In re Adoption of Sean M.

HARRELL, J. We are asked in this matter whether the failure of a putative father to file timely a notice of objection to a proposed independent adoption operates as an irrevocable deemed consent to the termination of his assumed parental rights. This case involves the adoption of a minor child, Sean M. (“Sean”), by his stepfather, Respondent Jeffrey Craig K. Petitioner, William H., the putative father of Sean, filed an objection to the stepparent adoption one day after the expiration of the thirty-day deadline provided by the show cause order issued by the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County, pursuant to Maryland Rule 9-107(b). Petitioner asks us to reverse the trial court’s and the Court of Special Appeals’s judgments that his failure to file the objection within the statutory time period constituted an irrevocable consent to the adoption.

For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgments of those courts. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Moira M. (“Mother”) and William H. engaged in a romantic relationship from April to November of 2008. They were not married.

Sean was born to Moira M. in Annapolis, Maryland, on 16 June 2009. Moira M. became engaged to Jeffrey Craig K. (“Stepfather”) in November of 2009. Since that time, she and Sean lived with Stepfather in Queen Anne’s County.

Mother and Stepfather married on 16 October 2011. On 14 July 2009, Mother filed a Complaint against William H. in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, asserting that William H. is the natural father of Sean 1 and seeking sole ⁶⁹⁹ legal and physical custody. In his Answer, filed on 14 September 2009, 2 William H. denied that he was the natural father of Sean and stated that he had no objection to Mother having custody. 3 On 14 January 2010, the suit was dismissed by agreement of the parties. On 30 March 2011, Stepfather filed a Petition for Stepparent Adoption of a Minor and Change of Name (“Petition”) in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County, stating his intention to continue to reside with Sean’s mother, and “[t]hat the natural father of the minor child has not been identified; no persons alleging to be the natural father of the minor child have come forward; and no natural father is listed on the minor child’s birth certificate.” The Petition stated also that, even if William H. was the natural father of Sean, he has “abandoned his parental rights” as to Sean because William H.: (1) denied that he was the natural father of the minor child during the earlier custody proceeding in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County; (2) has not “exercised any parental rights since the minor child’s birth;” and, (3) has not attempted to support and maintain Sean since his birth.

On 15 April 2011, the Circuit Court issued a show cause order and form notice of objection to William H., who was served properly by personal service on 29 April 2011. The show cause order stated, in pertinent part (emphasis in original): RELATIONSHIP TO POTENTIAL ADOPTEE: [Puported] FATHER You are hereby notified that: ⁷⁰⁰ 1. A Petition has been filed for the adoption of Sean ..., who was born on June 19, 2009 in Queen Anne’s County, Maryland. 4 2. If you wish to object to the adoption(s), you must file a notice of objection with the Clerk of the Court at Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County ... within thirty (30) days after this Order is served on you.

For your convenience, a form notice of objection is attached to this Order. $ $ $ $ $ u‘ WHETHER THE PETITION REQUESTS ADOPTION OR GUARDIANSHIP, IF YOU DO NOT MAKE SURE THAT THE COURT RECEIVES YOUR NOTICE OF OBJECTION ON OR BEFORE THE DEADLINE STATED ABOVE, YOU HAVE AGREED TO A TERMINATION OF YOUR PARENTAL RIGHTS. The form notice of objection, provided to William H. along with the show cause order, stated, in relevant part (emphasis in original and emphasis added): Instructions to the person served with the show cause order: IF YOU WISH TO OBJECT, YOU MUST MAKE SURE THAT THE COURT RECEIVES YOUR NOTICE OF OBJECTION ON OR BEFORE THE DEADLINE STATED IN THE SHOW CAUSE ORDER. You may use this form to do so. You need only sign this form, print or type your name, address, and telephone number underneath your signature, and mail or deliver it to the court at the address shown in paragraph 2 of the show cause order.

IF THE COURT HAS NOT RECEIVED YOUR NOTICE OF OBJECTION ON OR BEFORE THE DEADLINE STATED, YOU HAVE AGREED TO A TERMINATION OF YOUR PARENTAL RIGHTS. The required deadline for William H. to file with the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County any objection to Stepfather’s ⁷⁰¹ petition for adoption of Sean was 31 May 2011. 5 The Circuit Court received William H.’s written objection on Wednesday, 1 June 2011, one day after the expiration of the thirty-day deadline. On 13 June 2011, Stepfather filed a Motion to Strike Late Notice of Objection, requesting that the adoption proceed as an uncontested matter. A hearing was held before Judge J. Frederick Price on 8 August 2011.

Judge Price granted Stepfather’s motion, noting that William H. did not allege any disability or any other circumstance to excuse the requirement, pursuant to Maryland Rule 9—107(b)(1), 6 of filing a notice of objection to an adoption within thirty days after the show cause order is served. William H. filed a Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment on 18 August 2011, 7 and, a week later, an Emergency Motion to Stay Adoption Proceeding. The court denied both motions. William H. appealed the denial of the orders to the Court of ⁷⁰² Special Appeals.

