In Re David S.

SONNER, Judge. The District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County, sitting as a Juvenile Court, found appellant, David S., to be involved in the crime of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The court adjudicated David delinquent and placed him on probation, in the custody of his mother. He raises the following questions for our review: I. Did the trial judge err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress cocaine that was illegally seized?

II

Did the trial judge err in refusing to allow defense counsel to establish at the suppression hearing that the seizing officer knew the object he grabbed was not a handgun as soon as he touched it? We resolve the first issue in David’s favor and, accordingly, reverse. We do not reach the second issue. ³⁶⁶ On the evening of March 30, 1999, Corporal Rich Segalman, a twelve-year veteran of the Rockville City Police Department, observed a house on Moore Drive, the site of what the police maintain was an open air drug market. At about 8:00 p.m., Cpl.

Segalman saw what he believed to be a drug transaction between Pedro Hall, a known drug dealer, and another man. At about 8:30 p.m., Cpl. Segalman observed Hall and David S. near an abandoned transformer building, which had been boarded up for several months. David walked behind the building, while Hall stood lookout.

A few minutes later, David emerged, pulled an object from his pocket, and showed it to Hall. Next, David stuffed the object into the front waistband of his pants. At the suppression hearing, Cpl. Segalman testified that, based on his extensive experiences with drug arrests and training in narcotics, he believed David stuffed a handgun into his waistband.

As they began to walk back toward Moore Di-ive, Cpl. Segalman radioed to other officers to stop them. Corporal Segalman then came to where they were stopped, placed them on the ground in the prone position, and handcuffed them. He rolled David over onto his back, touched the area of David’s waistband, and felt a hard object.

Believing the object was a gun, Cpl. Segalman pulled out David’s tucked-in shirt and observed a black object protruding from his waistband, confirming his belief that the object was a handgun. He removed the object from David’s waistband, noted that it was wrapped in a black plastic bag, opened the bag, and found cocaine. David S. argues that the stop, frisk, and ultimate search and seizure of the contents of the black plastic bag violated the Fourth Amendment and, thus, any fruits of the unconstitutional search must be suppressed.

The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), states that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const, amend.

XIV

The ³⁶⁷ amendment protects a person’s reasonable “expectation of privacy.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). A search that is reasonable in its inception may turn violative of the Fourth Amendment through its intensity and scope. Terry, 392 U.S. at 18 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 . As Justice Fortas wrote, the scope of a search “must be tied to and justified by” the circumstances that rendered its initiation permissible.

Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)(Fortas, J., concurring). In Terry , the Supreme Court held that, even without probable cause, a police officer can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity “may be afoot.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). An officer making a Terry stop must furnish more than an “inchoate and unparticulatized suspicion or' hunch.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). Indeed, “[w]hile ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000).

In evaluating the existence of reasonable suspicion, coui“ts consider “the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). In the instant case, Cpl. Segalman gave two bases for stopping David. Initially, he was suspicious of David because he was associating with Hall, who the officer had recently observed in a drug sale.

A person’s presence with a recognized drug source, however, is not enough to support a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminality is afoot. ³⁶⁸ Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62 , 88 S.Ct. 1889 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“The inference that persons who talk to narcotics addicts [or dealers] are engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics is