Hunt v. Winkleman

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The Supreme Conclave, Improved Order Heptasophs, issued in 1898 to George W. Eowler, a member of Gem Conclave No>. 8, Improved Order Heptasophs, a certificate for $1,000.00, payable at his death to his wife, Lillie V. Eowler. Mrs. Eowler died on June 5th, 1915, and on the 23rd of that month George W. Eowler surrendered his old certificate and applied for a new certificate payable to his sister-in-law, Hannah M. Winkleman, who, he stated in a letter to the-secretary of Gem Conclave No. 8, had given up her position to nurse his wife and was dependent upon him, and a certificate was accordingly issued to him by the Supreme Conclave-on June 26th, 1915, payable to- “Sister-in-law, Hannah M. Winkleman, Dependent.” In May, 1911, “there was a merger” of- the Supreme Conclave, Improved Order Heptasophs, and the Fraternal Aid Union, of Lawrence, Kansas, and the Fraternal Aid Union assumed liability for the death benefits provided for in certificates previously issued by the-Supreme Conclave, Improved Order Heptasophs. George W. Fowler died in October, 1918, and Hannah M. Winkleman, in accordance with the requirements of the certificate, filed with the Fraternal Aid Union proof of death and her claim to the amount named in the certificate.

About the same time-certain of the next of kin of George W. Fowler notified the Fraternal Aid Union that they claimed the proceeds of the certificate. Thereupon the Fraterna] Aid Union filed a bill of interpleader in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City against Ethel F. Hunt and others, claiming as next of kin, and Hannah M. Winkleman, and in pursuance of a decree of interpleader Ethel F. Hunt and others, as plaintiffs, filed a bill of complaint in said Court against Hannah M. Winkle- ²⁵² man,, defendant. Tbe bill of complaint alleges, and tbe answer of Hannah ME. Winkleman admits that the Fraternal Aid Union is “a fraternal beneficiary association as defined in Sections 229 to 212 of Article 23 of the Code, as. amended by Chapter 821 of the Acts of 1912 (Code, Yol. 3, Art. 23, Secs. 229-211, inclusive)” and the record contains, an agreement of counsel that the “persons and relations” authorized to receive benefits under the constitution and by-laws of the Fraternal Aid Union are those mentioned in Bagby’s Code> Yol. 1, Art. 23, Sec. 231; that under said constitution and by-laws a member may change his beneficiary at any time by surrendering his old certificate and designating another beneficiary, within the list of those authorized to receive the same, and that upon the death of a member, if the beneficiary cannot take, the benefits are payable to the member’s next of kin.

Section 231 of Art. 23, Yol. 1 of the Code-, provides that, “The payment of death benefits, shall be confined to wife, husband, relative by blood to the fourth degree, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, stepfather, stepmother, stepchildren, children by legal adoption, or to a person or persons dependent upon the member,” and it is therefore apparent that as a. sister-in-law is not among those named in the Statute, the right of Hannah M. Winkleman to the proceeds of the certificate must depend upon whether she was dependent upon George W. Fowler at the time of his death. Dittmaier v. Supreme Conclave, Improved Order Heptasophs, 135 Md. 312 . The Court below dismissed the plaintiffs’ bill and awarded the fund to Hannah ME. Winkleman, and this appeal is by the plaintiffs from that decree.

The Statute provides for two distinct classes of beneficiaries: (1) those named, to whom benefits may be paid without regard to whether they were dependent upon the member or not, and (2) a person or persons dependent upon the member. And it is apparent, we think, that the statute ²⁵³ does not limit the second class of beneficiaries to those legally ar wholly dependent upon the member, for after naming those legally dependent, or who would likely be wholly dependent, as entitled to receive benefits whether dependent or not, it makes provision for others who may be dependent upon the member. Moreover, prior to> amendment by the Act of 1912, Oh. 821, Sec. 229 of Art. 23 of the Code, described those who could take as dependents a a persons dependent upon the member for either food, lodging, clothing or education, showing' clearly that the Legislature did not by Section 229 intend to confine that class of beneficiaries to. persons legally or wholly dependent upon the member', and there is nothing* in the Act of 1912 indicating a purpose to restrict rather than enlarge the meaning of the term dependent. While trivial or casual assistance, or occasional charitable gifts may not be sufficient to constitute the relation of dependency within the meaning of Section 231, Art. 23, Vol. 1 of the Code, yet where the beneficiary named in the certificate received, and relied and was dependent upon some substantial and material support and assistance from a member, under circumstances rendering such support lawful and proper, she is clearly within the meaning of the statute and the benevolent purpose of such associations.

