Howell v. Brummell

⁶⁴⁷ Couch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal we are asked to reverse a decree of the Circuit Court for Talbot County whereby Kevin Bruce Howell was found to be the father of a male child, born out of wedlock. The decree also imposed on Howell, inter alia, an obligation to provide prospective payment for support and other expenses for the child. An appeal was noted to the Court of Special Appeals raising questions as to a denial of Howell’s right to a speedy trial and whether prosecution of the case was barred by laches.

We issued the writ of certiorari prior to consideration by that court in order to determine an important question concerning whether a paternity proceeding is quasi-criminal. For reasons set out below we do not now reach that question. The Facts In October, 1970, the State’s Attorney’s office in Talbot County consented to the filing of a petition to establish the paternity of a male child born out of wedlock to a fifteen year old petitioner in January, 1970. This petition alleged that as a result of sexual intercourse with Kevin Howell the petitioner became pregnant, and ultimately delivered the child in question.

Service upon Howell was made but no answer was filed by him and for reasons unclear in the record no hearing was held; rather the matter was placed upon the stet docket in January, 1974.* 1 Howell claimed he had visited the State’s Attorney’s office and was not asked to file an answer or to appear in court. He testified he met the petitioner there ⁶⁴⁸ and she declined to take the matter to court because she was not sure that he was the father. The petitioner denied such a meeting or making such a statement. After remaining in the area for more than five years Howell entered the armed services and left the state.

Thereafter the State’s Attorney filed two URESA 2 petitions against Howell, but service was not perfected; he maintained his location was always obtainable. In any event, the case was removed from the stet docket 3 and the petition amended in July, 1979 when it came to light that Howell had sent some money to the petitioner to be used for the child’s school clothing. Service of a show cause order and the amended petition was made on Howell in December, 1980 when he was back in Talbot County on leave, to which he responded with a motion to dismiss based on limitations. 4 The court denied this motion after taking testimony and hearing argument. Thereafter, a trial on the merits was held which resulted in a finding that Howell was the father of the child and an order for support.

This appeal ensued. Contentions The appellant first argues that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applies to the paternity proceeding here, and that the right was violated because suit was first ⁶⁴⁹ filed against him in 1970 and his trial was not held until 1981. We find that we need not reach this issue because an amended petition, alleging that Howell made a payment for support of the child, was filed in July, 1979. The court found as a fact that Howell made a support payment for the child’s benefit in August, 1978.

We cannot say that that finding was clearly erroneous. See Md. Rule 886. Had the original petition, filed in 1970, been filed at the time the amended petition was filed, in 1979, it would have been brought within two years of a support payment and thus within the limitations period contained in the statute. See note 4, supra.

Assuming, without deciding, that a paternity proceeding is a quasi-criminal proceeding so as to afford the appellant with a right to a speedy trial, we hold this right to have been waived. The trial judge found as a fact that Howell