not confine their objection to a simple reference to the prayer by number, which alone sets this case apart from the Belt’s Wharf line of authority. Counsel mentioned “avoidable consequences,” which, when coupled with a mere cursory reading of the proffered instruction, was sufficient to identify for the trial judge the nature and ground of the objection.

That the court fully comprehended the legal contention being offered by appellants and also regarded further argument unnecessary is manifest____ Id., 283 Md. at 289 , 388 A.2d 543 . In fact, “where the record makes clear that all parties and the court understood the reason for the objection,” no specific ground for an exception to a jury instruction need be given. Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689 , 694 n. 6, 381 A.2d 1146 (1978). ³⁶⁰ In the case sub judice, after having taken exceptions, referring to his requested instructions both by number and, cursorily, by content, the court acknowledged: As to your other exceptions, I think we discussed all of those in chambers. And with respect to most of them my feeling was that