In re Adoption of Jayden G.

ADKINS, J. There is a presumption in our parental rights’ jurisprudence that a continuation of the parental relationship is in a child’s best interests. Yet, again, in this case, the child and the parent pursue antagonistic goals. The mother argues her parental rights should not have been terminated, while the child seeks adoption by his foster parents, with whom he has lived three quarters of his life. To be sure, this case presents an unusual situation.

After the child spent twenty-seven months in foster care without progress by his parents toward reunification, or a consistently active involvement by other relatives, the court decided it was time to pursue a plan of adoption by non-relatives. This order — changing the permanency plan to adoption — triggered the filing of the termination of parental rights (“TPR”) petition. The mother, however, appealed the plan change and sought a stay of the TPR case. She succeeded on appeal but not on the motion to stay.

As a result, by the time the Court of Special Appeals ruled in the mother’s favor on the plan change, her parental rights had been terminated. She argues the court should not have terminated her parental rights while her appeal of the permanency plan change was pending. But whether to stay a TPR case is within the juvenile court’s discretion. In this case, the court did not abuse its discretion because a stay would not have been in this child’s best interests.

Nor did the court err when — in terminating parental rights — it took into account the child’s attachment to his foster parents. ⁵⁴ BACKGROUND At the heart of this case is a five-year-old boy, Jayden G., born on September 26, 2007. Surrounding him, in the context of this case, are his two older siblings — Daeshawn E. and Victoria G.; and three adults — Jayden’s mother, Jennifer S.; his father, Justin G.; 1 and Jayden’s paternal grandmother, Darlene G. We will refer to Ms. S. as the “Mother,” Mr. G. as the “Father,” and Darlene G. as the “Grandmother.” On February 17, 2009, the three children were found to be Children in Need of Assistance (“CINA”) and placed in foster care. Daeshawn and Victoria went to live in one foster home, while Jayden was placed in another. The Department worked long and hard toward the children’s reunification with the Mother or the Father.

When it became clear, however, that reunification was not likely, the juvenile court ordered a plan of adoption by a non-relative for Jayden and granted limited guardianship over Daeshawn and Victoria to the Grandmother. The Mother appealed the plan of adoption, but while the appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated her parental rights. The Mother’s appeal of Jayden’s plan change, however, was successful. This is somewhat of an anomalous result: the Mother won her CINA appeal, but only after her parental rights had been terminated.

The CINA and TPR Statutes Two intricately connected, yet separate legal mechanisms, come into play in this case. CINA proceedings are governed by sections 3-801 through 3-830 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), and TPR proceedings are governed by sections 5-313 through 5-328 of the Family Law Article (“FL”). Before we delve into the facts and the procedural history of the case, we give a brief overview of this statutory framework. ⁵⁵ CINA Proceedings When a local department of social services receives a complaint of child abuse or neglect, it is required by statute to file a petition with the juvenile court for a determination of whether the child is CINA. CJP §§ 3-801(f), 3-809(a).

If the allegations turn out to be true, and the child is committed to an out-of-home placement, the court must hold a hearing to determine a “permanency plan” for the child. CJP § 3-823(b)(1). We explained in In re Damon M. that a permanency plan “sets the tone for the parties and the court” and “provides the goal toward which [they] are committed to work.” 362 Md. 429, 436 , 765 A.2d 624, 627 (2001). In this regard, the permanency plan is “an integral part of the statutory scheme designed to expedite the movement of Maryland’s children from foster care to a permanent living, and hopefully, family arrangement.” Id.

There are five permanency plans to choose from “in descending order of priority:” (1) reunification with a parent or guardian; (2) placement with relatives for adoption, custody, or guardianship; (3) adoption by a non-relative; (4) custody or guardianship by a non-relative; or (5) another planned permanent living arrangement. CJP § 3-823(e)(1)(i). In determining which plan would be in the “best interests of the child,” courts consider the child’s emotional, developmental, and educational needs. See CJP § 3-823(e)(2); FL § 5-525(f)(1).

After the initial permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court is required to review the permanency plan at least every six months. CJP § 3-823(h)(1). At those review hearings, the court makes findings as to “the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the commitment,” “whether reasonable efforts have been made to finalize the permanency plan that is in effect,” and “the extent of progress that has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating commitment.” CJP § 3-823(h)(2). The court must “[c]hange the permanency plan if a change ... would be in the child’s best interest,” and must be cognizant of the statutory requirement that “[e]very reasonable effort ... be made to effectuate a ⁵⁶ permanent placement for the child within 24 months after the date of initial placement.” CJP § 3-823(h)(2)(vi) & (h)(3).

The TPR Many CINA cases do not end with reunification with a parent. But even if “it is determined that reunification is not possible and that adoption is in the child’s best interests, the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to finalize this plan.” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 106 , 642 A.2d 201, 205 (1994) (citing In re Darius A., 47 Md.App. 232, 235 , 422 A.2d 71, 72 (1980)). “[Ujnless the parents consent to the adoption of their child, the department is required to petition the circuit court for guardianship pursuant to F.L. § 5-313.” Id. To obtain guardianship, the local department files a TPR petition, which “seek[s] to terminate the existing parental relationship and transfer to itself, hopefully for re-transfer to an adoptive family, the parental rights that emanate from that relationship.” In re Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 402 Md. 477, 496 , 937 A.2d 177, 188-89 (2007). Like with the permanency plan considerations in the CINA context, in ruling on a TPR petition, the juvenile court is guided by the child’s best interest.

