Howell v. State

Digges, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Our decision today to reverse the conviction * 1 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of Paul Monroe Howell, petitioner, for possession of marihuana (Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 287) discovered by the police in a warrantless search of his automobile conducted incident to his lawful arrest turns on the fact that the record, in certain critical parts, is replete with the “sounds of silence.” We conclude that the State has failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating on the record that the facts and circumstances of the incident bring this search within the dictates of Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 , 89 S. Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), where the,United States Supreme Court circumscribed the search incident to arrest exception to the basic tenet that a warrantless intrusion is per se unreasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 , 88 S. Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

First, a brief recapitulation of the ³⁸⁰ background events will be of assistance before we examine the particular facts relevant to the legal issue presented here. According to Adrian Merryman’s largely uncontroverted testimony, he returned to his Brooklandville home in the early afternoon of May 16, 1972 to find an intruder in the kitchen stealing his television set. Surprised by the homeowner’s return, the intruder fled after abandoning the television and physically assaulting Mr. Merryman. Armed with the victim’s photographic identification of Howell as his assailant, Corporal James Raymon of the Baltimore County Police obtained a warrant for the petitioner’s arrest.

Thereafter, a police teletype was sent out that requested the apprehension of Howell and which contained a description of the getaway car (a bluish-green Ford displaying Maryland license tag number LK 9218). On the basis of this teletype, at approximately 12:50 p.m. on May 19, three Baltimore City detectives detained Howell and his motor vehicle in the parking lot of a fast food restaurant located on Reisterstown Road in Baltimore County, very near the city-county line. Corporal Raymon arrived at the scene by 1:10 p.m., a short time after two other county policemen had converged on the parking lot, and he immediately observed the petitioner leaning against the Ford. The corporal promptly served Howell with the arrest warrant and then placed a female who wras seated in the front on the passenger side of the automobile under arrest. 2 A search of the vehicle ensued which led to the discovery, beneath the right front seat, of a pistol as well as a package containing marihuana, both of which were seized by the police.

At his trial, the petitioner moved, under the authority of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 , 81 S. Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), to suppress this seized marihuana and prohibit its use as evidence, arguing that it was the fruit of an unlawful search. The propriety of the denial by the trial judge of this ³⁸¹ motion was questioned by Howell in his appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Howell v. State, 18 Md. App. 429 , 306 A. 2d 554 (1973). That court took cognizance in its opinion of the fact that the accused was arrested in close proximity to his automobile and it correctly pointed out that in cases such as this a warrantless search of a motor vehicle is often permissible either under the “automobile exception,” Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 , 45 S. Ct. 280 , 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925) (see also the recent decision of this Court in Mobley and King v. State, 270 Md. 76 , 310 A. 2d 803 (1973)); or as being a search incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 , 89 S. Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Then, after examining the applicability of these two exceptions to the facts of this case, it concluded that while the record did not contain sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of probable cause to justify the search of the vehicle under the “automobile exception,” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 , 90 S. Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), the seizure of the marihuana was proper as being within the dictates of Chimel, 3 In overruling its previous decisions, such as United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 , 70 S. Ct. 430 , 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950), the Supreme Court in Chimel ruled that the arrest of a defendant within his home did not authorize a meticulous search throughout the entire premises of a three-bedroom house (including the attic and garage) conducted without a search warrant and over the arrestee’s objection.

By the following language, that Court established a new limit for the permissible scope of a search incident to an arrest: “When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in ³⁸² order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.

A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, fo^a search of the arrestee’s person and the ¡ja’rfea ‘within his immediate control’ — construing that phrase to mean the area from within ¡which he might gain possession of a weapon or dtestructible evidence.” 395 U. S. at 762-63 . This principle has bfeen at least implicitly reaffirmed in all of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court which have considered the question. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U. S. 260 , 94 S. Ct. 488 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 , 94 S. Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291 , 93 S. Ct. 2000 , 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973); Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 , 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 , 90 S. Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S. 30 , 90 S. Ct. 1969 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970).

However, in none of these cases has that Court further delineated the boundaries of the “area into which an arrestee might reach” ; nor has it addressed itself specifically to the scope of the search of an automobile when that search is conducted incident to the lawful arrest of its occupants. We conclude, after carefully considering the language used, that the test quoted above does not change simply because the arrestee is positioned in or near an ³⁸³ automobile. Though the actual scope of a valid search may vary with the vicissitudes of the conditions in existence at the arrest site, the policy which excuses the intrusion remains constant. Accordingly, the State, in order to justify its seizure of evidence under Chimel , must affirmatively show that a search of any place beyond the arrestee’s person which was made contemporaneous to an arrest, including the space which encompasses a motor vehicle, was conducted within the area of the arrestee’s immediate control as circumscribed by what is reasonably within his lunge, reach, or grasp.

This conclusion appears to be in accord with the decisions rendered by other courts throughout the nation. A few examples will suffice to demonstrate this. In United States v. Day, 331 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1971), the defendant was arrested while seated in his automobile and then placed in a police van to be taken to the station house. Subsequent to his removal, the motor vehicle in which he had been arrested was searched.

Without discussing whether the search would have been proper had it been conducted while the defendant was still in the automobile, the United States District Court suppressed the evidence seized because “ [c]ertainly [the defendant] could not [while in the police wagon] have reached below the seat of his car to grab a weapon or destroy evidence.” Id. at 255-56 . As the appellant in Commonwealth v. Ceravolo, 224 Pa. Super. 464 , 307