In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. T00032005

HOLLANDER, J. In this termination of parental rights case, we must consider whether a child has the right to withdraw his statutory consent to a petition seeking termination of parental rights. John B., Jr. (“John”), appellant, the minor child of Sheri H. and John B., Sr., complains, inter alia, that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City erred or abused its discretion when it did not permit him to withdraw his “deemed consent” to a Petition for Guardianship, with the Right to Consent to Adoption or ⁵⁷³ Long Term Care Short of Adoption (“the Petition”). The Petition was filed on February 23, 2000, by the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (“the Department” or “DSS”), appellee, when John was ten years of age. The circuit court subsequently granted the Petition. 1 From the time that John came into the Department’s care in 1995, he was placed with his paternal grandparents, Christine and Melvin G. Because John was happy with that placement, he did not object to the Petition and was deemed to have consented to it.

However, both before and at the termination of parental rights (“TPR”) hearing on March 28, 2001, John’s counsel advised the court that John no longer agreed to the Petition. Claiming that John is deeply “attached” to his mother and has “strong ties” to his two siblings, his attorney sought to revoke John’s statutory consent, and voiced John’s opposition to the Petition. On appeal, John presents three questions for our review, which we have reordered and rephrased slightly: I. Did the trial court err in failing to consider whether the child’s changed circumstances warranted relief from the 30-day response deadline to the show cause order?

II

Did the trial court err in failing to consider evidence regarding John’s family ties?

III

Was the evidence sufficient to support the termination of parental rights? For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm. FACTUAL SUMMARY John was born on July 10, 1989. He has a younger half sister, Shunta F., born on January 3, 1993, and an older half ⁵⁷⁴ brother, James H., born on March 12, 1984.

The Department filed a termination petition as to John and Shunta, but not as to James. 2 DSS acknowledges that John is “close” to his siblings. Shortly after Shunta’s birth, the hospital reported that both she and Ms. H. tested positive for drugs. Nevertheless, the three children did not come into care until August 1995; when they were removed because Ms. H.’s drug problem interfered with her ability to care for the children. At the time, the children ranged in age from eleven to two.

When John was removed, he was immediately placed with his paternal grandparents, with whom he has resided ever since. In his brief, appellant recognizes that “[t]here is no question but that John’s current placement with his grandparents affords him a stable environment.” On September 14, 1995, by agreement of the parties, the children were found to be children in need of assistance (“CIÑA”) and committed to the Department. Thereafter, beginning in 1995, Ms. H. entered several service agreements. In John’s brief, he concedes that his mother “failed to adhere” to those agreements.

On August 4, 1995, Ms. H. entered her first service agreement, in which she agreed to obtain drug treatment and attend parenting classes. On August 15,1995, she also agreed to a safety plan, in which she acknowledged her drug problem and her failure to provide proper care for her children. Further, she agreed to enter a drug detoxification and treatment program. Ms. H. executed a second service agreement on November 22, 1995, in which she again agreed to complete drug treatment, obtain a stable home, and attend parenting classes.

On the same day, she entered a residential drug treatment program, but left just three days later. She did not comply with ⁵⁷⁵ the provisions of the service agreement or the safety plan. Ms. H. subsequently had “sporadic contact” with her caseworker. On November 23, 1999, Ms. H. entered yet another service agreement, which again provided for drug treatment, parenting classes, and stable housing.

Ms. H. did not comply with its terms. Throughout this time, John consistently desired both sibling and parental visitation. Although the Department recommended regular sibling visits, John frequently complained about the inadequacy of visitation. In its transfer summary dated August 12, 1996, the Department acknowledged that “John needs to visit with his siblings.

He is very close to his brother.” When John was nine years old, he expressed a desire “to grow up with his paternal grandparents.” At that time, neither of John’s parents had maintained regular contact with the Department, even though they saw John occasionally. Accordingly, on or about March 22,1999, the parties agreed to a permanency plan for John of relative placement for the purpose of adoption or custody and guardianship. 3 On July 28,1999, the Department wrote a letter to John Sr., informing him that DSS was initiating termination of parental rights because John had been in care for “too long.” In a stipulation of September 29, 1999, the Department noted that the permanency plans for all three children were subject to change and were pending reevaluation by the Show Cause Committee. The Department subsequently changed the permanency plan for John and Shunta to adoption, while the permanency plan for James H. continued to be long-term foster care. As we noted, DSS filed the Petition on February 23, 2000, when John was ten years old.

