In Re Adoption/Guardianship of Victor A.

⁴¹⁶ ADKINS, Judge. At stake in this case are the interests of two parents and their severely disabled four year old in continuing their parent-child relationship, even though the child may never be able to live with either parent. Mr. “A” and Ms. “A” appeal from a decision to terminate their parental rights in order to make Victor A eligible for adoption. We shall vacate the judgment and remand to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, because it failed to make required factual findings or to explain why terminating the As’ parental rights is in Victor’s best interests.

On remand, the court and the Prince George’s Department of Social Services (DSS) must consider whether this is one of the rare cases in which a foster care permanency plan is in the child’s best interest. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Victor Victor A was born on March 26, 2000 to Ms. A and Mr. A. 1 He tested positive for cocaine and amphetamines at birth and was diagnosed with severe mental and physical disabilities, including cerebral palsy. His diagnoses include Mental Retardation, Dysphagia, Myopia, Reflux, Global Developmental Impairment Microcephaly, Encephalopathy, and Failure to Thrive. Victor cannot speak or walk, nor is he expected to be able to do so.

Victor is unable to control his head or any of his extremities, because he is severely spastic and cannot sit up unaided. He is given Valium to help this, as well as other medications to decrease muscle spasms, drug treatments through a nebulizer four times daily, and nose spray to help keep his lungs and breathing passages open. He has several contraptions, including a tumble form, a stander, and a straight sitter, which are ⁴¹⁷ used to stretch his muscles while keeping him safe and upright. Victor is unable to hold anything for very long.

He uses a wheelchair, braces to keep his legs straight, and a wedge to lie on. He is nearsighted, despite “lazy eye” surgery. He wears glasses but no one knows how much they really help his sight. Victor also requires medicines to help him void his bowels; he was not toilet trained at the time of these termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings, needing to be changed every two or three hours.

In order to prevent deformities that can result from the contraction of muscles and to help improve motor skills, Victor receives physical and occupational therapy, as well as speech therapy. Through treatments, it is hoped that Victor will be able to grasp objects, sit up on his own, and possibly even learn to use a message board to communicate. Because Victor has a swallowing disorder, he can be fed only through a gastronomy tube (G tube). His accompanying reflux disorder is managed daily by three different medications and gradual feeding using his G tube.

Over a 24 hour period, Victor gets medication evexy hour or two. He sleeps in a hospital cxib with side rails and suffers from sleep apnea; therefore he has to be watched through the night. Victor sees numerous doctors including a physical medicine doctor, a pulmonologist, an ophthomologist, a neurologist, a gastrologist, a pediatrician, and an orthopedist as part of his care. Victor’s foster mother, Jackie Plumley, said that Victor “pretty much has a doctor for every system he has.” Since he began residing at Plumley’s home in April 2001, Victor has gained weight and generally seems to be a happy, well-mannered child.

Victor is aware of his surroundings and is able to communicate on some level. He shows his pleasure by smiling or giggling when he is happy or crying and grimacing when he is upset. He can select between two toys or show his like or dislike of a television program. He also no longer cries when his caretaker leaves him bxiefly, if she explains to him that she will return in a moment. ⁴¹⁸ Victor responds to people he knows, including his parents and his foster mother.

Both Mr. A and Ms. A have court-approved visitation with Victor. Victor recognizes each parent and expresses happiness when they arrive. He enjoys their visits. All agree that both parents love Victor and express that love in these visits.

Mr. A’s History And Interactions With Victor Victor was discharged from the hospital in July 2000, to the care of Sonya Harris, one of Ms. A’s sisters. Neither Ms. A nor Mr. A was able to take Victor because Ms. A was an active substance abuser and Mr. A was being assessed for substance abuse as well. Mr. A agreed to be tested in order to prove that he was not taking drugs. The results were negative.

There has never been any indication of substance abuse by Mr. A. In late October, however, Victor was moved into therapeutic foster care with Mary Guding because Ms. A alleged that Harris’ fifteen-year-old son had sexually abused Victor. The DSS did not believe that Mr. and Ms. A were ready to assume custody and care of Victor. The abuse allegations were later ruled out and Harris was offered the opportunity to resume custody of Victor. She declined because she was angry with Ms. A. While Victor was in Guding’s foster care, Mr. A had unsupervised visitation with Victor from Wednesday through Saturday or Sunday of every week.

