In re: G.R.

In re: G.R., No. 32, September Term, 2018. Opinion by Getty, J. [CRIMINAL LAW — PROBATION AND PUNISHMENT — CONDITIONS OF PROBATION — PARTICULAR TERMS AND CONDITIONS — RESTITUTION AND REPARATIONS] The Court of Appeals held that, where assailants stole house keys from a minor during an armed robbery, the victim’s costs associated with rekeying the locks the keys corresponded to directly resulted from the underlying robbery pursuant to Criminal Procedure Article § 11-603, because theft of the keys substantially reduced the value of the locks by jeopardizing the locks’ status as protectors of the sanctity and security of the home. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. JA-17-0265 Argued: November 30, 2018 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 32 September Term, 2018 IN RE: G.R. Barbera, C.J. Greene, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Adkins, Sally (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ. Opinion by Getty, J. Filed: April 1, 2019 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2019-04-18 11:50-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk “A key that opens many locks is worth buying.

A lock that can be opened with many keys isn’t.” -Nabil N. Jamal, Ph.D. 1 On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has recognized “the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999). While the Supreme Court has recognized that this respect for the sanctity of the home is most often implicated within the context of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, in the present appeal we are asked to determine a subsidiary question. Particularly, we must determine, pursuant to the “direct result” requirement of Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) § 11-603(a), whether an award of restitution is proper for rekeying household locks where the corresponding keys were stolen during an armed robbery. For the following reasons, we answer this question in the affirmative and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

BACKGROUND In this juvenile matter, a set of stolen keys to three different households constitute the central issue of restitution. Two juveniles, J.S. and J.Y., were walking home from school in the Largo area of Prince George’s County on May 1, 2017. During their commute, the two were approached by a group of juveniles, including respondent G.R. An 1 Dr. Jamal is a self-improvement author and a performance development training specialist. https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/8107388.Nabil_N_Jamal [https://perma.cc/A72W-UEB2]. altercation ensued and the assailants robbed J.S. and J.Y. at knifepoint. The assailants took from J.S. his backpack and a Samsung cell phone.

Within his backpack was a key ring holding the three housekeys, two pairs of Jordan sneakers, and a binder. The keys corresponded to the locks of the exterior doors of three homes, the homes of J.S.’s mother, father, and sister. During the course of the robbery, J.Y. attempted to intervene and assist his friend. As a result, G.R. approached J.Y. armed with a boxcutter and demanded several items from him, ultimately taking his iPhone and wallet.

Thereafter, police responded to the incident and took statements from J.S. and J.Y. As the responding officers transported J.S. and J.Y. in a police cruiser to the police station to take further statements, J.S. observed three of the alleged assailants walking down the street. The officers pulled over the police cruiser, exited the vehicle, and attempted to apprehend G.R. and the other assailants. When the officers beckoned the group of juveniles, the alleged assailants took flight. Although officers were unable to catch the assailants, during the pursuit G.R. dropped a backpack.

Police later determined that the backpack belonged to J.S. At the time the backpack was recovered, the keys were missing but it contained J.Y.’s iPhone and the box cutter used by G.R. in the robbery. Subsequently, police apprehended G.R.2 At the time of his apprehension, he possessed several items stolen from J.S. These items included the set of housekeys as well as the second pair of Jordan sneakers stolen from J.S. G.R. was then 2 The record does not indicate the amount of time that lapsed between the pursuit and the police eventually apprehending G.R. 2 taken, processed, and detained at Cheltenham Youth Facility (“Cheltenham”), a juvenile detention center located in Prince George’s County. At this point, the arresting officers apparently failed to properly inventory the keys stolen from J.S. According to the record, the keys were impounded by police and mistakenly held with G.R.’s personal property at Cheltenham. As a result, neither J.S. nor his family members, whose homes the keys corresponded to, were aware that the keys were in police custody.

Consequently, J.S.’s family members decided to have the locks of their homes rekeyed, because of the security risk associated with the stolen keys which, unbeknownst to J.S. or his family, were being held at Cheltenham at the time. On May 18, 2017, before the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, sitting as a juvenile court, G.R. was charged with robbery, second-degree assault, and openly carrying a dangerous weapon. In response, he pleaded involved to all the charges.3 On June 16, 2017, the juvenile court held a restitution hearing. The State sought $120 in restitution for J.S. as follows: (1) $65 dollars to rekey the locks of the three homes of which the keys were stolen; (2) $50 for replacing the cellphone; and (3) $5 for the binder that was never recovered.

