In Re Adoption No. 95195062

HOLLANDER, Judge. The six children of Janine P., appellant, were removed from her custody in 1990. Some six years later, The Baltimore City Department of Social Services (“the Department”), appellee, filed a petition for guardianship with the right to consent to adoption or long-term care short of adoption. After a hearing held in August 1996, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted the petition.

Appellant has timely noted her appeal, and presents the following questions for our review: I. Was the evidence legally sufficient to justify terminating the parental rights of the natural mother?

II

Did the trial court err by failing to make specific findings of fact?

III

Did the trial court err by failing to afford counsel the opportunity to make closing argument?

IV

Did the trial court err by admitting hearsay evidence? We shall answer the second and fourth questions in the affirmative. Therefore, we shall vacate the judgment and remand the matter to the circuit court to make specific factual findings in accordance with the applicable statutory and evidentiary criteria. Although the third issue has not been preserved for our review, the court, on remand, should permit the parties to present closing arguments.

In light of our holding, we need not address the first issue. Factual Background Janine P. and her late husband had six children during their troubled marriage: Lester P., bom November 23,1983; Catherine P., born June 11, 1985; David P., born June 10, 1986; Joseph P., bom August 18, 1987; Victor P., born June 15, 1989; and Grace P., born May 18, 1990. The family had lived in Washington, D.C. until May 2, 1990. On that date, which was just two weeks before Grace’s birth, Ms. P. left her abusive husband and moved to Baltimore with her children. ⁴⁴⁸ Ms. P. had intended to live in Baltimore with her father.

When she arrived in Baltimore, however, she discovered that her father had moved out of state. Because her strained relationship with other family members precluded her from living with them, Ms. P. moved to the House of Ruth, a Baltimore shelter for victims of domestic violence. The family first came to the attention of the Department in early June 1990, when a worker at the shelter reported that two of Ms. P’s children wandered away from her and had almost been hit by a car. Ms. P. and her children were referred to the Department’s Intensive Family Services program (“IFS”).

A team consisting of a social worker and a parent aide visited Ms. P. at the shelter on June 11,1990, arriving soon after Ms. P. learned of her husband’s sudden, unexpected death. 1 In response to the situation, the IFS team provided Ms. P. with bereavement counseling. The IFS’s report at the time of its first intervention with the family detailed the children’s myriad developmental and behavior problems. Lester, age six at the time, demonstrated a fear of abandonment whenever his mother left the room, dropping to the floor and curling into a fetal position. He also had a speech deficit.

Catherine, age five when the family was first evaluated, also displayed a fear of abandonment, banging her head against the wall when her mother left the room, and becoming fearful or panicky when her mother discussed activities that would not include her. She rarely spoke, but when she did her speech was unintelligible. David, then age four, was inappropriately aggressive toward strangers and destructive of property. Joseph, age three in June 1990, was “extremely withdrawn” and had a “very flat affect.” He hid behind furniture, cried when his mother left the room, and rarely spoke.

Victor, one year old at the time, did not respond to smiles or attempts to interact with him, nor to a rattle he was given. Similarly, Grace, then two months old, ⁴⁴⁹ did not seem to respond normally to faces. Additionally, in June 1990, Ms. P. did not express affection toward her children or reassure them. The IFS’s initial report also described the condition of the family’s room at the House of Ruth and the children’s hygiene as “deplorable.” Ms. P. and the IFS team entered into a service agreement on June 25, 1990, which provided that Ms. P. was to arrange for child care, evaluations for the older children, and enrollment of the children in school or pre-school, as well as to normalize the family’s routines by creating household rules and chore assignments for the children.

Pursuant to the agreement, the IFS team provided home-based counseling on stress, time, and financial management and parenting skills, transportation to medical appointments made by the IFS team, and child care for the children who remained at home during those appointments. At trial, Ms. Evans, a social worker assigned to the case, testified that Ms. P. did not cooperate with arranging child care, even though it would have been provided at no cost to her, or with arranging evaluations for her children. Nor did she initially attempt to enroll her children in school. Further, the Department felt she did not make efforts to provide organization and structure through household rules and chores.

