In Re Anthony R.

CATHELL, Judge. Appellant, Anthony R., was charged as a juvenile under petition number 399021021 and petition number 399085025. Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion for the juvenile court to dismiss petition 399021021 because the petition was not filed in accordance with Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl-Vol., 2000 Supp.), section 3-812(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 1 After a hearing, the motion was denied. A motion to dismiss petition 399085025 was also filed prior to trial and was also denied.

After adjudication hearings, the juvenile court found facts to sustain both petitions. A disposition hearing was held on August 31, 1999, at which time a delinquency finding was made and appellant was placed on indefinite probation. Appellant filed an appeal on September 21, 1999 to the Court of Special Appeals, appealing the juvenile court’s denial of the two motions to dismiss. We granted certiorari on our own motion prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals.

Appellant presents two questions: 1. Did the juvenile judge err in holding that the Court of Appeals decision in In re James &[, 286 Md. 702 , 410 A.2d 586 (1980) ], was no longer good law and in therefore refusing to dismiss the Petition filed against the Appellant in violation of the time requirements of Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, [section] 3-812(b)? 2. Did the juvenile judge err in ruling that the statute of limitations did not apply to juvenile offenses? We answer yes to questions I and II.

We reverse the findings of the trial court in petition 399021021 and in petition ⁵⁴ 399085025 and shall direct that court to dismiss those petitions. Facts The allegations of petition 399085025 2 were first made by-Corey B., based on an alleged incident on December 3, 1997. Corey B. stated that he was on a bus, going to school, when a group of approximately nine boys boarded the bus. One of these boys, Generio, approached Corey B. and questioned him as to why he had hit Generio’s cousin.

Corey B. replied that he did not know anything about the incident at which time Generio struck Corey B. The other boys in the group, including appellant, then started to attack Corey B. Corey B. testified that appellant was one of the boys who hit him. Appellant testified that he did not hit Corey B. and he did not witness any other boys hitting him. The allegations of petition 399021021 occurred on September 14,1998. Corey B. testified that he was in the cafeteria at Patterson High School when he was approached by appellant and two other boys.

The three boys asked Corey B. if he wanted to fight. The boys left when he responded that he did not want to fight. Later in the day, Corey B. was confronted by the same three boys. Corey B. testified that appellant hit him in the face and when Corey B. fought back, all three boys attacked him.

Appellant testified that he did not hit Corey B. that day. A hearing was held before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as a juvenile court, on April 28, 1999, at which time appellant argued that petition 399021021 should be dismissed because the State failed to comply with the time requirements of section 3-812. Under section 3-812(b), the ⁵⁵ State’s Attorney shall prepare and file a delinquency petition within thirty days of receipt of a referral from the intake officer. The State’s Attorney received the referral from the intake officer on December 15, 1998, but did not file the delinquency petition until January 21, 1999, seven days after the thirty-day deadline.

After the hearing, the juvenile court kept the matter sub curia, granting appellant time to file a written brief in support of his motion. Appellant filed a brief on April 30, 1999, in which appellant stated that in accordance with In re James S., 286 Md. 702 , 410 A.2d 586 (1980), petition 399021021 should be dismissed with prejudice for the State’s failure to comply with section 3-812(b). The juvenile court filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order on May 11, 1999, denying appellant’s motion to dismiss. In its opinion, the court stated that: Maryland courts have made it abundantly clear that dismissal is not appropriate when the mandatory time provisions are not complied with regarding the intake phase, adjudication, disposition, and restitution hearings in juvenile cases.

After considering statutory changes to Section 3-812(b), In re James S., post -James case law, Maryland Rule 1-201, and the overall purpose of the Juvenile Causes Act, this Court concludes that a bright line test or blanket rule that dismissal is mandated is not appropriate. Instead, the better approach is to examine the totality of the circumstances and the facts of each case to determine the sanction for noncompliance with the statute. Under some circumstances, dismissal with prejudice will be the proper sanction for failure to comply with Section 3 — 812(b). However, after considering the nature of the charges and the fact that the respondents have not been detained as a result of the delay, this Court does not believe that dismissal is required....