Compare CJP § 3-823(e), with FL § 5-323(d). The CINA Journey of Jayden and His Siblings and the TPR Three separate CINA cases overlap in this case: Jayden’s, Daeshawn’s, and Victoria’s. There was also a TPR proceeding, which resulted in the termination of the Mother’s parental rights to Jayden. Then, there were two appeals with respect to Jayden: one of the permanency plan change and the other of the TPR proceeding.

We examine this complex procedural history below, focusing on the facts pertinent to this appeal and saving some details for the analysis section. How Jayden and His Siblings Became CINA The involvement of the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services (the “Department”) in the lives of ⁵⁷ Jayden and his older siblings began in May of 2008. At that time, the Mother requested and was granted a protective order against the Father, “alleging that [he] had punched and kicked her, and jabbed a car key into her leg,” and “had put a cutter to her throat, stating that he wanted to kill her.” These allegations prompted the Department to open an investigation to determine whether the children were receiving proper care and attention. 2 On January 30, 2009, while the Department’s investigation was ongoing, Montgomery County police received phone messages from the Mother, in which she stated that the Father “was trying to poison her and her children were trying to communicate with her by underlining certain sentences in certain books.” The next day, while staying at the Betty Ann Krahnke Center, the Mother jumped out of a window, claiming “they were after me.” She was later found in the woods behind the Center by the police. After that incident, she was placed in the psychiatric unit at Washington Adventist Hospital.

On February 2, 2009, the Department met with the Mother at the hospital to discuss possible placement options for the children. The Mother “adamantly requested that the children not be placed with [the Father or the Grandmother],” alleging that they “had been trying to poison her.” She suggested two relative placement options, neither one of which was acceptable, however. 3 With no viable family placement options, the Department placed the children in shelter care and filed CINA petitions. ⁵⁸ The CINA petition involving Jayden was heard on February 17, 2009 by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as Juvenile Court. Based on the facts stipulated by the parties, in which the Mother and the Father agreed that they were unable or unwilling to care for Jayden, the court found Jayden to be a Child in Need of Assistance. Specifically, the court stated that “it is not currently possible to return the child to the home of the Mother because she is unable to give the Child proper care and attention, and the father is incarcerated.” Around the same time, the court made similar findings with respect to Victoria and Daeshawn and ordered all three children to be committed to the Department for placement in foster care.

The Mother and the Father were ordered to undergo psychological and psychiatric evaluations, and to participate in a number of programs, designed to help parents achieve reunification with their children. The children were placed in different foster homes. Daeshawn and Victoria changed placements three times. They stayed twenty-one months with the first foster family until there were allegations of abuse, and nine months with the second.

On July 28, 2011, they were placed with the Grandmother. Jayden, however, has lived with the same foster parents since his original placement with them on February 3, 2009. The Permanency Planning Hearings During the next thirty-four months, from the time Jayden and his siblings were found CINA to December 21, 2011, when the Mother’s parental rights to Jayden were terminated, the juvenile court conducted seven permanency planning hearings. Following the initial hearing, held on July 30, 2009, the court ordered a permanency plan of reunification with either parent.

This plan was maintained at the next three review hearings, conducted on December 10, 2009; March 22, 2010; and June 11, 2010. ⁵⁹ On September 20, 2010, after fourteen months of pursuing a sole plan of reunification with at least one of the parents, the juvenile court ordered that the children’s permanency plans change to a concurrent plan of reunification with the Mother and placement with a relative for custody and guardianship. Eight months later, on May 25, 2011, the court established new permanency plans for the children: (1) custody and guardianship by a relative for Daeshawn and Victoria and (2) adoption by a non-relative for Jayden. We review these developments below. Reunification with Either Parent A plan of reunification with either the Mother or the Father was ordered when the children were first found CIÑA and was maintained for over a year.

The evidence presented at the three permanency planning review hearings during that time was substantially the same: the Mother made some effort to give the Department hope that reunification was possible, but she was unable or unwilling to comply with most of the requirements imposed by the court. 4 The Department’s reports and recommendations, adopted by the juvenile court, focused on four areas: visitation, employment, mental health, and placement of the children with relatives. 5 Out of these, visitation is the area in which the Mother was more compliant, at least at the beginning. During the first three months the children were in foster care, she visited with them consistently, demonstrating affection, and informing the Department if she was running late. According to the De ⁶⁰ partment, during that initial time in foster care, “[a]ll three children love[d] their mother and remain[ed] extremely attached to her despite their separation.” As time went on, however, the Mother began to neglect her visitation obligations. In the March 2010 report, adopted by the court, the Department noted that, although the Mother “started off diligent in her pursuit to be reunified with her children,” “[f]or the last five months, she has been less consistent with visits.” The situation with employment was even less encouraging.

The Mother remained unemployed by the first permanency review hearing. At the time of the second permanency plan review hearing, she was employed at a Target, but by the fourth hearing, she was again without housing or employment. Perhaps most worrisome was the Mother’s inability to address her mental health needs. After the incident when she was found in the woods behind Betty Ann Krahnke Center, “exhibiting disorganized and delusional behaviors,” she was diagnosed with acute stress and depression and hospitalized at a psychiatric unit for one month “due to suicidal ideations.” She was also diagnosed with depression by history, obsessive compulsive personality traits, histrionic features, and narcissistic personality features.