Mr. A was awarded full custody of Victor in January 2001. The court authorized only supervised visits for Ms. A, however, mostly due to concern about her mental health. Mr. A’s custody was rescinded three months later, because Victor’s medical needs were not being met and the DSS suspected that Victor had been left in Ms. A’s unsupervised care, in violation of the court order granting Mr. A custody. Mr. A had been relying on relatives of Ms. A for Victor’s care during the day.

These arrangements changed on a daily basis. Victor’s therapists had great difficulty locating Victor ⁴¹⁹ for his treatments, frequently having to call several homes to find out where Victor was that day. As a result, Victor often did not receive necessary in-home services. When Victor was returned to therapeutic foster care in April, he was adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA).

Victor was placed with Jackie Plumley, who continued to care for him through the time of the TPR proceedings. Plumley described Victor’s emaciated and feverish condition when he arrived: He was a mess. He was crying hysterically nonstop not only the first few hours but almost for the first week. His body itself was—he was quite emaciated.

He was very light in weight. He weighed 17 pounds, I believe, 17 something. His skin itself had a big rash on it around his neck from drooling, I’m sure, because it was an eczema-type thing. He had a quarter size or larger ulceration on the inside of his lip, bottom lip where he was just biting, and I had never seen anything quite so bad, actually.

It had to be very painful. He was in dire need of medical attention. Plumley re-enrolled Victor in the Rare and Expensive Medical Program (REM) to obtain the equipment he needed because those services had lapsed. She also had his prescriptions refilled.

After Victor was returned to foster care, Mr. A resided in the basement of someone else’s home, where he could not take Victor on a permanent basis. Mr. A agreed to find other housing and to arrange for appropriate daycare for Victor. Although he had the financial means to secure suitable housing, he was reluctant to undertake that expense until he could be sure that Victor would live with him. Mr. A signed service agreements on June 6 and August 26, 2001, in which he promised to take parenting classes for parents of children with special needs.

DSS caseworkers referred Mr. A to three programs and wrote to the one that he selected, advising of Victor’s condition and Mr. A’s need for training. Mr. A did attend some of Victor’s medical appoint ⁴²⁰ ments, as well as educational meetings concerning children with special needs. Mr. A continued to visit Victor after he returned to foster care at the Plumleys. According to Plumley, Mr. A was satisfied with that arrangement.

He initially told her that he did not think he could take care of Victor because, at least in his native Nigeria, “that’s the mother’s job.” Plumley told him about the services that would be available to him and told him about a conference for children with cerebral palsy, which he attended. Nevertheless, Mr. A continued to observe that “[i]t’s my culture that the woman takes care of the children.” Mr. A later disputed that he said caring for children is the woman’s job. Although Mr. A and Victor initially had unsupervised overnight visits away from the Plumleys, those were reduced to day visits because Mr. A did not give Victor the right amount of medication. 2 Mr. A’s visits were rescheduled from ten in the morning until six at night so that Victor would need no food or medication during that time period. According to Plumley, since Victor was placed in her care and been placed on a very regular regime of medication, therapy, and sustenance, he has become a delightful young man.

His personality has blossomed. He’s less irritable. Physically the things that were wrong are gone, the rashy skin. He’s well hydrated now.

The ulcerations that he had in his mouth healed up and they’re not present. When Victor first came to me he was so irritable that I almost didn’t keep him. Ms. A’s History, Diagnoses, And Interaction With Victor At the time of Victor’s birth and hospital release, Ms. A was an active cocaine and alcohol abuser who was not undergoing ⁴²¹ treatment. Ms. A was referred to the Treatment of Mothers of Addicted Newborns (TMAN) program 3 while Victor was still hospitalized following his birth.

TMAN then referred Ms. A to the Children and Parents Program (CAP), which offers outpatient substance abuse and mental health therapies. Ms. A began treatment there on June 2, 2000. She was expected to submit to urinalyses and go to treatment sessions three days a week. Ms. A attended sessions on June 5 and 7, but did not come again until June 30.

Her first urinalysis tested positive for cocaine and two other tests were positive for alcohol. TMAN referred Victor to the DSS because Ms. A had missed so many sessions. Ms. A claimed that she had been unable to attend the CAP sessions because she was visiting the hospital for instruction on Victor’s care. The hospital denied that she received such instruction.

