In re Guardianship No. 89-CA-9865

JAMES S. GETTY, Judge, Specially Assigned. The appellant herein, Sally Clemons, appeals from an Order of the Circuit Court for Howard County directing that she is jointly and severally liable, together with a child placement agency known as Adoption Counseling Organization and Resource Network (ACORN), for costs and attorney fees arising from an adoption proceeding. Appellant alleges that: 1. The Master in Chancery of the Circuit Court for Howard County did not have jurisdiction to hear the guardianship proceeding resulting in the assessment of costs and expenses against the appellant. 2.

The court erred in not sustaining the exception to the Master’s recommendation that an individual not a party to the proceedings (Clemons) be held responsible for fees and expenses. Background Mr. and Mrs L sought to adopt a child born and residing in the Philippines. In April, 1988, they were contacted by appellant, who was the Executive Director of ACORN, concerning an available child. The adopting parents were asked to adopt a second child, Raymond, but they declined.

Eventually they were told that a family had been found for Raymond, and they were asked by appellant to escort Raymond back to the United States along with their own child. According to the L’s, ACORN would reduce its agency fee by $1,300.00 in exchange for their returning Raymond; they agreed. One week before leaving for the Philippines, the L’s were told they would be required to do a "proxy” adoption of Raymond in order to clear the way for his release into their custody. The L’s arrived in the Philippines on August 4, 1988, and three weeks later they went to court for the adoption hearing whére they learned, for the first time, that they were adopting both their child and Raymond.

Later that day they contacted appellant who assured them that ¹⁹⁴ she would handle the separation of the children upon their return. Mrs. L left the Philippines after ten weeks due to illness and Mr. L returned five weeks later with their adopted child. Raymond did not return with Mr. L and he was never in the L’s custody except for the appearances in the Philippine court. In December 1988 the L’s signed a Consent and Waiver form granting ACORN guardianship of Raymond for the purposes of adoption.

Appellant filed a Petition for Guardianship in the circuit court and attached the waivers. The circuit court appointed counsel for Raymond who met with the L’s on April 3, 1989, and, at that meeting the L’s learned that Item 10 of the guardianship proceeding stated that they were placing Raymond for adoption “in part because the minor was too much to handle for them.” The L’s then met with appellant and gave her a document revoking their waiver of the right of notice of further proceedings relating to Raymond’s guardianship. The revocation, however, was never filed in the court proceedings. The L’s also filed a motion requesting that the trial court amend its order directing the L’s to pay for the legal services of the court appointed counsel for Raymond and direct ACORN to assume these costs.

The case was heard before a master on April 26, 1989, and a second hearing was held on May 16 in response to the L’s petition concerning the allocation of costs and counsel fees. The background data set forth above incorporates the Master’s fact-finding. In a comprehensive and thorough report, he recommended that ACORN and appellant be held-jointly and severally liable for the costs and counsel fees incurred by the court appointed counsel based upon what the Master termed appellant’s “... original deceits ... preposterous explanations together with her attempts to disassociate herself ... has utterly destroyed her credibilitv...." ¹⁹⁵ 1 On July 10, 1989, while the Master’s recommendations were still pending before the circuit court, appellant, through counsel, moved to intervene in the guardianship action and to file exceptions to the Master’s The trial court granted the motion and the were filed alleging that the Master lacked jurisdiction to hear the guardianship, that appellant was not a party