Appellant thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss both petitions on July 6, 1999. In the motion, appellant claimed that under petition 399085025 he had been denied his right to due process and his right to a speedy trial based on the period of delay until the hearing and that the State’s failure to file with the court and serve on appellant an order to extend the State’s ⁵⁶ time for petitioning in the delinquency matter of petition 899085025 made the extension ineffective. 3 The court heard oral arguments on the motion on July 7, 1999, before the adjudication hearing. At the hearing, appellant renewed his claims from his motion to dismiss and also claimed that the State violated Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.), section 5-106 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, 4 by not prosecuting a misdemeanor within one year after the offense was committed. The court dismissed the due process and speedy trial claims based on its analysis of Supreme Court and Maryland case law.

The court also dismissed appellant’s last issue about the applicability of section 5-106, stating that: The Court believes that based on the purposes of the Juvenile Causes Act, as detailed in this Court’s memorandum, opinion, and order dated May 11, of accountability, responsibility, the Court does not believe that that section applies to the Juvenile Causes Act, and accordingly, will deny the [appellant’s] motion to dismiss on that ground as well. The adjudication hearing was then held and the court found that under petition 399085025, there was evidence to sustain the facts as to the second degree assault. The court found petitioner “not involved” in the reckless endangerment charge. Under petition 399021021, the court found petitioner “involved” as to both second degree assault and molesting a student on school property under Maryland Code (1978, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.), section 26-101 of the Education Article.

Appellant appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Before consideration by the Court of Special Appeals, we granted certiorari on our own motion. ⁵⁷ Discussion We will first examine the legislative history of section 3-812 and address appellant’s first question. We will then address whether the statute of limitations in section 5-106 applies to juvenile actions. A. Section 3-812 We commence our analysis of section 3-812 by attempting to ascertain the intent of the legislature.

As we said in State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709 , 720 A.2d 311 (1998): We have said that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). Legislative intent must be sought first in the actual language of the statute. Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45 , 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380 , 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (quoting Tidewater v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344 , 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995)); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256 , 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996); Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693 , 668 A.2d 1, 2 (1995); Oaks, 339 Md. at 35 , 660 A.2d at 429 ; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92 , 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (1979); Board of Supervisors v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136 , 141 A.2d 734, 736 (1958). Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts normally do not look beyond the words of the statute to determine legislative intent.

Marriott Employees, 346 Md. at 445 , 697 A.2d at 458 ; Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414 , 237 A.2d 35, 41 (1968). This Court recently stated that “statutory language is not read in isolation, but ‘in light of the full context in which [it] appear[s], and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence.’ ” Stan ⁵⁸ ford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380 , 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (alterations in original) (quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185 , 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989)). To this end, [wjhen we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed.... We may and often must consider other “external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence,” including a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case. ... [I]n State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327 , 524 A.2d 51 (1987), ... [although we did not describe any of the statutes involved in that case as ambiguous or uncertain, we did search for legislative purpose or meaning — what Judge Orth, writing for the Court, described as “the legislative scheme.” [Id. at] 344-45, 524 A.2d at 59 .

We identified that scheme or purpose after an extensive review of the context of Ch. 549, Acts of 1984, which had effected major changes in Art. 27, § 297. That context included, among other things, a bill request form, prior legislation, a legislative committee report, a bill title, related statutes and amendments to the bill. See also Ogrinz v. James, 309 Md. 381 , 524 A.2d 77 (1987), in which we considered legislative history (a committee report) to assist in construing legislation that we did not identify as ambiguous or of uncertain meaning. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15 , 525 A.2d at 632-33 (some citations omitted).

