In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. T96318005

MOYLAN, Judge. The appellant, Janet P., challenges an order issued by Judge Martin P. Welch, Sr., in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City terminating her parental rights with regard to her son, Edwin C. On appeal, she contends: 1. that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights; and 2. that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence. On August 17, 1994, the appellant’s son, Edwin C., was declared to be a child in need of assistance (“CINA”) and committed to the Baltimore City Department of Social Ser ³⁰¹ vices (the “Department”), with limited guardianship awarded to the appellant’s aunt, Leola J. Edwin’s status as a CINA was continued at a review hearing on February 28, 1996. According to stipulations entered into by both the appellant and the Department, the appellant has been “diagnosed as having a rare, severe psychiatric disorder called ‘Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy.’ ” The disorder “is characterized by a parent’s, usually a mother’s, falsely reporting or actually causing symptoms of medical illness in her child.” As a result of this disorder, the appellant’s first child, Christina, was declared to be a CINA in June of 1990, when she was eleven months old, after it was determined that she needed to have 95% of her pancreas removed due to severe life-threatening hypoglycemia.

The hypoglycemia was caused by the appellant’s having injected Christina with insulin. The appellant’s parental rights with regard to Christina were terminated and Christina was subsequently adopted. The appellant was ultimately convicted of child abuse and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. The appellant’s sentence was suspended and she was placed on five years probation.

As of February 28, 1996, the appellant’s probationary period had ended. On November 11, 1996, Department filed a petition to terminate the appellant’s parental rights with regard to Edwin. On March 4 and June 7, 1999, a two-day hearing was held in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Judge Welch found that termination of the appellant’s parental rights would be in Edwin’s best interest and granted the Department’s petition.

The appellant noted this timely appeal. The appellant first contends that Judge Welch erred in terminating her parental rights. The appellant specifically contends that the trial judge erred in finding that the appellant’s previous abuse of Christina was enough to outweigh the Department’s requirement to offer adequate reunification efforts as provided for in Md.Code, Family Law, § 5-313(c). We are not persuaded. ³⁰² Section 5-313 of the Family Law Article provides, in pertinent part: (c) Required, considerations. — In determining whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate a natural parent’s rights as to the child in any case, except the case of an abandoned child, the court shall give: (1) primary consideration of the safety and health of the child; and (2) consideration to: (i) the timeliness, nature, and extent of services offered by the child placement agency to facilitate reunion of the child with the natural parent; (ii) any social service agreement between the natural parent and the child placement agency, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the agreement; (iii) the child’s feelings toward and emotional ties with the child’s natural parents, the child’s siblings, and any other individuals who may significantly affect the child’s best interests; (iv) the child’s adjustment to home, school and community; (v) the result of the effort the natural parent has made to adjust the natural parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be returned to the natural parent’s home, including: 1. the extent to which the natural parent has maintained regular contact with the child under a plan to reunite the child with the natural parent, but the court may not give significant weight to any incidental visit, communication, or contribution; 2. if the natural parent is financially able, the payment of a reasonable part of the child’s substitute physical care and maintenance; 3. the maintenance of regular communication by the natural parent with the custodian of the child; and ³⁰³ 4. whether additional services would be likely to bring about a lasting parental adjustment so that the child could be returned to the natural parent within an ascertainable time, not exceeding 18 months form the time of placement, but the court may not consider whether the maintenance of the parent-child relationship may serve as inducement for the natural; parent’s rehabilitation; and (vi) all services offered to the natural parent before the placement of the child, whether offered by the agency to which the child is committed or by other agencies or professionals.