During the restitution hearing, defense counsel brought to the State’s, the court’s, and J.S.’s attention that the keys had been recovered by police and mistakenly held with G.R.’s personal belongings at Cheltenham. Prior to this point, including the period in which the locks were rekeyed, G.R., his family, the court, and the State’s Attorney were entirely unaware that the keys had been recovered. 3 In juvenile matters, minors may plead or are found “involved” instead of guilty. 3 At the restitution hearing, counsel for G.R. argued to deny restitution for rekeying the locks under Williams v. State, 385 Md. 50 (2005) contending that there was insufficient direct causation to justify the $65 restitution. In contrast, the State argued that pursuant to Goff v. State, 387 Md. 327 (2005), the cost of rekeying the locks was a direct result of the robbery and assault. The circuit court agreed with the State and ultimately found G.R. liable for the entire $120 in restitution.

Subsequently, on August 15, 2017, G.R. filed a notice of appeal of the juvenile court’s decision and appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported opinion filed on May 17, 2018, the intermediate appellate court affirmed in part and vacated in part the juvenile court’s order, determining that the court erred in ordering $65 in restitution to rekey the three locks. The court determined that the costs of rekeying the locks was not a direct result of the underlying robbery and concluded that “while there is undeniably a causal link between the theft of the keys and J.S.’s decision to replace his locks, that nexus does not partake of the directness required by the statute.” In re G.R., No. 853, Sept. Term, 2017, 2018 WL 2263819 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 17, 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Subsequently, the State petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari, which we granted on August 10, 2018. In re G.R., 460 Md. 492 (2018).4 4 The State presents the following question for our review: Where a robbery victim whose house keys are stolen takes the reasonable and prudent action of replacing the locks that correspond to the stolen keys, are the costs associated with replacing those compromised locks a “direct result” of the robbery for purposes of ordering restitution? 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW Generally, an appellate court reviews a circuit court’s order of restitution for abuse of discretion. In re Cody H., 452 Md. 169, 181 (2017) (citing Silver v. State, 420 Md. 415, 427 (2011)). However, where a circuit court’s order involves “an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law[,]” we review its decision de novo.

Goff v. State, 387 Md. 327, 337-38 (2005) (quoting Nesbit v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 382 Md. 65, 72 (2004)). See also In re Cody H., 452 Md. at 181 . As the present case centers around an interpretation of the “direct result” language of CP § 11-603, we review the circuit court’s restitution order under the de novo standard.

DISCUSSION The statutory framework providing a court’s authority to order restitution is Subtitle 6, Title 11 of the Criminal Procedure Article. Particularly, CP § 11-603 identifies appropriate grounds for restitution and, in pertinent part, provides the following: (a) A court may enter a judgment of restitution that orders a defendant or child respondent to make restitution in addition to any other penalty for the commission of a crime or delinquent act, if: (1) as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act, property of the victim was stolen, damaged, destroyed, converted, or unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased; (2) as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act, the victim suffered: The State uses the term “replacing” but the locks in this instance were rekeyed. The process of rekeying locks generally involves removing the lock cylinder, replacing the lock pins or cores depending upon the type of lock involved, and issuing a new set of keys. Bill Phillips, The Complete Book of Locks and Locksmithing, 9-11, 43 (2005). 5 (i) actual medical, dental, hospital, counseling, funeral, or burial expenses or losses; (ii) direct out-of-pocket loss; (iii) loss of earnings; or (iv) expenses incurred with rehabilitation; *** (b) A victim is presumed to have a right to restitution under subsection (a) of this section if: (1) the victim or the State requests restitution; and (2) the court is presented with competent evidence of any item listed in subsection (a) of this section.

CP § 11-603. This case turns on the meaning and scope of the term “direct result” in CP § 11-603(a). However, this term is not defined in the definitions section of CP § 11-601. The State argues that rekeying the locks was a direct result of G.R.’s delinquent act because when the keys were stolen, the sanctity of the home which those locks protected had been jeopardized.

As a result, the locks had been damaged or their value “substantially decreased” to an extent cognizable under CP § 11-603(a)(1). The State describes the choice to rekey the locks as a “reasonable and prudent” or “reasonable and proportional” response to the theft of the keys. In contrast, counsel for G.R. argues that the rekeying of the locks was an intervening act too far removed from the robbery to constitute a direct result. Maryland Crime Victims Resource Center, Inc., pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-511(a)(1), filed an amicus curiae brief that argues similar to the State that the security of the homes 6 the locks belonged to had been diminished when the keys were stolen; thereby, the costs incurred rekeying the locks was a direct result of the robbery.

In prior cases, this Court has considered the direct result language of CP § 11-603(a). In re Cody H., 452 Md. 169 ; Williams, 385 Md. 50 ; Goff, 387 Md. 327 ; Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 60-61 (2004). In Pete, we were asked to determine whether restitution was improperly awarded as a direct result of an underlying assault. Id. at 56-57 .