Id. at 717-19, 720 A.2d at 315-16 (some alterations in original); see Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 115-17 , 753 A.2d 41, 48-49 (2000); Riemer v. Columbia Medical Plan, 358 Md. 222, 235-36 , 747 A.2d 677 , 684-85 ⁵⁹ (2000); Laznovsky v. Laznovsky, 357 Md. 586, 606-07 , 745 A.2d 1054, 1065 (2000). Chapter 554 of the Laws of Maryland of 1975 (House Bill 483) revised the statutes pertaining to juvenile actions, establishing the Juvenile Causes Act. Chapter 554, in final form, stated in its title that it had the following purpose: FOR the purpose of generally revising and recodifying the law concerning Juvenile Causes, creating a uniform law for Juvenile Causes, providing for the jurisdiction of the courts to hear juvenile causes, setting forth procedures, powers, duties, and limitations with respect to judicial and executive personnel in connection with juvenile causes, and relating generally to juvenile causes. Section 3-812(b), as originally enacted by Chapter 554, read: (b) Petitions alleging delinquency shall be prepared and filed by the State’s attorney.

All other petitions shall be prepared and filed by the intake officer. Section 3-812(b) was amended by Chapter 814 of the Laws of Maryland of 1978 (Senate Bill 551). 5 In its amended form, section 3-812(b) stated that the State’s Attorney “shall” file a delinquency petition within fifteen days of receiving a referral. It was clear that the General Assembly wanted juvenile actions to be processed expeditiously. The statute was in this form when we analyzed it in In re James S. In the case of In re James S., supra, we held that a petition filed under section 3-812(b) must be dismissed, with prejudice, if not filed within the designated time period.

At that time, section 3-812(b) stated, in relevant part, that “[petitions alleging delinquency ... shall be prepared and filed by the State’s [Ajttorney. A petition alleging delinquency shall be filed within 15 days after the receipt of a referral from the intake officer.” We paid close attention to the word “shall” and its generally mandatory nature. We stated that: ⁶⁰ This Court most recently considered the word “shall” to be mandatory in State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310 , 403 A.2d 356 (1979). That case involved interpretation of Maryland Rule 746 which in turn was based on Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 591 relative to prompt trial of criminal charges in the circuit courts and the Criminal Court of Baltimore.

In the opinion on the motion for reconsideration we said: Under settled principles of statutory construction, the word “shall” is ordinarily presumed to have a mandatory meaning. Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 321 , 384 A.2d 709 [, 713] (1978); Moss v. Director, 279 Md. 561, 564-565 , 369 A.2d 1011 [, 1013] (1977); United States Coin & Currency v. Dir. [of Finance], 279 Md. 185, 187 , 367 A.2d 1243 [, 1244] (1977); Bright v. Unsat. C. & J. Fund Bd., 275 Md. 165, 169-170 , 338 A.2d 248 [, 251] (1975), and cases there cited. Moreover, if it were intended that the deadline for trial of the case was not mandatory and could be overlooked whenever convenient, there would have been no necessity for the further provision in the statute and rule requiring “extraordinary cause” and permission of the county administrative judge for an extension of the deadline. [Id. at 334, 403 A.2d at 369 .] In re James S., 286 Md. at 708 , 410 A.2d at 589 .

We also were aware of the similarities between the language in section 3-812 and other statutes that limited actions. We stated that: We are struck- by the similarity between the language used in the statute here under consideration and that in the various limitations of actions found in Code (1974, 1979 Cum.Supp.) Title 5, Subtitle 1, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Here the words “shall be filed within 15 days” are used. In each of those sections the words “shall be filed” or “shall be instituted” within a specified period of time are used.