The psychologist, who evaluated her, recommended that she “continue seeing her psychiatrist and therapist” and “enroll in the Abused Persons Program.” She would not follow up on treatment, however, missing appointments without ever rescheduling. 6 The Mother concedes she “did not comply with the requirement that she obtain psychiatric treatment and medication.” Finally, despite the Department’s efforts to find a relative placement for the children, initially, the parents were not able to provide the Department with any adequate placement options. 7 With respect to the Grandmother specifically, the Mother “reported that [she] is not an option and has a past ⁶¹ criminal history and ... would not prevent [the Father] from having contact with the children.” In the first six months, the Grandmother “only attended one visit on June 9, 2009 when she accompanied [the Mother].” Between July and December 2009, the Grandmother “attended several visits with the children ... and ... expressed an interest in having two children placed with her while the parents work towards reunification.” 8 Reunification with the Mother A much bleaker picture of the parents’ situation was presented at the fourth permanency planning hearing, conducted on June 11, 2010. In contrast to the Department’s position in the earlier reports, where it consistently emphasized the goal of reunification with a parent, the Department began its fourth report by pointing out that “the children have now been in care for 16 months,” but neither the Mother nor the Father “has satisfactorily demonstrated that they are in a position to have the children return to live with either one of them.” By then, Jayden “ha[d] been placed out of the home 15 of the last 22 months,” and the Department was authorized by statute to file a TPR petition. It explained that it had not done so because it was still exploring relative placements for the children. The Department was awaiting results of the Grandmother’s home study, and was planning to undertake a home study of a Mother’s cousin.

In light of these developments, the Department requested, and the juvenile court reaffirmed, a permanency plan of reunification with the Mother, but not with the Father, for all three children. Concurrent Plan of Reunification and Placement with a Relative The fifth permanency planning hearing took place on September 21, 2010, nineteen months after Jayden and his sib ⁶² lings were found CIÑA and placed in foster care. At that time, in accordance with the Department’s recommendation, the court ordered that Jayden’s permanency plan be changed from reunification with the Mother to a concurrent plan of reunification with her and placement with a Relative or Guardian. The reason for the change was that Jayden had “been in care for 20 months,” but neither the Father nor the Mother had made meaningful progress towards reunification.

The Department did observe, however, that the Mother showed “improvement over the past 3 months in terms of her attitude towards the Department, in accepting responsibility for the position in which she finds herself today, and in setting better boundaries with [the Father].” The Department continued to explore family placement options. The Grandmother failed to “follow up” on the home study request by Prince George’s County Department of Social Services because the Mother “reportedly told her that the Department was just looking at reunification.” By the time of this permanency planning hearing, the Grandmother had “moved to Montgomery County ... into a home that can accommodate all three of the children.” The Department expressed its intent to consider her as a placement. The Abduction and Its Ramifications The sixth permanency planning hearing was originally scheduled for December 21, 2010 but was rescheduled twice: first to February 8, 2011, then to April 15, 2011. During that time, certain important developments took place.

First, on October 12, 2010, the Grandmother and the Mother made allegations that Victoria had been physically abused by her foster parents. 9 These allegations culminated in the Father and the Mother’s abducting the children from a scheduled visit. 10 ⁶³ The Department attributed some of the fault for this incident to the Grandmother and no longer wished to consider her as a relative placement option, filing a motion to that effect. 11 On November 1, 2010, the juvenile court granted the motion. The court also ordered that the visitation between the Father and the children be terminated and the visitation with the Mother continue but be supervised. Three months later, on February 8, 2011, the juvenile court rescinded the order rejecting the Grandmother as a placement resource. The court also ordered supervised visitation between the Father, Victoria and Daeshawn, but not Jayden.

Although the order did not address the Grandmother’s right to visit with the children specifically, her visitation was conditioned on the Father’s. Accordingly, in suspending the Father’s visitation with Jayden, the order also suspended the Grandmother’s visitation with him. 12 The actual permanency planning review hearing took place two months later. On April 29, 2011, the court ordered the Department to “promptly conduct a Home Inspection of the home of [the Grandmother] for Jayden, Victoria, and Daeshawn for kinship eare[.]” At the hearing on May 19, 2011, the Department indicated that it considered the Grandmother to be suitable for custody and guardianship over Daeshawn and Victoria. With respect to Jayden, the Department stated: “The Department is still asking for a plan of adoption by a non-relative for Jayden. [T]he reason for that would be Jayden has ⁶⁴ bonded with the [foster parents].

He’s spent two thirds of his life there. And the Department sees that as a very positive development for him.” After reviewing the FL § 5—525(f)(1) factors, the juvenile court agreed with the Department and “concluded that it was in Jayden’s best interest to change his permanency plan from a concurrent plan of reunification and placement with a relative, to adoption by a non-relative.” The Events Following the Plan Change The Mother timely appealed the plan change to the Court of Special Appeals. She argued that the juvenile court abused its discretion in changing Jayden’s permanency plan to adoption by a non-relative, when it could have placed Jayden with the Grandmother. Specifically, she alleged that the juvenile court gave too much weight to Jayden’s time in foster care and the bond with his foster parents and failed to assess Jayden’s ties with his siblings “as supportive of a plan of custody and guardianship.” 13 On June 24, 2011, while the Mother’s appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, the Department petitioned the juvenile court for guardianship over Jayden with the right to consent to adoption or other planned permanent living arrangement. 14 On July 13, 2011, the Mother sought a stay of the TPR case, arguing that proceeding with the TPR “would lead to the possibility of [the TPR court] terminating [her] parental rights only to have the appellate court decide the ... pending appeal in her favor and remand the case.” 15 On August 5, 2011, the juvenile court denied the Mother’s motion. ⁶⁵ The TPR trial took place in November and lasted five days: from November 14 through November 18, 2011.

