In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 93321055/CAD

WILNER, Judge. We have before us five cases in which the State sought guardianship of a child pursuant to Maryland Codé (1984,1991 Repl.Vol.), § 5-313 of the Family Law article. A judgment of guardianship under that section terminates the parental rights of the parents of the child and permits the State, through its Department of Social Services (DSS), to consent to the subse ⁴⁶⁵ quent adoption or other long-term placement of the child without the need for any further consent of the parents. Both the Code and the Maryland Rules set forth a procedure for bringing and prosecuting these kinds of cases.

That procedure will be described in some detail below. Suffice it to say here that, if a parent does not affirmatively consent to the guardianship, he or she is entitled to notice of the State’s petition and an opportunity to object to it. The notice is given through a show cause order issued by the court. If a parent does not file a written objection within the time specified in the show cause order, the court is directed to consider the parent to have consented to the guardianship and to treat the petition accordingly.

We granted certiorari in these cases to consider three questions, which we rephrase slightly as follows: (1) Does the circuit court have authority to accept and consider an objection filed after the time specified in the show cause order; (2) If a parent fails to file a timely objection as directed in the show cause order and is therefore deemed to have consented to the DSS petition, may the parent thereafter revoke that deemed consent; and (3) May a parent who fails to file a timely objection collaterally attack a judgment of guardianship entered in the case on the ground that the parent did not receive notice of the judgment or proceedings leading to it? Regrettably, after delving into the records of these cases, we discovered that (1) the first question was squarely raised in only three of the five cases and is moot in those cases, and (2) the fourth case, because of its procedural posture, does not present any of the three questions directly. The fifth case raises the second and third questions, which overlap. In the context of that case, we shall answer those questions.

For reasons to be explained, we shall address the first question as well, notwithstanding its mootness. ⁴⁶⁶ Our answer to the first question is “ordinarily no.” Our answer to the second is “no” with a caveat. Our answer to the third is an unqualified “no.” I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. No. 93321055 On November 17, 1993, DSS filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for guardianship of Mario and Marlen C. and to terminate the parental rights of their mother, Monique C., and their putative father, Eugene A. The children were born on May 9, 1991, cocaine addicted and in need of extraordinary care. They were placed in foster care five weeks later—on June 19, 1991. In October, 1991, they were found by the juvenile court to be children in need of assistance (CIÑA) and formally committed to the custody of DSS.

Upon the filing of DSS’s petition for guardianship, show cause orders were issued by the court informing the parents of the petition, enclosing a copy of it, advising them of their right to file an objection to the petition by a certain date, and stating the court’s address, where the objection should be filed. The orders warned, in capital letters, that “IF YOU DO NOT FILE A NOTICE OF OBJECTION ON OR BEFORE THE DEADLINE STATED ABOVE A DECREE TERMINATING YOUR PARENTAL RIGHTS MAY BE ENTERED WITHOUT YOUR CONSENT.” Attached to the show cause order was a form entitled “Notice of Objection”; it too warned, in capital letters, that “IF YOU WISH TO OBJECT, YOU MUST FILE YOUR NOTICE OF OBJECTION WITH THE COURT ON OR BEFORE THE DEADLINE STATED IN THE SHOW CAUSE ORDER.” All that the parent had to do was to sign the objection form, print his or her name, address, and telephone number, and mail or deliver it to the court. The show cause order was served on Monique on July 26, 1994; it required that any objection by her be filed by August ⁴⁶⁷ 11, 1994. Eugene was not served until November 14, 1994. 1 The order required that any objection be filed by January 9, 1995.

On January 19, 1995—five months after the deadline set for Monique and almost two weeks after the deadline set for Eugene—they each filed an objection. DSS moved to strike the late-filed objections. The court conducted a hearing on the DSS motion on June 30, 1995. Monique did not appear.

