In Re GARY T.

ALAN M. WILNER, J. (Retired, Specially Assigned). The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, sitting as a Juvenile Court, found appellant to be delinquent by reason of conduct which, if committed by an adult, would constitute second degree assault. The victim of the assault was A. Fofana.

BACKGROUND Mr. Fofana was playing basketball at a neighborhood park. He had left some personal belongings, including his cell phone, on a nearby bench and tried to keep an eye on them as he was playing. He observed three individuals, including appellant and one Cameron P., standing near the bench watching the game. At some point, Fofana noticed that his cell phone was gone and saw appellant and Cameron walking away.

He caught up with them and demanded that his phone be returned. Fofana claimed that, while he was talking with Cameron, appellant punched him in the head from behind, leaving him bloody and dazed, and that appellant and Cameron then left. A photograph was admitted showing injury to the right side of Fofana’s face. That much is essentially undisputed.

Appellant’s defense was one of self-defense. He testified that Fofana was the aggressor — that before any blows were struck, Fofana rifled through appellant’s pockets and then threw the first punch, to which he responded. The court believed Fofana, largely because appellant’s version was inconsistent with the nature of Fofana’s injury. The court noted that appellant was right-handed and that, if appellant had hit Fofana while the two were facing each other, as he claimed, the injury would have been to the left side of Fofana’s face.

The blow had to come from the rear, as Fofana testified. The court also doubted ³⁷⁷ that appellant would have permitted Fofana to go through his pockets. The sole issue in this appeal arises from appellant’s attempt, during cross-examination of Fofana, to impeach Fofana’s credibility by showing that, in November 2013 — some four months after the incident and four months before trial — Fofana had been convicted on a guilty plea of conspiracy to distribute marijuana. Relying largely on this Court’s decision in Wal-lach v. Board of Education, 99 Md.App. 386 , 637 A.2d 859 (1994), the court concluded that conspiracy to distribute marijuana was not an impeachable offense.

The court also expressed doubt that, based on the evidence admitted to that point, “it’s going to be that probative.” On those bases, the court sustained an objection to the proffered evidence. DISCUSSION Appellant acknowledges the Wallach decision but claims that it was at least tacitly overruled by the Court of Appeals in State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205 , 642 A.2d 870 (1994) and that it is inconsistent with case law elsewhere in the country. The State’s response is that (1) Wallach was not overruled in Giddens , (2) the trial court also based its decision on its finding that the probative value of the evidence would not outweigh the prejudice to Fofana from its admission, and (3) any error was harmless because the ultimate issue of appellant’s “guilt” did not turn on Fofana’s credibility. Although Wallach and Giddens are the most relevant cases, they did not, like Athena, spring live (and fully armored) from the head of Zeus; there were precursors that informed the analysis undertaken in those cases.

Wallach arose from a collision between a motorcycle, driven by Wallach, and a school bus. At least one issue was whether Wallach, the plaintiff, was negligent. During trial, in an effort to impeach Wallach’s credibility as a witness, the defendant sought to establish that Wallach had been convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The trial court allowed the evidence, and ultimately the jury found for the defendant.

In the ³⁷⁸ appeal, Wallach claimed that conspiracy is not an impeachable offense because it has little relevance to credibility and that, in any event, the prejudice to him from its admission outweighed its probative value. This Court reversed, holding that conspiracy to distribute marijuana was not an impeachable offense. The law governing impeachment by prior conviction, at the time, was Rule 1-502, in particular section (a), which read largely as Rule 5-609(a) does now, namely, that evidence of a conviction of a crime is admissible for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, but only “if the crime was an infamous crime or other crime relevant to the witness’s credibility and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the witness or the objecting party.” 1 The Court first concluded that conspiracy to distribute marijuana was not an “infamous crime” as defined in the common law or for purposes of Rule l-502(a); the issue was whether it fell within the common law ambit of crimen falsi — a misdemeanor involving dishonesty. Wallach, at 389, 637 A.2d at 860 .

In that regard, the Court considered Carter v. State, 80 Md.App. 686 , 566 A.2d 131 (1989) and our decision in Giddens v. State, 97 Md.App. 582 , 631 A.2d 499 (1993). In Carter , which was decided prior to the adoption of Rule 1-502 and was based therefore on common law, we held that a conviction for manufacturing a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) was relevant to credibility because the offense “requirefd] several steps involving premeditation and conscious violation of the law.” Carter, 80 Md.App. at 694 , 566 A.2d at 131 . In Giddens, we reached a different conclusion with respect to distribution of CDS. Our conclusion there was based on the ³⁷⁹ varied and significantly different ways in which that crime could be committed, some relevant to credibility and some not.