On December 21, 2011, the court granted the Department’s petition, finding that the parents were unfit, that exceptional circumstances existed which made termination of their parental rights in Jayden’s best interest, and that terminating the parental rights was in Jayden’s best interest. The Mother’s appeal of Jayden’s permanency plan change, however, was not resolved until January 19, 2012, which was almost exactly one month after her parental rights were terminated. The Court of Special Appeals held there was insufficient evidence “to support the circuit court’s finding that it is in Jayden’s best interest to be separated from his family.” Thus, the intermediate appellate court vacated the juvenile court’s order and remanded the case for a determination of which permanency plan was in Jayden’s best interest. The TPR case proceeded on a parallel appellate track, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the termination of the Mother’s parental rights in an unreported opinion filed on August 7, 2012.

The Mother filed a petition for writ of certiorari to this Court on September 6, 2012. On November 16, 2012, we granted certiorari, In re Adoption/Guardianship of Jayden G., 429 Md. 303 , 55 A.3d 906 (2012), to consider both questions she presented: 1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in affirming the circuit court’s order terminating parental rights, where the circuit court proceeded with the termination of parental rights hearing while the appeal challenging the CINA order changing the permanency plan from reunification to non-relative adoption was still pending in the Court of Special Appeals, and where ultimately the order changing the permanency plan was vacated? 2. Did the circuit court err in basing its decision to terminate parental rights on Jayden’s prospect of being adopted by, as well as the quality of care being provided by, his current foster care providers? ⁶⁶ DISCUSSION Despite the complex factual and procedural history, the first issue is easy to formulate: was it appropriate for the juvenile court to proceed with the TPR hearing while the CINA order, changing the permanency plan from reunification to non-relative adoption, was still pending in the Court of Special Appeals?

We answer this question in the affirmative, but do so with the recognition that whether to stay the TPR proceedings pending a permanency plan appeal is within the juvenile court’s discretion. In this case, the court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with the TPR case. The court also did not err when, in finding that the termination of the Mother’s parental rights was in Jayden’s best interests, it took into consideration Jayden’s strong attachment to his foster parents. I. The Right to Parent is Fundamental But Not Absolute The relationship between a parent and a child holds a special place in the law. 16 As the United States Supreme Court has observed, “[t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 , 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1541 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972).

The role of parents in caring for their children is “established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.” Id., 92 S.Ct. at 1541-42 . In recognition of this principle, the Supreme Court and this Court have long protected the parents’ right “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children” under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 , 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 , 43 ⁶⁷ S.Ct. 625, 626 , 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 112-13 , 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994). Another paramount consideration is the child’s best interest.

Recently, in In re Adoption/Guardianship of Ta’Niya C., we reviewed “33 years of Maryland jurisprudence on the topic” and concluded that “the child’s best interest has always been the transcendent standard in adoption, third-party custody cases, and TPR proceedings.” 417 Md. 90, 112 , 8 A.3d 745, 758 (2010). There is an interesting interplay between the parent’s right to parent and the child’s best interests. “The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.” Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 , 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2504 , 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979). Moreover, “historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.” Id. As a result, there is “a presumption of law and fact — that it is in the best interest of children to remain in the care and custody of their parents.” Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 495 , 937 A.2d at 188 .

But, “[a]s with so many other legal presumptions, experience and reality may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point.” Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 , 99 S.Ct. at 2504 . Indeed, “[o]ne need not wander far into the thickets of family law before running into situations and circumstances where application of an absolute right of the parent would fail to produce a just result.” In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 568 , 819 A.2d 1030, 1040 (2003). That is particularly obvious in cases of child abuse, neglect, and abandonment. See, e.g., In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. 2152A 2153A 2154A, 100 Md.App. 262, 265 , 641 A.2d 889, 890 (1994).

It is in those cases that it becomes clear that, although the right to parent is essential in our cultural and legal understanding, it has limitations. Resolving the conflict between the parent’s right to parent and the child’s best interest may get tricky. But, “our case ⁶⁸ law has been clear and consistent, that, even in contested adoption and TPR cases ..., where the fundamental right of parents to raise their children stands in the starkest contrast to the State’s effort to protect those children from unacceptable neglect or abuse, the best interest of the child remains the ultimate governing standard.” Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 496 , 937 A.2d at 189 . We have explained that the focus of the inquiry into the child’s best interest — even with the parental presumption in place — must be on the child, not the parent.

Ta’Niya C., 417 Md. at 116 , 8 A.3d at 760-61 . Importantly, “[i]n balancing fairness to the parent and fulfilling the needs of the child, the child prevails.” In re Ashley S., 431 Md. 678 , 66 A.3d 1022 (2013). With this framework in mind, we turn to the present case.