Eugene appeared and explained that he had read the show cause order and was aware of the deadline, that he had taken some papers to the clerk’s office at some unspecified time but was told that they were filled out incorrectly, that he took them back three or four times only to find the clerk not there, and that he did not think a week or so delay “would make a difference.” DSS informed the court that the parents had not visited the children since 1991 and that the last contact DSS had with Eugene was in 1993, when he was told that DSS intended to proceed with adoption rather than continued foster care. The court was also informed that the children had no concept of a biological parent, that they had been placed in a pre-adoptive home in February, 1995 and were doing well there, and that the plan was to have that couple adopt the children. On this evidence, the court granted the motion with respect to Monique but denied it as to Eugene. It found that, although Eugene “could have filed [the objection] more timely” and failed to do so, “it is just a matter of days.” DSS filed an appeal from the denial of the motion as to Eugene as well as a motion to reconsider that decision.

On August 9, 1995, the court denied the motion to reconsider. In an amended order, it confirmed its decision to strike Monique’s objection, finding no timely intervention by her, and also confirmed its decision to allow Eugene’s objection, finding that his objection, though filed 10 days “after the expiration of time for objection ⁴⁶⁸ within the Show Cause Order, is sufficiently .timely to allow this objection to be received by this Court.” DSS filed another appeal from that order. 2 The court conducted a hearing on the merits on January 25, 1996. Eugene did not appear. On February 26, 1996—more than two years after the petition was filed—the court entered an order appointing DSS as guardian of the children with the right to consent to their adoption.

That order effectively terminated the parental rights of Monique and Eugene. B. No. 95089042 On March 30, 1995, DSS filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for guardianship of Devonta H. and to terminate the parental rights of his mother, Evonne H., and his putative father, Ali J. or Paul W. Devonta was born on May 15,1993; he was placed in foster care on October 7, 1993, and was found to be a CINA on May 16,1994. Show cause orders were issued on April 18, 1995, setting a deadline of July 19, 1995 for objections and giving the same printed warnings noted in our discussion of No. 93321055, supra. Ali filed a timely objection.

Evonne was served on May 15, 1995. She filed an objection, on the form included with the show cause order, on August 22, 1995—a month late. DSS moved to strike the objection. At a hearing on the motion, Evonne testified that she misplaced the paper and did not find it until August.

DSS informed the court that Devonta was in an approved pre-adoptive home and that the plan was for him to be adopted if the DSS petition was granted. The court expressed some disbelief that Evonne “would be served with notice of termination of your parental rights and you would lose it,” but denied the motion nonetheless, essentially because there would have to be a trial in any event due to Ali’s objection. DSS filed an appeal. ⁴⁶⁹ Notwithstanding her objection, when the hearing on the merits occurred seven months later, on June 7, 1996, Evonne failed to appear, and the court granted the petition for guardianship. C. No. 95108035 On April 18, 1995, DSS filed a petition in the Circuit Court ■ for Baltimore City for guardianship of Portia and William G. and to terminate the parental rights of their mother, Veronica D. The father of the children had died.

Portia was born on April 16, 1988. Three months later, she was found to be a CIÑA and committed to DSS for placement with relatives. She was returned to Veronica in July, 1990, but was replaced in foster care in November, 1993. William was born on August 22, 1990.

He was found to be a CIÑA and committed to DSS on January 17, 1994. A show cause order, containing all of the information noted above, was served on Veronica on May 6, 1995. It set a deadline of July 26, 1995 for her to file an objection to the petition. Veronica filed an objection on August 10, 1995, which DSS moved to strike.

At a hearing held on November 16, 1995, Veronica’s lawyer informed the court that Veronica had “mistakenly allowed the time to elapse”—that “it just got away from her.” It appears from the transcript that Veronica was not in court when the hearing began, that she appeared about an hour late, and that the court saw no reason to hear from her. It denied DSS’s motion and set the matter in for hearing on the merits in June, 1996. DSS filed an appeal from the denial of its motion. In its brief, the State informed us that the hearing did not occur until August and that no decision had been made in the matter.

