In Re Adoption No. 09598 in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County

GARRITY, Judge. In this matter, we shall track the statutory considerations necessary to the termination of parental rights. This case represents an example of massive social service efforts to stabilize and improve the family situation of four children who were in serious need of assistance due to neglect and lack of parental care. In this particular chapter of failed parental responsibility, the appellant, Earl L., currently twenty-six years-of-age, appeals a judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Perry, J.) granting the petition of the Prince George’s County Department of Social Services for termination of parental rights and giving the Department guardianship over his son, Brandon, with the right of the Department to consent to adoption.

The appellant asks us to review (1) whether the circuit court erred when it applied the provisions of Md.Fam.Law Code Ann. § 5-313 in determining, on November 10, 1987, that it was in Brandon’s best interest to terminate the appellant’s parental rights and (2) whether the circuit court ⁵¹⁵ erred when, after determining that it was in Brandon’s best interest to terminate the appellant’s parental rights, it ordered guardianship with the right to consent to adoption instead of long-term foster care. The child’s mother, Ms. W., did not appeal the court’s determination to terminate her parental rights to Brandon. Factual Background To facilitate our review of this matter in accordance with statutory considerations, we shall be detailed in our presentation. Brandon was born to the appellant and Ms. W. on July 28, 1982.

For the first three months of his life, Brandon lived with his parents and a half-brother, Lamont, in an apartment in Forestville, Maryland. In October 1982, Ms. W. took Brandon and Lamont to stay with the T.’s in the District of Columbia. Mrs. T. was a woman Ms. W. had met at her church and with whom she had developed a close relationship. In early January 1983, Ms. W., Lamont and Brandon returned to live with the appellant in the Forest-ville apartment.

On January 31, 1983, Ms. W. called the Prince George’s County Department of Social Services about placing her children in foster care. Ms. W. told Carol Kramer, a protective services worker, that she had been physically abused by the appellant, but that he had not hurt the children. When Ms. Kramer met with Ms. W., Ms. W. no longer wanted to place the children with the Department. A few days later, Ms. Kramer visited the appellant and Ms. W. at the apartment and provided referrals for services after the appellant admitted he had hit Ms. W. On February 4, 1983, Ms. W. called Ms. Kramer and reported that she and the appellant had been involved in another altercation.

After Ms. Kramer met Ms. W. at the apartment, Ms. W. agreed to have the children placed in foster care. Ms. Kramer removed the children at that time and filed a Child in Need of Assistance (CINA) petition with ⁵¹⁶ the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. At the hearing on the petition, however, Lamont and Brandon were returned to the care and custody of Ms. W. The appellant did not attend the hearing. The day after the hearing, Ms. W. and the appellant again separated.

Ms. W. again took Brandon and Lamont to the T.’s home in the District of Columbia. After a brief reconciliation between the appellant and Ms. W., Ms. W. and the two boys returned to the T.’s home for a few weeks in April 1983. For a six-week period in April and May 1983, Ms. W. and the children lived in various District of Columbia shelters. During this period, Lamont had not been attending school and Brandon was behind in his immunization shots.

On May 23,1983, Ms. W.’s third child, Kelly was born three months prematurely. 1 At approximately this time, Ms. W. and the children moved back to the Forestville apartment with the appellant. In an interview with Ms. W. and the appellant, neither parent would consent to placing the children in foster care. Consequently, the Department petitioned the circuit court for a review hearing. The parents were subpoenaed to appear and were informed that transportation would be provided.

When neither parent appeared, the court ordered writs of attachment for Mrs. W., Lamont and Brandon. They were located in a Montgomery County shelter. On June 2, 1983, the two boys were adjudicated CIÑA and were committed to the Department for placement in foster care. In late July 1983, Ms. W. asked that Lamont and Brandon be removed from their original foster home and placed with the T.’s.

Shortly thereafter, Lamont and Brandon were placed in the T.’s home in the District of Columbia and have lived there continuously since that day. During the next three years, the appellant and Ms. W. conducted a sporadic relationship with each other. Another son, O’Keith, was born in the District of Columbia in 1985; ⁵¹⁷ Ms. W., however, was persuaded by social workers to put the child into foster care, where he remains. In 1987, the couple, who remained unmarried, had a fourth child, Earl, Jr. That child, who was initially placed with the District of Columbia Department of Human Services (DCDHS), now lives with Mr. L. On June 11, 1986, the Department filed a petition for guardianship of Brandon and Lamont with the right to consent to adoption.

