Hutchins v. Hutchins

Urner, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The will of Isaac H. Hutchins, of Calvert County, which was executed February 9, 1907, devised one of his farms to his sons, Ernest S. Hutchins and Benson C. Hutchins, “with the desire that they hold the same in common and work and use the same as they are now working it, until one of them shall become able and willing rto purchase the interest of the other therein, or so long as they shall work the same amicably” ; and they were directed to divide the property, or have it divided, between them in the event of any disagreement. By a. codicil dated January 24, 1917, the testator himself ⁴⁰³ divided the farm between the two sons, in accordance with a line of division therein described, devising to Ernest the part of the farm lying north of the line thus indicated, and to Benson the southern portion. The testator died in June, 1918.

The division of the farm “effected by the codicil is considered by Benson Hutchins to he unequal and prejudicial to the interests which he would have taken under the will if it had not been modified, and by his pending caveat to the codicil he charges that it was procured by undue influence1, and that his father had not the requisite mental capacity at the time of its execution. Issues based on these allegations were tried in the Circuit Court for Calvert County. The trial resulted in a verdict sustaining the validity of the will on both issues. The appeal is from rulings on the admissibility of evidence and instructions to the jury.

The first of the twenty-four exceptions in the record was taken to the refusal of the trial court to permit the caveator to be asked in chief whether he had any conversation with his father as to what division of the farm he was going to make and what part he intended to give the witness. This was a proper question to be asked and answered. It was evidently directed to the proof of declarations by the testator prior to the execution of the codicil and inconsistent with its provisions. The caveator was entitled to prove, if he could, as reflecting upon the question of undue influence or mental incapacity, that the terms of the codicil were contrary to the settled convictions of the testator as to a just disposition of his estate.

Dudderar v. Dudderar, 116 Md. 610 ; Grill v. O’Dell, 113 Md. 631 Moore v. McDonald, 68 Md. 338; Griffith v. Diffenderfer, 50 Md. 466 ; Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. & J. 269 . There was no prejudice to the caveator in the rulings on the second and tenth exceptions. The questions objected to were asked in the cross-examination of expert- witnesses for the caveator, and the answers were entirely favorable to his theory. ⁴⁰⁴ The third, fourth, sixth and seventh exceptions were reserved because of the disallowance of questions propounded to witnesses for the caveator as to their business transactions with the testator at specified periods within a year before or after the date of tire codicil. These inquiries were permissible.

They did not seek to elicit the opinion of the witnesses to whom they were addressed as to the testator’s mental incapacity. Apparently the purpose was to have the witnesses describe his conduct in the transactions to which the questions referred. This is an approved method of investigating a testator’s mental condition. While the issue to be decided is concerned exclusively with his capacity at the time of the testamentary act, it is admissible to prove his prior and subsequent conduct and conversations as reflecting upon his mental capacity at that time.

It is when a qualified witness is asked for his opinion of the testator’s mental condition, and not merely for a description of his talk and actions, and when the opinion requested is intended to prove incapacity, rather than the state of capacity, which the law ordinarily presumes, that the interrogatory must be specifically