A Show Cause Order was ⁵⁷⁶ served on Ms. H. on April 17, 2000, and she timely objected. John’s father was served with the Petition on June 4, 2000, and did not object. By motion on May 2, 2000, John’s counsel complained about service of the Show Cause Order on appellant. As a result, on May 5, 2000, when John was about two months shy of his eleventh birthday, the Department reserved the Show Cause Order on John’s attorney.

Accordingly, at a hearing on June 6, 2000, John’s counsel withdrew her motion challenging service of the Show Cause Order. She also said: “We have no objection to the TPR at this time.” Nevertheless, John’s attorney expressly sought to preserve John’s “right to be able to participate” fully at the TPR hearing. DSS did not object to that request, and the court responded: “Just in case. Right, right.” John explains that, initially, he did not oppose the termination of parental rights, because he “was in a stable situation with his grandparents and was happy to stay with them.” Over the next several months, however, as John continued to mature and grow “very close” to his family, he changed his mind.

Accordingly, at a conference on January 9, 2001, John’s counsel informed the circuit court that John had “undergone developmental changes and [he] was no longer in favor of the termination.” The court gave John’s lawyer an opportunity to speak with John and to determine whether counsel had to withdraw from her dual representation of John and Shunta, to avoid a possible conflict. John’s counsel subsequently advised the court on January 16, 2001, that John was, indeed, “adamantly opposed to termination.” Accordingly, the court appointed a new attorney for Shunta. At the termination of parental rights hearing on March 28, 2001, neither Ms. H. nor John was present, but both were represented by counsel. John’s counsel advised the court, without objection, that John wanted to remain in the care of his paternal grandparents, but opposed the severance of legal ties to his parents and siblings.

Further, she explained that John “considered himself a part of his biological family,” and wanted to maintain a relationship with his siblings. Suggesting to the court that termination of parental ties' would ⁵⁷⁷ “devastate” John, his lawyer urged the court to allow John to withdraw his prior consent to the Petition and to deny DSS’s request. At the TPR hearing, all the parties proceeded by proffer, without any limitation imposed by the court. In connection with its proffer, the Department offered its entire record as an exhibit, although the court admitted only those portions “which do not contain inappropriate hearsay.” With respect to the proffer made by John’s counsel, the following colloquy is relevant: [THE COURT]: [John’s lawyer], any evidence or proffer as to John’s case? [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Yes, Your Honor.

Let me say that if John B. was here he would try to explain to the court at 11 years old exactly what has personally happened to him with regard to both his mother, his father and now his caretaker[s], his paternal grandparents. As the State has shown, John has, in fact, been with the department since the early age of 1995[sic], has had the department’s involvement, but from his perspective he’s been with his family. His primary caretakers are his grandparents, his paternal grandparents. If he was here he would talk about how he treasured the visits that he does have with his mother, and that he honors and would love to be able to keep a relationship with his mother that would not entail termination of parental rights.

In addition to that, he does have contact with his father because he’s with his paternal grandparents and, in fact, would find it devastating if, in fact, his parents’ legal ties and all other ties were terminated at this time. To the extent that a child can understand what termination of parental rights mean, and to the extent that counsel could explain that, I think that John clearly did not understand the magnitude of what that meant until January 2000, at which time he intimated to his counsel that he was not in favor of TPR. ⁵⁷⁸ In this instance at one time I thought there was some confusion as to whether— [THE COURT]: For January 2001. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: 2001, I’m sorry, Your Hon- or. Thank you. Counsel talked with John extensively about his comprehension of that, and I think it was at that time that he clearly said no, I really don’t want this to happen.