II

The Stay of TPR Proceedings This appeal presents a situation where the rights and interests of the parent clash with the interests of the child. The Mother seeks a blanket rule requiring a stay in TPR proceedings whenever there is an appeal of a change in the permanency plan from reunification to adoption. Conversely, the Department fears that an automatic stay “will transform the periodic CINA review hearing — designed to speed [up] a child’s exit from foster care — into a mechanism for delaying permanence for a child.” It argues that, under FL § 5-319(a), TPR petitions are to be adjudicated within 180 days of filing. Jayden voices similar concerns, arguing that an automatic stay “will frustrate the statutory mandate to achieve a timely, permanent placement for the child — the very purpose of the CINA, permanency planning, and TPR proceedings.” 17 At oral argument, however, Jayden conceded that a stay may nevertheless be appropriate in some cases. ⁶⁹ We agree with Jayden that — when it comes to the best interests of a child — the one-size-fits-all approach does not work.

The parent does have the right to appeal a permanency plan of adoption, but that right is not absolute. By the same token, the 180-day provision is not to be used as a sword against all motions to stay. The paramount concern here is the child’s best interests. Neither automatic stays nor routine denials of motions account for that.

Only the exercise of sound discretion does. A. The Interests at Stake The Mother asserts an immediate right to appeal a change in the permanency plan from reunification to adoption and complains that this right would be forfeited without an automatic stay of TPR proceedings. On the other end of the spectrum, the Department argues that any extension beyond the 180-day limit is prohibited by FL § 5-319(a) and carries with it the risk of harming the prospects of achieving permanency in a child’s life. Jayden takes a middle ground.

He maintains that, although a stay was not in his best interests, courts should not routinely deny stays in other cases. A Parent’s Right to Appeal A parent’s right to appeal an interlocutory order changing the permanency plan from reunification to adoption originates in our decision In re Damon M., 362 Md. 429, 436-38 , 765 A.2d 624, 628-29 (2001). Under Section 12-303 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, interlocutory orders “[d]epriving a parent ... of the care and custody of his child, or changing the terms of such an order” are immediately appealable. Md.Code (1974, 2013 Repl.Vol.), § 12-303(3)(x) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

The right to appeal a permanency plan change does not obviously flow from CJP § 12-303, however. When the court changes a permanency plan to adoption, the parent is not deprived of custody because by then the child is already in the Department’s custody. In Damon M., we explained that this type of an interlocutory order is nevertheless immediately appealable because ⁷⁰ “when the plan is reunification, there necessarily is ... an expectation — more than a hope — that the parent will regain custody.” 362 Md. at 436 , 765 A.2d at 628 . When the permanency plan is changed to adoption, however, the reasonable efforts to achieve reunification, “including the provision of services to the family,” cease.

Id. at 437 , 765 A.2d at 628 . This makes “[t]he amendment of the permanency plan to long-term or permanent foster care and adoption ... a change in the terms of the custody order, whenever it was passed.” Id. In re Karl H. In Damon M., this Court’s primary concern was the change in the level of services resulting from the change in the permanency plan. But in a subsequent case — In re Karl H.— we emphasized that the main reason orders changing the permanency plan to adoption are immediately appealable is because they have a detrimental effect on the parent’s constitutionally protected right to parent. 394 Md. 402, 430 , 906 A.2d 898, 914 (2006).

Thus, we held in Karl H. that — in cases where the permanency plan includes adoption — it does not matter that reunification services continue; the plan change is still immediately appealable because, regardless of reunification efforts, such a plan “is sufficiently far enough along the continuum of depriving a parent of a fundamental right.” Id. at 430-31 , 906 A.2d at 914 . The procedural history in Karl H. is as complicated as the one in this case. Like here, there was a CINA case and a TPR case, with corresponding appeals traveling through the appellate channels on parallel tracks. After the permanency plan was changed to adoption in the CINA case, the parent appealed the plan change to the Court of Special Appeals.

Meanwhile, the Department filed a TPR petition, which opened a separate TPR case. The juvenile court ruled on the TPR petition even before we heard oral arguments on the propriety of the permanency plan change in the CINA appeal. As a result, by the time we issued our opinion in the CINA case, the petitioner’s parental rights had been terminated by ⁷¹ the juvenile court in the TPR case. 18 Id. at 410 , 906 A.2d at 902 . We realized we were addressing an issue that was moot, unless the Court of Special Appeals reversed the TPR ruling. 19 Id. at 411 , 906 A.2d at 903 .

We did not dismiss the CINA appeal as moot, however, in the belief that the case presented the type of an issue that is of “public importance,” would “likely recur,” but would “evade review.” Id. at 410, 411 , 906 A.2d at 902, 903 . The procedural aspects of Karl H. are important to its holding. The procedural posture of the case shows that, in solidifying the parent’s right to appeal a permanency plan change to adoption, we were aware of the constraints imposed on that right by the CINA and TPR statutes. We were cognizant of the requirement under CJP § 3-823(g) that a TPR petition be filed within thirty days of the plan change.

Id. at 431, 906 A.2d at 914 . We knew very well that such a petition had not only been filed, but had been ruled on by the juvenile court before the CINA appeal was decided. Id. at 410 , 906 A.2d at 902 . Yet, we did not express any view with regard to the propriety of the juvenile court’s action.

Nor did we attempt to have any influence on the outcome of the TPR appeal. Rather, we accepted as a given that a juvenile court may terminate parental rights while the CINA appeal is pending, and took for granted the possibility that our own ⁷² opinion in the CINA case may be rendered moot by the resolution of the TPR appeal in the Court of Special Appeals. The Mother seeks to use Damon M. and Karl H. to place the parent’s right to appeal on a pedestal above any and all considerations. But we did not write those cases that way and they should not be read that way.

