In Re Demetrius J.

CHARLES E. ORTH, Judge, Retired Specially Assigned. We are called upon by these appeals, consolidated for our review, to resolve a question concerning the authority prescribed by the Legislature for the disposition of a child 1 adjudicated to be delinquent. 2 Specifically, we are asked to determine: Whether § 3-820 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article authorizes a juvenile court to commit a delinquent child to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Services for placement in a specific private facility and to order the Department to pay the cost of that placement? The question presents the heart of the controversy. To resolve it we shall overview the pertinent parts of two statutes: (1) the Juvenile Causes Act, Md.Code (1973, 1989 Repl.Vol.), §§ 3-801 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ); and (2) the Juvenile Services Act, Md.Code (1957, 1988 Repl.Vol., 1990 Cum.Supp.), Art. 83C, §§ 1-101 et seq. ⁴⁷¹ THE JUVENILE CAUSES ACT The court 3 ordering disposition of a child adjudicated delinquent may: Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this subsection, commit the child to the custody or under the guardianship of the Department of Juvenile Services, a local department of social services, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, or a public or licensed private agency on terms that the court considers appropriate to meet the priorities set forth in subsection (b) of this section, including designation of the type of facility where the child is to accommodated, until custody or guardianship is terminated____ CJ § 3-820(c)(l)(ii) (emphasis added).

Paragraph (2) of subsection (c) provides: A child committed under paragraph (l)(ii) of this subsection may not be accommodated in a facility that has reached budgeted capacity if a bed is available in another comparable facility in the State, unless the placement to the facility that has reached budgeted capacity has been recommended by the Department of Juvenile Services. Subsection (b) of § 3-820 sets forth: The priorities in making a disposition are the public safety and a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation best suited to the physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child consistent with the public interest. THE JUVENILE SERVICES ACT The Department of Juvenile Services (DJS) is “a principal department of State government.” Code, Art. 83C § 2-101(a). The head of DJS is its Secretary, who is responsible for its operation, § 2-102(a) and (b), and for its budget and for the budget of each unit in the Department, ⁴⁷² § 2-104(a).

DJS is “the central administrative Department for ... [t]he State juvenile, diagnostic, training, detention, and rehabilitation institutions.” Section 2-lll(a)(2). DJS may (1) Designate, as its agent for the purposes of this article, any public or private agency or organization in this State; and (2) Spend funds: (i) To aid that agent or to buy services from it; or (ii) If adequate services are not available in this State, to buy services from any agency or organization outside this State. Section 2-114. Except as expressly provided otherwise, the Secretary may transfer, by rule, regulation, or written directive, any function, staff, or funds from any unit in the Department to the office of the Secretary or another unit in the Department.

Section 2-104(g). It is, of course, self-evident that DJS may spend only those funds available to it by law and must operate within those funds. The Secretary is charged with developing “a State Comprehensive Juvenile Services 3-year Plan,” prior to 1 January 1990, § 2-104(e)(3)(l). The Plan “shall be revised for each subsequent calendar year for three years and shall be submitted to the General Assembly by February 1 of each year,” id., subsections (e)(3)(i) and (ii).

Subsection (e)(3)(i) requires, among other matters, that the Plan shall: (2) Set out the needs of the various areas of services for clients ...; [and] (3) Establish priorities for the different services needed____ 4 ⁴⁷³ LEGISLATIVE INTENT The Guidelines In order to answer the question before us, we must divine the intent of the legislature with respect to the disposition of a delinquent child. See Miller & Levinson, Ghost Hunting: Searching for Maryland Legislative History, 22 Md.Bar J. 11-16 (July-August 1989); M. Miller, Ghost Hunting: Finding Legislative Intent in Maryland, A Check List of Sources (October 1984) (unpublished manuscript available in the Maryland State Law Library). The guidelines for statutory construction were set out by Judge Adkins speaking for the Court in Morris v. Prince George’s County, 319 Md. 597 , 573 A.2d 1346 (1990): There is no doubt that the beginning point of statutory construction is the language of the statute itself. Obviously, “ ‘what the legislature has written in an effort to achieve a goal is a natural ingredient of analysis to determine that goal.’ ” When we look at the statutory language, we attempt to give effect to all the words in the statute.

And sometimes it may not be necessary to go further than the scrutiny of statutory language, for ⁴⁷⁴ the language itself may be sufficiently expressive of the legislative purpose or goal. But our endeavor is always to seek out the legislative purpose, the general aim or policy, the ends to be accomplished, the evils to be redressed by a particular enactment. In the conduct of that enterprise, we are not limited to study of the statutory language. The plain meaning rule “ ‘is not a complete, all-sufficient rule for ascertaining a legislative intention____’” The “meaning of the plainest language” is controlled by the context in which it appears.

Thus, we always are free to look at the context within which statutory language appears. Even when the words of a statute carry a definite meaning, we are not “precluded from consulting legislative history as part of the process of determining the legislative purpose or goal” of the law. Id. at 603-604 , 573 A.2d 1346 (citations and footnote omitted). See Franklin Square Hosp. v. Laubach, 318 Md. 615, 619-620 , 569 A.2d 693 (1990).