On 27 April 2012, a panel of the court affirmed the Circuit Court’s grant of Stepfather’s Motion to Strike William H.’s untimely objection. The court held that the time period established in Md. Rule 9—107(b)(1) applied equally to guardianships as well as adoptions, and that it rendered the late filing of a notice of objection to an adoption as an irrevocable consent to termination of the pertinent parent’s rights, In re: Adoption of Sean M., 204 Md.App. 724, 742 , 42 A.3d 722, 732 (2012). The intermediate appellate court held also that this statutory scheme did not offend any due process right of William H. Id. at 749 , 42 A.3d at 737 . William H. filed a petition for Writ of Certiorari with us on 18 June 2012.

We granted the petition, In re: Adoption of Sean M., 427 Md. 606 , 50 A.3d 605 (2012), to consider two questions: 1. Whether a natural parent’s failure to file a timely objection to a proposed independent adoption, as directed in a show cause order, constitutes an irrevocable consent to the adoption? 2. Whether the statutory scheme resulting in an irrevocable deemed consent to an independent adoption offends the due process rights of the parent? DISCUSSION Where a trial court interprets and applies Maryland case or statutory/regulatory law, we determine on appellate review, under a non-deferential standard of review, whether the trial court’s conclusions are “legally correct.” Garfink v. Cloisters at Charles, 392 Md. 374, 383 , 897 A.2d 206, 211 (2006) (quoting Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366, 374-75 , 879 A.2d 1064, 1068 (2005) (internal citations omitted)).

Thus, we apply the non-deferential standard in reviewing the trial court’s conclusion here that a Maryland statute and rule of procedure renders William H.’s late filing of his notice as an irrevocable consent to the adoption of Sean. A. Failure to File a Timely Objection Constitutes an Irrevocable Consent William H. contends that his failure to file timely a notice of objection to the proposed independent adoption does not con ⁷⁰³ stitute an irrevocable consent to the adoption. Stepfather argues, and the panel of the Court of Special Appeals agreed, that, under several Child in Need of Assistance (“CINA”) cases interpreting the effect of a similar thirty-day objection period, a parent’s late-filed objection is a deemed irrevocable consent in independent adoptions as well. This Court has not addressed previously the issue of statutorily-deemed consent in the context of independent adoptions.

The principles of statutory interpretation guide our analysis of the effect of the thirty-day notice of objection period upon independent adoptions. In interpreting statutory and rule-based language, our “ ‘primary goal is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules.’ ” Miller v. Mathias, 428 Md. 419, 450 , 52 A.3d 53, 72 (2012) (quoting Ray v. State, 410 Md. 384, 404 , 978 A.2d 736, 747 (2009) (internal citations omitted)). The rules of interpretation applicable to statutes apply equally to interpreting the Maryland Rules. Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 365 Md. 67, 78 , 775 A.2d 1218, 1224 (2001).

Our first step in this analysis is to look to the “normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute [or rule] as a whole to ensure that ‘no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’ ” Id. at 450-51, 52 A.3d at 72 (quoting Ray, 410 Md. at 404 , 978 A.2d at 747-48 (internal citations omitted)). “If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends.” Ray, 410 Md. at 405 , 978 A.2d at 748 (citations omitted). Md.Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol) Fam. Law (“FL”) § § 5-3B-01 to 5-3B-32, and their implementing rules, Md. Rules 9-101 through 9-113, govern independent adoptions.

The independent adoption process begins with the filing of a petition to adopt, which requires the trial court to issue and serve a show cause order “on each of the prospective adoptee’s living parents who has not consented to the adoption.” FL § 5-3B-15. ⁷⁰⁴ An order for adoption may be entered only if each of the prospective adoptee’s parents consents either in writing or “by failure to timely file notice of objection after being served with a show cause order....” FL § 5-3B-20. Md. Rule 9-105 establishes for all adoptions the required content of the show cause order and when a show cause order must be issued. Pursuant to Md. Rule 9-105(a), a show cause order is required in independent adoptions, public agency adoptions, public agency guardianships, and private agency guardianships. 8 According to Md. Rule 9-105(e), all show cause orders must include language substantially similar to the following: IF YOU DO NOT MAKE SURE THAT THE COURT RECEIVES YOUR NOTICE OF OBJECTION ON OR BEFORE THE STATED DEADLINE, YOU HAVE AGREED TO A TERMINATION OF YOUR PARENTAL RIGHTS. The show cause order served personally on William H. on 29 April 2011 contained language consistent with the requirements of Md. Rule 9-105.

According to Md. Rule 9-107(b)(l), a parent must file “any notice of objection to an adoption or guardianship ... within 30 days after the show cause order is served.” William H. concedes that he filed his notice of objection on 1 June 2011, thirty-one days after he was served with the show cause order on April 29. He does not dispute that the filing was untimely under Md. Rule 9 — 107(b)(1). Thus, the sole issue in this appeal is what is the legal effect, if any, of William H.’s late filing. Analyzing how Md. Rule 9-107(b)(l) and the corresponding guardianship statutory provisions operate in guardianship cases provides helpful guidance in determining that Rule’s ⁷⁰⁵ effect in independent adoption cases.