To be sure, the parent has a right to appeal the plan changing the permanency plan from reunification to adoption, but that right does not foreclose or forestall the pursuit of other, overlapping statutory processes. It must coexist with the statutory provisions encouraging expediency in the resolution of TPR cases and the child’s paramount need for permanency, which underlies our CINA and TPR statutes. Although there is a right to appeal, neither Damon M. nor Karl H. stand for the proposition that there is also an absolute right to stay TPR proceedings pending CINA appeals. Emileigh F. and the Stay The Mother also relies heavily on In re Emileigh F., 355 Md. 198 , 733 A.2d 1103 (1999) to argue that terminating her parental rights while her CINA appeal was pending was a prohibited action.

In Emileigh F., a child was found CINA while in the mother’s custody and later placed in the custody of her father. Id. at 200 , 733 A.2d at 1103-04 . The mother appealed the latter order, but while the appeal was pending in this Court, the juvenile court — finding the child was no longer a CINA — closed the case. Id. at 200-01 , 733 A.2d at 1104 .

In the meantime, this Court issued an opinion, reversing the juvenile court’s award of custody to the father. Id. When this Court realized that the case had been closed, it issued certiorari on its own initiative and held that the juvenile court should not have terminated the case while the appeal was pending. Id. at 204 , 733 A.2d at 1105 .

We explained: “the action taken by the juvenile court addressed matters that were clearly involved in the pending appeal [and], if permitted, would in essence defeat the right of [the parent] to prosecute her appeal with effect.” Id. The Mother finds support in this ⁷³ language and argues that Emileigh F. should dictate the outcome of this case. We agree with the Department, however, that Emileigh F. does not determine whether it was proper for the juvenile court in this case to proceed with terminating the Mother’s parental rights. We do so for two reasons.

First, unlike in Emileigh F., where there was no statutory provision instructing the juvenile court to take action, in this case we have a statute that directs the juvenile court to rule on TPR petitions within 180 days of filing. The Department emphasizes, citing In re Deontay J., 408 Md. 152 , 968 A.2d 1067 (2009), there is a difference “between prohibited action that frustrates a party’s right to appeal and a juvenile court’s permitted action, in a child’s best interests, that has the incidental effect of rendering an appeal moot.” 20 In Deontay J., a child was taken from the mother’s custody, found CIÑA, and placed with the father. 408 Md. at 155-56 , 968 A.2d at 1068-69 . At a later time, he was moved into the Department’s custody, and the father appealed. Id. at 156-57 , 968 A.2d at 1069-70 .

While the appeal was pending, the Department’s view regarding the father’s parenting abilities changed, and it was willing to return the child to his custody. Id. at 162 , 968 A.2d at 1072 . The juvenile court, however, refused to take “further action until” the father’s appeal was resolved, and “it received instructions from this Court.” Id. We held that the juvenile court erred in refusing to consider placing the child in the father’s custody pending appeal.

Noting the differences between that case and Emileigh F., we observed that “[prohibited action by the trial court that ⁷⁴ defeats the right of a party to prosecute an appeal is distinguishable from permitted action by the trial court that renders a case moot.” Id. at 163 , 968 A.2d at 1073 . We explained that the juvenile court was not prohibited from changing the child’s custody pending appeal because it “has a duty to modify a custody order when persuaded that a modification is necessary to protect the health, safety and well-being of a CIÑA.” Id. at 164 , 968 A.2d at 1074 . We held that “there is no reason why the appeal of a custody order divests the circuit court of jurisdiction to decide the merits of a claim that a change of custody is in the best interest of the child whose custody order is at issue in the pending appeal.” Id. at 167 , 968 A.2d at 1075 . In this case, like in Deontay J., the termination of the Mother’s parental rights was a permitted independent action that only had the incidental effect of rendering an appeal moot.

As the Department emphasizes, the juvenile court’s proceeding with the TPR case was expressly authorized by FL § 5-319(a), which provides that the juvenile court “shall rule on a TPR petition within 180 days of filing.” If the statute expressly authorizes the court’s action, it cannot reasonably be characterized as “prohibited” action. The second reason Emileigh F. does not determine the outcome of this appeal is that the case that the juvenile court closed in Emileigh F. was the same case that was being reviewed by this Court at the same time. In contrast, in this case, the TPR ruling was made in one case, but the change in the permanency plan was being appealed in another case. 21 ⁷⁵ Although “a CINA adjudication must precede a TPR determination, it is a separate legal proceeding.” In re Adoption/Guardianship of Cross H., 200 Md.App. 142, 150 , 24 A.3d 747, 752 (2011), cert. dismissed, 431 Md. 371 , 65 A.3d 679 (2013). The two are governed by different statutes, serve different purposes, depend on different factors, require different standards of proof, and follow different case tracks.

We address these differences below. As we stated above, CINA proceedings are governed by the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and TPR proceedings are governed by the Family Law Article. They serve different purposes: CINA proceedings are designed “[t]o provide for the care, protection, safety, and mental and physical development of’ children found CINA; “conserve and strengthen the child’s family ties;” ensure that parents and local departments work together to “remed[y] the circumstances that required the court’s intervention;” and “achieve a timely, permanent placement for the child consistent with the child’s best interests.” CJP § 3-802(a). In contrast, when the Department initiates TPR proceedings, it “seek[s] to terminate the existing parental relationship.” Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 496 , 937 A.2d at 188-89 .