Ms. A eventually returned to the CAP program, which she attended on a fairly regular basis, though she did lapse occasionally. Ms. A. was allowed supervised visits at first, and later unsupervised visits with Victor. By October 2000, Mr. A and Ms. A were allowed to have extended visits with Victor. Kathleen Schooley, Victor’s DSS caseworker, related her concerns about Ms. A’s handling of Victor during her visits.

She stated that Ms. A did not support his head, which he cannot support himself, letting it “flop.” She also “scrunched up” his legs, an action that exacerbates the constriction in his chest and stomach, and thus puts pressure on his abdominal area. Nurse Karole Ozkirbas reported that, although Ms. A had been taught the proper way to hold Victor, she often handled him in an unsafe manner. Jackie Plumley testified that Victor had vomited on occasion after visits with Ms. A, possibly due to her improper handling of him. ⁴²² In order to gain custody of Victor, Ms. A was required to have psychological, sociological, and psychiatric evaluations; to complete parenting skills classes for the parents of special needs children; to engage in mental health therapy; and to participate in substance abuse treatment. 4 Ms. A was discharged from the CAP program on May 2, 2001, because she moved to Washington, D.C. Her CAP therapist, however, felt she required further treatment. She referred Ms. A to another mental health treatment program in the District of Columbia.

Ms. A did attend these programs as well as a United Cerebral Palsy parenting class. Ms. A was examined by Jamal Lewis, Ph.D. over two sessions on August 19 and October 5, 2002. Although the juvenile court had released Ms. A from court-ordered drug testing 30 days earlier, she reported to Lewis that she was living in a “crack” house, had consumed alcohol in the preceding thirty days, and had tested positive for cocaine recently. ⁴²³ Dr. Lewis recommended substance abuse treatment and individual mental health counseling. A DSS caseworker tried to obtain medical assistance for Ms. A in the District of Columbia, where Ms. A was residing at the time, so that her therapy would be paid for without having to travel to Maryland for treatment.

The caseworker was not able to ascertain a home address for Ms. A, and Ms. A did not provide one. For that reason, the caseworker could not secure medical assistance for Ms. A from October 2002, when Dr. Lewis made the recommendation, to January 2003, when Ms. A voluntarily entered Bethany Women’s Center in N Street Village. From January 2003 until the TPR hearing, Ms. A was in the Bethany Women’s Center program, residing at the Luther Place Night Shelter. At the shelter, she is not permitted to have any children living with her, though she had tried to obtain a placement in transitional housing, but found it would be possible only if Victor was in her custody.

She had to remain on the campus of the shelter all the time for the first ninety days she was there, except when she had medical appointments or had to attend mandatory AA or NA meetings. She had random urinalyses approximately once a month. At the time of the TPR hearing, her results had all been negative. Ms. A also received therapy from Community Connections, a psychiatric day program providing mental health services and therapeutic case management.

Ms. A attends both group therapy and individual therapy sessions covering issues of mental health, substance abuse, and personal welfare in general, as well as anger management, problem solving, and coping. Ms. A also was evaluated by David Paul Faygo, Ph.D. on May 28 and June 4, 2003, in accordance with a court order. Dr. Faygo testified at the TPR hearing that he reviewed a great deal of past information, previous medical records, court reports, and correspondence before the evaluation. After a two hour clinical interview and psychological testing, he concluded that she has an Axis 1 diagnosis of delusional disorder, which he thought was part of a Type II Bipolar Disorder, a major mood disorder characterized by states of high energy, ⁴²⁴ sleeplessness, delusions, and actions that reflect impaired judgment and decision-making.

He also determined that she has an Axis 2 diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder with paranoid schizoidal and obsessive compulsive traits, which are common in persons with Type II Bipolar Disorder. Dr. Faygo recounted Ms. A’s difficult history arising from her mother’s mental illness, depression, and nervous breakdowns, and from sexual abuse she experienced as a child. He diagnosed her with polysubstance dependence in early partial remission, meaning that she was in a treatment program and had been substance-free from four to six months. He explained that, at this early stage of recovery, she was at risk of relapsing.