Even at oral argument in this Court on December 5, 1996, no one seemed to know whether the circuit court had yet decided the case. In fact, we were informed that, on September 16, 1996, the court entered a judgment of guardianship, and we have had the record before us supplemented to include that judgment. ⁴⁷⁰ D. Nos. 11711 and 11712 On May 4, 1994, DSS filed petitions in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for guardianship of Andrew J. and Unique 0. and to terminate the parental rights of then-mother, Nicole S., and their respective fathers, Andre J. and Tony 0. Andrew was born on March 1, 1992. He was placed in the custody of DSS and put into foster care on January 12, 1993.

In April, he was found to be a CINA by the juvenile court. In July, 1993, he was returned to his mother or other relatives but five weeks later was placed back in foster care. Unique was born March 14, 1993. She was placed in the custody of DSS and put into foster care two days later.

In April, 1993, she was found to be a CINA by the juvenile court. Like her half-brother, Andrew, she was returned to Nicole in July but placed back into foster care in August. Show cause orders were issued on May 10, 1994, setting a deadline of July 8, 1994 for filing an objection and giving the advice and warnings noted above. Nicole was served on June 10, 1994.

No objection was filed, and, on September 27, 1994, upon motion by DSS, the court entered an order granting the petitions. On June 12,1995, Nicole filed what she termed a Revocation of Consent to Petition for Guardianship with respect to each child. She noted in her Revocations that, pursuant to what is now Family Law article, § 5-322(d), her failure to file an objection had been deemed a consent to the guardianship and that, under § 5—311(c) of that article, she was authorized to revoke her consent at any time prior to the entry of a final decree of adoption. As no such decree had yet been entered with respect to Andrew or Unique, she averred that she still had the right to revoke her presumed consent and object.

Along with those Revocations, she filed a motion in each case to vacate the guardianship order. At a hearing on the motion in August, 1995, she argued, through counsel, that her due process rights had been violated because she never received notice of DSS’s motion for the guardianship order or notice of ⁴⁷¹ a hearing on the motion. The court denied Nicole’s motions, and she appealed. E. Nos. 11387 and 11388 On April 21, 1993, DSS filed petitions in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for guardianship of Stephon and Alphonso P. and to terminate the parental rights of their parents, Clemy P. and Sam L. Stephon was born on April 16, 1989, He was committed to the custody of DSS in August, 1990, was placed with his mother or other relatives until September, 1991, and had been in foster care since then.

He was adjudicated to be a CINA in October, 1991. Alphonso was born on August 3, 1990. He was committed to DSS at birth, resided with his maternal grandmother until September, 1991, and had been in foster care thereafter. Sam L. consented to the petition.

The show cause order issued for Clemy P. was served on her on May 11, 1993. It gave her the same advice and warnings noted above and set June 25, 1993 as the deadline for filing an objection. No objection was filed, and, on October 20, 1993, upon motion by DSS, the court granted the petition and entered a judgment of guardianship. Clemy filed an appeal 32 days later, which the circuit court struck as untimely.

On July 25,1994, through their court-appointed counsel, the children requested a hearing. They averred that a number of problems had developed since the order of guardianship had been entered. They pointed out that, under Family Law article, § 5-319, DSS was obliged to make a written report to the court and to give notice to both the children’s attorney and the natural parents if placement for adoption was not made within nine months after entry of the guardianship, that nine months had passed, that the children had not been placed for adoption, and that no report had been made. Underlying that problem, they averred, was the fact that they were not going to be able to remain in the home where they were then living because the foster mother was not willing to adopt them.

Compounding the problem was the additional circumstance that their sister was also living in the home, that their natural ⁴⁷² parents’ parental rights had not yet been terminated with respect to their sister, and that “this is causing problems for all three children, as the mother is still visiting and talking by phone with [the sister], but is not able to talk with [them], causing upset to Stephon and Alphonso.” Among other things, they asked that their maternal grandmother be considered as a resource. Three days after the children’s motion was filed, Clemy P. moved to intervene. She too complained about (1) the failure of DSS to make a written report as the statute required, (2) its refusal to consider her mother as a resource, and (3) the impending separation of Stephon and Alphonso from their sister. She complained as well that the guardianship order was entered without any testimony and that she “did not receive notice of the Motion or Order of Default due to a change of address until the time for appeal had expired.” She averred that she was then ready to resume custody of the children.

DSS opposed the children’s motion and Clemy’s request to intervene.’ As to the children’s motion, it informed the court that it intended to place Stephon and Alphonso in a preadoptive home within 10 days and that no hearing would be necessary. As to Clemy’s motion, DSS pointed out that there had never been a default order, that Clemy received all of the notices to which she was entitled, and that there were no proceedings pending before the court. The docket indicates that a “status hearing” was held by Judge McGuckian on August-11, 1994, but neither the docket nor anything else in the record indicates how, or whether, the children’s and Clemy’s motions were resolved. On July 5, 1995—some 21 months after the judgments of guardianship were entered—Clemy moved to vacate them.

Although she did not deny receiving a copy of the show cause order and did not deny reading it, she alleged that she “was not aware of the necessity of filing a written response” to the guardianship petitions and “remained unknowing as to the significance of [those petitions].” She claimed that she had ⁴⁷³ expressly declined to consent to the guardianships, that she had informed DSS orally that she would not consent, and that she did not become aware of the judgments until a month after they had been entered. She averred that the children had still not been adopted and continued to live in foster care. Clemy complained that she had received no notice of DSS’s motion for final order and, indeed, no notice of any proceedings after the initial petition. She urged that the judgments were defective because they were based on her presumed consent and she was never informed of her right to revoke that consent.

Her theory seemed to be that, once DSS took the position that her non-response amounted to a consent, it was obliged to inform her of her right to revoke that consent. She complained as well about not receiving a copy of the judgments or of any status report required by § 5-319. On December 5, 1995, the court entered an order vacating the judgments of guardianship. In an accompanying opinion, the court held that, although Clemy may be deemed to have consented to the guardianships by not filing a timely objection, she retained the right to revoke that deemed consent and to receive notice of all further proceedings, including service of all pleadings.

The court, at least tacitly, appeared to regard the failure of DSS to serve a copy of its motion for final order on Clemy as an irregularity under Md. Rule 2-535, thereby justifying a setting aside of the 21-month old judgments. DSS promptly filed a motion to alter or amend that order as well as a request to stay its effect. The motion for stay was supported by a letter from Stephen’s psychiatrist and pointed out that (1) Clemy had requested that the children be immediately returned to her, (2) unless the order was stayed, DSS’s authority to continue the children in foster care would terminate, and (3) immediate return of the children would be detrimental to them. The court initially stayed the December 5 order but ultimately denied the motion to alter or amend, and this appeal ⁴⁷⁴ by DSS ensued.

Whether the stay is still in effect is not entirely clear. 3 II. STATUS OF THE CASES IN TERMS OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED A. Nos. 93321055, 95089042, 95108035 As we observed in Part I, the only appeals in these three cases are those of DSS, complaining of the orders denying its respective motions to strike the untimely objections filed by one or both of the parents. When those appeals were filed, no judgment had been entered in the cases; the appeals were from orders that were clearly interlocutory. We need not address here whether those appeals were proper, for subsequent events have made the three appeals moot.

The State acknowledges, as it must, that the appeals in the first two cases are moot, and, because of the post-appeal judgment entered in No. 95108035, that case has also been rendered moot. 4 The objecting parents’ parental rights were terminat ⁴⁷⁵ ed after a hearing on the merits, and it is therefore utterly immaterial at this point whether the court erred in allowing the untimely filed objections. Even if DSS is correct and the court erred in considering the untimely objections, DSS has won on the merits, and there is no effective relief that we can provide. We shall therefore dismiss these three appeals. B. Nos. 11711 and 11712 Nicole’s appeals in these two cases are from an order denying her motion to vacate an enrolled judgment.