For instance, § 5-101 specifies, “A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced.” Section 5-105 provides, “An action for as ⁶¹ sault, battery, libel, or slander shall be filed within one year from the date it accrues.” Section 5-106(c) states, “A prosecution for Sabbath breaking or drunkenness shall be instituted within 30 days after the offense was committed,” while § 5-106(a) says, “Except as provided by this section, a prosecution for a misdemeanor not made punishable by confinement in the penitentiary by statute shall be instituted within one year after the offense was committed.” Section 5-107 requires that “[a] prosecution or suit for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture shall be instituted within one year after the offense was committed.” The wording used in these sections is but little changed from that previously appearing in Code (1957) Art. 57 where, for instance, § 12 states, “All actions or prosecutions for blasphemy and Sabbath breaking, or drunkenness shall be made within one month after the fact.” No one would contend seriously that the language of these limitations statutes is directory rather than mandatory. Id. at 711-12, 410 A.2d at 590-91 . We went on to hold that: We see this statute as clearly and unambiguously requiring that a petition alleging delinquency must be filed within 15 days after the receipt of a referral from the intake officer. We view this as entirely within the scheme set down in the act for expediting juvenile matters.

Once the issue of a tardy filing was raised here, dismissal of the delinquency petition was mandated. Thus, it is virtually the same as the dismissal required in the case of an ordinary civil action filed three years and one day “from the date it accrues” or a prosecution for assault (a common law misdemeanor not required by statute to be punished by confinement in a penitentiary) instituted a year and a day after the offense was committed. This can only mean dismissal with prejudice. We point out that when the General Assembly intended a dismissal under the Intrastate Detainer Act to be without prejudice, it said so specifically.

See Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol., 1979 Cum.Supp.) Art. 27, § 616S(e). We are told of many problems that may be created if we hold this provision to be mandatory. We do not deny that ⁶² such might be the case, but the General Assembly is in session and it no doubt will take prompt corrective action if it does not mean the sections to be mandatory. It is our duty to interpret the statute in accordance with the established law of this State.

Id. at 713-14, 410 A.2d at 591-92 (emphasis added). After our decision in In re James S. was filed on January 29, 1980, the legislature immediately took up the issue and amended section 3-812(b). Chapter 34 of the Laws of Maryland of 1980 (House Bill 640) and Chapter 304 of the Laws of Maryland of 1980 (Senate Bill 318) both provided for essentially the same language in respect to amending section 3-812(b). It was stated in the title of House Bill 640 that the amendment was, “[for] the purpose of altering the time within which a petition alleging juvenile delinquency shall be prepared and filed by a State’s Attorney.... ” Similarly, the title of Senate Bill 318 stated that the amendment was “[for] the purpose of increasing the time period within which the State’s attorney is to file a petition alleging delinquency of a juvenile.” Both bills amended section 3 — 812(b); in its new form, it read: (b) Petitions alleging delinquency or violation of Section 3-831 shall be prepared and filed by the State’s attorney.

A petition alleging delinquency shall be filed within SO days after the receipt of a referral from the intake officer. All other petitions shall be prepared and filed by the intake officer. [Emphasis added.] The bills were passed to provide the State’s Attorneys with an additional fifteen days to file delinquency petitions. The General Assembly did not pass the bills to change the mandatory nature of section 3-812(b) or it would have stated that it was not its intent for the section to be mandatory, as this Court in In re James S. had clearly invited the Legislature to do if that were the Legislature’s intent. House Bill 640 and Senate Bill 318 faced opposition even to the proposal to extend the time for the State’s Attorney to file a delinquency petition from fifteen to thirty days.

In the file for House Bill 640, there is a letter from Mrs. Betty McShel- ⁶³ ley, Chairwoman of the Montgomery County Juvenile Court Committee. The letter, addressed to the House Judiciary Committee stated that: I am writing on behalf of the Montgomery County Juvenile Court Committee in opposition to HB 640 — Juvenile Causes — Petitions. It is the feeling of the Committee that 15 days is enough time for the State’s Attorney to file a delinquency petition. The additional 25 days 6 will only serve to delay the judicial process that has already been criticized as being too slow.

