In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 11137

CATHELL, Judge. Appellant, Seanna B., appeals from a Decree of Final Adoption entered on September 2, 1994, in favor of appellees, Mr. and Mrs. B., 1 by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Miller, J., presiding). She challenges the validity of her consent thereto, and the propriety vel non of the court’s order, setting forth the following issues for our consideration: 1. Whether the Court properly entered a Decree of Adoption from a procedural standpoint. ³¹² 2.

Whether the Consent to Adoption was procured by duress or undue influence. 3. Whether there was a valid revocation of the Consent. 4. Whether the lower court’s factual findings prohibit the legal conclusion that the Consent was valid. We shall reverse.

Appellant gave birth to her first child (the “child”) on October 27, 1985. In November of 1988, an Order was entered in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County appointing appellees, the child’s grandparents and appellant’s parents, his co-guardians, with appellant’s consent. This was later renewed on October 12, 1990, again with appellant’s consent. The sole purpose of the guardianship was to provide the child with medical insurance under the grandparents’ coverage.

In August of 1992, appellees, pro se, filed a document entitled “Petition for Independent Adoption” with the trial court, using a form the copy of which was obtained by Mr. B. from a book at the local library. At the time of the filing, appellees did not have appellant’s consent and knew that they would have to “work on her” to obtain it. Moreover, appellees made no effort to inform appellant (their own daughter) that they were attempting to adopt her child. Thus, appellant was completely unaware that the petition had been filed.

Additionally, no show cause order, as required, was issued to inform her thereof. 2 Later, on January 11, 1993, appellant, still unaware of the pending litigation, before a notary, signed a document presented to her by her father, entitled “Consent to Adoption and Waiver of Notice of Process.” This form was also obtained from a book at the library. Both parties differ in then-account of the events of that day. Appellant states that she, still unaware of appellees’ efforts to adopt the child and of their prior initiation of adoption proceedings, was called to her parents’ home. She was accompanied there by a classmate, ³¹³ Kathy Provost, who also testified at the hearing on appellant’s Motion to Revoke her Consent.

Upon her arrival at her parents’ house, appellant was greeted by her father’s request that she “sign the papers.” Appellant testified that she did not know the papers to which he referred and, forestalling her father’s efforts, indicated to him her desire to discuss the matter at a later time. Mr. B., however, would not be put off; he stated, “You are going with me, and you’re going now.” At that point, appellant and Provost, in one car, and Mr. B., in another, drove to a notary not far from appellees’ home. At the notary, more discussion took place, culminating in appellant signing the document. Provost testified that appellant was very upset by the entire incident and felt pressured by her father’s machinations.

When appellant and her father exited the place wherein the two entered to sign the “papers,” appellant is said to have told her father “that she was going to try to get it overturned,” to which he responded that she would be unsuccessful; “she had already lost her right.” Mr. B. offered contrary testimony—appellant is said to have indicated to him, on January 11, 1993, her readiness to sign. He testified that he asked appellant if she was certain of her decision and appellant responded, “Yes.” Mr. B. further stated that he had in no way forced her to sign the document and denied that appellant told him she would get the consent set aside. According to him, appellant signed the consent voluntarily and without, at any time, revoking or expressing an intent to revoke. Appellant did not learn of the pending adoption proceeding until June of 1993, approximately one to two days before a scheduled hearing at which she, appearing pro se, objected to the adoption and asked the trial court to declare her consent to have been revoked.

She alleged that her consent had been obtained by duress and undue influence and that, alternatively, she had revoked it immediately thereafter. A continuance was granted in order for the parties to obtain counsel. Subsequently, a hearing on the issue of consent revocation was held ³¹⁴ on July 27, 1994, after which the trial court took the matter under advisement. On August 4, 1994, the court issued an Opinion and Order wherein it held that the evidence fell “far short of the clear and convincing proof necessary to show that [appellant] was deprived of her free will and that she was the victim of her father’s duress and undue influence.” Turning to the revocation of her consent, the court stated: “Even assuming that [appellant] told her father [that she would get the consent “turned around”], in the Court’s opinion this was not an oral revocation of her consent, but a statement of her future intention to seek revocation of that consent.... ” Appellant’s Motion to Revoke her Consent was therefore denied, and without any further hearing or any further opportunity for appellant to challenge the adoption, or, in fact, any further hearing in reference to the feasibility of the adoption itself, a final decree of adoption issued on September 2, 1994.

