In Re Caitlin N.

WOODWARD, Judge. On April 22, 2008, an intake officer with the Department of Juvenile Services (the “Department”), filed a Petition for Continued Detention or Shelter Care concerning appellant, Caitlin N., in the Circuit Court for Talbot County, Maryland, sitting as a juvenile court, alleging that appellant may be a delinquent child. Following a hearing, the juvenile court granted the Department’s petition for continued detention or shelter care and ordered that appellant remain in the care and custody of the Department. On May 7, 2008, appellant was ²⁵⁶ • conditionally released from detention, with electronic monitoring, into the custody of her mother, Suzanne N. On May 13, 2008, the State filed a juvenile petition, alleging that appellant was a delinquent child for having attempted to possess marijuana.

The juvenile court held an adjudicatory hearing on the State’s petition on June 26, 2008, and found appellant involved in the delinquent act of attempted possession of marijuana. At the disposition hearing on July 17, 2008, the juvenile court held that appellant was a delinquent child, placed her in the custody of her older sister, Sara M., and also placed her on supervised probation under the supervision of the Department. Appellant timely appealed to this Court and presents the following three questions for our review: 1. Did the court below err in denying Appellant’s “Motion to Hold Adjudicatory Hearing within Sixty Days?” 2.

Did the juvenile court err in ruling that the State was not required to provide the name of the chemist in discovery? 3. Was the evidence legally insufficient to sustain the finding that Appellant was involved in the delinquent act of attempted possession of marijuana? For the following reasons, we shall affirm the judgment of the juvenile court. BACKGROUND On April 20, 2008, Patrolman First Class (“PFC”) George T. Larrimore, Jr., of the Easton Police Department, observed appellant with a group of other individuals at approximately 10:03 p.m. in the area of 12 North Washington Street in Easton, Maryland.

During the course of his observations, PFC Larrimore heard appellant ask one Brandon Sinclair, “hey do you have any weed?” and “you should let me buy a gram from you. Will you let me buy a gram?” Appellant was then seen retrieving something from her pocketbook and attempting to hand it to Sinclair. Appellant and Sinclair were taken into custody and police recovered 1.8 grams of marijuana from Sinclair’s person during a search incident to arrest. ²⁵⁷ On April 21, 2008, appellant was placed in emergency detention at the Waxter Children’s Center. The next day, April 22, 2008, the Department filed a Petition for Continued Detention or Shelter Care in the juvenile court pending the possible filing of a juvenile petition.

Following a hearing the same day, wherein the Department proffered the underlying bases for its petition, including that appellant attempted to possess a controlled dangerous substance, the juvenile court granted the Department’s petition for continued detention at Waxter Children’s Center or other secure detention facility. The court found that continued detention was necessary in order to “protect the child or the person and property of others,” and because “there appears to be no parent, guardian, custodian or other person able to provide supervision and care for the child and return the child to Court when required.” The juvenile court additionally found that appellant “has been [a] habitual runaway, has been implicated in substance abuse, and her mother is currently out of state [until] the weekend, thus there is no supervision and considerable concern for her safety if released[.]” Appellant then was ordered into the care and custody of the Department. That detention continued until May 7, 2008, when appellant was conditionally released with electronic monitoring to the custody of her mother. The juvenile court’s order provided as follows: Upon the matters presented before the Court in Hearing on the Petition of the State of Maryland, Department of Juvenile Services, for continued detention of [appellant] alleged to be a delinquent child, the Court finds that there is no parent, guardian, custodian or other person able to provide adequate supervision and care of and to the Respondent to the Court when required, without the assistance of electronic monitoring and compliance by respondent with the terms and conditions of a Conditional Release, but that with such monitoring and compliance, such supervision, care and return to Court can be provided by [] [appellant’s] mother. ²⁵⁸ Following appellant’s conditional release, on May 13, 2008, the State of Maryland filed a juvenile petition alleging that appellant was a delinquent child for having been involved with the attempted possession of marijuana, a controlled dangerous substance.

The petition lists PFC Larrimore as the State’s sole witness in support of the petition. The Office of the Public Defender entered an appearance in the juvenile court on behalf of appellant on May 22, 2008. The record additionally discloses that, although the petition was served on appellant’s mother on May 23, 2008, an attempt to serve appellant with the petition that day was unsuccessful. On June 10, 2008, after the State provided discovery, appellant’s attorney filed a Demand for Presence of Chemist, Analyst, or Person in Chain of Custody, citing Maryland Code (1974, 2006 RepLVol.), § 10-1003 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”). 1 Additionally, appellant’s attorney filed a motion in the juvenile court, entitled “Motion to Hold Adjudicatory Hearing within Sixty Days.” The motion requested that the adjudicatory hearing be set on or before June 20, 2008, for the following reasons: 1.

