Hurt v. Chavis

THIEME, Judge. Appellant appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and requests a new trial on the issue of damages arising from a personal injury action. Appellant presents the following issue for our review: Whether, in light of appellees’ stipulation and the entry of judgment as to liability in favor of appellant at the close of the proceedings, the trial court erred in requiring the jury to then consider the issue of probable cause in its deliberations. We answer “no,” and explain.

Facts This case arose from an April 22, 1993, automobile accident in Baltimore City. Appellant Bonnie Lee Hurt was a passenger in a Jeep Grand Wagoneer being driven by Dan Beall, her then-husband. Appellee, Cedric Chavis, in the course of his employment with Cedric Chavis Construction Company, was traveling behind the Jeep and rear-ended it. Police respond ⁶²⁹ ed to the scene, but did not write a report.

Both vehicles were operable after the accident, although Beall and Hurt both testified that the impact was substantial and Beall estimated that Chavis was traveling between 40 and 50 miles per hour immediately prior to impact. Chavis did not testify. At the time of the accident, Hurt was on her way to see Dr. David Buckholtz at Johns Hopkins Hospital for an independent medical examination in connection with a “slip and fall” incident in September 1989, wherein Hurt severely injured her neck and back. Since that date, she had been treated for those injuries and had not worked. 1 Hurt appeared for her examination ten minutes after the auto accident and performed all the tests asked of her without complaint, including bending over and touching the floor with the palms of her hands.

Hurt did not tell Dr. Buckholtz that she had just been in a car accident. After her examination with Dr. Buckholtz, Hurt drove Beall to the emergency room of the Anne Arundel Medical Center in Annapolis because of the pain he suffered after the accident. Hurt did not seek or receive any treatment at that time. Hurt’s medical history since the 1989 slip and fall is extensive and has little relevance to the issue we review in this appeal.

Suffice it to say, significant testimony was adduced through depositions and at trial that, despite numerous visits with physicians who were treating her for pain and injuries in connection with the slip and fall, Hurt did not mention the automobile accident to any Maryland physician until December 1993, when she told Dr. William Tham. The first record which Dr. Tham had of an April 1993 accident is contained in a report dated April 3,1995. A lawsuit arose out of the 1989 slip and fall accident. In her answers to interrogatories in that suit, Hurt claimed that ⁶³⁰ the accident left her permanently disabled and unable to work.

Dr. Tham had opined in a June 1992 record that Hurt would never return to work due to the injuries she sustained in the 1989 accident. The 1989 lawsuit was settled in August or September 1993. Over $100,000 in medical expenses accrued in the period after the April 1993 accident. Most of those medical expenses were incurred subsequent to August 1993.

Future medical expenses were estimated at trial to be approximately $300,000. Hurt endured multiple surgeries both before and after she told Dr. Tham about the automobile accident. Following one surgery in May 1995, Hurt lost bowel and bladder functions and now must be catheterized every three or four hours each day and will have to be so treated for the rest of her life. Eventually, after the multiple surgeries did not alleviate her pain, Hurt consulted Dr. Richard North, a neurologist and pain management specialist.

Dr. North recommended the implant of an electrical stimulation device to control pain. Hurt must now wear an external apparatus connected to the implants in her spine for pain control. It is expected that she will wear this for the rest of her life. During the course of her treatment, numerous radiological studies were performed on Hurt.

Three of her doctors testified that the symptoms Hurt complained of were the result of a new injury she sustained during the April 1993 auto accident. Another doctor who reviewed all of the radiographic studies and Hurt’s medical records concluded that her complaints were the result of a combination of normal aging and progression of the 1989 injury. This conclusion was based on the fact that no treatment could be documented as having been rendered to Hurt for six months after the accident, and there had been no change in her symptoms. This doctor was of the opinion that an aggravation of her pre-existing condition or a new condition would have surfaced within several days after the accident.

At the conclusion of Chavis’s case, the court granted Hurt’s motion for judgment on the issue of “liability.” In addition to ⁶³¹ other instructions, and upon Hurt’s request, the court instructed the jury that it “[did] not have to decide the question of whether the defendants are responsible to the plaintiff,” and instead “need only to decide the amount, if any, of damages” that should be awarded to the plaintiff. The court further instructed the jury on aggravation of a pre-existing injury. Chavis requested instructions regarding causation and the ability of the jury to find that no injury was caused by the accident. Because the court agreed that the first question to be answered on the verdict sheet was whether the accident caused an injury, the court declined to give this instruction.

After closing arguments, the court provided the jury with a verdict sheet that included two questions. The first was: “Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Bonnie Lee Hurt sustained an injury as a result of the April 22, 1993, automobile accident?” The second question regarded the measure and award of damages. The jury answered the first question “no” and found that Hurt did not sustain an injury as a result of the 1993 accident. Thus, the jury did not reach the second question.