In Faygo’s professional experience, a woman with Ms. A’s diagnoses and in her situation could care for a child, but it would affect her ability to function well. He felt that, even though Ms. A was trying to be able to take care of her child and to comply with the service agreement requirements, Victor’s enormous needs, both developmental and medical, are enough to overwhelm two parents, let alone one. He testified that he “could not see how [Ms. A] would ever be capable of providing for his care.” Change In Permanency Plan On May 28, 2002, 13% months after Victor was placed in the Plumleys’ care, the primary permanency plan for Victor was changed from reunification with Mr. A to adoption. On December 12, at a review and permanency planning hearing, the court granted the DSS limited guardianship; ordered Ms. A to continue drug testing and counseling for her substance abuse and mental health needs; and ordered Mr. A to attend training for parents of children with cerebral palsy, to secure housing suitable for Victor, and to obtain an attorney.

It reduced both parents’ visits to once a month. The day before, the DSS had petitioned the court for a termination of parental rights with the right to consent to adoption. ⁴²⁵ Joan Terry, Victor’s caseworker at the time, testified that one reason for the change in the permanency plan was that she saw no movement on Mr. A’s part. She only wanted to reunify Victor with his father, due to Ms. A’s substance abuse, mental health problems, and housing situation. Terry asked for the change because [i]t had been at least 15 months and reunification had not occurred, and that’s one of the policies that all of us in foster care know about.

Not only that, there was no movement on Mr. A’s part and I could not sit on this case and just hold it. When asked, “did you consider leaving Victor with Mrs. Plumley and just letting [the parents] visit?” Terry explained: No.... There has to be some movement on these cases. That’s part of policy.

I mean, somebody has to do something. It has to move toward a goal of stabilization for the child, and if the child can be adopted by a family because their own family isn’t doing anything and are not capable then that’s the way it should be. So why would I just leave a kid in a foster home.... Terry also ruled out a permanent foster care placement because Plumley planned to retire in two to three years.

Kathleen Schooley, the caseworker who succeeded Terry, confirmed that a plan to leave Victor in long-term foster care while allowing the A’s to continue visits “was ruled out.” The Decision At the end of the TPR hearing, the circuit court found that “Victor ... has an awareness that his parents are special people, and he reacts to them as well as his foster parents, whom he reacts to as special people.” Given Ms. A’s history of mental illness and substance abuse, however, “the return of Victor, Jr., to his mom does pose an unacceptable risk to [his] future safety[.]” In contrast, the court stated that it could not make a similar finding with respect to Mr. A. ⁴²⁶ Although the court was satisfied with Mr. A’s parent training efforts, it found Mr. A’s failure to find housing appropriate for Victor troubling. The court discounted Mr. A’s assurances that, if Victor were to be returned to his care, he would secure suitable housing, finding that “Mr. A has not really put himself in a better position to deal with Victor, Junior’s problems, that there is little likelihood that those conditions will be remedied at an early date so the child can indeed return to the natural parent in the immediate future.” The court determined that Victor was receiving better care through the foster care placement arranged by the DSS than his father could give him. At the end of the August 14 hearing, however, it reserved decision on “whether it is in the best interests to terminate his parents’ rights[.]” In a September 29, 2003 written order, the court “eonclude[d] that it is in the best interests of Victor [A] for termination of his natural parents rights[.]” It granted the DSS’s petition for guardianship -with the right to consent to adoption and/or long term care, but also [found] that until such time as the “Department” identifies such adoptive or long-term resource, that it is in the best interests of Victor [A] to continue visitation with [Ms. A] and [Mr. A] under the supervision of the “Department.” Ms. A and Mr. A filed this timely appeal. DISCUSSION Termination Of Parental Rights The proper starting point for legal analysis when the State involves itself in family relations is the fundamental constitutional rights of a parent.

Certain fundamental rights are protected under the U.S. Constitution, and among those rights are a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in raising his or her children as he or she sees fit, without undue interference by the State. In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 565 , 819 A.2d 1030 (2003). The right to rear one’s own child is a basic civil right that cannot ⁴²⁷ be taken away without clear justification, under both federal and Maryland law. See id. at 566-67 , 819 A.2d 1030 .

But “[t]he rights of a parent in the raising of his or her children ... are not absolute.” Id. at 568, 819 A.2d 1030 . In some circumstances, “application of an absolute right of the parent would fail to produce a just result.” Id. “[WJhen clear and convincing evidence exists that the child’s best interests are served by termination^] a parent’s constitutional right to parent his child [may] be permanently foreclosed.” In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. J9610436 and J9711031, 368 Md. 666, 692-93 , 796 A.2d 778 (2002). A court considering whether to terminate parental rights must give “primary consideration to the safety and health of the child[.]” Md.Code (1984, 1999 RepLVol., 2003 Cum.Supp.), § 5-313(c)(l) of the Family Law Article (FL). “[I]n almost all cases, it is in the best interests of the child to have reasonable maximum opportunity to develop a close and loving relationship with each parent.” In re Adoption/Guardianship J9610436, 368 Md. at 670 , 796 A.2d 778 . For that reason, [t]he best interests of the child standard embraces a strong presumption that the child’s best interests are served by maintaining parental rights.