Appellant filed this timely appeal therefrom. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW The scope of review of a trial court’s decision in adoption proceedings is generally limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion or whether the findings of fact by the trial court were clearly erroneous. Coffey v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 41 Md.App. 340, 346 , 397 A.2d 233 (1979). If it appears that the chancellor erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless.

Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 126 , 372 A.2d 231 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 , 98 S.Ct. 430 , 54 L.Ed.2d 299 , reh’g denied, 434 U.S. 1025 , 98 S.Ct. 754 , 54 L.Ed.2d 774 (1977). The reviewing court, however, must exercise its best judgment in determining the ultimate question of whether the chancellor abused his discretion in determining what is best for the welfare, benefit, and interest of the child. Nutwell v. Prince George’s County Dep’t of Social Servs., 21 Md.App. 100, 107 , 318 A.2d 563 (1974). THE LAW As in custody cases, the overriding consideration that must be addressed in each adoption case is the welfare ³¹⁵ and best interests of the adoptive child. 3 In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A 334 Md. 538, 559 , 640 A.2d 1085 (1994); Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512, 530 (1994); Lippy v. Breidenstein, 249 Md. 415, 420 , 240 A.2d 251 (1968); Beltran v. Heim, 248 Md. 397, 401 , 236 A.2d 723 (1968); Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284 , 157 A.2d 273 (1960); Crump v. Montgomery, 220 Md. 515, 525 , 154 A.2d 802 (1959), aff’d, 224 Md. 470 , 168 A.2d 355 (1961); King v. Shandrowski, 218 Md. 38, 43 , 145 A.2d 281 (1958); Winter v. Director of the Dept. of Pub.

Welfare, 217 Md. 391, 396 , 143 A.2d 81 , cert. denied, 358 U.S. 912 , 79 S.Ct. 242 , 3 L.Ed.2d 233 (1958); Ex parte Frantum, 214 Md. 100, 103 , 133 A.2d 408 , cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882 , 78 S.Ct. 149 , 78 S.Ct. 149 , 2 L.Ed.2d 112 (1957); Anderson v. Barkman, 195 Md. 94, 97 , 72 A.2d 709 (1950); Falck v. Chadwick, 190 Md. 461, 467 , 59 A.2d 187 (1948); Atkins v. Gose, 189 Md. 542, 548 , 56 A.2d 697 (1948); White v. Seward, 187 Md. 43 , 48 A.2d 335 (1946); In re Adoption No. 90072022/CAD, 87 Md.App. 630, 638 , 590 A.2d 1094 (1991); Weinschel v. Strople, 56 Md.App. 252, 263 , 466 A.2d 1301 (1983); Lloyd v. Schutes, 24 Md.App. 515, 521 , 332 A.2d 338 (1975); Nutwell, 21 Md.App. at 105 , 318 A.2d 563 ; Schwartz v. Hudgins, 12 Md.App. 419, 424 , 278 A.2d 652 (1971); Goodyear v. Cecil County Dep’t of Social Servs., 11 Md.App. 280, 283 , 273 A.2d 644 , rev’d on other grounds, 263 Md. 611 , 284 A.2d 426 (1971). The determination of a child’s best interests is to be made as of the time the adoption decision is made, no earlier. Crump, 220 Md. at 525 , 154 A.2d 802 . By the same token, however, the rights of the natural parent or parents, though not absolute or of equal import, must be as carefully guarded as those of the child, Winter, 217 Md. at 396 , 143 A.2d 81 ; the right to raise one’s own child, “recognized by constitutional principles, ... is so fundamental that it may not be taken away unless clearly justified,” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 112 , 642 A.2d ³¹⁶ 201 (1994).