What we’re asking for the court to do is to recognize first of course his right to be able to get a cognitive point of understanding what that meant, and two, to respect that with regard to the emotional, psychological, and legal ramifications of his right to be terminated. I know for the record it was the early stipulation intimate to that [sic]. At one time James (inaudible) was part of this, his brother. The Department did not choose to request termination of parental rights for him.

He’s 16 years old. I think that those boys are very, very close and bonded, and, in fact, we represent all three children, and I think to the extent that both of these boys understand now what that means it is incumbent upon the court for the best interests of this child, given the psychological and emotional damage that could happen to him, that termination of parental rights not be entered, an order for that not be entered. [THE COURT]: And with that John rests? [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: John rests. Ms. H.’s attorney made the following proffer: [THE COURT]: [Mother’s attorney], any evidence on behalf of Ms. H? [MOTHER’S ATTORNEY]: Yes, Your Honor. Other than my client is not here today, she did, through her objection, advise the court and has indicated that her desire is to not have her rights terminated with regard to her children.

Your Honor, as you heard that particularly with John, although she has not been around, she’s not here today and she’s had a rocky experience with the Department of Social ⁵⁷⁹ Services, she has always, throughout all these proceedings, maintained some contact with the Department of Social Services and with her children. And, in fact, apparently it’s been enough that it’s been demonstrated by the 11 year old that her involvement and contact has been enough to maintain his bonding with her. And, Your Honor, I would ask today that her rights not be terminated and that this child’s desires be acknowledged and that his acknowledgment also go for the benefit of the parent, and that her contact is enough that it warrants her being able to maintain her parental rights with regard to this child, and, in fact, with regard to both children. So Your Honor, I’d ask that the Department’s petition for termination be denied.

The Department argued as follows: [COUNSEL FOR DSS]: ... Your Honor, without going through the details of my proffer, I would state to the court that clearly in this case the Department has shown that we did make efforts to work with the mother. As late as 1999 the Department of Social Services did enter into a service agreement with her. As far as the father is concerned, again even we [sic] signed a service agreement well after the 18 month period in 1998, and even at the most recent court review in 2000 when he expressed an interest in a relative resource we did explore that resource, so clearly, Your Honor, we have made efforts in this case to continually work with the parents well beyond statutory requirements.

Your Honor, as to Shunta clearly she’s in a stable placement. There seems to be no argument from child’s counsel as to Shunta. As to John, however, the testimony has been clear that he is in a stable and loving placement. It is a family placement.

He is — because of that placement he does have some access to his biological family, which is a benefit for him, and [that] will continue to take place, my guess is, after ⁵⁸⁰ termination of rights takes place if this court does grant it.... After a review of the requisite statutory factors set forth in Md.Code (1999 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.), § 5-513 of the Family Law Article (“F.L”), the court granted the Petition. We shall include additional facts in our discussion. DISCUSSION A. It is beyond cavil that a parent has a fundamental right to raise his or her own child.

In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687 , 782 A.2d 332 (2001); Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 218 , 721 A.2d 662 (1998); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 112 , 642 A.2d 201 (1994); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 , 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 , 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (recognizing the “fundamental liberty interest” of the parent “in matters of family life----”); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. J970013, 128 Md.App. 242, 247 , 737 A.2d 604 (1999); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 94339058/CAD, 120 Md.App. 88, 97 , 706 A.2d 144 (1998); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 95195062/CAD, 116 Md.App. 443, 454 , 696 A.2d 1102 (1997). Similarly, this Court has recognized that a child has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the preservation of parental rights. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z970003, 127 Md.App. 33, 50-51 , 731 A.2d 467 (1999). Although the Court of Appeals has not decided that precise constitutional issue, it has said that a child “ordinarily has an interest in maintaining a close familial relationship with siblings” and other family members.

In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. T97036005, 358 Md. 1, 16 , 746 A.2d 379 (2000). In Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 the Supreme Court said that, “[wjhen the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.” Similarly, the ⁵⁸¹ Court of Appeals recognized the seriousness of such a proceeding in Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284 , 157 A.2d 273 (1960), stating: (AJdoption decrees cut the child off from the natural parent, who is made a legal stranger to his offspring. The consequences of this drastic and permanent severing of the strongest and basic natural ties and relationships has led the Legislature and this Court to make sure, as far as possible, that adoption shall not be granted over parental objection unless that course clearly is justified. The welfare and best interests of the child must be weighed with great care against every just claim of an objecting parent.