The motion to vacate was filed more than 30 days after the judgment was entered and is therefore deemed to have been filed under Md. Rule 2-535(b). Under that rule, a court may revise an enrolled judgment upon a finding of fraud, mistake, clerical mistake, or other irregularity if, in addition, the movant establishes that she acted in good faith and with ordinary diligence and that she has a meritorious defense. Owl Club v. Gotham Hotels, 270 Md. 94, 100 , 310 A.2d 534, 537 (1973); Maryland Lumber v. Savoy Constr. Co., 286 Md. 98, 101-02 , 405 A.2d 741, 743-44 (1979).

The denial of a motion to revise under Rule 2-535(b) is appealable, but the only issue before the appellate court is whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion in denying the motion. New Freedom Corp. v. Brown & Meyer, 260 Md. 383, 386 , 272 A.2d 401, 403 (1971); S. & G. Realty v. Woodmoor Realty, 255 Md. 684, 690-92 , 259 A.2d 281, 283-85 (1969). 5 Except to the extent that they are subsumed in that question, the merits of the judgment itself ⁴⁷⁶ are not open to direct attack. In order to challenge the judgment itself, a timely appeal must be taken from it. In these cases, Nicole filed her Revocation and motion to vacate nine months after the judgment of guardianship was entered and eleven months after the deadline for objecting.

She produced no evidence of either due diligence or a meritorious defense to the petition. Indeed, she produced no evidence at all. The attack on the judgment was based entirely on counsel’s argument that, as a matter of law, Nicole had until entry of a judgment of adoption to object. At no point in her argument did counsel offer any evidence that Nicole actually believed that she had that extended time or that she had any reason for not acting sooner.

As DSS pointed out, the show cause order was also served on the attorney who represented Nicole at the CINA hearing. There was no evidence, or even any suggestion,' that Nicole was ill or otherwise incapacitated. Nor was there any indication of what defense she would have interposed to the petition. The children had been found CINA in 1993 and had been in foster care for over two years.

There had been no contact by Nicole during that time with DSS and apparently none with the children. On this record, we find no error of law and no abuse of discretion in the denial of Nicole’s motions to vacate; we therefore shall affirm the orders denying those motions. C. Nos. 11387 and 11388 These appeals by DSS arise from an order granting a motion to revise under Md. Rule 2—535(b) and vacating en ⁴⁷⁷ rolled judgments. Such an order is appealable as a final judgment, and it brings before the appellate court the merits of that judgment.

First Federated Com. Tr. v. Comm’r, 272 Md. 329, 333 , 322 A.2d 539, 542 (1974); Ventresca v. Weaver Brothers, Inc., 266 Md. 398, 403 , 292 A.2d 656, 659 (1972); Mut. Benefit Soc’y v. Haywood, 257 Md. 538, 540 , 263 A.2d 868, 870 (1970). See also Sisk v. Friendship Packers, 326 Md. 152 , 157-58 n. 3, 604 A.2d 69, 71-72 (1992).

III

DISCUSSION A. Statutory Procedure The procedure governing adoptions and guardianships that terminate parental rights is found in §§ 5-301 through 5-330 of the Family law article and in the implementing rules of this Court. The former rules were in Ch. 1100, subtitle D of the Md. Rules; they now comprise Rules 9-101 through 9-113. We commence with Family Law article, § 5-311(a), which provides that a child may not be adopted without the consent of his natural parents unless the parental rights of those parents have been terminated by a judicial proceeding. It is common for the State, when it concludes that a continuing relationship between a child and his natural parents is likely to be harmful to the welfare of the child, to seek to terminate parental rights as an intermediate measure.

A judgment terminating those rights not only eliminates the need for parental consent to a subsequent adoption but also provides the State with flexibility in seeking out adoptive persons or families and in caring for the child in the interim. Most States authorize this intermediate procedure. See Joan H. Hollinger, et al., Adoption Law and Practice, § 4.04[l][a]. A judgment terminating parental rights may be entered upon the voluntary, affirmative consent of the natural parents if the action is filed under title 5, subtitle 3 of the Family Law ⁴⁷⁸ article. 6 Indeed, except as provided in §§ 5-313 and 5-313.1, a guardianship may not be entered without the consent of each living natural parent.

