Iager v. Rogers

Powers, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Shortly before midnight on 24 June 1971, Timothy V. lager, appellant here, was riding his motorcycle eastward on Route 198 in Anne Arundel County from Laurel toward Fort Meade. At that point Route 198 is paved and two lanes wide, one lane for traffic in each direction. It is intersected on the north side only by Route 216, a public highway, which leads to the D. C. Children’s Center. lager testified that when he was about 800 feet from the intersection, he saw an automobile in the right lane in front of him.

It appeared to be stopped or traveling very slowly, also eastward. Without reducing his speed or sounding his horn, lager swung his cycle to the left lane in order to pass the car. The car was being driven by its owner, the appellee, George Alden Rogers, III. Rogers made a left turn into Route 216.

The motorcycle collided, in the left lane, with the left rear side of the car. The operators of both vehicles filed suit, 1 each alleging that the accident was caused by the negligence of the other, lager sought to recover damages for personal injuries and loss of property; Rogers claimed only property damages. Trial commenced on 21 May 1974 in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County before a jury, Judge George Sachse presiding. lager first presented his evidence, at the conclusion of which the court granted a motion by Rogers for a directed verdict in his favor. In the action brought by Rogers, the jury returned a verdict in his favor against lager for $363.05, the stipulated damages.

Judgment was thereafter entered in favor of Rogers in each case. From those judgments, lager timely noted this appeal. According to lager’s declaration, Rogers was solely at fault in failing to keep a proper lookout for traffic behind him before turning and in failing to signal his intention to turn. Rogers, on the other hand, alleged that the accident resulted solely from the conduct of lager in operating his ⁵⁵⁸ motorcycle in a careless, reckless and negligent manner and on the left side of the road in violation of the vehicle laws.

After the directed verdict was granted against lager at the close of his plaintiffs case, and Rogers completed his case, the jurors were instructed that lager was negligent as a matter of law and that their function was to determine whether Rogers was negligent, so as to bar recovery by him. In this appeal lager contends that the trial judge erred in ruling that he was negligent as a matter of law. We hold that the judge ruled correctly, and we shall affirm both judgments. A motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs case puts to the test of legal sufficiency the evidence adduced by him.

The applicable principles were restated by this Court in Newton v. Spence, 20 Md. App. 126 , 316 A. 2d 837 (1974), where at 134, we said: “When called upon by a motion for a directed verdict to rule on the legal sufficiency of the evidence to require submission of any issue to the jury, the trial court must assume the truth of all credible evidence on that issue and of all inferences fairly deducible therefrom, and consider them in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made; and if such evidence and inferences lead to conclusions from which reasonable minds could not differ, then the issue is one of law for the court and not one of fact for the jury. Lauer v. Scott, 12 Md. App. 555 , 280 A. 2d 917 (1971).” lager maintains that, under the circumstances in the case before us, the issue of his negligence, whether characterized as primary or contributory, presented a question for the jury. It is undisputed that the motorcycle was being operated on the left side of the road when the collision occurred. At that time, its operator was in violation of at least two statutes 2 ⁵⁵⁹ which govern the operation of motor vehicles.

By Code, Article 66 V2, section 11-301 (a) (1), the law requires that: “(a) Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows: (1) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing this movement;” Section 11-305 provides in part: “(a) No vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the center of the roadway in overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless authorized by the provisions of this part * * *. “(b) No vehicle shall at any time be driven to the left side of the roadway under the following conditions: (2) When approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection or railroad grade crossing;” The statute clearly requires that when a vehicle is driven to the left side of the center of the roadway in overtaking and passing, its operator must observe the rules governing that movement. One of the rules governing that movement is that no vehicle shall at anytime be driven to the left side of the roadway when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing an intersection. The importance of this prohibition* 3 was ⁵⁶⁰ explained by the Court of Appeals in May v. Warnick, 227 Md. 77 , 175 A. 2d 413 (1961). The Court said, at 83-84: “There can be little doubt that one of the primary reasons for prohibiting an overtaking vehicle from going to the left side of the road in passing another at, or within a specified distance from, an intersection is that the front car may be anticipating a left turn. 3 Berry, Automobiles (7th Ed.), § 3.42; Cierley v. Uhalt, 10 P. 2d 769 (1932) (Cal.); 3 Blashfield, Cyc., Automobile Law & Practice, § 965.

If the present provisions of the law are complied with, there is little danger from this source: the motorist contemplating a left turn is required to approach the intersection (where two-way traffic is being accommodated on both streets) in that portion of the right half of the roadway nearest the center line thereof (giving an appropriate signal, in accordance with Sections 228, 229 and 230), but he is prohibited from passing to the left of the center until the intersection is reached, Section 225 (b); and the following motorist is forbidden to pass the lead vehicle on the left of the roadway, Section 221 (b) (2). “This prohibition in Section 221 against overtaking and passing ‘to the left side of the roadway * * * when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection,’ when applied to two-way highways, eliminates much of the danger of a collision that would be involved if the overtaking vehicle were permitted to pass on the left, or wrong, side of the road at or near the intersection.” Of course, a violation of the statutory requirement to keep to the right must be a proximate cause to support a finding ⁵⁶¹ of negligence. In Sun Cab Co. v. Cusick, 209 Md. 354 , 121 A. 2d 188 (1956), the Court of Appeals, after stating the principle that a driver who fails to comply with the statute which requires him to keep to the right is prima facie guilty of negligence, went on to say, at 361: “But we have made it clear that a violation of this rule does not constitute negligence except where it is the direct and proximate cause of the injury. [Citations omitted.]” In that case, the Court reversed a judgment entered on a jury verdict against Sun Cab, and held that as a matter of law the cab driver’s conduct was not the direct and proximate cause of the accident. In the case before us, the evidence showed that the motorcycle struck the automobile when the front of it had already entered the intersecting road. The point of impact on the automobile was on the left side, on that part of the left rear fender or quarter panel which extends behind the left rear wheel.

The collision would not have occurred but for the fact that the cycle was in the left lane. That its position was a proximate cause of the accident is a conclusion about which reasonable minds could not differ. We hold that appellant’s violation of the statute was, as a matter of law, a proximate cause of the collision. An occurrence quite similar factually to the present one was considered by the Court of Appeals in Miller v. Mullenix, 227 Md. 229 , 176 A. 2d 203 (1961).

There, a motorcyclist was