We noted in Giddens that a person could violate the law against distribution by selling a ton of cocaine to sub-dealers throughout the community or by giving a friend a marijuana cigarette, that the distribution could occur in the privacy of one’s home, in an open air drug market, in the back of a car or on a public street, as part of a secret business enterprise or as a simple gift to an acquaintance. The net, we said, “is very large and encompasses a wide variety of conduct, and therein lies the problem.” Giddens, 97 Md.App. at 591 , 631 A.2d at 503 . Because the issue is the truthfulness of the witness, “where there is no way to determine whether a crime affects the [witness’s] testimony simply by the name of the crime[,] that crime should be inadmissible for purposes of impeachment.” Id. We pointed out that, in Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701 , 436 A.2d 906 (1981), the Court of Appeals had held that a conviction for indecent exposure could not be used for impeachment purposes because the offense requires only a general intent and the circumstances falling within the ambit of the crime “are so widely varied that, while one person may indeed have shown a moral depravity sufficient to impact upon his credibility, another may have committed a very minor infraction indicative of nothing more than momentary poor judgment....” Id.

In Wallach, we found the concern noted in Gi,ddens and Ricketts to be equally applicable to conspiracy to distribute CDS. Like distribution of a CDS, we said, “conspiracy to distribute marijuana is not a crime that inherently indicates that the witness is not to be believed.” Wallach, 99 Md.App. at 391 , 637 A.2d at 861 . We observed that the crime of conspiracy also includes a wide variety of behavior — that any crime can be the object of a conspiracy, which is nothing more than an agreement to commit the crime, and that it can be committed in a variety of ways. A conspiracy, without further definition of what the conspiracy was, fails to inform the trier of fact anything about whether the particular conduct suffices to cast doubt on the witness’s credibility.

On that basis, a ³⁸⁰ majority of the panel held that the trial court erred in allowing the evidence. 2 Wallach was decided in February 1994. In June of that year, the Court of Appeals, having granted certiorari in Giddens, reversed this Court’s judgment in that case. The Court of Appeals found the analysis in Carter v. State, supra, which concerned manufacturing CDS persuasive and concluded that “an individual convicted of cocaine distribution would be willing to lie under oath.” Giddens, 335 Md. at 217 , 642 A.2d at 876 . It noted, in that regard, the comment made in United States v. Ortiz, 553 F.2d 782, 784 (2nd Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 897 , 98 S.Ct. 277 , 54 L.Ed.2d 183 (1977) that “a narcotics trafficker lives a life of secrecy, being prepared to say whatever is required by the demands of the moment, whether the truth or a lie.” Giddens, id.

The Court recognized that, “in theory, some activity falling within the definition of drug distribution would not be probative of an individual’s lack of veracity,” but concluded that “the vast majority of convictions for cocaine distribution are relevant to credibility.” Id. at 218 , 642 A.2d at 876 . The Court of Appeals’s Giddens decision certainly undercut this Court’s reliance on its Giddens analysis in Wallach but, contrary to appellant’s argument, we do not view the high court’s Giddens decision as tacitly (and certainly not directly) overruling Wallach. Indeed, in its Giddens Opinion, the Court of Appeals cited Wallach, along with Ricketts , as an example of crimes that “have little or no bearing on credibility and consequently are not admissible for impeachment purposes.” Giddens, 335 Md. at 215 , 642 A.2d at 875 . Wallach obviously did rely, at least in part, on this Court’s decision and analysis in Giddens, but the thrust of the Court of Appeals’s conclusion was that the crime of CDS distribution — the crime itself — was sufficiently clear and relevant to credibility, at least in the majority of cases, to be admissible ³⁸¹ for impeachment purposes.

The Court accepted the assumption that most people who distribute cocaine would be willing to lie under oath, including about matters having nothing to do with the conviction. We, of course, are bound by that assumption as it pertains to the crime of distributing CDS. Whether a similar assumption can be made about the crime of conspiracy requires further analysis. Part of the problem — indeed, the heart of the problem — is describing the crime for purposes of its use as impeachment evidence.

Conspiracy in Maryland is a common law misdemeanor, the sentence for which cannot exceed the maximum punishment for the offense that is the objective of the conspiracy. Johnson v. State, 362 Md. 525, 528 , 766 A.2d 93, 94 (2001); Md.Code, Crim. Law Art. § 1-202. The essence of the crime is an agreement to achieve some unlawful purpose— any unlawful purpose — or to employ unlawful means — any unlawful means — to achieve a lawful purpose.

State v. Johnson, 367 Md. 418 , 788 A.2d 628, 632 (2002); also State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 712 , 104 A.3d 142, 161 (2014). The crime is complete when the agreement is reached; it does not require that anything be done to implement the agreement. As noted in Townes v. State, 314 Md. 71, 75 , 548 A.2d 832, 834 (1988) and confirmed most recently in State v. Payne, 440 Md. at 713 , 104 A.3d at 161 : “The essence of a criminal conspiracy is an unlawful agreement. The agreement need not be formal or spoken, provided there is a meeting of the minds reflecting a unity of purpose and design.

In Maryland, the crime is complete when the unlawful agreement is reached, and no overt act in furtherance of the agreement need be shown.” One constant in a prior-conviction impeachment analysis, in Maryland jurisprudence, is that the court must look only at the elements of