See § 5—317(c); Md. Rule 9-102(a) (former Md. Rule D 73). Section 5-313 sets forth the circumstances under which a court may enter a judgment of guardianship without the consent, and even over the objection, of the natural parents; section 5-313.1 deals with foreign adoptions and guardianships. Neither section is directly relevant in these cases. A parent’s affirmative consent is not valid unless (1) it contains an express notice of the right afforded by § 5-317 to revoke the consent, and (2) if the parent is a minor, it is also accompanied by an affidavit of counsel that the consent is given knowingly and willingly.

Fam. Law art., § 5-314. The statute contemplates, and the rules (former Rule D 72 a.l.(g)); current Rule 9-103(b)(2)(A)(viii) and (c) require that a copy of any consent signed by a parent either accompany the DSS petition or be filed in court thereafter. At the time the petition was filed in Clemy P.’s case, § 5-317(e) allowed a consenting parent to revoke her consent at any time within the earlier of 30 days after the consent was filed in court or entry of the judgment of guardianship.

As the result of a 1994 amendment, § 5-317(e) now limits the revocation period to 30 days after the consent is signed. In cases in which the parent does not affirmatively consent to the guardianship, § 5-322(a) of the Family Law article requires that the court, upon the filing of a petition, enter and serve upon the parent a show cause order informing the parent of the petition. The rules extend the statute and require more detailed information. Former Rule D 74 (current Rule 9-105) required that a copy of the petition also be served on the parent and set forth a form of show cause order ⁴⁷⁹ for the courts to use.

The order explains in plain language that the parents have the right to object to the guardianship but that, if they wish to object, they must file their objection with the court by the date set forth in the order. In Clemy P.’s case, that date was June 25,1993. As we noted in Part I, the order tells the parents, in capital letters, that if they do not file a notice of objection by the stated deadline, a decree terminating their parental rights may be entered without their consent. As we further noted, a form notice of objection is appended to the show cause order, which also advises the parent of the need to file the notice before the stated deadline.

The notice makes clear that the parent need do nothing more than sign the form and print his or her name, address, and telephone number in the places indicated and mail or deliver it to the court at the address shown. Section 5-322(d) provides in relevant part: “If a person is notified under this section and fails to file notice of objection within the time stated in the show cause order or if a person’s notification has been waived under subsection (c) of this section: (1) the court shall consider the person who is notified or whose notice is waived to have consented to the ... guardianship; and (2) the petition shall be treated in the same manner as a petition to which consent has been given.” 7 Former Rule D 76.a. provided that a person having the right to notice of a guardianship proceeding may file an objection to the guardianship “[wjithin the time specified in the show cause order.” Rule D 77.a. did not make a hearing mandatory but stated only that the court “shall hold such hearing as justice may require.” Current Rule 9—107(b)(1) requires that, if the show cause order is served within Mary ⁴⁸⁰ land, a notice of objection must be filed within 30 days after the show cause order is served. Rule 9-109(a) requires a hearing on the merits “in a contested guardianship action and in every adoption action.” (Emphasis added). Rule 9-lll(a) precludes a court from entering a judgment of guardianship before “[ejxpiration of the time for revoking all required consents.” B. The Parents’ Position In the circuit court, Clemy P. attempted to relate the “deemed” consent under § 5-322(d) to an affirmative consent contemplated by § 5-317 and former Rule D 73, now expressly provided for by Rule 9-102.