The problem would seem to be more appropriately solved by having more [Sjtate’s [Attorneys on staff for the jurisdiction[s] that are having difficulties in meeting the time limit. In notes from a meeting of the House Judiciary Committee, James F. Lynch from the Administrative Office of the Courts expressed the view of the Maryland Judicial Conference as not being opposed to extending the limit to thirty days, but the Judicial Conference was opposed to extending the period to forty days and requested that the requirement remain mandatory. Marion Mattingly, from Juvenile Justice expressed that problems in complying with the fifteen-day requirement were isolated to Baltimore City and Anne Arundel County. She thought the fifteen-day limit could be complied with if the priorities of the State’s Attorney’s office were adjusted to accommodate the fifteen-day requirement.

In the file for Senate Bill 318, a letter from Sally Michel, Chairperson of the State Advisory Committee to the Executive Department’s Office for Children and Youth, addressed to the Honorable Joseph Owens, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, stated that: The State Advisory Committee to the Office for Children and Youth opposes SB 318, Juvenile Causes — Delinquency Petition, which extends the time period within which the ⁶⁴ State’s attorney is to file a petition alleging delinquency of a juvenile. We firmly believe that the current law provides adequate time for the State’s [Attorney to file a petition alleging delinquency after reviewing the intake officer’s denial of such petition. The child and the public are best served when action is taken in an expeditious and reasonable manner. Extending the time period would only cause a further delay in the court process if a petition were to be filed.

The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene made a legislative comment that stated: The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene supports the extension of the filing of a delinquency petition because of the practicality of the State’s Attorney’s being able to file the petition within 15 days. However, unlike the adult system, the juvenile is served best in the most expeditious process of court action. Therefore, whenever possible, the petition should be filed within 15 days of the receipt of the complainant’s appeal. Peter S. Smith, Director of the Maryland Juvenile Law Clinic, testified before the Judicial Proceedings Committee.

While opposing an extension of the time for the State’s Attorney to file a delinquency petition, Mr. Smith stated that he would not be opposed to Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays not being included in computing the fifteen days. Later, Chapter 707 of the Laws of Maryland of 1989 (House Bill 924), added further amendment, by modifying section 3-812(b). The purpose of the amendment was stated in its title as: FOR the purpose of authorizing the extension of the time the State’s Attorney has to file a petition alleging that a child is delinquent; making a stylistic change; and relating generally to the filing of delinquency petitions under the laws relating to juvenile causes. The amended 3-812(b) read: (b) Petitions alleging delinquency or violation of § 3-831 shall be prepared and filed by the State’s Attorney.

A ⁶⁵ petition alleging delinquency shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt of a referral from the intake officer, unless that time is extended by the court far good cause shown. All other petitions shall be prepared and filed by the intake officer. [Emphasis added.] The Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee provided a bill analysis of House Bill 924 that stated: SUMMARY OF BILL: This bill authorizes a juvenile court, for good cause shown, to extend the 30-day period during which the State’s Attorney is required to prepare and file a petition alleging delinquency. BACKGROUND: Under current law, a petition must allege that a child is a delinquent, in need of assistance, or in need of supervision. If the petition alleges delinquency or alleges that an adult willfully contributed to a child’s delinquency, need of supervision, or need of assistance, the State’s Attorney must prepare and file the petition within 30 days after receipt of a referral from the intake officer.

All other petitions are prepared and filed by the intake officer. By allowing the court to extend the State’s Attorney’s deadline for preparing and filing a delinquency petition, the bill allows these petitions to be brought even if circumstances prevent the State’s Attorney from completing the petition within 30 days. [Emphasis added.] We note that even though the General Assembly has provided the State’s Attorney with the power to request an extension of time for good cause, the General Assembly did not change the mandatory nature of section 3-812(b). In analyzing the holding of In re James S., discussed supra, and its application to amended section 3-812(b), and in considering that the Legislature has not seen fit to change the mandatory nature of the statute as expressed by us in In re James S., despite the invitation and opportunity to do so, we ⁶⁶ are, in this case, especially cognizant of the doctrine of stare decisis. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 273 , 462 A.2d 506, 521 (1983) (“We are mindful of the value of the doctrine of stare decisis and aware that for reasons of certainty and stability, changes in decisional doctrine ordinarily should be left to