Accord Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. at 113 , 642 A.2d 201 ; Adoption/Guardianship No. 94339058/CAD, 120 Md.App. at 97-98 , 706 A.2d 144 ; Adoption/Guardianship No. 95195062/CAD, 116 Md.App. at 454 , 696 A.2d 1102 . Nevertheless, as the Court of Appeals recently reiterated, the parents’ “fundamental interest ... is not absolute and does not exclude other important considerations.” In Re Mark M., at 343. Indeed, notwithstanding the harsh nature of a termination proceeding, it is unassailable that the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child. Boswell, 352 Md. at 219 , 721 A.2d 662 ; In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 323-24 , 701 A.2d 110 (1997); In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. at 112 , 642 A.2d 201 ; In re Adoption/Guardianship No. J970013, 128 Md.App. at 247 , 737 A.2d 604 .

As the Court underscored in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A 334 Md. 538, 561 , 640 A.2d 1085 (1994): [W]e have ... made clear that the controlling factor, or guiding principle, in adoption and custody cases is not the natural parent’s interest in raising the child, but rather what best serves the interests of the child. We have said that in all cases where the interests of a child are in jeopardy the paramount consideration is what will best promote the child’s welfare, a consideration that is of “tran-scendant importance.” ⁵⁸² Given the gravity of a TPR case, and the compelling nature of the best interest standard, the General Assembly has provided a detailed statutory scheme that must be satisfied before termination may be ordered. To determine what is in a child’s “best interest,” the trial court must consider and address all relevant statutory criteria. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 87A262, 323 Md. 12, 19-20 , 590 A.2d 165 (1991); see In re Abiagail C., 138 Md.App. 570, 587 , 772 A.2d 1277 (2001); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. T98314013, 133 Md.App. 401, 416 , 758 A.2d 552 (2000).

The Court has said: “In cases where parental rights are terminated, it is important that each factor be addressed specifically not only to demonstrate that all factors were considered but also to provide a record for review of this drastic measure.” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 87A262, 323 Md. at 19-20 , 590 A.2d 165 ; see In re Adoption/Guardianship No. T97036005, 358 Md. at 23 , 746 A.2d 379 ; In re Adoption/Guardianship No. T96318005, 132 Md.App. 299, 311 , 752 A.2d 646 (2000). Because a TPR decree severs the legal ties of parent and child, the burden falls on the State to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. T98314013, 133 Md.App. at 412 , 758 A.2d 552 . Accordingly, F.L. § 5-313(a) provides: “A court may grant a decree of adoption or a decree of guardianship, without the consent of a natural parent [only] ... if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the natural parent’s rights as to th[at] child____” (Emphasis added).

