In re Erica S.

GILBERT, Chief Judge. As a result of Erica S.’s reporting that she had been sexually abused by her mother’s long-time, live-in male companion, DeWitt O., a petition was filed in the District Court for Montgomery County, Juvenile Division. The petition asserted that Erica was a child in need of assistance (CINA), namely, the court’s assistance in removing her from the household wherein the alleged assailant resided. When the case was called to trial in the juvenile court, DeWitt 0. attempted to participate as a party.

Judge Douglas H. Moore Jr. refused to allow DeWitt O.’s participation, and this appeal ensued. From the record we infer that at the time the appeal was taken the criminal charge of child abuse was still pending in the circuit court. DeWitt 0. admittedly was not the natural father of Erica. He staked his claim to participate in the CINA proceeding on the ground that he had lived with the child for seven to nine years and had acted as her father during that period of time.

DeWitt 0. argued that Erica recognized him as her father and he was named in certain school records as being her father. Furthermore, DeWitt averred that he was the father of Erica’s half-brother. In sum, DeWitt advanced the theory that he was the “common law father” of Erica. ¹⁵⁰ Preliminary to the CINA hearing, counsel for Erica’s mother advised Judge Moore that DeWitt 0. was identified in “school records and things like that” as being the child’s “natural father.” The statement was qualified by counsel, who added the words, “And, of course, I can’t proffer that to you because I haven’t got it in my hand.” Contrary to the way appellant’s counsel views the statement by the lawyer for Erica’s mother, we think it falls well short of a proffer. Indeed, it expressly disavows being a proffer.

The sole issue posited to us is whether Judge Moore erred in ruling that DeWitt 0. could not participate as a party in the CINA hearing involving Erica. Appellant seems to argue that he was entitled to participate in the hearing because he is the child’s “natural father.” Although he admitted in the trial court that he was not the “natural father” of the child, appellant now appears to have altered his position considerably. Because Erica’s mother listed him on certain school records as being Erica’s father, appellant now seizes that listing and converts the seemingly innocuous misrepresentation into a positive identification. He claims that his being named by the mother in the school records as the father of the child constitutes a declaration that he is the natural father within the meaning of Md. Family Law Art., § 5-310(a)(4).

Family Law Art., § 5-310(a) defines a “natural father” as a man who “(1) was married to the individual’s natural mother at the time of conception; (2) was married to the individual’s