For that reason, there is a presumption that a child’s interests will be best served in the care of the natural parent. Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512, 530 , 639 A.2d 1076 (1994); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 560, 640 A.2d 1085 ; Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351 , 86 A.2d 463 (1952). “The justification for this presumption is the belief that the parent’s natural affection for the child creates a greater desire and effort to properly care for and rear the child than would exist in an individual not so related.” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 560 , 640 A.2d 1085 (1994) (citing Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 188 , 148 A.2d 387 (1959)). See Lloyd v. Schutes, 24 Md.App. 515, 522 , 332 A.2d 338 (1975). The rights of the natural parent or parents, as we have said, are subject to the best interests of the child.

Courtney v. Richmond, 55 Md.App. 382, 392 , 462 A.2d 1223 (1983). It is because “the parental rights of the natural mother and father ... [are] ‘far more precious than property rights’ ... [that they are] protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” In re Adoption No. 85365027/AD, 71 Md.App. 362, 366 , 525 A.2d 1081 (1987) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 , 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1211 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)). By the grant of an adoption decree, a natural parent’s rights to a child are terminated and a wholly new parent-child relationship is created, McGarvey v. State, 311 Md. 233, 240-41 , 533 A.2d 690 (1987); a natural parent is made, in essence, a “legal stranger” to his or her child. Walker, 221 Md. at 284 , 157 A.2d 273 ; Coffey, 41 Md.App. at 347 , 397 A.2d 233 .

Thus, to divest a parent’s rights to his or her child and vest them in another is a drastic procedure that must be strictly scrutinized and clearly justified lest a parent be improperly deprived of that child. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 560, 640 A.2d 1085 (“[B]ecause adoption carries with it a finality not present in a custody decision, it is even more imperative that the decision be made with due regard to the rights of the natural parent.”). “The welfare and best interests of the child must be weighed with great care against every just claim of an ³¹⁷ objecting parent.” Walker, 221 Md. at 284 , 157 A.2d 273 . See also Atkins, 189 Md. at 550 , 56 A.2d 697 (“[T]he laws do not mean to deprive parents of their own children except under extraordinary conditions----”). Indeed, a parent’s inherent right to raise and care for his or her child will not be denied unless forfeited by his or her own acts or conduct, or by voluntarily consenting to the custody of the child being vested in a third party, unless the best interests of the child dictate to the contrary.

Ex parte Johnson, 247 Md. 563, 569 , 233 A.2d 779 (1967). DISCUSSION CONSENT AND THE REVOCATION THEREOF Under the facts presented in the case sub judice, we must, in respect to this issue, determine whether or not a natural parent’s consent to an adoption was effectively and properly revoked when that parent communicated an intention to revoke to the person to whom the consent was being given. Given the importance of the interests involved, i.e., a relationship between a parent and a child, we hold that, when such an expression of revocation is made, it is effective as of the time it is communicated and, if done so timely, ie., within thirty days, is effective to nullify a previously obtained consent to adoption. The consent executed by appellant in the case sub judice read as follows, in pertinent part: CONSENT TO ADOPTION AND WAIVER OF NOTICE OF PROCESS I, [appellant], birth parent of minor child ... born on October 27,1985, hereby certify that I freely and voluntarily consent to join the aforegoing Petition for Independent Adoption.

I understand that my consent may be revoked at any time up to 90- (ninety) 30 (thirty) S I B [apparently, appellant’s initials] days from the filing of the Consent to ³¹⁸ Adoption or anytime before a final decree of Adoption is entered, whichever occurs first.[ 4 ] The conspicuous absence from the consent of any instructions regarding how appellant might exercise her right to revoke calls into question whether appellant had any meaningful opportunity to do so. See In re Adoption No. 10087, 324 Md. 394, 421 , 597 A.2d 456 (1991), where the Court of Appeals reasoned: [T]he consents contain a statement notifying the parents of their right of revocation. No instructions are included, however, which would advise them how to go about doing so.... [N]o information is given on the face of the consents which would enable a parent to recant.... From these facts, it is questionable whether the natural parents had a meaningful opportunity to revoke.