We turn to review other pertinent statutory provisions. F.L. § 5-313(c) states, in part: (c) Required considerations. — In determining whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate a natural parent’s rights as to the child in any case, except the case of an abandoned child, the court shall give: (1) primary consideration to the safety and health of the child; and (2) consideration to: ⁵⁸³ (i) the timeliness, nature, and extent of the services offered by the child placement agency to facilitate reunion of the child with the natural parent; (ii) any social service agreement between the natural parent and the child placement agency, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the agreement; (iii) the child’s feelings toward and emotional ties with the child’s natural parents, the child’s siblings, and any other individuals who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; (iv) the child’s adjustment to home, school, and community; (v) the result of the effort the natural parent has made to adjust the natural parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be returned to the natural parent’s home, including: 1. the extent to which the natural parent has maintained regular contact with the child under a plan to reunite the child with the natural parent, but the court may not give significant weight to any incidental visit, communication, or contribution; 2. if the natural parent is financially able, the payment of a reasonable part of the child’s substitute physical care and maintenance; 3. the maintenance of regular communication by the natural parent with the custodian of the child; and 4. whether additional services would be likely to bring about a lasting parental adjustment so that the child could be returned to the natural parent within an ascertainable time, not exceeding 18 months from the time of placement, but the court may not consider whether the maintenance of the parent-child relationship may serve as an inducement for the natural parent’s rehabilitation; and (vi) all services offered to the natural parent before the placement of the child, whether offered by the agency to ⁵⁸⁴ which the child is committed or by other agencies or professionals. When, as here, a child has been adjudicated a CINA, the court must also consider the provisions set forth in F.L. § 5-313(d). That section provides: (d) Considerations following juvenile adjudication.— (1) In determining whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate a natural parent’s rights as to the child in a case involving a child who has been adjudicated to be a child in need of assistance, a neglected child, an abused child, or a dependent child, the court shall consider the factors in subsection (c) of this section and whether any of the following continuing or serious conditions or acts exist: (i) the natural parent has a disability that renders the natural parent consistently unable to care for the immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs of the child for long periods of time; (ii) the natural parent has committed acts of abuse or neglect toward any child in the family; (iii) the natural parent has failed repeatedly to give the child adequate food, clothing, shelter, and education or any other care or control necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health, even though the natural parent is physically and financially able; (iv) 1. the child was bom: A. addicted to or dependent on cocaine, heroin, or a derivative thereof or B. with a significant presence of cocaine, heroin, or a derivative thereof in the child’s blood as evidenced by toxicology or other appropriate tests; and 2. the natural parent refuses admission into a drug treatment program or failed to fully participate in a drug treatment program; or (v) the natural parent has: 1.

Subjected the child to: A. torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse; or ⁵⁸⁵ B. chronic and life-threatening neglect; 2. been convicted [of a statutorily defined crime of violence against certain persons]; or C. of aiding or abetting, conspiring or soliciting to commit [a crime]; or 3. involuntarily lost parental rights of a sibling of the child (2) If a natural parent does not provide specified medical treatment for a child because the natural parent is legitimately practicing religious beliefs, that reason alone does not make the natural parent a negligent parent. (3) The court shall consider the evidence under paragraph (l)(i) through (iv) of this subsection regarding continuing or serious conditions or acts and may waive the child placement agency’s obligations under subsection (c) of this section if the court, after appropriate evaluation of efforts made and services rendered, finds by clear and convincing evidence that the waiver of those obligations is in the best interest of the child. (4) The court shall waive the child placement agency’s obligations under subsection (c) of this section if the court finds that one of the circumstances or acts enumerated in paragraph (l)(v) of this subsection exists. (5) If the court finds that any of the circumstances or acts enumerated in paragraph (l)(v) of this subsection exists, the court shall make a specific finding, based on the facts of the record, as to whether or not the return to the child to the custody of the natural parent poses an unacceptable risk to the future safety of the child.

On appeal, we must “ ‘ascertain whether the trial court considered the statutory criteria, whether its factual determinations were clearly erroneous, whether the court properly applied the law, and whether it abused its discretion in making its determination.’ ” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 94339058/CAD, 120 Md.App. at 101 , 706 A.2d 144 (citation omitted); see In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 ⁵⁸⁶ Md. at 311, 701 A.2d 110 . In explaining the role of appellate review in a termination case, we have stated: “[0]ur function ... is not to determine whether, on the evidence, we might have reached a different conclusion. Rather, it is to decide only whether there was sufficient evidence — by a clear and convincing standard — to support the chancellor’s determination that it would be in the best interest of [the child] to terminate the parental rights of [the] natural [parent]. In making this decision, we must assume the truth of all the evidence, and of all the favorable inferences fairly deducible therefrom, tending to support the factual conclusion of the trial court.” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. T98314013, 133 Md.App. at 415-16 , 758 A.2d 552 (citation omitted).