There, Mr. Pete assaulted a woman in her apartment and fled in a vehicle. Id. at 51 . Nearly two hours later, police attempted to effectuate a stop on his vehicle. Id.

In response, he sped away but subsequently aggressively braked his vehicle causing the police cruiser to crash into its rear-end. Id. at 51-52 . Before the Circuit Court for Dorchester County, Mr. Pete was convicted of second-degree assault and reckless driving. Id. at 49 .

As a condition of Mr. Pete’s probation, the circuit court ordered that he pay restitution to the Local Government Insurance Trust in the amount of $6,490.53 for repairs to the damaged police cruiser. Id. at 50 . On appeal, this Court concluded that the restitution order constituted an illegal sentence because the damages to the police cruiser were not a direct result of the assault. Id. at 61 .

The Court found the temporal relationship between the assault and the damage to the police cruiser dispositive commenting, “[i]t is easy to see on this record that the damage to the police cruiser could not be a direct result of the assault on another individual that occurred approximately two hours earlier than the vehicle collision.” Id. at 61 . In addition, the Court held that restitution could not be ordered pursuant to Mr. Pete’s reckless driving charge and that the damage to the police cruiser was “undoubtedly a direct result 7 of the reckless driving.”5 Id. at 56 . Therefore, we concluded that damage to the police cruiser was a direct result of Mr. Pete’s reckless driving, which precluded a determination that the damage was a direct result of the earlier assault.6 See id. Subsequently, we considered the direct result requirement within the context of a theft.

Williams, 385 Md. at 51 . In Williams, a defendant stole multiple motorcycles from a victim’s garage. 385 Md. at 51-52 . After apprehending the defendant, police held three of the motorcycles at an impoundment lot in Baltimore City. Id. at 52 .

However, the victim was unable to recover the three motorcycles because he had never properly acquired title to the vehicles. Id. at 53 . The Circuit Court for Baltimore County awarded the victim restitution in the amount of $1,500. Id. at 54 .

On appeal, we vacated the circuit court’s restitution order on the basis that the victim’s failure to recover the motorcycles from the impoundment lot was not a direct result of the theft and commented, Jones’s inability to reclaim the undamaged motorcycles was not the direct result of Williams’s theft of them. While there is undeniably a causal link between the theft 5 The court determined that restitution could not be ordered with respect to Mr. Pete’s reckless driving charge because, [u]nder § 11–603, restitution may be ordered to a victim “as a direct result of the crime....” § 11–603(a)(1). A crime includes “a violation of the Transportation Article that is punishable by a term of confinement.” § 11–601(d)(2). Any person convicted of reckless driving under § 21–901.1 is guilty of a misdemeanor and only “subject to a fine of not more than $1,000.” Md. Code (1977, 2002 Repl.

Vol.), § 21–101(g) of the Transportation Article. Pete, 384 Md. at 56–57. 6 In later decisions, to be discussed shortly, we read Pete as standing for the proposition that restitution may not be awarded where there is an intervening agency, occurrence, or event which severs direct causality. See Goff, 387 Md. at 343-344 ; Williams, 385 Md. at 61 . 8 in Baltimore County and the motorcycles ending up in the Baltimore City impoundment lot, that nexus does not partake of the directness required by the statute. Moreover, Jones’s failure to produce proof of ownership to secure release of the vehicles is in no way a direct result of their underlying theft.

The aftermath of the theft in this case merely revealed Jones’s possible failures to title properly the motorcycles with the State and/or register them with Baltimore County. If Jones can muster some means of proving ownership and satisfy the Baltimore City authorities, he presumably will be able yet to recover the undamaged vehicles. Id. at 62 . Accordingly, we determined that the victim’s failure to properly title the motorcycles directly caused his inability to regain possession of them.

Id. at 62-63 . In Goff, we held that damage to a victim’s shower insert was a direct result of an assault and the circuit court did not err in ordering restitution to the victim for costs associated with replacing it. 387 Md. at 350 . In that case, Mr. Goff forced entry into the victim’s apartment, assaulted the victim in the bathroom, and damaged the shower insert. Id. at 332-33 .

In relation to these events, Mr. Goff was found guilty of second-degree assault and trespass. Id. at 331 . Thereafter, the victim had the shower replaced rather than repaired. See id. at 333-34 .

The circuit court found restitution warranted and ordered Mr. Goff to pay restitution in the amount of $2,156.00 for the replacement of the damaged shower insert. Id. at 336 . Before this Court, Mr. Goff argued that the circuit court’s order of restitution was in error because: “(1) the damage to the shower is not the direct result of the crime; (2) the shower is not the property of the victim; and (3) ordering replacement instead of repair is not fair and reasonable.” Id. at 339 . The Goff Court focused its analysis on the “natural and ordinary meaning” of the term “direct result” noting that we employ “basic principles of common sense” in our