She argued that (1) if the judgment of guardianship was based on her “deemed” consent under § 5-322(d), she had a right under § 5-317(e) to revoke that consent at any time prior to entry of the judgment, (2) it was incumbent upon DSS as a matter of due process to inform her that she had that right and to give her notice of all proceedings and papers filed with the court prior to entry of the judgment so that she could effectively exercise her right to revoke, (3) she was not apprised of her right to revoke and was not given notice of DSS’s motion for entry of the judgment or of the entry of the judgment, and (4) the judgment was therefore defective and invalid. In this Court, the Public Defender presses that argument on behalf of Clemy P. but, in advocating the position of the parents in the three Baltimore City cases, has expanded it to include the filing of untimely objections prior to the entry of a judgment of guardianship. In that regard, he urges that (1) courts have discretion under Rules 1-204 and 2-613 to consider late-filed objections, and (2) to construe the law otherwise would cause it to constitute a violation of due process of law and equal protection of the law. That argument was not articulated by Clemy P. in her case in the circuit court.

C. Analysis (1) Question 2: Right To Revoke “Deemed” Consent The argument actually articulated by Clemy P. in the circuit court, which was accepted by that court, founders ⁴⁸¹ on the erroneous assumption that underlies its major premise. Section 5—322(d) does not incorporate within it the provisions of § 5-317(e). A deemed consent under § 5-322(d) may not be revoked, for it is not a volitional consent but one arising by operation of law. If the parent fails to file a timely objection, no further notices need be given to the parent, prior to or upon the entry of a judgment of guardianship.

This conclusion is clear from both the structure and the history of the relevant statutes and rules. Before considering in further detail the current text of the statutes, we note that we have examined closely the legislative development of those statutes and of the rules implementing them. We have reviewed the 1982 general revision of the adoption and guardianship laws (1982 Md. Laws, ch. 514), the revision of the subtitle D Rules in 1983 and 1986, the amendments to § 5-322(d) made in 1987 (1987 Md. Laws, ch. 282), the amendments made to § 5~317(e) adopted in 1992 and 1994 (1992 Md. Laws, ch. 511; 1994 Md. Laws. ch. 234), and the most recent revision to the adoption and guardianship rules adopted by this Court in June, 1996, which took effect January 1, 1997. It is not necessary to prolong this opinion with a complete recitation of those various enactments and promulgations.

It will suffice, to demonstrate the point, to focus on 1987 Md. Laws, ch. 282 amending § 5-322(d) and 1992 Md. Laws, ch. 511 and 1994 Md. Laws, ch. 234, amending § 5-317(e). Until 1986, § 5-322(d), as supplemented by Md. Rule D 76, required a parent who wished to object to a DSS petition for guardianship to file a formal petition to intervene in the case and, if that petition was granted, to file an answer to the petition. In the 94th Report of this Court’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, filed in January, 1986, the Committee recommended, and this Court later adopted, rules that replaced the intervention scheme with a simple notice of objection and required the show cause order to give clear advice as to the necessity and manner of filing an objection and as to the consequence of failing to do so. ⁴⁸² Apart from that change, the Rules Committee raised in its 94th Report the very issue underlying the questions presented here, pointing out that it was unclear from the existing statutes what the effect was of a parent refusing to consent but failing to object to a DSS petition. At the time, § 5-322(c) provided that, if a parent failed to intervene within the time specified, the court shall consider the “requirement of consent” by that person to have been waived.

Even -with the other changes recommended by it, the Committee urged in its Report that the failure to object not be treated as the effective equivalent of consent. In light of substantial opposition to that approach by various groups and certain other ambiguities in the statute, however, the Committee asked the Court to defer action on that recommendation, which we did. The issue raised by the Rules Committee was presented squarely to the Legislature in its 1987 session through the introduction of HB 590, which was enacted as ch. 282. The bill was introduced at the behest of the Governor’s Task Force To Study Adoption Procedures in Maryland.

In its 1987 Report, the Task Force noted the increasing number of children “drifting” in foster care without any permanent home or family attachment. It pointed out that there were then 5,300 children in Maryland in the DSS foster care program, about 3,200 of whom had been in foster care for more than two years. Governor’s Task Force to Study Adoption Procedures In Maryland, Growing Up Alone: Children Waiting For Families vii (1987). DSS statistics showed that, State-wide, it took an average of 5.1 years for a child in foster care to be adopted.

The delay in Baltimore City was even worse—an average of 7.4 years. Id. at