With the assistance of the Department, Ms. P. rented an apartment. Oddly, Ms. P. brought with her from the House of Ruth bags of used sanitary napkins and diapers; rather than throwing them away as she had agreed, she stored them under a bed. Ms. Evans testified that after Ms. P. had been living in her home for a week, she could smell the odor from this refuse at the front door. Additionally, Ms. P. appeared severely depressed, and failed to supervise her children.

She also did not purchase groceries regularly, and had to be reminded to buy food, although she received welfare benefits and food stamps. Moreover, the Department bought furniture for the home, including beds and bedding for the children, but after one or two weeks in the home, Ms. P. still had not prepared the children’s beds. Rather, the children all ap ⁴⁵⁰ peared to sleep with Ms. P. in her bed or on the floor in her room. Because of Ms. P.’s continued inability to care for her children, and due to her mental condition, the Department removed the children from her care on August 3, 1990 and placed them with three paternal aunts who resided in the Maryland suburbs of Washington, D.C. At the time, the children still had behavioral and developmental problems.

Lester and David were placed with Renee M. At the time, Lester was six and a half; he was extremely withdrawn and rarely spoke or interacted with other children. His psychological evaluation placed his functioning in most areas at three years below his actual age. David, then four, still wet the bed and sometimes wet himself while awake. Catherine and Joseph were placed -with Vanessa B. Both children were very withdrawn; Catherine refused to talk and Joseph refused to look at anyone.

Victor and Grace were placed with Gwendolyn B. Neither of the youngest children appeared to respond normally to stimulation. As Ms. P. was severely depressed when the Department removed the children, her caseworker urged her to seek mental health treatment. She was admitted to the psychiatric ward at Maryland General Hospital, and had inpatient treatment for 30 days. The treating psychiatrist at Maryland General diagnosed her with an adjustment disorder and possible latent schizophrenia.

When appellant agreed to seek outpatient mental health care, the hospital released appellant at her request. She did not pursue follow-up care, however. On May 13, 1991, the children were adjudicated children in need of assistance (“CIÑA”), 2 and remained in the care of ⁴⁵¹ their aunts. 3 Following that hearing, Ms. P. physically attacked the social worker in the courthouse, and was arrested for assault and resisting arrest. The May 13, 1991 order adjudicating the children CINA initially granted Ms. P. supervised visitation.

The court later suspended Ms. P.’s visitation until she completed mental health counseling and attended parenting classes. Because Ms. P. was unable to visit her children, the Department sought telephone visitation for her. Ms. P. was to telephone the children from the offices of the Department. The telephone visitation was later suspended.

Ms. P. called Victor and Grace’s child care center at inappropriate times, and the child care center requested that she stop calling. Similarly, the children’s paternal aunts opposed the telephone calls, because Ms. P. demanded assurances from the children of their love, and the calls distressed the children. The Department proposed a second service agreement, aimed at helping Ms. P. to take the steps necessary to reunite her with her children. Ms. P. initially refused to sign the agreement, but eventually she executed it, after repeated letters and meetings with her children’s caseworker.

Ms. P. took an eight-week parenting course in 1993. The course was designed for parents of infants to three-year-olds. By the time appellant took the course, however, only the youngest child was under the age of three. Ms. P.’s mental health treatment proved uneven.

Appellee conceded that she never completed the required course of therapy ordered by the court as a condition of visitation and eventual reunification. She explained that after signing the second service agreement, she sought treatment at the Liberty Community Mental Health Center; the hospital records indicate that she was in treatment from November 5, 1991 ⁴⁵² until October 16, 1992, when she was discharged because she moved out of the service area. Ms. P. also claimed she sought treatment at Sinai Hospital; its records reflect that she was seen only for an evaluation on October 11, 1993, by Anne Holman, LCSW, and for one therapy session. Thereafter, Ms. P. canceled or failed to attend therapy sessions at Sinai Hospital.

