Hubbard v. Mayor of Baltimore

⁴⁷ Ukxeb, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. By this suit in ejectment the appellants dispute the validity of condemnation proceedings under which certain land owned by them was acquired by the City of Baltimore for street widening purposes. The condemnation was conducted under the provisions of chapter 32 of the Acts of 1912, which authorized the Mayor and City Council, by ordinance, to direct the commissioners for opening streets, after giving the notice required by law, to value the damages and benefits resulting to the owners from the acquisition of land for street improvements, subject to the right of the city or the owners to appeal from the valuation of the commissioners to the Baltimore City Court and to have the issue determined by a jury. In thus providing for a jury trial on appeal, the act satisfied the mandate of section 40 of article 3 of the Maryland Constitution, that: “The General Assembly shall enact no law authorizing private property to be taken for public use, without just compensation as agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a jury, being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation.” Stewart v. Baltimore, 7 Md. 500, 514 ; Baltimore v. Ulman, 79 Md. 469 ; Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265 ; Branch v. Indemnity Ins.

Co., 156 Md. 482 ; 2 Poe, Pl. & Pr., see. 769. In 1913, however, that provision of the Constitution was amended by the addition of the following clause: “But where such property is. situated in Baltimore City and is desired by this State or by the Mayor and City Council, of Baltimore, the General Assembly may provide for the appointment of appraisers by a court of record to value such property, and that, upon payment of the amount of such valuation to the party entitled to compensation, or into court, and securing the payment of any further sum that may be awarded by a jury, such property may be taken.” (Const., art. 3, sec. 40A.) The contention is that, since the ratification of that amendment, the only constitutional method available to the City of Baltimore for the exercise of the power of eminent domain is by resort to a court of record for the appointment of appraisers to value the property sought to be condemned, and that the condemnation ⁴⁸ of the appellants’ property, through the action of the commissioners for opening streets, under a statute antedating the quoted amendment to the Constitution, was therefore ineffectual to deprive -the appellants of their title. By chapter 150 of the Acts of 1914, entitled “An Act to carry out the provisions of the amendment adding section 40A to article 3 of the Constitution,” it was provided that “whenever the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore shall hereafter provide by ordinance for the laying out, opening, extending, widening or straightening of any street, square, lane or alley, such ordinance may provide that the commissioners for opening streets shall proceed to acquire the property necessary, in accordance with section 172, and following, of the City Charter, or said ordinance may provide that the property necessary to be acquired for such laying out, opening, extending, widening or straightening, may be acquired by proceedings in the Baltimore City Court under article 33A of the Code of Public General Laws.” The procedure directed by the City Charter sections mentioned in the Acts of 1914 was that pursued in the condemnation of the appellants’ land. While article 33A of the Code, as originally enacted by chapter 117 of the Acts of 1912, provided for valuations' by appraisers appointed by a court of law and for the right of jury trial on exceptions to their award, article 3 3A, in its present form, as enacted by chapter 463 of the Acts of 1914, omits the provision for an initial valuation by appraisers and directs the ascertainment and award of damages to be made in court by a jury there empaneled.

But it was provided by article 3 3A, in both its original and amended forms, that nothing