In Re John R.

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. ²³ The appellant was found delinquent by Judge J. Albert Roney, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Cecil County sitting as a juvenile court. The court found that the act appellant committed “which would be a crime if committed by an adult,” Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-801 (k) (Supp. 1978), constituted a violation of Md. Transp.

Code Ann. § 14-104 (a) (1977). Section 14-104 (a) states in pertinent part: “(a) In general. — A person may not: (1) Willfully damage or tamper with any vehicle without the consent of its owner; . . . .” The State concedes that there was no damage, and the issue turns upon whether appellant’s conduct constituted “tampering.” The State’s case shows that the victim’s vehicle had been parked in her driveway and locked for the night. Subsequently, shortly after midnight, a witness saw a person approach the victim’s automobile. Although the witness could not see who the person was or what he was doing, he did see the interior light of the automobile illuminated.

The witness called the police who arrived propitiously. They detained the suspicious person, now identified as appellant, as he was moving away from the automobile. The witness could not “say for a fact that [he] seen him [appellant] in the car.” Recognizing that the judge could infer from this testimony that appellant had opened the car door, causing the light to come on, and conceding (if only for sake of argument) that he had entered the car, appellant argues here that there is no evidence of “tampering.” Concisely stated, appellant contends that the statute presupposes a criminal intent that was not proven, and that the proscribed act implies some injury to the automobile “since the word ‘damage’ must be read as so closely linked with ‘tamper’ as to control its meaning.” The limited number of cases throughout the country provide us little guidance in interpreting our statute, partly because the statutes vary from state to state, and partly because the cases are factually decided. See Annot., 57 A.L.R.3d 606 (1974).

We will, therefore, look to the intent of ²⁴ our own Legislature to interpret it in relation to the facts before us. Intent We do not agree that the State must prove any “criminal” intent on the part of one who tampers with a "vehicle other than that he consciously intended to act (in the words of the statute) “without