Hyder v. Montgomery County

MEREDITH, J. This case involves a dispute regarding the number of days of notice that must be given by a tenant who seeks to terminate a lease. More specifically, the question is: what is the deadline for a tenant’s notice when the lease requires “thirty (30) days’ written notice of termination prior to the Rent Due Date”? The Commission on Landlord-Tenant Affairs for Montgomery County ruled that the tenants in this case had given timely notice of termination by delivering to the landlord on April 1 a notice that the tenants intended to terminate the tenancy as of April 30. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County affirmed that conclusion.

So shall we. The tenants in this case rented a residential property from a landlord in Montgomery County, utilizing a preprinted form lease published by the Greater Capital Area Association of REALTORS®, Inc. The form, captioned “Single Family Dwelling Lease,” is widely used in Montgomery County. After!the initial twelve-month term of the lease came to an end on June 30, 2001, the tenants continued in residence pursuant to an express agreement to extend the term on a month-to-month basis, at an increased monthly rental rate but otherwise subject to all other provisions of the lease. On April 1, 2002, the tenants delivered to the landlord notice that the tenants intended to terminate the lease as of April 30, 2002.

The landlord responded that the notice was given too late to avoid liability for rent for the month of May. Pointing to the language of the lease that required the party desiring to terminate the month-to-month tenancy to give “thirty (30) days’ written notice of termination prior to the Rent Due Date,” the landlord took the position that the April 1 notice of termination was not given in sufficient time to permit an April 30 termination. Accordingly, the landlord advised the tenants that they would be liable for rent through May 31 unless the unit was rented to a replacement tenant. The tenants nevertheless vacated the property on April 29, and refused to pay the rent that would have been due on May 1.

When the landlord subsequently deducted from the tenants’ ⁴⁸⁵ security deposit an amount to cover rent for May, and a late fee on that rent, the tenants filed a complaint with the Commission on Landlord-Tenant Affairs for Montgomery County. The Commission conducted a hearing pursuant to Montgomery County Code (2001), §§ 29-10, 29-14, 29-41, and 29-44. After the Commission conducted its hearing, it concluded (1) that the tenants had properly served timely notice of their intent to vacate on April 30, and (2) that the landlord was not entitled to withhold May’s rent (and late fees thereon) from the tenants’ security deposit. The Commission found that the landlord had not acted in bad faith, however, and refused to award the tenants penalty damages, pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 2003 RepLVoL), Real Property Article, § 8-203(e)(4), beyond the amount the Commission determined had been wrongfully withheld.

The Commission stated: Paragraph 22a of the Lease, entitled “Termination— Hold Over,” states that either party can terminate the Lease at the expiration of the Lease “by giving the other thirty (30) days’ written notice of termination prior to the Rent Due Date.” Pursuant to this Lease provision, in order to terminate their month-to-month tenancy at the end of April 2002, Complainants [tenants] were required to provide Respondents’ Agent [landlord’s agent] written notice thirty (30) days before the Rent Due Date of May 1, 2002. Therefore, because thirty (30) days before May 1, 2002 was April 1, 2002, the Complainants served Respondents’ Agent with a proper written notice on April 1, 2002 of their intention to vacate the Property as of April 30, 2002. ... Based on the Complainants having provided Respondents’ Agent with a proper notice to vacate, the Complainants’ tenancy and obligation to pay rent ceased as of April 30, 2002, and Respondents are not entitled to charge against Complainants’ security deposit $2,200.00 rent for May of 2002, or $110.00 for a late fee for May 2002. The landlord filed a timely petition in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County seeking judicial review of the Commission’s ruling.

We shall affirm the circuit court’s judgment that affirmed the ruling of the Commission. ⁴⁸⁶ Standard of Review The Court of Appeals has recently summarized the principles governing our role in reviewing an administrative agency’s decision as follows: We review an administrative agency’s decision under the same statutory standards as the Circuit Court. Therefore, we reevaluate the decision of the agency, not the decision of the lower court. Moreover, in United Parcel Service, Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Baltimore County, 336 Md. 569 , [576-77,] 650 A.2d 226 , [230] (1994), we stated generally that “[judicial review of administrative agency action is narrow. The court’s task on review is not to substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency.” We expounded upon this doctrine in Board of Physician [Quality Assurance] v. Banks, 354 Md. 59 , 729 A.2d 376 (1999): Despite some unfortunate language that has crept into a few of our opinions, a “court’s task in review is not to □substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency.[’]” ...

Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency. Thus, an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the [statute] which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts.... Furthermore, the expertise of the agency in its own field should be respected.[ ] Banks, 354 Md. at 68-69 , 729 A.2d at 381 . “We, however, ‘may always determine whether the administrative agency made an error of law. Therefore, ordinarily the court reviewing a final decision of an administrative agency shall determine (1) the legality of the decision and (2) whether there was substantial evidence from the record as a whole to support the decision.’ ” Balt.

