In Re Dominic W.

Couch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. ²³⁷ On November 29, 1979, Montgomery County police took into custody the appellant, Dominic W., a juvenile, on a theft complaint lodged by the assistant principal of a public high school in the county. A petition was subsequently filed in the Maryland District Court alleging appellant to be a delinquent child. That court held an adjudicatory hearing and found the appellant to be a delinquent child. After a disposition hearing the appellant was placed on probation under the supervision of the Juvenile Services Administration.

On appeal, Dominic W. presents several questions, and requests that we reverse the judgment of the lower court. We must reverse that judgment because of our affirmative answer to appellant’s first question, "Was a watch taken from appellant during a search by the assistant principal seized without probable cause, in violation of § 7-307 of the Maryland Code’s Education Article, and improperly admitted into evidence?” What gave rise to the delinquency petition being filed against appellant may be briefly summarized with additional facts supplied as necessary in our discussion of the issue. Two male students at the high school involved prepared to attend an assigned gym class. They shared a locker in the gym’s locker room to store their regular clothing; the locker was made secure by the use of a combination lock.

On the day in question, after changing into their gym clothes, the students placed their regular clothing and personal possessions in the locker, locked the combination lock, and proceeded to the gym class. These students were two of some ninety students taking gym at that time. After completion of the gym class these two students returned to their locker and found the combination lock broken and unlocked. Upon opening the locker door they discovered that a watch belonging to one of them was missing, as well as two five-dollar bills.

A report of this theft was made to the school’s assistant principal. One of the students reported that he had seen three individuals walking by the row of ²³⁸ lockers and looking around. He gave their names to the assistant principal. The assistant principal testified he had been told by one of the student victims that appellant and two others were seen by the victims "hanging around the lockers” before gym class.

After interviewing the other two boys named, who denied involvement, the assistant principal sought out the appellant, took him to an empty classroom, and told him he was suspected of being involved in a theft. The appellant was requested to empty his pockets, which he did, revealing ten one-dollar bills and a pack of cigarettes. The assistant principal then felt appellant’s pockets and, upon reaching into one of them, found a watch. This watch was later identified as being the one that was missing from the locker.

Appellant was turned over to the police, who took him to a police station. Appellant was given his "Miranda” rights, and gave police a statement incriminating another student. Although he admitted being at the locker when it was broken into, he said that the watch was given to him. The next day, this second student gave police a statement wherein he said that appellant forced open the locker and took the watch and money.

During the adjudicatory hearing appellant made timely objections to the admission of his statements and the watch, which the court overruled. The appellant contends that the watch seized from his pants pocket should not have been admitted into evidence. Conceding that the assistant principal had authority under Md. Educ. Code Ann. § 7-307 to make certain searches, the appellant argues that such searches are authorized only if probable cause exists to believe that the suspect possesses contraband. 1 ²³⁹ The State argues that the exclusionary rule developed for violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply to this case, and that the appropriate probable cause was present to satisfy the Maryland statute.

In our view the exclusionary rule developed for Fourth Amendment violations does apply. This conclusion is reached because § 7-307 of the Md. Education Article makes patent that the search was governmental action in the context of the Fourth Amendment. That the assistant principal here was an agent of the State would appear to be beyond doubt. Furthermore, the legislature itself required probable cause to exist before the search could be made.

While Maryland has no exclusionary rule by statute, case law, or rule of evidence for search and seizure purposes, it does have the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations imposed on it under the constitutional compulsion of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961). See Belton v. State, 228 Md. 17 , 178 A.2d 409 (1962). By our interpretation of § 7-307 and the application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the items seized