In re Anthony Z.

FISCHER, Judge. The State appeals from a decision of the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County sitting as a Juvenile Court dismissing a petition alleging that Anthony Z., appellee, is a delinquent child. The issues raised by the State in this appeal are: 1. Was the intake procedure conducted in this case in compliance with Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Section 3-810? 2.

If not in compliance with Section 3-810, was dismissal the appropriate sanction? On February 26,1991, the Department of Juvenile Services (DJS) received a complaint against Anthony Z. stemming from an alleged incident which, if committed by an adult, would constitute theft of an automobile. DJS promptly wrote to Anthony’s mother requesting that she contact DJS by March 7, 1991. On February 27, 1991, a letter was also sent to the alleged victim.

On March 1, 1991, a DJS intake officer, Singleton Golden, spoke to the person from whom the automobile in question was allegedly taken. The property owner indicated that restitution was due and that prosecution of the case was desired. Ms. Golden spoke with Anthony Z.’s mother on March 8, 1991. Anthony’s mother indicated to Ms. Golden that they were willing to pay the “deductible” in the case.

At that point, Ms. Golden believed that it might be possible to recommend an informal resolution of the petition, but in order to be certain, she wished to make further investigation. Specifically, she wished to meet with Anthony in person. Thereafter, on March 13, 1991, she went to the school where Anthony was being held and interviewed him. On the same date, she decided to recommend to the State’s Attorney that an informal adjustment of the case be made since Anthony told her that he was willing to make restitution.

Notwithstanding her recommendation, a petition alleging that Anthony is a delinquent child was filed by the State’s Attorney on April 23, 1991. ¹¹⁹ The matter came before the court on June 5, 1991. Counsel for Anthony moved to dismiss the petition on the basis that the preliminary inquiry was not completed within fifteen days. The trial court agreed and dismissed the petition. This appeal followed.

The applicable statute is Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 3-810 (1989 Repl.Vol.) 1 which states in pertinent part: (a) The intake officer shall receive: (1) Complaints from a person or agency having knowledge of facts which may cause a person to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court; and (2) Citations issued by a police officer under § 3-835 of this article. (b) (1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in considering the complaint, the intake officer shall make a preliminary inquiry within 15 days as to whether the court has jurisdiction and whether judicial action is in the best interests of the public or the child. The intake officer may, after such inquiry and in accordance with this section: (i) Authorize the filing of a petition; (ii) Conduct further investigation into the allegations of the complaint; (iii) Propose an informal adjustment of the matter; or (iv) Refuse authorization to file a petition. * * * * * * (d)(1) The intake officer may conduct a further investigation if, based upon the complaint and the preliminary inquiry, the intake officer concludes that further inquiry is necessary in order to determine whether the court has jurisdiction or whether judicial action is in the best interest of the public or the child. ¹²⁰ (2) The further investigation shall be completed and a decision made by the intake officer within 10 days, unless that time is extended by the court. Appellee argues that the intake officer cannot invoke the ten day period provided by § 3-810(d) simply to extend the time available for completing his or her assigned task.

On the other hand, the State contends that if the ten day period under subsection (d) cannot be utilized until the preliminary inquiry is complete and if, under subsection (d), the State can only invoke the ten day period for further investigation to determine whether the court has jurisdiction and whether judicial action is in the best interest of the child, the Department of Juvenile Services could never invoke section (d). It is obvious that, in resolving this issue, subsections (b) and (d) must be read together and harmonized. See Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 510-516 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987). Paragraph (b)(1) provides, in part, “[T]he intake officer shall make a preliminary inquiry within 15 days as to whether the court has jurisdiction and whether judicial action is in the best interests of the public or the child.

The intake officer may, after such inquiry ... (ii) Conduct a further investigation into the allegations of the complaint.” Paragraph (d)(1) states, in part, “The intake officer may conduct a further investigation if, based upon the complaint and the preliminary inquiry, the intake officer concludes that further inquiry is necessary in order to determine whether the court has jurisdiction or whether judicial action is in the best interests of the public or the child.” In the case sub judice, the intake officer made a preliminary inquiry and, in so doing, spoke to the juvenile’s mother and the victim. She reached a conclusion that an informal