Lutheran High Sch. v. Employment Sec. Admin., 302 Md. 649, 662 , 490 ⁴⁸⁷ A.2d 701, 708 (1985). Regarding the substantial evidence test, we explained in Baltimore Lutheran High School: That is to say, a reviewing court, be it a circuit court or an appellate court, shall apply the substantial evidence test to the final decisions of an administrative agency, but it must not itself make independent findings of fact or substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Balt. Lutheran High Sch., 302 Md. at 662 , 490 A.2d at 708 .

Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” In Baltimore Lutheran High Sch[ool], we further explained: The scope of review is limited to whether a reasoning mind could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached. In applying the substantial evidence test, the reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken. The reviewing court also must review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to the agency, since decisions of administrative agencies are prima facie correct and carry with them the presumption of validity. Furthermore, not only is it the province of the agency to resolve conflicting evidence, but where inconsistent inferences from the same evidence can be drawn, it is for the agency to draw the inferences.

Balt. Lutheran High Sch., 302 Md. at 662-63 , 490 A.2d at 708 (citing Bulluck [v. Pelham, Wood Apartments], 283 Md. [505,] 512, 390 A.2d [1119,] 1123 [(1978)] )[(emphasis in original) ...].[”] Jordan Towing, Inc. v. Hebbville Auto Repair, Inc., 369 Md. 439, 449-52 , 800 A.2d 768 (2002) (quoting Gigeous v. E. Corr. Inst., 363 Md. 481, 495-97 , 769 A.2d 912, 921-22 (2001) (footnote omitted)) (some citations omitted) (omissions in original). ⁴⁸⁸ Annapolis Market v. Parker, 369 Md. 689, 703-04 , 802 A.2d 1029 (2002). With these principles in mind, we will review the decision of the Commission.

Notice of Termination The common law rules regarding the notice that was required to terminate a periodic tenancy were summarized by Professor Tiffany as follows: The ordinary mode in which such a tenancy comes to an end is by reason of a notice given by one party to the other to the effect that he desires to terminate the tenancy. The English rule, that a notice of half a year is necessary in order to terminate a tenancy from year to year, has ordinarily been adopted in this country, in the absence of a statutory provision on the subject. In a number of the states the length of the notice is fixed by statutory enactment, it varying from one to six months. In the case of a tenancy from quarter to quarter, month to month, or week to week, a notice of a quarter, a month, or a week, respectively, is ordinarily regarded as necessary to terminate it.

In a number of states the length of the notice necessary in such cases is prescribed by statute, the statute occasionally referring in terms to a tenancy from quarter to quarter, month to month, or week to week, and sometimes being so framed as to apply to any periodic tenancy, or to any such tenancy measured by periods less than a year. The obligation to give notice is, at common law, reciprocal, the tenant being bound to give it, as well as the landlord, if he desires to terminate the tenancy. The statutes above referred to likewise ordinarily require notice to be given by the tenant as well as by the landlord. The common-law rule, in regard to the length of notice necessary to terminate a periodic tenancy, may be superseded by an express agreement in this regard, and a statutory provision on the subject would no doubt likewise yield to any contract between the parties. ⁴⁸⁹ 1 Herbert T. Tiffany, Law of Real Property, § 173 (3d ed.l939)(footnotes omitted).

As Professor Tiffany pointed out, the common law rule would be superseded by an express agreement between the parties. In the present case, there was an express written agreement regarding the required period of notice. Consequently, the outcome of this case is governed by principles of contract interpretation rather than the common law rules pertaining to a notice to quit. The result is not affected by Maryland Code (1974, 2003 Repl.

Vol.), Real Property Article (“R.P.”), § 8-402(b), which requires a landlord who wishes to take advantage of the statutory remedy of summary repossession to “give notice in writing one month before the expiration of the term.” See Darling Shops v. Balto. Center, 191 Md. 289, 297-98 , 60 A.2d 669 (1948) (“ ‘A notice intended to determine the tenancy should not be confounded with a notice which entitles the landlord to repossess himself of the premises by a summary remedy. This last is entirely the creature of statute law.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)). Nor do other statutory provisions addressing a notice of termination control the disposition of this case.

See R.P. § 8-208(d)(5), prohibiting a landlord from using a lease that purports to allow the landlord to give a notice to quit which is a shorter period than that provided by applicable law; and R.P. § 8-501, prohibiting a written agreement that requires the tenant to provide a longer period of notice of termination than the agreement requires of the landlord. The specific portion of the lease agreement that gave rise to the present dispute is the following language found in Section 22.a., a section captioned “Termination — Hold Over,” which reads as follows: Either Landlord/Agent or Tenant may terminate this Lease at the expiration of said Lease or any extension thereof by giving the other thirty (30) days’ written notice of termination prior