Appellant lodges numerous challenges to the court’s ruling granting the Petition. John maintains that the trial court erred when it refused to consider whether his changed circumstances — increased maturity and heightened appreciation for the significance of a TPR ruling — warranted relief from his deemed consent to the Petition. At the hearing, appellant’s counsel proffered that, “[a]s [John] grew older and gathered a greater understanding of the long-term consequences of termination, the potential for psychological and emotional damage arising from termination of [parental] ties was likely to increase.” John also relies on F.L. § 5 — 313(c)(2)(iii), and complains that the court failed to consider his emotional ties to his parents and siblings when it determined his best interests. He asserts that the court erred because it “ignored the consistent and uncontroverted evidence in the record of John’s strong [familial] ties to his siblings” and his mother.

In this regard, John points to his consistent efforts to maintain visitation with his family and his feelings of affection for them. Further, John complains that “[l]ittle evidence was proffered” as to the statutory factors, apart from the service agreements. For example, appellant suggests that the court gave “extremely short shrift” to F.L. § 5-313(c)(2)(i), concern ⁵⁸⁷ ing the extent of services offered by DSS to his mother to facilitate reunification. Apart from furniture provided in 1995 and some referrals for drug treatment, John observes that there was no evidence of services to his mother to facilitate reunification, a factor that “deserves particular attention....” John also claims that, on the whole, the record is insufficient to support the court’s ruling that it was in his best interest to grant the Petition.

He maintains that the Department presented “flimsy evidence” that did not support termination, and complains that the court’s ruling was “based on the slimmest of proffers, hardly the weighty ‘clear and convincing’ evidence required to support a severance of parental rights.” Rather, he asserts that DSS did not meet its “exacting burden,” and that the weight of the evidence “tips decisively against termination.” In support of his position, John observes that the trial court issued its decision immediately after the parties rested, and perfunctorily “went through the motions of addressing” the statutory factors. According to appellant, the Department and the court also erred in assuming that John would be able to maintain his “critical” family ties even if the Petition were granted. John argues that “the Department’s decision to proceed with termination was not based on the application of permanency plan priorities, but on the amount of time that had elapsed since John had been brought into care.” He relies on F.L. § 5-525(e), which states: (e) Development of a permanency plan. — (1) In developing a permanency plan for a child in an out-of-home placement, the local department of social services shall give primary consideration to the best interests of the child____ (2) To the extent consistent with the best interest of the child in an out-of-home placement, the local department shall consider the following permanency plans, in descending order of priority: (i) returning the child to the child’s parent or guardian, unless the department is the guardian; ⁵⁸⁸ (ii) placing the child with relatives to whom adoption, guardianship, or care and custody, in descending order of priority, are planned to be granted; (iii) adoption in the following descending order of priority: (1) by a current foster parent with whom the child has resided continually for at least the 12 months prior to developing the permanency plan or for a sufficient length of time to have established positive relationships and family ties; or (2) by another approved adopted family; (iv) an independent living arrangement; or (5) in long-term foster care. Appellant argues that DSS had an alternative to termination of parental rights, stating: There is no question but that John’s current placement with his grandparents affords him a stable environment.

There is also no question, as set forth above, that his stability is fostered, if not dependent upon, his continued visits with his siblings and family members. Both goals can be achieved by keeping John in the long term care of his relatives. John’s counsel urged the Court to consider the existence of an alternative to termination — continued relative placement with his grandparents — as in his best interest and therefore a strong reason to deny the Petition. B. We first consider John’s claim that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in refusing to consider whether a child’s change in circumstances warrants relief from the 30-day response deadline to a show cause order.

We begin with a review of the applicable statutory provisions. F.L. § 5 — 317(c) provides: (c) Requirements for granting petition. -Except as provided in §§ 5-313 and 5-313.1 of this subtitle, the court may grant a decree awarding guardianship only: ⁵⁸⁹ (1) after any investigation and hearing the court considers necessary; and (2) with the consent of each living natural parent of the child. F.L. § 5-317(e) is also pertinent. It states: (e) Revocation of consent. — In a proceeding for guardianship, consent may be revoked at any time within 30 days after the consent is signed.