Ms. Holman wrote in a letter to the children’s caseworker, “Ms. P. is not an appropriate candidate for counseling because she has no insight into her problems. She has stated she doesn’t need counseling.” A letter dated September 26, 1994 from Dr. Riva Novey, M.D., stated: In accord with our conversation of last Thursday, September 22,1994,1 don’t believe that continued sessions with me ' would be useful to you. In my letter of August 15, 1994 I made it clear that the only way I could help you would be to determine whether visits with your children could be explored in the near future. However, you tell me that what you need is a letter stating that you have completed a-period of therapy and recommending that your children be returned to you as soon as possible.

As I have explained, I am unable to do that and therefore, it is not worth your while to make the effort to get to my office. On June 14, 1995, Ms. P. was evaluated by the Adult Outpatient Program of Community Psychiatry at Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center. Subsequently, she attended six therapy sessions there. A letter from Johns Hopkins Bay-view, signed by Joan Moskowitz, M.S., and Gerard Gallucci, M.D. concluded: “No additional treatment is seen as necessary.” At the time of the hearing in August 1996, the evidence revealed that the children were all doing remarkably well.

They were taking dance classes together, attending church together, where they sing in the choir, and all visited their paternal grandmother’s home regularly on Sundays. They appear to have formed strong attachments to their aunts. Evidence was also presented that the children’s academic ⁴⁵³ performance was good. Lester had received a Presidential citation for educational excellence.

Catherine and Joseph were both on the honor roll. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court said: I need to follow the statutory guidelines which, of course, specify that the best interests of the child is what is at stake and that I must find by clear and convincing evidence that it would be in the best interests of the child to terminate the natural parent’s rights, and I believe that in this case that burden has been satisfied. I appreciate, Ms. P., your effort to essentially get your children back, but on the other hand, I think in some respects you ought to feel yourself very fortunate because, at least based on the evidence, it appears that the children have been placed in very nurturing and stable and loving environments. We’re talking about six children, all siblings, all of whom have been placed with different families, two children each with a different family, and the evidence was quite clear and convincing that strong bonding has been formed between the children and each of those families, and I think that the ability of these foster care parents to provide for the children and to give them what they need is rather clear.

Reviewing the evidence and the criteria and considerations listed in the statute, again, I find by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of all six children would be served by termination of parental rights and allowing the Department to proceed with its current plan. Discussion I. In decisions regarding the termination of parental rights, the best interest of the child has long been the guiding standard. In Re Adoption No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 112 , 642 A.2d 201 (1994); In Re Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 561 , 640 A.2d 1085 (1994). Indeed, the child’s welfare is of “ ‘transcendent importance’.” In Re Adoption No. A91-71A, ⁴⁵⁴ 334 Md. at 561 , 640 A.2d 1085 (quoting Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116 , 43 A.2d 186 (1945)).

Termination of parental rights, however, implicates the fundamental constitutional right to raise one’s own child. Because this right “is so fundamental ... it may not be taken away unless clearly justified.” In Re Adoption No. 10941, 335 Md. at 112 , 642 A.2d 201 ; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 , 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1397 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (,cWhen the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.”) The Court of Appeals has long recognized the gravity of the decision to terminate a person’s legal status as a child’s parent. In Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284 , 157 A.2d 273 (1960), the Court said: [Ajdoption decrees cut the child off from the natural parent, who is made a legal stranger to his offspring. The consequences of this drastic and permanent severing of the strongest and basic natural ties and relationships has led the Legislature and this Court to make sure, as far as possible, that adoption shall not be granted over parental objection unless that course clearly is justified.

The welfare and best interests of the child must be weighed with great care against every just claim of an objecting parent. As termination of parental rights involves two strong but often conflicting interests, the Legislature has provided a detailed statutory scheme that must be satisfied before a parent’s rights may be terminated. Maryland Code (1957, 1991 Repl.Vol. & 1996 Supp.), Family Law Article (“F.L.”), § 5-313. In these proceedings, the State bears the heavy burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of a parent’s rights serves the best interests of the child.