During a five-day trial, in addition to establishing Mr. L.’s immature, violent, and neglectful pattern of conduct, representatives from the Department testified that the appellant had rarely visited Brandon, had switched jobs frequently, and had failed to secure a place for the children to live. Discussion I. The appellant argues that the chancellor erred by improperly applying the statutory criteria of Md.Fam.Law Code Ann. § 5-318 in determining that it was in Brandon’s best interest to terminate the appellant’s parental rights. Section 5-818(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: A court may grant a decree of adoption or a decree of guardianship, without the consent of a natural parent otherwise required by §§ 5-311 and 5-817 of this subtitle, if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the natural parent’s rights as to the child and that ... (2) in a prior juvenile proceeding, the child has been adjudicated to be a child in need of assistance____ As to the circumstances of this case, we construe Section 5-318(a) as unambiguously empowering a court to grant a decree of guardianship without the consent of a natural parent if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the natural parent’s rights as to the child and (2) in a prior juvenile proceeding the child has been adjudicated a child in ⁵¹⁸ need of assistance. 2 Section 5-313 requires that the court determine whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the natural parent’s rights as to the child by making findings of fact as to each factor of required consideration listed under Section 5-313(c) and (d).

See Washington County Dept. of Social Services v. Clark, 296 Md. 190, 198-99 , 461 A.2d 1077 (1983). Our scope of review in the present case is delineated by the Maryland Rules. In particular, Md. Rule 8-131(c) mandates that: When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

Our present task, therefore, is to review the evidence presented below to determine whether the chancellor’s findings were clearly erroneous. Pahanish v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md.App. 342, 353-54 , 517 A.2d 1122 (1986). Accordingly, our function, in reviewing Chancellor Perry’s findings, is not to determine whether, on the evidence, we might have reached a different conclusion. Rather, it is to decide only whether there was sufficient evidence—by a clear and convincing standard—to support the chancellor’s determination that it would be in the best interest of Brandon to terminate the parental rights of his natural father.

In making this decision, we must assume the truth of all the evidence, and of all the favorable inferences fairly deducible therefrom, tending to support the factual conclusion of the trial court. Id. at 354 , 517 A.2d 1122 . A. Prior CINA Finding The appellant apparently does not dispute that Brandon had been adjudicated a child in need of assistance in a prior ⁵¹⁹ juvenile proceeding. Indeed, our review of the record indicates that Brandon was adjudicated a CINA at a hearing held on June 2, 1983.

B. Findings Under Section 5-313(c) Section 5-313(c) details various factors a court must consider in determining whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate a natural parent’s rights. Specifically, the subsection provides: (c) Required considerations.—In determining whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate a natural parent’s rights as to the child in any case, except the case of an abandoned child, the court shall consider: (1) the timeliness, nature, and extent of the services offered by the child placement agency to facilitate reunion of the child with the natural parent; (2) any social service agreement between the natural parent and the child placement agency, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the agreement; (3) the child’s feelings toward and emotional ties with the child’s natural parents, the child’s siblings, and any other individuals who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; (4) the child’s adjustment to home, school, and community; (5) the effort the natural parent has made to adjust the natural parent’s circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be returned to the natural parent’s home, including: (i) the extent to which the natural parent has maintained regular contact with the child under a plan to reunite the child with the natural parent, but the court may not give significant weight to any incidental visit, communication, or contribution; (ii) if the natural parent is financially able, the payment of a reasonable part of the child’s substitute physical care and maintenance; ⁵²⁰ (iii) the maintenance of regular communication by the natural parent with the custodian of the child; and (iv) whether additional services would be likely to bring about a lasting parental adjustment so that the child could be returned to the natural parent within an ascertainable time, but the court may not consider whether the maintenance of the parent-child relationship may serve as an inducement for the natural parent’s rehabilitation; and (6) all services offered to the natural parent before the placement of the child, whether offered by the agency to which the child is committed or by other agencies or professionals. We shall review the chancellor’s findings of fact as to each of the foregoing criteria. Services Offered to Facilitate Reunion The chancellor found that social services in the form of counseling, medical care, financial assistance, and tenant assistance had been constantly offered since Brandon was placed in foster care but were not accepted by the appellant.

Specifically, the chancellor found that the appellant failed to present himself for counseling, did not fill out forms necessary to continue medical and financial assistance, and failed to follow through with assistance for housing. The services offered by the Department included psychiatric therapy, a parenting skills class, medical assistance, public assistance, and referral to the Tenant Assistance Program in the District of Columbia, with which it cooperated. When the case was first opened in early 1983, the Department offered the appellant referrals for counseling to address his violent behavior towards Ms. W. The appellant did not attend counseling until March of 1984, when he attended a few sessions with Ms. W. and her therapist, Ms. Marian McCarthy. At that time Ms. McCarthy referred the appellant for psychiatric treatment, but he did not attend. ⁵²¹ In September 1984, the appellant expressed to Ms. Elizabeth Emond, a foster care worker, his desire to work with the Department to have his children returned.

Ms. Emond arranged for the appellant and Ms. W. to begin counseling in the District of Columbia. The appellant, however, did not attend counseling until the court ordered him to participate on October 22, 1984. Subsequently, the appellant attended only a few sessions