Further, F.L. § 5-322(d) provides: (d) Failure to respond or waiver of notification. — If a person is notified under this section and fails to file a notice of objection within the time stated in the show cause order or if a person’s notification has been waived under subsection (c) of this section: (1) the court shall consider the person who is notified or whose notice is waived to have consented to the adoption or to the guardianship; and (2) the petition shall be treated in the same manner as a petition to which consent has been given. (Emphasis added). Title 9 of the Maryland Rules is called “Family Law Actions.” Maryland Rule 9-107(a) states: “Any person having a right to participate in a proceeding for adoption or guardianship may file a notice of objection to the adoption or guardianship .... ” Rule 9-107(b)(1) states, in part: “[A]ny notice of objection to adoption or guardianship shall be filed within 30 days after the show cause order is served.” (Emphasis added). (3) John’s attorney was served with the Petition and Show Cause Order on May 11, 2000, pursuant to F.L. § 5-322(a)(l)(ii)(l).

No objection was ever filed on John’s behalf. Therefore, pursuant to F.L. § 5-322(d), John was deemed to have consented to the Petition. Nevertheless, John claims that the trial court erred or abused its discretion because it did not allow him to withdraw his deemed consent. ⁵⁹⁰ Appellant states that “there are situations, which we expect will be relatively infrequent, when changed circumstances should require the trial court to consider whether relief from those timelines is necessary to enable the court to protect the best interest of the child.” Because children continue to mature and gain greater appreciation for the significance of a termination proceeding, John urges that, upon request, “the trial court should determine whether the child’s changed circumstances warrant relief from his earlier position.” Therefore, he maintains that a trial court must have discretion to allow a child to change his or her mind, based on changed circumstances. John points to his increased maturity and corresponding appreciation for the importance of a TPR order as the kind of change in circumstances that justified his request to revoke his consent.

It is undisputed that John’s failure to object was not inadvertent. Indeed, he acknowledges in his brief that he wanted “to grow up with his paternal grandparents,” and “was happy to stay” with them. On the other hand, John was just ten years old when the Petition was filed in February 2000. A year later, he sought to withdraw his consent, as a result of ensuing “developmental changes” and his increasing maturity.

John maintains that “[h]is intervening intellectual and emotional development led him to [gain] a greater understanding of the significance of termination....” At that point, although John still “wanted to remain with his paternal grandparents, he was strongly opposed to cutting off’ his legal ties to his family. To be sure, in the life of a child, a year hopefully provides an opportunity for significant intellectual and emotional growth, of a kind that is not generally associated with a comparable period in adulthood. Based on the circumstances of this case, however, we are satisfied that, in effect, John was allowed to withdraw his consent, because he had a full opportunity to advise the court of his opposition to the TPR. Moreover, the court considered John’s view, even though the court was not certain whether the statute permitted John to ⁵⁹¹ interpose a belated objection or revoke his consent.

We explain. As we observed, John’s attorney expressly represented to the court that John, who was eleven at the time of trial, had changed his mind and opposed termination of parental rights. John’s lawyer explained that, until January 2001, John “clearly did not understand the magnitude” of a termination ruling. In view of John’s “cognitive point of understanding what termination meant,” and his close familial bonds, his counsel asked the court to deny the Petition.

Significantly, DSS did not object to the proffer made by John’s lawyer, nor did the court restrict John’s opportunity to present his proffer. 4 Subsequently, in closing argument, counsel for DSS said: [COUNSEL FOR DSS]: Your Honor, I do feel compelled to bring to your attention that this case is one of those cases that straddles the Christopher [C.] time lines. On May 11th of 2000 we served [child’s counsel] ... as to this petition .... And, Your Honor, we have no indication in our file that there is an objection on behalf of either of her clients at the time both children were her clients and there’s no indication that there is an objection. So, Your Honor, according to Christopher [C.] standards her client has consented.

And, Your Honor, I can see that I feel that this is an ugly way to go when you’ve heard the expression of her client. However, we served her in May. She had 30 days at that time to object, and there is no objection. THE COURT: To the extent- — and [John’s counsel], I’d love to hear from you in a few minutes, but to the extent that [counsel] on behalf of a child post Christopher [C.][is] clearly entitled to participate and participated by way of proffering his position, and I assume you’d