A close comparison of the statutory language of FL § 5-320, which establishes the procedure for consent to a guardianship petition and governs the failure to object to a guardianship of a child, and of similar language in FL § 5-3B-20, which addresses the ramifications of a parent’s failing to object to the adoption of a child, reveals that the Legislature intended for both statutes to have the effect of rendering a late-filed objection as a statutorily-deemed consent. FL § 5-320 provides, in relevant part: (a) Consent and acquiescence or best interests. — A juvenile court may grant guardianship of a child only if: (iii) 1. Each of the child’s living parents consents: A. in writing; B. knowingly and voluntarily, on the record before the juvenile court; or C. by failure to file a, timely notice of objection after being served with a show cause order in accordance with this subtitle ... FL § 5-320 (emphasis added).

Section 5-3B-20 of the Family Law Article, which governs the court’s authority to grant independent adoptions, provides a procedure virtually identical to the one established by FL § 5-320 for guardianship proceedings. FL § 5-3B-20 states: A court may enter an order for adoption only if: (1) (i) 1. Each of the prospective adoptee’s living parents consents: A. in writing; or B. by failure to tim,ely file notice of objection after being served with a show cause order in accordance with this subtitle ... FL § 5-3B-20 (emphasis added).

We agree with intermediate appellate court that “there is no basis to conclude that the [Legislature intended the language of FL § 5-3B-20 be given different effect than the language of FL § 5-320.” In re: Adoption of Sean M., 204 Md.App. at 739 , 42 A.3d at 731 . ⁷⁰⁶ The Legislature’s 2005 revisions to the adoption and guardianship statutes demonstrate that it intended for a late filing of a notice of objection to an adoption to become a consent to that adoption arising under operation of law: [§ 5-3B-19][ 9 ] is derived from former FL SECTION 5-317(c)(2), as it related to adoption under this subtitle, and revised to clarify that failure to respond to a show cause order is deemed to be consent. it Committee Note, 2005 Md. Laws, ch 464 § 3, p. 2718. Furthermore, the thirty-day period to file an objection under Md. Rule 9-107 applies to guardianship and adoption proceedings alike, and thus provides additional support for the proposition that failure to adhere to the Rule’s deadline constitutes a deemed consent in the context of guardianship cases and independent adoption cases. Md. Rule 9-107 provides the requirements to file an objection in either an adoption or guardianship proceeding: (a) In general. Any person having a right to participate in a proceeding for adoption or guardianship may file a notice of objection to the adoption or guardianship.

The note may include a statement of the reasons for the objection and a request for the appointment of an attorney. (b) Time for filing objection. (1) In general.... [A ]ny notice of objection to an adoption or guardianship shall be filed within 30 days after the show cause order is served. Md. Rule 9-107 (emphasis added).

The absence of any distinction or limitation between filing a notice of objection to a guardianship or an adoption demonstrates that there is no difference in the effect of the Rule in either proceeding. Lastly, we have held that a statutorily-deemed consent to a guardianship petition is irrevocable. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 93321055, 344 Md. 458, 486 , 687 A.2d 681, 694 ⁷⁰⁷ (1997) (“No. 93321055 ”). 10 See In re Adoption/Guardianship of Audrey B., 186 Md.App. 454, 476 , 974 A.2d 965, 978 (2009) (finding that the conclusions of No. 93321055 apply with “equal force to the 2005 revisions to Maryland’s guardianship and adoption laws.”). Thus, we deduce that the statutory scheme for independent adoption proceedings supports a similar holding.

The current statutory scheme that provides parents and putative parents notice of and a means to object to an independent adoption is similar to that employed in guardianship proceedings that was at issue in No. 93321055, where we observed that, “in eases in which the parent does not affirmatively consent to the guardianship ... the court, upon the filing of a petition, [must] enter and serve upon the parent a show cause order informing the parent of the petition.... a copy of the petition [must] also be served on the parent and [must] set forth a form of show cause order for the courts to use. The order explains in plain language that the parents have the right to object to the guardianship but that, if they wish to object, they must file their objection with the court by the date set forth in the order.” 11 Id. at 478-79 , 687 A.2d at ⁷⁰⁸ 691 . We held, therefore, that the failure to file within the statutory time period constituted a deemed consent. Id. at 479 , 687 A.2d at 691 .

Once an untimely filed objection to a guardianship petition operates as a deemed consent, that “deemed consent under § 5-322(d) may not be revoked, for it is not a volitional consent but one arising by operation of law.” Id. at 481, 687 A.2d at 692 . 12 Because a parent’s or putative parent’s deemed consent to his or her child’s adoption arising from his or her failure to file a notice of objection is — as we held in No. 93321055 in the context of guardianship proceedings — not a “volitional consent but one arising by operation of law,” such deemed consent