It is said in 1 Bacon’s Benefit Societies, etc. (4th Ed.), Sec. 336, after a review of numerous decisions: “From the definition and cases cited it seems that whether or not a person is included among the dependents of a member of a benefit society is a question of fact, and that each case must be decided upon its own merits. In accordance with the liberal view of the Supreme Court of Michigan, in defining who are included in the term family, we should say that if any person, relative of the member or not was supported by him, directly or indirectly, or wholly or in part, at his home or abroad, because of a legal or moral obligation, or merely from affection, such person might be called a dependent and be designated as the beneficiary of such member. But in all cases, it would ap ²⁵⁴ pear essential to apply the test of good faith, for mere capricious liking or temporary liberality in the way of gifts would not make the recipient a dependent.” The case most frequently cited and relied upon is the case of McCarthy v. Order of Protection, 153 Mass. 314 , 26 N. E. 866 , 11 L. R. A. 144. The statute construed in that case provided that “a corporation organized for any purpose in Sec. 2 may, for the purpose of assisting widows, orphans or other relatives of deceased members or any persons dependent upon deceased members, provide in its by-laws for the payment by such member of a fixed sum to be held by such association until the death of a member occurs, and then to be forthwith paid to the person entitled thereeto,” and the Court said: “It is evident from the language here used that while widows, orphans or other relatives may be ‘persons dependent upon* a deceased member, it is within the contemplation of the statute that a person may be dependent upon a deceased member who is not a widow, or orphan, or relative of such member,, and that it is one of the objects of the statute to provide that such persons may share in the benefits' of the association which may be organized under it.

The purpose seems to have been to provide that ‘widows, orphans or other relatives/ whether dependent or not, might be designated as beneficiaries, and that any other person, who is dependent upon a member, although not a widow, or orphan, or other' relative, may also be designated by him as a beneficiary. * * * Nor is there anything in the statute which requires that the dependent person should be legally or wholly dependent upon a member. On the contrary, the enumeration of the classes of persons who would be legally dependent upon a member, followed by a phrase distinctly intended to include other persons, would seem to establish conclusively that legal dependency was not the test. Nor can it be justly said that if the beneficiary is dependent in part he or she is not dependent. Oases will readily occur to one m which persons are partly supported or partially assisted by others.

It would be giving ²⁵⁵ an unnecessarily harsh construction to a statute which the Court had said should be construed ‘liberally and in such a manner as to carry out the benevolent purpose sought to be provided for’ to hold that such cases were excluded from it.” After stating what would not constitute the relation of dependency, the Court said further: “Something more is undoubtedly required. The beneficiary must be dependent upon the member in a material degree for support, maintenance, or assistance, and the obligation on the part of the member to furnish it must, it would seem, rest upon some moral, or legal, or equitable grounds., and not upon the purely voluntary and charitable impulses, or dispositions of the member.” That case was decided in 1891, and in support of the definition there given of a dependent the Court cited American L. of H. v. Perry, 140 Mass. 580 , 5 N. E. 634 ; Bacon on Benefit Societies, 261; Ballou v. Gile, 50 Wis. 614 . In American L. of H. v. Perry , the Court adopted the definition given in Ballou v. Gile , where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said: “We think the true meaning of the word dependent, in this connection, means some person or persons dependent for support in some way upon the deceased.” When the case of McCarthy v. Order of Protection, supra, and that part of the definition of a dependent which requires the ‘obligation’ of the member to ‘rest upon some moral or legal or equitable grounds’ is interpreted in the light of the later case of Wilber v. Order of Protection, 192 Mass. 477 , decided in 1906, and the case of Order of Foresters v. Heffernan, 283 Ill. 429 , decided in 1918, it would seem to bei in, substantial accord with the statement of the text of the late (4th) edition of Bacon’s Benefit Societies from which we have quoted. In Wilber's Case the beneficiary named in the certificate and her two sisters, Agnes, and Georgiana, were keeping house together in Cambridge.

The beneficiary and Agnes, worked out and earned the money necessary to maintain the home, and Georgiana, who was not strong, did the house work. This was known to the deceased member before he married Agnes ²⁵⁶ in 1897. Before her marriage Agnes said to him that she would not marry and break up the home of herself and sisters, and he replied that if she would marry him the sisters-should go with her and have a home as long as they lived. After the marriage the old home was broken up> and the sisters' of the beneficiary went to live with her husband under an arrangement by which Agnes ran the house and Georgiana helped in the work, while the beneficiary and the decedent worked out and supported the family, he contributing from twelve to fifteen dollars a week and she four dollars a week, which sums were turned over to Agnes who ran the house, etc. The beneficiary testified that after the death of Agnes-the decedent said “we would gu on keeping house the same as we did before my sister died, giving in together and keeping house,” and also said that “If we would keep on keeping' house for him, we might go on and live the same way we had' been living.” In pursuance of that arrangement the home was kept up as before until the death of the- decedent, Georgiana acting as treasurer.

There was also evidence that decedent after the death of Agnes told the beneficiary that he had made her one of the beneficiaries “because his children (by a former marriage) all had good homes, and that if anything happened to him she had her sister Georgiana to look after and needed the money.” In disposing of the case the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, after quoting from McCarthy v. Order of Protection, supra, said: “In the present case the jury might properly have found that Lucy (the-beneficiary) was dependent upon the assistance of Wilber (the deceased member) to support herself and Georgiana in his lifetime in the same degree of comfort in which they had' lived before his marriage to Agnes, and that Wilber had agreed in substance that the family should not be broken up’, and that such loss as might be suffered from the fact that Agnes, in consequence of her marriage, had become a non-producer, should be made up> by his contribution to the common fund. They might