Hughes v. Carter

Henderson, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In this motor vehicle accident case the only questions raised on appeal relate to the instructions of the trial court on the matter of damages. It is first contended that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to disregard the medical testimony connecting the pneumonia suffered by the female appellee with the accident, on the ground that it was insufficient. When Dr. Smith, the attending physician, was called by the ⁴⁸⁶ plaintiffs, his testimony was not very positive.

He testified that she had no evidence of pneumonia when she was treated and x-rayed at the hospital the night of the accident, but that she had it the next morning when he examined her. It showed then in the x-rays and she had a temperature. When asked if the accident caused the pneumonia he first said it was possible, then that it was probable, and finally that he would not “pin it down”, but thought it was possible. He explained that pneumonia was sometimes caused by a patient being confined to bed, and sometimes it followed a compression-type injury to the chest.

He had described one of the injuries she had suffered as “severe compression of the right chest.” The appellant cites Ager v. Baltimore, 213 Md. 414, 421 , for the proposition that the jury may not be permitted to “form a judgment or conclusion on the basis of testimony which admits of mere possibilities.” But in Charlton Bros. v. Garretton, 188 Md. 85, 94 , Judge Markell, for the Court, said: “The law requires proof of probable, not merely possible, facts, including causal relations. Reasoning post hoc, propter hoc is a recognized logical fallacy, a non sequitur. But sequence of events, plus proof of possible causal relation, may amount to proof of probable causal relation, in the absence of evidence of any other equally probable cause” (citing cases). See also Wilhelm v. State Traffic Comm., 230 Md. 91 , 103 and