The Construction When the statutes are considered in the light of the guidelines, the legislative scheme shines bright and clear. Governmental rights and obligations in juvenile causes are rationed between the Judiciary Department and the Executive Department. When a juvenile petition filed by a State’s Attorney alleges that a child has committed a delinquent act, the court must determine whether the allegation has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. CJ § 3 — 819(b)(1); Md.Rule 914(e)(1).

If the allegation has been duly proved, the court may commit the child to the custody of DJS, and, in doing so, may designate the type of facility where the child is to be accommodated. The court may not, however, designate a specific facility; such designation is the prerogative of DJS. This view is entirely consistent with the rights and obligations of DJS and its Secretary. It is difficult to perceive how the functions of DJS could be properly fulfilled if it ⁴⁷⁵ could not control the monies appropriated to it or which otherwise came into its hands.

The 3-year Plan which the Secretary was required to develop, revise, and submit to the Legislature each calendar year would be thrown into utter disarray if the Secretary were obliged to spend the Department’s funds as dictated by a court. The estimate of the needs of the various areas of services would be meaningless, and establishment of priorities for the different services needed would be futile if the funds allocated for such needs were expended without the Secretary’s control. We take into account that it is DJS, not the court, which is charged with administration of the State juvenile, diagnostic, training, detention, and rehabilitation institutions. DJS could not properly administer these institutions if it could not control the monies to be spent on them, nor could it adequately fulfill the other obligations assigned to it.

Whether DJS has funds available to support a child in a private facility or could tap some source to obtain such funds, begs the question. It may well determine that the monies would be better spent elsewhere to serve the purposes clearly announced by the legislature. It is evident on the face of the statutes that such a determination rests with DJS. As we have seen, it is the DJS which is authorized by the Legislature to designate “any public or private agency or organization in this State” and to spend funds “[t]o aid that agency or to buy services from it ...” or, “[i]f adequate services are not available in this State, to buy services from any agency or organization outside this State.” Code, Art. 83C § 2-114.

The plain language of the statute places these matters within the sound discretion of DJS. There is no indication, expressed or implied, that the discretion may be exercised by a court or any other agency, entity, or person. The Juvenile Causes Act authorizes the court to commit a delinquent child to the custody of DJS and permits it, upon such commitment, to designate “the type of facility where the child is to be accommodated.” CJ § 3-820(c)(l)(ii). But ⁴⁷⁶ it does not go so far as to permit the court to designate the specific facility.

The short of it is that the language of the statutes in the context in which it appears, considered with the legislative purpose, the general aim or policy, the ends to be accomplished and the evils to be redressed by the enactments, lead inevitably to the conclusion that the Legislature intended that the particular facility in which a delinquent child may be placed is within the exclusive discretion of DJS. The history of what is now CJ § 3-820(c) supports this view. Prior to 1986, the court was empowered under then § 3-820(b)(2) to [c]ommit the child to the custody or under the guardianship of the Juvenile Services Administration [now DJS], a local department of social services, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, or a public or licensed private agency____ In the wake of a decision of this Court, In re Appeal No. 653, Term 1975, 277 Md. 212 , 352 A.2d 845 (1976), and two decisions of the Court of Special Appeals, Dep’t of Health v. Prince George’s Co., 47 Md.App. 436 , 423 A.2d 589 (1980), cert. denied sub nom. Tom and June G. v. Dept. of Health, 290 Md. 714 (1981), and In re George G., 64 Md.App. 70 , 494 A.2d 247 (1985), which indicated that the court was not authorized under the statute to mandate the terms of a child’s commitment to DJS, a spate of bills was introduced in the 1986 General Assembly.

The question concerning the authority to designate a specific facility resulted in a compromise reflected in the present statute. The statute, as we have seen, permits the court to name the type of facility but generally bestows no authority on the court to specify a particular facility. The compromise was encouraged in significant part by the hope that it would avoid constitutional considerations. See SB 348, SB 661, HB 500, HB 635, all 1986.

See also the fiscal note and the revised fiscal note of the Division of Fiscal Research to SB 348; the position memoranda of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene regarding SB 348, HB 500, and HB 635 presented to ⁴⁷⁷ the respective Senate and House Committees; the position statement from the Baltimore County Department of Fiscal Services to. the Baltimore County Legislative Liaison Office dated 11 February 1986; position statement from the Baltimore County Office of Law dated 27 February 1986; letter from the Attorney General to the Executive Assistant to the Governor dated 21 January 1986 regarding HB 500; letter from the Attorney General to the Governor dated 23 May 1986 regarding HB 635 and SB 348. STATEMENT OF THE CASES SUB JUDICE The three cases before us traveled the same path to this Court. In each of them, upon petition of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, the court adjudicated the named child to be delinquent. Upon a disposition hearing in each case, the court, by means of an identically-worded printed form entitled “Order for Commitment of Juvenile,” committed the child over the signature of the presiding judge, “to the care and custody of the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services.” It further ordered that the