In re Kemmo N.

CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Judge, Specially Assigned. I For over two hundred years in Maryland, statutory construction has been an integral part of the appellate function. As early as 1755, in Hammond v. Denton, 1 H. & McH. 185 , the “Court of Appeals of Maryland” was concerned with the intent of a legislative enactment. Since 1965 some thousand Maryland appellate opinions have quested legislative intent.

The reason for the plethora of opinions is that the laws enacted by the legislature are at times ethereal, and the appellate court is called upon to construe or interpret them. Over the years standardized rules used by courts in statutory interpretation have evolved, basically from court explanations as to how they have arrived at the meaning of a statute brought before them in litigation. These precepts have come to be referred to as the cardinal rules or canons of statutory construction. Ghost Hunting: Finding Legislative Intent in Maryland (1984) p. 1, by Michael S. Miller, Director, Maryland State Law Library. “To a considerable extent [the canons] are founded on both logic and common sense.” Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 369 Md. 505, 512 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987).

And although, as we observed in Kaczorowski, they may “afford an opportunity for principled decision making, as opposed to ad hoc judicial legislation,” id., “we do not engage in mindless application of canons of statutory construction.” NCR Corp. v. Comptroller, 313 Md. 118, 145 , 544 A.2d 764 (1988). Instead, [w]e look at statutory language in context; we consider legislative history when it is available.... Our endeavor always is to construe statutes so as to implement the legislative goal, not to frustrate it. ¹⁹⁶ Id. at 145-146 , 544 A.2d 764 (citations omitted). In short, when a court is engaged in the divination of legislative “intent,” the key is the purpose of the legislation, determined in light of the statute’s language and context.

Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 516 , 525 A.2d 628 . See Wynn v. State, 313 Md. 533, 539 , 546 A.2d 465 (1988); State v. In re Patrick A., 312 Md. 482 , 540 A.2d 810 (1988). II On 24 January 1987, Kemmo N., born 31 December 1971, was charged with “strong arm robbery,” misdemeanor theft, possession of a controlled dangerous substance (POP), and possession of the substance with intent to distribute. The intake officer of the Juvenile Services Agency (JSA) received a complaint from the arresting officer.

In due course the intake officer notified the arresting officer that the case would proceed by way of informal adjustment. The intake officer said that upon a review of the facts he had “decided not to authorize Juvenile Court action.” The notice set out the factors considered in the decision and explained the reasons for it. The notice included this statement: If you disagree with this decision and desire to appeal, you must complete the attached form and mail it to the State’s Attorney’s Office so that it is received by 4/6/87. The arresting officer did indeed disagree with the decision.

He completed the form for appeal and mailed it within the designated time to the State’s Attorney. The State’s Attorney reviewed the police report and a “Juvenile Report Cover Sheet” showing Kemmo’s prior involvement with JSA. He filed a petition in the District Court of Maryland sitting as a juvenile court in Montgomery County charging Kemmo with commission of delinquent acts. JSA closed the case “at intake, pending prosecution by the State’s Attorney’s Office.” Prior to adjudication of the petition, Kemmo requested the District Court to dismiss the petition.

He alleged that the State’s Attorney’s action was improper because it was ¹⁹⁷ based solely on a review of the police report and the Juvenile Report Cover Sheet and that, in any event, there was no appeal from the intake officer’s decision to proceed by way of informal adjustment. The District Court agreed and dismissed the petition. The State noted an appeal. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court.

In Re Kemmo N., 75 Md.App. 269 , 540 A.2d 1202 (1988). We granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari. The sole question presented is: Did the Court of Special Appeals erroneously conclude that there is no right of appeal from a decision by the Juvenile Services Agency to proceed informally on a complaint against a juvenile? Ill The question calls upon us to interpret Maryland Code (1957, 1984 Repl.Vol., 1988 Cum.Supp.) § 3-810 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ).

The section concerns complaints which may cause a person to be subject to the jurisdiction of a court 1 in the exercise of its duties with respect to juvenile causes. Specifically, we are requested to construe the right of appeal from a decision of an intake officer 2 of the Juvenile Services Agency to proceed informally on a complaint against a child under the age of 16 years who was charged with the commission of a delinquent act. We look first at the relevant provisions of CJ § 3-810. References are to subsections and paragraphs of that section.