It files the TPR petition when it believes a child’s welfare will be best served in the care and custody of others, rather than the natural parents. See Yve S., 373 Md. at 572 , 819 A.2d at 1043 . Further distinguishing CINA and TPR proceedings is that, in these two types of proceedings, courts consider different factors. The CINA statute focuses on factors that mostly have to do with the child’s present well-being and the likely effect of a change of placement or remaining in foster care: ⁷⁶ (i) the child’s ability to be safe and healthy in the home of the child’s parent; (ii) the child’s attachment and emotional ties to the child’s natural parents and siblings; (iii) the child’s emotional attachment to the child’s current caregiver and the caregiver’s family; (iv) the length of time the child has resided with the current caregiver; (v) the potential emotional, developmental, and educational harm to the child if moved from the child’s current placement; and (vi) the potential harm to the child by remaining in State custody for an excessive period of time.

FL § 5-525(f)(1)(i)-(vi); see also CJP § 3-823(e)(2). Although the TPR statute likewise requires courts to “give primary consideration to the health and safety of the child,” it covers a broader range of considerations. It requires juvenile courts to make specific findings with respect to the past actions of the parents toward the child, and efforts the parents and the department made towards reunification, including: (1) (i) all services offered to the parent before the child’s placement ...; (ii) the extent, nature, and timeliness of services offered by a local department to facilitate reunion of the child and parent; and (iii) the extent to which a local department and parent have fulfilled their obligations under a social services agreement, if any; (2) the results of the parent’s effort to adjust the parent’s circumstances, condition, or conduct to make it in the child’s best interests for the child to be returned to the parent’s home ...; (3) whether: (i) the parent has abused or neglected the child or a minor and the seriousness of the abuse or neglect---- ⁷⁷ FL § 5-323(d). The TPR statute pays particular attention to the parent’s efforts at remedying the circumstances that led to the court’s intervention, requiring courts to consider, under the second category, the following factors: (i) the extent to which the parent has maintained regular contact with: 1. the child; 2. the local department ...; and 3. if feasible, the child’s caregiver; (ii) the parent’s contribution to a reasonable part of the child’s care and support, if the parent is financially able to do so; (iii) the existence of a parental disability that makes the parent consistently unable to care for the child’s immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs for long periods of time; and (iv) whether additional services would be likely to bring about a lasting parental adjustment so that the child could be returned to the parent within an ascertainable time not to exceed 18 months from the date of placement unless the juvenile court makes a specific finding that it is in the child’s best interests to extend the time for a specified period.

FL § 5-323(d)(2). That in TPR proceedings courts are required to take into consideration additional factors is not the only difference between CIÑA and TPR proceedings. Different evidentiary burdens also apply. TPR proceedings require a “clear and convincing” standard of proof, but CINA adjudications are made based on the lesser “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

In re Blessen H., 163 Md.App. 1, 16 , 877 A.2d 161, 169-70 (2005), aff'd, 392 Md. 684 , 898 A.2d 980 (2006). Furthermore, in a permanency plan review hearing, strict application of the Maryland Rules of Evidence is not required. Md. Rule 5—101(c)(6); In re Ashley E., 158 Md.App. 144, 161 , 854 A.2d 893, 903 (2004), aff'd, 387 Md. 260 , 874 A.2d 998 (2005). It is, however, required in a TPR proceeding.

See Md. Rule 5-101(c). ⁷⁸ Finally, the changing of the permanency plan to adoption is not a prerequisite to the filing of a TPR petition. The Mother argues that “the circuit court should not proceed with a TPR hearing until the appellate courts have conclusively determined that the decision to order a permanency plan of adoption was correctly reached,” suggesting that a reversal of the change of the permanency plan to adoption necessarily undermines the footing on which the TPR proceedings stand. But, “the changing of the permanency plan from reunification, or adoption by a relative, to adoption by a non-relative, is not required before the Department can file a TPR petition.” Cross H., 200 Md.App. at 150 , 24 A.3d at 752 . Under the CIÑA and Child Welfare Services provisions, there are three ways in which TPR proceedings may be initiated.

First, as in this case, the department is required to file a TPR petition after the juvenile court finds that a permanency plan of adoption by a non-relative is in the child’s best interests. See CJP § 3-823(g). Second, FL § 5-525.1(b) requires the department to file a TPR petition when “the child has been in an out-of-home placement for 15 out of the most recent 22 months.” Third, if the department “determines that adoption ... is in the best interest of the child,” it is required to “refer the case to the agency attorney,” and the attorney must file a TPR petition. FL § 5-525.1(a).

For these reasons, we reject the Mother’s argument that TPR proceedings must be automatically put on hold when a parent appeals a CIÑA plan change. Although, without a stay of TPR proceedings, the outcome of the parent’s appeal of a change in the permanency plan may be rendered moot, our holdings in Damon M., Karl H., and their progeny, even when combined with our holding in Emileigh F., simply do not add up to the conclusion the Mother advocates. Indeed, in Karl H. itself, in deciding to review an appeal rendered moot by a subsequent TPR, we acknowledged the possibility that this might happen in some cases. See 394 Md. at 411 , 906 A.2d at 903 .