If it were otherwise, the most disadvantaged of our adult citizens always would be at greater risk of losing custody of their children than those more fortunate. Those of our citizens coping with emotional or mental difficulties could be faced with such discrimination. In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 571 , 819 A.2d 1030 (citations omitted). For children in foster care, both the local social services department and the court must consider whether the individual child’s health and safety is being compromised by the long term effects of foster care.

Federal and state governments have recognized that long periods of foster care may harm the very children whom the foster care system is designed to protect. They have undertaken reasonable steps to prevent childhoods spent in “foster care drift”—the legal, emotional, ⁴²⁸ and physical limbo of temporary housing with temporary care givers. The federal “Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,” codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-79 , was enacted to redress the growing problem of children spending substantial amounts of their childhood in foster homes. See id. at 572 , 819 A.2d 1030 ; In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 104 , 642 A.2d 201 (1994).

To comply with federal mandates in that act, the Maryland General Assembly ... enacted legislation .... for those children committed to a local department of social services ... requiring] [the department] to develop and implement a permanency plan that is in the best interests of the child. F.L. § 5-525. In developing the permanency plan, the department is required to consider a statutory hierarchy of placement options in descending order of priority. F.L. § 5-525(c).

First and foremost, the department must consider returning the child to the child’s natural parents or guardians. F.L. § 5-525(c)(l). If reunification with the biological parents is not possible, the department must consider placing the child with relatives to whom adoption, guardianship, or care and custody, in descending order of priority, are planned to be granted. F.L. § 5-525(c)(2).

If placement with relatives is not possible, then the department must consider adoption by a current foster parent or other approved adoptive family. F.L. § 5-525(e)(2)(3)(l). Only in exceptional situations as defined by rule or regulation is a child to be placed in long term foster care. F.L. § 5-525.

If it is determined that reunification is not possible and that adoption is in the child’s best interests, .... the department is required to petition the circuit court for guardianship pursuant to F.L. § 5-313. If the circuit court finds by clear and convincing evidence, after considering the statutorily enumerated factors, that it is in the best interest of a child previously adjudicated a CINA for parental rights to be terminated, the circuit court has authority to grant the department’s petition for guardianship. Such award carries ⁴²⁹ with it the right for the department to consent to the adoption of the child. F.L. §§ 5-311 and 5—317(f).

The overriding theme of both the federal and state legislation is that a child should have permanency in his or her life. The valid premise is that it is in a child’s best interest to be placed in a permanent home and to spend as little time as possible in foster care. Thus, Title 5 of the Family Law Article seeks to prevent the need for removal of a child from its home, to return a child to its home when possible, and where returning home is not possible, to place the child in another permanent placement that has legal status. In re Adoption/Guardianship 10941, 335 Md. at 105-06 , 642 A.2d 201 (emphasis added); see In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 575-76 , 819 A.2d 1030 .

Foster Children With Special Needs Together, sections 5-313, 5-525, and 5-525.1 of the Family Law Article, along with Md.Code (1974, 2002 RepLVol., 2003 Cum.Supp.), section 3-283 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ), comprehensively govern termination of the rights of parents whose children are in foster care. 5 Section 5-525(b) requires the DSS to “develop and implement a permanency plan that is in the best interests of the child” at the same time that it is “providing] time-limited family reunification services to a child placed in an out-of-home placement and to the parents ... of the child, in order to facilitate the child’s safe and appropriate reunification within a timely manner!.]” The DSS may make “[reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or with a legal guardian ... concurrently with ... reasonable efforts” to reunify and preserve the family. FL § 5-525(d)(3). ⁴³⁰ In creating and structuring the foster care system, the General Assembly recognized that children with significant physical or mental health challenges are likely to have special needs within the system. For example, to ensure that families are not separated solely as a result of the financial burdens arising from a child’s special needs, the General Assembly directed that [a] child may not be committed to the custody or guardianship of a local department and placed in an out-of-home placement solely because the child’s parent or guardian lacks shelter or solely because the child’s parents are financially unable to provide treatment or care for a child with a developmental disability or mental illness. FL § 5—525(c)(2)(i).

