Maryland case law › Howard v. Severn

Howard v. Severn

204 Md. 187 (1954) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: ReversedHenderson✓ Good law
HoldingThe Severns filed a bill of complaint alleging that the County Commissioners' July 17, 1950 conveyance of a triangular parcel to the Howards was procured by fraudulent misrepresentation, and seeking to have the land 'in back' of their lot awarded to them.

Henderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is from a decree awarding a certain parcel of land in Harford County to the appellees, on a bill of complaint filed December 5, 1952, alleging that a conveyance of the parcel by the County Commissioners to the Howards on July 17, 1950, was a result of fraudulent misrepresentation. After answers had been filed and testimony taken, the Chancellor delivered an opinion in which he stated that the conveyance was either in furtherance of a plan to embarrass the Severns and defraud them of their rights, or was the result of a mistake, and under either view the Severns were entitled to relief and, in effect, a reformation of the deed. The testimony shows that prior to 1950 the Severns, the Howards, Vanneman and Gabler owned adjoining lots facing the Bush River to the northwest.

There was a platted but unopened driveway between the lots and the river. A public highway known as the Washington Road ran to the river in a westerly direction, cutting a corner of lot 4 for a distance of about 13y% feet. Severn owned lot 4 and part of lot 5, and thus had access to the road by means of the 131/2 foot corner. Howard, owning the rest of lot 5 and part of lot 6, had no access to the road, nor did Vanneman, owning lot 7 and part of lot 6, or Gabler, owning lots 8 and 9.

The triangular piece of land between these lots and the Washington Road was owned by the County, and formerly used by it for a parking lot, but it had become overgrown and unsightly, and was seldom used by the public. All of the lot owners mentioned had used it for many years as a means of access to their respective properties. Early in 1950, Howard approached all the other owners with a suggestion that they buy the triangular piece from the County. Vanneman and Gabler agreed, and the three of them employed counsel, who obtained an agreement of sale from the County Commissioners at a price of $300.

Severn refused to join in the application or employment of counsel, but testified that Howard 190 told him he would give him the portion of the land in back of his lot, to the road. Severn specifically testified, however, that he never authorized Howard to act for him in the matter, and never assumed any responsibility for costs or expenses. Severn never communicated with the County Commissioners, or dealt with anyone except Howard. He testified that Howard told him he (Howard) would give him the land in back of his (Severn’s) lot, if he would agree to an adjustment of the division line between his land and the Howards’, which had never been located by a survey.

Howard testified that Severn was to get the land in back of his lot when there was an agreement as to the line between their properties; that Severn later agreed to and signed a deed and cross-conveyance on the basis of the existing boundary line. A great deal of the testimony at the trial was directed toward the fact that in the resolution of the County Commissioners authorizing the sale, the name of Severn was typed in after the first typing and later deleted. We find no sinister implication in this fact. Both of the two Commissioners who testified in the case said they understood that all the lot owners were to get the land in back of their lots as a means of access, but the application was in the name of only three of the four owners, and the ultimate division was to be by mutual agreement.

Three deeds were executed and recorded. The deed to Howard included the land in back of Severn’s lot. But there is no evidence that the situation was misrepresented to them, or that there was any mistake. The best evidence of Howard’s good faith in the matter is that a deed and agreement was. prepared by the attorney for the three grantees, according to the existing, visible division lines, and on August 11, 1950, it was executed by all the parties, including Severn, except Mrs. Severn.

A Mrs. Martin joined for the purpose of conveying to Severn, free of charge, a strip with a frontage of six feet on the road, in order to give him better access to his garage. 191 The testimony is that Severn, after he signed this deed and agreement, decided that

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