In Re Adoption No. 09598, 77 Md.App. 511, 518 , 551 A.2d 143 (1989). F.L. § 5-313 is singularly important here. For convenience, we shall set forth the most relevant portions of it: Guardianship; adoption in general. ⁴⁵⁵ (a) In general.—A court may grant a decree of adoption or a decree of guardianship, without the consent of a natural parent otherwise required by §§ 5-311 and 5-317 of this subtitle, if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the natural parent’s rights as to the child and that: (2) in a prior juvenile proceeding, the child has been adjudicated to be a child in need of assistance, a neglected child, an abused child, or a dependent child; (c) Required considerations.—In determining whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate a natural parent’s rights as to the child in any case, except the case of an abandoned child, the court shall consider: (1) the timeliness, nature, and extent of the services offered by the child placement agency to facilitate reunion of the child with the natural parent; (2) any social service agreement between the natural parent and the child placement agency, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the agreement; (3) the child’s feelings toward and emotional ties with the child’s natural parents, the child’s siblings, and any other individuals who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; (4) the child’s adjustment to home, school, and community; (5) the effort the natural parent has made to adjust the natural parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be returned to the natural parent’s home, including: (i) the extent to which the natural parent has maintained regular contact with the child under a plan to reunite the child with the natural parent, but the court may not give ⁴⁵⁶ significant weight to any incidental visit, communication, or contribution; (ii) if the natural parent is financially able, the payment of a reasonable part of the child’s substitute physical care and maintenance; (in) the maintenance of regular communication by the natural parent with the custodian of the child; and (iv) whether additional services would be likely to bring about a lasting parental adjustment so that the child could be returned to the natural parent within an ascertainable time, not exceeding 18 months from the time of placement, but the court may not consider whether the maintenance of the parent-child relationship may serve as an inducement for the natural parent’s rehabilitation; and (6) all services offered to the natural parent before the placement of the child, whether offered by the agency to which the child is committed or by other agencies or professionals. (d) Considerations following juvenile adjudication.—(1) In determining whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate a natural parent’s rights as to the child in a case involving a child who has been adjudicated to be a child in need of assistance, a neglected child, an abused child, or a dependent child, the court shall consider the factors in subsection (c) of this section and whether any of the following continuing or serious conditions or acts exist: (i) the natural parent has a disability that renders the natural parent consistently unable to care for the immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs of the child for long periods of time; (ii) the natural parent has committed acts of abuse or neglect toward any child in the family; or (in) the natural parent has failed repeatedly to give the child adequate food, clothing, shelter, and education or any other care or control necessary for the child’s physical, ⁴⁵⁷ mental, or emotional health, even though the natural parent is physically and financially able.

(Italics in original; boldface supplied.) It is a well settled principle of statutory construction that use of the word “shall” makes a provision mandatory, unless the context of its use indicates a contrary intent. In Re Adoption No. A91-71A 334 Md. at 559 n. 5, 640 A.2d 1085 . F.L. § 5-313(c) expressly makes mandatory the trial court’s consideration of the statutory factors, because it provides that “the court shall consider....” See also In Re Adoption! Guardianship Nos. CAA 92-10852 and CAA 92-10853, 103 Md.App. 1, 10 , 651 A.2d 891 (1994) (stating, “In determining what is in the best interest of a child, the court is required to consider an array of factors detailed in subsection (c) of 5-313.”) (Emphasis supplied.) So important are these statutory considerations that, on review, we cannot be left to speculate as to whether the trial court has fulfilled its obligations.

Thus, in In Re Adoption No. 09598, 77 Md.App. 511, 518 , 551 A.2d 143 (1989), we said: “Section 5-313 requires that the court determine whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the natural parent’s rights as to the child by making findings of fact as to each factor of required consideration listed under Section 5-313(e) and (d).” (Emphasis supplied.); See also In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 87A262, 323 Md. 12 , 590 A.2d 165 (1991). Indeed, in considering each factor under F.L. § 5-313, the court must even make findings of “the non-existence of facts where appropriate.... ” In Re Adoption No. 2428, 81 Md.App. 133 , 139 n. 1, 567 A.2d 139 (1989). See also In Re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. CAA 92-10852 and CAA 92-10853, 103 Md.App. at 24 , 651 A.2d 891 (1994) (noting that chancellor was required to note on the record its conclusion that it had considered the factor, even though it found the factor irrelevant). In this case, the trial court’s only specific findings were that “strong bonding has been formed between the children and each of [the foster] families,” and that the paternal aunts