On April 20, 2008 Respondent was arrested and ordered detained by an intake officer, pursuant to Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, section 3-8A-15. 2. This Honorable Court, sitting as a Juvenile Court, obtained jurisdiction of the Respondent when the State filed a petition alleging that the Respondent is a delinquent child. 3. This Honorable Court then held a hearing on April 22, 2008 on the State’s petition for continued detention. At that hearing, this Court authorized continued secure detention. ²⁵⁹ 4.

Also at this April 22nd hearing, Respondent received formal notice of the allegation contained in petition number J-08-5460. 5. Pursuant to Rule 11-114 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure, an adjudicatory hearing shall be held within 60 days after a juvenile petition is served on the respondent. 6. Respondent’s scheduled adjudicatory hearing for petition number J-08-5460 is June 26, 2008, which is outside the 60-day time requirement mandated by Maryland Rule 11-114. At this time, Respondent has not waived her right to adjudication within 60 days.

On June 10, 2008, the State filed a response to this motion, stating: 1. The Petition in this case was filed on May 7, 2008 [sic]. 2. The Respondent’s attorney entered her appearance on May 22, 2008. 3. The Respondent has not yet been served with the Petition. 4.

There was a Continued Detention Hearing on April 22, 2008. 5. Rule 11-114 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure provides that an Adjudicatory Hearing shall be held within sixty days after the juvenile Petition is served on the respondent. 6. Since the Petition has not been served, the currently scheduled date is not in violation of the sixty day time period. On June 11, 2008, the juvenile court entered a written order denying appellant’s Motion to Hold Adjudicatory Hearing within Sixty Days.

Thereafter, on June 26, 2008, the adjudicatory hearing was held before the juvenile court. The record reveals that appellant was personally served with the petition at 9:00 a.m. that same day. Prior to receiving evidence at the hearing, appellant’s counsel renewed the motion to hold the adjudicatory hearing ²⁶⁰ within sixty days. Appellant contended that, because the juvenile court had jurisdiction over appellant at the April 22, 2008 detention hearing, the adjudicatory hearing should have been held on June 20, 2008, and that there was no extraordinary cause to hold the hearing on June 26, 2008.

Specifically, counsel stated, “without the extraordinary cause finding I don’t believe that we can go forward today.” The State responded that the sixty day time period of Rule 11-114 did not begin to run until the petition was served. The State also argued that “[a] continued detention hearing after the juvenile is arrested is not considered filing a petition. It’s not considered a notice of the charges because the charges are not filed until the State’s Attorney’s Office signs the petition and files it with the Court.” After the juvenile court confirmed that appellant actually was served with the petition the day of the adjudicatory hearing, her counsel argued that, pursuant to C.J. § 3-8A-15, a child may be placed in detention for, to protect the child or others, or if the child is likely to leave. And then it talks about how continuation of detention under section (d) if they are not released then they shall immediately file petition to authorize detention and have a hearing.

And I think that the rules contemplate at that hearing for continued detention as it’s done in most jurisdictions, the petition is filed at that time. Otherwise I’m just not sure how the Court’s getting to jurisdiction to authorize continued detention. Noting that appellant was released on May 7th on electronic monitoring, and after agreeing with appellant’s counsel’s suggestion that this was still detention, the juvenile court ruled on this motion as follows: But I think that the time line I have to agree with [the State] begins with the filing of a petition. Why the petition was not filed sooner I can’t answer.

I don’t know why it was not filed sooner. She was detained on April 22nd. The petition was filed on May 13, she was released on home detention prior to the filing of the petition. Judge Earnest ²⁶¹ denied the motion.

I’m going to deny the motion. It’s an interesting question and I’m glad you raised it. After denying appellant’s renewed motion, the juvenile court then heard argument on a different issue related to appellant’s demand for the presence of the chemist under C.J. § 10-1003. While the chemist was not listed as a witness on the petition, the State proffered that it sent appellant’s counsel a copy of the drug analysis report on June 9, 2008, and that the name of the chemist was included on that report.

After appellant filed the demand pursuant to C.J. § 10-1003, the State then subpoenaed the chemist to testify. The State informed the court that appellant was now objecting to the chemist’s testimony on the grounds that the State failed to provide notice that the chemist would testify. After learning that the chemist was present and prepared to testify, the court initially ruled that the State satisfied appellant’s request. Thereafter, appellant’s counsel stated that filing a demand for a chemist was her normal practice, and that such a demand did not “absolve[] the State of their duty for continued discovery.” After stating that the purpose of the demand was to “have our Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine people,” appellant then moved to exclude the chemist’s testimony because the State failed to comply with its duty of continuing discovery under Maryland Rule 11-109.