In cases involving a child previously adjudicated as a child in need of assistance, the section further provides: (d) Considerations following juvenile adjudication. — (1) In determining whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate a natural parent’s rights as to the child in a case involving a child who has been adjudicated to be a child in need of assistance, a neglected child, an abused child, or a dependent child, the court shall consider the factors in subsection (c) of this section and whether any of the following continuing or serious conditions or acts exist: (i) the natural parent has a disability that renders the natural parent consistently unable to care for the immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs of the child for long periods of time; (ii) the natural parent has committed acts of abuse or neglect toward any child in the family; (iii) the natural parent has failed repeatedly to give the child adequate food, clothing, shelter, and education or any other care or control necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health, even though the natural parent is physically able and financially able; (iv) 1. the child was born: A. addicted to or dependent on cocaine, heroin, or a derivative thereof; or ³⁰⁴ IN RE ADOPTION T96318005 [ 132 Md.App. 299 (2000).] B. with a significant presence of cocaine, heroin or a derivative thereof in the child’s blood as evidenced by-toxicology or other appropriate tests; and 2. the natural parent refuses admission into a drug treatment program or failed to fully participate in a drug treatment program; or (v) the natural parent has: 1. subjected the child to: A. torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse; or B. chronic and life-threatening neglect; 2. been convicted: A. in this state of a crime of violence, as defined in Article 27, § 643B of the Code, against the child, the other natural parent of the child, another child of the natural parent, or any person who resides in the household of the natural parent; B. in any state or in any court of the United States of a crime that would be a crime of violence, as defined in Article 27, § 643B of the Code, if committed in this State against the child, the other natural parent of the child, another child of the natural parent, or any person who resides in the household of the natural parent; or C. of aiding, abetting, conspiring or soliciting to commit a crime described in item A or item B of this item; or 3. involuntarily lost parental rights of a sibling of the child. (2) If a natural parent does not provide specific medical treatment for a child because the natural parent is legitimately practicing religious beliefs, that reason alone does not make the natural parent a negligent parent. (3) The court shall consider the evidence under paragraph (l)(i) through (iv) of this subsection regarding continuing or serious conditions or acts and may waive the child placement agency’s obligations under subsection (c) of this section if the court, after appropriate evaluation of efforts made and services rendered, finds by clear and convincing ³⁰⁵ evidence that the waiver of those obligations is in the best interest of the child. (4) The Court shall waive the child placement agency’s obligations under subsection (c) of this section if the court finds that one of the circumstances or acts enumerated in paragraph (l)(v) of this subsection exists.

(5) If the court finds that any of the circumstances or acts enumerated in paragraph (l)(v) of this subsection exists, the court shall make a specific finding based on facts in the record, as to whether or not the return of the child to the custody of the natural parent poses an unacceptable risk to the future of the safety of the child. In rendering his decision and thereby terminating the appellant’s parental rights, Judge Welch considered extensively all of the required considerations listed in § 5-313 and explained his findings as follows: The Court, having had the opportunity to review the exhibits, the three exhibits, that were admitted into evidence as well as the testimony that was given in this court on March 4, 1999, and today’s date, the court makes the following findings pursuant to Family Law Article 5-300, generally. First of all, the Court makes a finding that the respondent’s father, Mr. Edwin Andrew C., filed a notice of objection on November 1, 1996, and then on October 16, 1997, filed with the court a fully signed denial of paternity and consent to guardianship. So, therefore, he is deemed to have consented by operation of law.

The Court’s following findings and comments will address issues as to both the respondent, Edwin C., and the respondent’s mother, Ms. Janet P. First of all, the Court finds pursuant to Family Law Article 5-313(a)(2) that this respondent, on August 14, 1994, was found to be a child in need of the Court’s assistance and committed to the Department of Social Services, and has remained committed to the Department ever since. The Court will consider though, the 5-313(c) factors, and specifically, (c)(1), to wit, primary consideration to the safety and health of the respondent. ³⁰⁶ The Court does find that the Department of Social Services, through the current caretaker, is meeting the safety and health needs of the respondent. The Court is not at this juncture fully satisfied or convinced of the mother’s ability. I am not saying that she cannot, but the mother has not had an opportunity to demonstrate if she is able to meet his safety and health needs.

The (c)(2) factors are considerations to (2)(i), timeliness, nature, and extent of services offered by the child placement agency to facilitate reunion of the child with the natural parent. The Court finds that — and maybe it is the nature of this case, the respondent was born in June 1994, and then finally ... 8 months later, the Department gets the treatment plan from Dr. Ravenscroft. So the Court is not overly convinced that the Department provided services in the timeliest of fashions. The Court does find, at least as to this one issue, that one of the underlying issues in this case had to do with conflict or family issues and conflict resolution between the caretaker and the other maternal relatives as well as the mother.

The Court finds that the Department did not exactly make the most effective referrals to the mother to deal with issues of conflict resolution. The (c)(2)(ii) factor, any social service agreements, in this case there were not social service agreements entered into between the mother and the Department. Section (2)(iii) is the child’s feelings toward and emotional ties with parents, siblings, or other individuals who may