Appellant asserts that she expressed her intent to revoke orally to her father immediately following the execution of the consent. In this regard, however, we are cognizant that Maryland Rule 8-131(a) provides that an appellate court will not consider that which has not first been duly addressed by the trial court. The trial court in the instant case assumed, without deciding, that appellant had expressed words of revocation to her father on January 11, 1993, finding that they constituted an intent to revoke in the future but not a revocation, and, thus, did not rise to the level sufficient to revoke the consent. The occurrence vel non of the conversation following ³¹⁹ the notarization of the consent form was not decided by the court.

If the court had found that appellant told her father that she would revoke the consent, then we perceive that the consent was, in fact, thereby revoked and dismissal of the Petition for Adoption was mandated. We find support for our decision in In re Adoption No. 85365027/AD, supra, 71 Md.App. 362 , 525 A.2d 1081 . There, the adoptive parents, with knowledge of the natural parent’s desire to revoke her consent, met with the trial judge ex parte and, without informing the judge of the natural mother’s intent to revoke, obtained the judge’s signature on the decree of adoption before the revocation could be filed with the court. Under those circumstances, we reasoned that the adoptive parents’ “rush to the courthouse steps” was not dispositive of the issue of the enforceability of the mother’s revocation. “[Sjocial policy in adoption cases, unlike that in commercial cases, is not served by rigid adherence to the doctrine of ‘First in time, first in right.’ ” 71 Md.App. at 371 , 525 A.2d 1081 (footnote omitted).

We reasoned that it was doubtful that the trial judge, armed with knowledge of the natural mother’s desire to revoke, would have signed the final order of adoption. An analogous situation is presented by the case sub judice. If it is found that appellant had communicated her desire to revoke her consent to her father at the time and in the manner in which she alleges, it was sufficient to put him on notice of her objection to the adoption and any attempt to proceed with the adoption thereafter was improper. The trial court erred in concluding that appellant’s communication, if in fact made, was not sufficient to put Mr. B. on notice.

As we have stated, the nature of the parent-child relationship is of such importance, see In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, supra, that courts should act to preserve its integrity in the best interests of the child. To this end, any words that indicate that a natural parent does not intend to relinquish his or her rights to the child, if found by a trial court to have been timely communicated to the petitioner ³²⁰ or consentee, must be broadly construed as tantamount to the revocation provided for in Maryland Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1994 Cum.Supp.), § 5-311 of the Family Law Article (FL). That section is completely silent as to the manner in which a revocation is to be communicated and to whom it is to be addressed.

The consent executed in the case sub judice is, itself, similarly silent regarding the method of revocation. We note that the “requirement of consent ... is intended for the protection of the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child----” 2 Am.Jur.2d Adoption § 24 (1962). The trial court erred in interpreting appellant’s statement on January 11, 1993, as indicative of future intent. If said, it clearly evidenced her desire to revoke the consent she had just given to her father, the only person, as far as she knew or could have known, who was involved in the matter, and, under FL § 5-311, it was timely.

Were we to decide this case solely on the ground that appellant’s revocation, if communicated, was timely, we would remand to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the occurrence vel non of the conversation in which appellant revoked her consent. Given, however, the procedural deficiencies caused by appellees with which this case is fraught, we shall reverse and focus our remaining discussion primarily on the additional reasons for our decision. We shall begin by looking to the requirements attendant upon proceeding under the provisions for adoption set forth in the Family Law Article. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS Adoption in Maryland was not provided for at common law.

Carroll County Dept. of Social Servs. v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 174 , 577 A.2d 14 (1990); Winter, 217 Md. at 395 , 143 A.2d 81 ; Falck, 190 Md. at 467 , 59 A.2d 187 ; Atkins, 189 Md. at 548 , 56 A.2d 697 ; Spencer v. Franks, 173 Md. 73, 81 , 195 A. 306 (1937). Rather, it is a creature of more contemporary origin, finding its genesis in legislation. FL § 5-311 and § 5- ³²¹ 312 set forth