The following then ensued: THE COURT: Address the prejudice issue. Tell me how you have been prejudiced. Have you not seen the report? [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I have reviewed the report. THE COURT: So have you been prejudiced in anyway [sic] by the late production of the report or the fact that [the State] did not supply that in the normal course of discovery? [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: I didn’t prepare questions for a chemist.

I wasn’t anticipating a chemist being here. And for some ... THE COURT: But aren’t we talking about an issue were the chemist not here, you would be standing here telling me ²⁶² another story. You would say, all right, I demanded the chemist, he’s not here, State cannot go forward. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: No, if the chemist were not here the State would not be able to prove their case.

I wouldn’t be objecting to that. I wouldn’t be saying bring the chemist in. If I had gotten notice that the chemist was going to be here and demanded their presence and they weren’t here, the burden’s on the State to produce this case. THE COURT: I agree but the sword cuts both ways.

Had [the State] not produced the chemist today you would be standing here in front of me saying something entirely different. You would say to me, Judge, I demanded a chemist to be here, he’s not here, the State cannot go forward and I would agree with you. I’d have to agree with you because you had made the demand. You made the demand, he is here, we will go forward.

I’m going to deny your motion. The juvenile court then proceeded to hear evidence from the State’s first witness, PFC Larrimore. PFC Larrimore was on duty on April 20, 2008, at approximately 10:03 p.m., in the area of 12 North Washington Street in Easton, Maryland. Conducting surveillance of the area from a concealed position near some bushes in front of the circuit courthouse, PFC Larrimore observed appellant in a “very well lit” area, near a bench in front of the Courthouse Square shops, with approximately three other individuals.

PFC Larrimore testified that he was approximately 50 feet away from the group, and that he could “absolutely” hear what this group was saying from his concealed position. He observed this group for approximately forty minutes, and during that time, a person known to PFC Larrimore as Conrad Frederick “Rickey” Horney approached. According to PFC Larrimore, appellant told a person in the group named “Mushaw,” “ask him.” Mushaw then asked Horney, “do you have any weed?” Horney responded, “no, I’m trying to score some myself.” ²⁶³ A short time later, Brandon Sinclair approached appellant’s group and began a conversation. During that discussion, PFC Larrimore heard appellant ask Sinclair, “hey do you have any weed?” PFC Larrimore then testified: At which point Mr. Sinclair said actually I do.

Then Mr. Mushaw asked Mr. Sinclair how much do you have. Then Mr. Sinclair replied three grams. He pulled an item out of his pocket and showed it to both [appellant] and Mr. Mushaw. At that point [appellant] stated to Mr. Sinclair, her exact words were, you should let me buy a gram from you.

Will you let me buy a gram? PFC Larrimore then testified about his observations after this discussion between appellant and Sinclair, as follows: [Appellant] continued to clutch whatever item she had retrieved from her pocketbook in her hand. She tried several times. It appeared she tried several times to hand it to Mr. Sinclair.

Each time that they tried to do this it was approximately three or four times that this was attempted. Each time that it was attempted, there’s a business two doors down that’s called Scoccia’s that was currently [sic] had clientele out front and folks were walking to and from that restaurant. As they would walk from the restaurant [appellant] would place her hand down and Mr. Sinclair would not approach her. As they would walk away she would attempt to hand him the item again, Mr. Sinclair would approach her and the people would walk away again. [ 2 ] Appellant, Mushaw, and Sinclair then discussed how to smoke the “weed,” and Mushaw indicated that he would buy a soda, empty the can, and then “they could all smoke weed by using the can.” At around this same time, Sinclair produced a number of window chalk markers, handed them out to the others, and then, for some unknown reason, appellant, Mushaw, and a person named “Fifer” began to write on the ²⁶⁴ nearby store windows with those markers.

At this point, PFC Larrimore had police officers respond, and he emerged from his concealed surveillance location. After detaining the subjects, PFC Larrimore then searched Sinclair and recovered from his front left hand pocket a clear ziploc baggie containing three smaller ziploc baggies. Those smaller ziploc baggies contained a “green vegetable matter.” That substance was packaged and sent to the drug lab for analysis. No marijuana was recovered from appellant’s person.

The State next called Catherine Savage, a forensic scientist with the Maryland State Police Forensics Scientist Division. Over appellant’s objection, the court accepted Savage as an expert forensic scientist in the field of controlled dangerous substances. Savage testified that she analyzed State’s Exhibit 1 in this ease, the green vegetable matter seized from Sinclair, and that this substance was 1.8 grams of marijuana, a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance. At the conclusion of this evidence, appellant’s counsel moved to dismiss the charges for failure to prove the chain of custody.