Nor may a child with special needs be placed into foster care for the sole purpose of “obtaining] treatment or care related to the child’s disability that the parent is unable to provide.” FL § 5-525(a)(2)(i). In light of the different circumstances frequently presented by developmentally disabled and other special needs children in the foster care system, the General Assembly also established exceptions to certain time frames designed to prevent children from languishing in foster care limbo. There are a host of legislatively mandated deadlines designed to reduce the amount of time that a child spends in foster care. 6 And the declared legislative policy is that “[ejvery reasonable effort shall be made to effectuate a permanent placement for the child within 24 months after the date of initial placement.” CJ § 3-823(h)(3). In most cases, if the DSS concludes that adoption is in the best interest of a child who has been in foster care for 15 of the last 22 months, termination of parental rights proceedings must be initiated within 120 days.

See FL § 5-525.1(a)-(b). ⁴³¹ Concurrent with the termination proceedings, “the local department shall identify, recruit, process, and seek to approve a qualified family for adoption, guardianship, or other permanent placement.” FL § 5-525.1(c). But the General Assembly also recognized that the need for permanency reflected in these time frames may be different for foster children with special developmental, physical, or mental health needs. It explicitly provided that a child may remain in an out-of-home placement under a voluntary placement agreement for more than 180 days if the child’s disability necessitates care or treatment in the out-of-home placement and a juvenile court makes a finding that continuation of the placement is in the best interests of the child. FL § 5—525(a)(2)(ii).

It also made clear that [a] local department is not required to file a petition [for termination of parental rights] ... if ... the local department has documented in the case plan ... a compelling reason why termination of parental rights would not be in the child’s best interests; or ... the local department has not provided services to the family consistent with the time period in the local department’s case plan that the local department considers necessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s home. FL § 5—525.1(b)(3). See also FL § 5-525.1(d)(“This section may not be construed to ... require a local department to file a petition”). One legislatively approved alternative to adoption and its attendant termination of parental rights is foster care.

FL section 5-525(e)(2) directs local departments to “consider ... permanency plans [] in [a] descending order of priority[,]” with adoption generally favored over foster care plans. The General Assembly nevertheless left open the possibility that the local department might determine that the lower priority option of “permanent foster care with a specific caregiver” or “long term foster care” would be in a child’s best interest. CJ section 3-823 requires courts to follow the same priority, but explicitly recognizes that a court may decide that permanent ⁴³² or long term foster care is appropriate for children with special needs: (e) Determinations to be made at hearing.—At a permanency planning hearing, the court shall ... (1) Determine the child’s permanency plan, which may be: (i) Reunification with the parent or guardian; (ii) Placement with a relative for: 1.

Adoption; or 2. Custody and guardianship; (iii) Adoption by a nonrelative; (iv) Guardianship by a nonrelative; (v) Continuation in a specified placement on a permanent basis because of the child’s special needs or circumstances; (vi) Continuation in placement for a specified period because of the child’s special needs or circumstances; or (vii) Independent living.... (f) Continuation of placement for a specifíed period.— The court may not order a child to be continued in a placement under subsection (e)(l)(v) or (vi) of this section unless the court finds that the person or agency to which the child is committed has documented a compelling reason for determining that it would not be in the best interest of the child to: (1) Return home; (2) Be referred for termination of parental rights; or (3) Be placed for adoption or guardianship with a specified and appropriate relative or legal guardian willing to care for the child. (Emphasis added.) The As’ Challenges To Termination We use three different standards in reviewing a circuit court’s decision to terminate parental rights.

First, [w]hen the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard of Rule [8—131(c) ] applies. [Second,] if it appears that the [court] erred as to matters of ⁴³³ law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the [court] founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [court’s] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 126 , 372 A.2d 231 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 , 98 S.Ct. 430 , 54 L.Ed.2d 299 (1977); see In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 586 , 819 A.2d 1030 . In this appeal, the As ask us to hold that the DSS and the circuit court failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of their parental rights was in Victor’s best interest.

Observing that “Victor is no ordinary child,” Mr. A and Ms. A argue that “it would be in Victor’s best interest to leave him in foster care with visitations with