Discussion I. Standard of Review Appellant contends that the first question on the verdict sheet, whether she sustained any injury as a result of the automobile accident, was erroneous in light of the previously granted motion for judgment as to defendant’s “liability.” 2 As this determination is a question of law, we review the issue de novo. See, e.g., Inlet Associates v. Harrison Inn, 324 Md. 254, 264-66 , 596 A.2d 1049 (1991); Maryland National v. Parkville Federal, 105 Md.App. 611, 614 , 660 A.2d 1043 (1995). ⁶³² II. Stipulation Throughout the trial, defense counsel represented to the court that he was “admitting responsibility” for the April 1993 auto accident and repeatedly stated that the case was about “damages only.” Confusion arose, however, when it became apparent to the court and to plaintiffs counsel that defense counsel was not conceding that his client caused appellant’s injuries, but that his concession was only to “liability” or “negligence.” The court granted plaintiffs motion for judgment as to defendant’s “liability” and submitted both the questions of causation and damages to the jury. Appellant appeals from the court’s decision to submit the causation question to the jury, contending that the jury “should have been precluded” from considering causation at all.

We disagree. Before the trial began, defense counsel told the court that “[w]e’ll be admitting liability in this case.” Shortly thereafter, he modified his representation and stated, “Actually, I’d rather prefer it be called that we’ll be admitting responsibility for the happening of the accident on April 22 nd.” The second time counsel raised this issue was in the context of a motion in limine “to keep the conviction of my client from this case.” At that point, counsel again stated, “We’re going to be admitting liability.” The third time the issue arose came when defense counsel requested that the court excuse his clients’ presence during a portion of the trial. Again counsel stated, “This case is about damages, not liability.” At the conclusion of the trial, the court attempted to clarify the defense position with respect to liability. The following discussion ensued: THE COURT: ...

Exactly what did you stipulate to as to liability? MR. WHITWORTH [plaintiffs counsel]: I stipulated that— THE COURT: Well, let me ask you another question. Is there any reason why there’s anything for [the jury] to decide other than what, if any, damages there are? ⁶³³ MR.

BURGOYNE [defense counsel]: The — the issue as to damages is quite clear from the stipulation, that we may have been a cause of the accident. Okay? But liability is a little bit different question. Liability assumes causation.

This whole case is about causation. THE COURT: Wait a minute. You’re a cause of the accident, but you’re not what? MR.

BURGOYNE: Cause of the injuries. And so, I think that— THE COURT: So what did you stipulate to? MR. BURGOYNE: That we acknowledge that we caused the accident of April 22 nd, 1993.

THE COURT: Okay. MR. BURGOYNE: And perhaps the Court is making reference to our verdict sheet. THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. BURGOYNE: Which, the first question I would propose in this case is, did the April 22 nd’ 1993 motor vehicle accident cause any injuries? If the answer is yes, then they go on to determine what injuries. If they say no, then there’s no need to even discuss economical loss, medicals, et cetera.

THE COURT: It’s considerably less than a stipulation that I thought I heard at the beginning of the case. MR. WHITWORTH: You’re [sic] Honor, we’re in the same position, and that’s why — if they don’t think any damages were caused, they can put zero in any category, or all categories. But to add that extra hurdle— THE COURT: That’s how I thought we were going to approach it actually.

I thought you were going to argue that, sure, there was an accident, but it didn’t cause anything, so zero damages here. MR. BURGOYNE: We’ll talk about damages in the jury instructions, but in every element of damage, Your Honor, it’s what, if any, what, if any, what, if any. ⁶³⁴ MR. WHITWORTH: Your Honor, if I may, we would certainly oppose putting anything in there about liability or negligence, because that would be confusing since it’s not— THE COURT: Well, there’s not a — there’s not an issue of negligence, is there?

I assume you’re conceding negligence? MR. BURGOYNE: Well, Your Honor,— THE COURT: We’re slipping again, aren’t we? MR.

BURGOYNE: Well, it’s that, when I took law school classes on negligence, they told me that causation [is] intertwined in the whole idea of negligence. And in this case, causation is our entire case. So, I think that I can stipulate that we caused the accident. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BURGOYNE: That our car, through no fault of Mrs. Hurt, — okay?—struck her vehicle. But that’s not saying the same as that we admit negligence, which is causation, damages, that we admit liability. THE COURT: What you’ve done is essentially, is admit that an accident happened?

MR. BURGOYNE: And it was our fault. THE COURT: Well, now you’ve lost me again. MR.

WHITWORTH: Your Honor, when he closes, I want to move for a directed verdict as to liability, and then have a sample verdict sheet. On appeal, appellee “concedes that Chavis’fs] counsel, at times, was less than legally precise when referring to the issues of liability and negligence.” Counsel’s statements went beyond imprecision as he appeared to waffle on whether he was admitting “liability,” “negligence,” “damages,” or “causation.” Counsel was not, however, substantively changing his position; rather, he seemed to have been attempting to present a consistent position to the court, but in doing so was interchanging legal terms that are simply not interchangeable. Instead of getting hopelessly entangled in defense counsel’s ⁶³⁵ erroneous terminology, we will consider his position in its entirety, and in the context of the trial, to determine the pivotal question of whether he admitted negligence or liability, and the significance of each. To do so, we must first examine the distinction between the two concepts.

III

Negligence vs. Liability This Court and the Court of Appeals have decided a number of cases directly addressing this issue and have attempted to articulate the distinction between liability and negligence in a clear and concise manner. As the Court of Appeals explained in Richardson v. Boato, 207 Md. 301, 306-07 , 114 A.2d 49 (1955): [T]he negligence of the appellee gave no right of action to the appellant unless that negligence injured or harmed her. The appellant, to have been entitled to an instruction that the appellee was subject to liability to her, must have shown uncontroverted causal connection between the negligence and the injury or