Appellant also made a motion for judgment of acquittal, contending that, because no marijuana was recovered from appellant, and no testimony was adduced concerning money, the State had failed to establish that appellant made a substantial step towards possession of the marijuana. The State did not respond to the chain of custody motion, but responded that the facts were sufficient to establish attempted possession of marijuana. The court denied both motions. After appellant exercised her right not to testify, appellant rested her case without producing any evidence.

Appellant then renewed her motion for judgment of acquittal, maintaining that the State had failed to prove a substantial step towards the purchase of marijuana. Appellant also questioned the ability of PFC Larrimore to actually hear the conversations from his surveillance location. The court ruled that appellant was involved in the attempted possession of marijuana. In support of that ruling, the ²⁶⁵ court found that PFC Larrimore “was stationed in a location that he could see what was going on and he could hear what was going on.

But I have nothing to tell me to the contrary that he was not able.” Further, the court stated: So the Court certainly can conclude from his testimony that he had an opportunity to see and hear what he testified to. And then he testified that he heard [appellant] say to Mr. Mushaw, when Conrad Horney approached the group, Mr. Horney came up [to] the group and [appellant] asked Mr. Mushaw to ask Horney if he had any weed. We don’t know exactly what took place after that but then Mr. Sinclair appears on the scene. And I don’t know whether we have an exit on Horney and an entry of Sinclair but we do know that Sinclair comes on the scene and [appellant] asked Mr. Sinclair if he had any weed.

And the next phrase was, let me buy a gram. I think that we all over time learn that the lexicon of the street is something that is unlike what we understood common terms to mean when we were much younger. The phrase weed or the term weed means much, much more than than [sic] it did 10 or 15 years ago. In fact I suspect that when someone uses the word weed it doesn’t refer to crabgrass and lawn growth any longer.

Because weed is certainly to younger folks and to this member of the Court having been in courtrooms now for 40 years means exactly what it is intended to mean, and that is marijuana. It doesn’t mean smack or anything but marijuana. And that of course is bolstered and buttressed by the fact that Mr. Sinclair was found to have marijuana on his person by the officer when he apprehended him. So the Court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] did in fact attempt to possess marijuana on or about April 20th, 2008.

I don’t know what she had in her purse but certainly the evidence is that she had the ability to make the purchase or she would not have approached someone and asked to buy a gram. It wouldn’t make much sense to go up to someone and say do you have any weed let me buy a gram if one were not in the position to carry it forward [sic] that request. So the Court finds that the evidence of this case ²⁶⁶ does support a finding of involved. And the Court -will find that [appellant] is in fact involved as a result of the occurrence of April 20th, 2008.

On July 17, 2008, the juvenile court held a disposition hearing in this case, as well as another case where the court previously found appellant involved in the unauthorized removal of an automobile. After hearing recommendations from the Department and the State, and after hearing from appellant, her mother, Suzanne N., her sister, Sara M., and her counsel, the juvenile court adopted the recommendations of the Department, found appellant to be a delinquent child, and then committed her to the care and custody of her sister, Sara M., under the supervision of the Department. The juvenile court also ordered standard as well as special conditions, including that appellant successfully complete outpatient addictions and mental health treatment programs, and complete her education. This timely appeal followed.

We will include additional facts in the following discussion. DISCUSSION I. Appellant first contends that the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to hold the adjudicatory hearing within sixty days. Citing generally C.J. § 3-8A-15, and more specifically, Rule ll-114(b), appellant asserts that, when the court granted the Department’s petition for continued detention or shelter care on April 22, 2008, ordering that appellant may be a delinquent child, that “[t]his notice of pending delinquency proceedings should have triggered the start of the 60-day time period for holding an adjudicatory hearing.” The State responds that the adjudicatory hearing was held within the proper time frame in this case, pursuant to Rule ll-114(b). The State specifically asserts that, “under the plain language of the rule, the triggering event is the service of the delinquency petition upon the juvenile.” Because appellant was actually served on June 26, 2008, the date of the ²⁶⁷ adjudicatory hearing, the State contends that the juvenile court properly denied appellant’s motion.

For the following reasons, we hold that, pursuant to Rule 11 — 114(b)(1), the adjudicatory hearing was held within sixty days after the juvenile petition was served and thus the juvenile court properly denied appellant’s motion. 3 Maryland has adopted “a separate system for juvenile offenders, civil in nature.” In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 91 , 646 A.2d 1012 (1994); accord In re Areal B., 177 Md.App. 708, 714 , 938 A.2d 43 (2007) (“Juvenile causes are civil, not criminal proceedings.”). The Juvenile Causes Act (“the Act”), codified at C.J. §§ 3-8A-01 to -34, “grant[s]