Thus, we reject the Mother’s invitation to issue a blanket rule, which would require automatic stays in all TPR cases with pending CINA appeals. ⁷⁹ The 180-Day Provision The Department advances a different, but also a categorical, position. It maintains that FL § 5-319(a) leaves juvenile courts no choice but to deny motions to stay TPR proceedings. As we discussed above, FL § 5-319(a) provides that “a juvenile court shall rule on a guardianship petition ... within 180 days after the petitioner is filed.” Citing Goins v. State, the Department argues that “statutes and rules that govern ‘procedure setting forth requirements in mandatory terms are not guides to the practice of law but precise rubrics ... to be read and followed.’ ” 293 Md. 97, 109 , 442 A.2d 550, 556 (1982) (citations omitted). Thus, in the Department’s opinion, “[bjeeause the guardianship petition in this case was filed on June 24, 2011, the juvenile court was required to conclude and rule on the petition by December 24, 2011, a task the court would not have accomplished had it awaited the appellate court’s decision in the CINA appeal.” Our intermediate appellate court had an opportunity to examine the import of the 180-day requirement in In re Abiagail C., 138 Md.App. 570 , 772 A.2d 1277 (2001). 22 The parent in that case attempted to use the 180-day time limit as a statute of limitations, arguing that the TPR petition should have been dismissed because the juvenile court failed to rule on it within 180 days.

Id. at 579 , 772 A.2d at 1283 . The Court of Special Appeals disagreed, holding that the provision had no mandatory connotation. Id. at 584 , 772 A.2d at 1286 . The intermediate appellate court began its analysis by discarding the argument that, just because the statute contained the word “shall,” the juvenile court is required to rule on the TPR petition within 180 days.

Id. at 581 , 772 A.2d at 1284 . The court pointed out that the word “shall” does not always constitute a mandatory term, but may be directory only: ⁸⁰ Depending on the context, placement, and use of the word “shall,” and the nature of the constitutional provision or statute in which it appears, the word may have a mandatory connotation, so as to require that the action that “shall” be done must be done, or may be directory in meaning, so as to exhort the doing of the thing that “shall” be done without requiring it. Id. In the context of “a constitutional provision or enactment appearing to impose a duty on the court,” the word “shall,” however, is more often “viewed as directory in meaning,” not mandatory.

Id. Indeed, there is “reasonable continuity in the line of cases dealing with interpretation of the word ‘shall’ directed toward an arbiter’s time constraints for issuing a decision.” G & M Ross Enterps., Inc. v. Bd. of License Comm’rs, 111 Md.App. 540, 544 , 682 A.2d 1190, 1192 (1996). Under this line of cases, “if a statute governs the actions of an arbiter, [be it a court or an administrative agency,] its use of the word ‘shall’ will generally be interpreted as directory, rather than mandatory.” 23 Id. at 545 , 682 A.2d at 1193 . Thus, the presence of the word “shall” in FL § 5-319 does not at all necessitate a conclusion that the juvenile court must rule on a TPR petition within 180 days of filing.

Having found no mandatory connotation in the word “shall,” the Court of Special Appeals in Abiagail C. went on to review the legislative history of FL § 5-319(a). It discovered that FL § 5-319(a), enacted in 1991 as House Bill 295 (1991 Md. Laws, chapter 173), was meant to be “an additional step in the ‘speeding up’ of the adoption and guardianship process.” ⁸¹ Abiagail C., 138 Md.App. at 585, 586 , 772 A.2d at 1286 . That was apparent from the evidence in the legislative history that the 180-day provision was put in place to “assist the courts in assigning a higher priority to these cases.” Id. For instance, in supporting this legislation, the Department of Human Resources explained to the General Assembly its concerns over the increase in TPR petitions filed and the resulting delay in their adjudication: the recent enactments designed to streamline the guardianship/adoption process had brought about an increase in the number of guardianship cases being filed and, as a result, an increase by almost six months in the average length of time between the filing and disposition of those cases.

Id. It advocated for the enactment of HB 295, “ ‘establishing [a] time frame[ ] for the courts to hear these cases ... [to] assist the courts in assigning a higher priority to these cases and thus enable earlier implementation of adoption plans for children.’ ” Id. (alterations in original). Similar evidence was presented in the Senate on “an identical cross-filed Senate Bill (SB 656),” where the testimony was that the legislation was “intended to reduce the length of time involved in implementing adoption plans for foster children.” Id.

(quoting S. Jud. Proc. Comm. Rep., HB 295 (1991)) (quotation marks omitted).

That the provision encourages courts to rule on TPR petitions in an expedient manner, however, does not mean that this goal takes on a life of its own, leaving juvenile courts no choice but to rule on TPR petitions within 180 days or else risk dismissal, as the mother argued in Abiagail C., or reversal, as the Department would argue. Without a doubt, the 180-day provision is not mandatory on the court. In “real-time,” even without a juvenile court granting a stay, many TPR petitions are not resolved within 180 days. For instance, in 2005, “the average time for TPR case processing” in Baltimore City “was 1,480 days, with only 39.84 percent of cases being resolved within 180 days, 65.04 percent of cases resolved within 271 days, and 76.42 percent of cases resolved within 365 days.” Yolanda A. Tanner, One Family-One Mas ⁸² ter Docketing in Juvenile Court, Md. B.J., May-June 2009, at 26, 29.

Faced with this reality, we are not persuaded that the juvenile court in this case was bound to deny the Mother’s motion to stay because of the 180-day