The intake officer shall receive complaints from a ¹⁹⁸ person or agency having knowledge of facts which may cause a person to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court. (a)(1). He shall make an inquiry as to whether the court has jurisdiction and whether judicial action is in the best interests of the public or the child, (b)(1). Thereafter he may: (i) authorize the filing of a petition; 3 (ii) conduct a further investigation into the allegations of the complaint; (iii) propose an informal adjustment of the matter; or (iv) refuse authorization to file a petition.

Id. The intake officer may conduct a further investigation if he concludes it is necessary to reach a decision, (d). The intake officer may propose an informal adjustment of the matter if based on the complaint, his preliminary inquiry, and such further investigation as he may make, he concludes that the court has jurisdiction but that an informal adjustment, rather than judicial action, is in the best interests of the public and the child. If the intake officer proposes an informal adjustment, he shall inform the parties of the nature of the complaint, the objectives of the adjustment process, the conditions and procedures under which it will be conducted, and the fact that it is not obligatory.

The intake officer shall not proceed with an informal adjustment unless all parties[ 4 ] to the proceeding consent to that procedure. (e). During the informal adjustment process, the child shall be subject to such supervision as the intake officer deems appropriate; however, no party is compelled to appear at any conference, produce any paper, or visit any place. ¹⁹⁹ The informal adjustment process shall not exceed 90 days unless that time is extended by the court. If all of the parties do not consent to an informal adjustment, or such adjustment cannot, in the judgment of the intake officer, be completed successfully, he shall authorize the filing of a petition or deny authorization to file a petition pursuant to subsection (g).

(f). Subsection (g) prescribes: If based upon the complaint, his preliminary inquiry, and such further investigation as he may make, the intake officer concludes that the court has no jurisdiction, or that neither an informal adjustment nor judicial action is appropriate, he may deny authorization to file a petition. He shall, in that event, inform the following persons, through use of the form prescribed by § 3-810.1 of this article, of his decision, the reasons for it, and their right of review provided in this section: (1) The victim; (2) The arresting police officer; and (3) The person or agency that filed the complaint or caused it to be filed. The right to appeal the intake officer’s denial of the authorization to file a petition is set out in subsection (h)(1): If the complaint alleges the commission of a delinquent act and the intake officer denies authorization to file a petition, the following persons may appeal the denial to the State’s Attorney: (i) The victim; (ii) The arresting police officer; and (iii) The person or agency that filed the complaint or caused it to be filed.

In order for an appeal to be made, it must be received by the State’s Attorney’s office within 30 days after the form prescribed by § 3-810.1 is mailed by the juvenile intake officer to the person being informed of the intake officer’s decision. ²⁰⁰ Paragraph (2) of subsection (h) announces the course to be followed by the State’s Attorney upon receiving notice of the appeal: The State’s Attorney shall review the denial. If he concludes that the court has jurisdiction and that judicial action is in the best interests of the public or the child, he may file a petition. This petition shall be filed within 30 days of the receipt of the complainant’s appeal. Section § 3-810 plainly spells out when an appeal may be taken from an action of the intake officer.

It is only upon an intake officer’s denial of authorization to file a petition that an appeal is authorized. Subsection (h). As we have seen, in general, the intake officer may deny authorization to file a petition if he concludes that “neither an informal adjustment nor judicial action is appropriate____” Subsection (g). Specifically, however, if he has decided to proceed by way of informal adjustment, and the process has begun, he may, during the informal adjustment process, deny authorization to file a petition (or authorize the filing of a petition) when, in his judgment, the informal adjustment cannot be completed successfully.

Subsection (f). The statute could not be more clear. The denial of authorization to file a petition and the proposal to proceed with an informal adjustment, consummated by agreement of the parties, are separate and distinct. The former triggers the appeal; the latter does not.

This reading of the statute is supported by the context within which its language was adopted. The law we have outlined is in substantial part that which was enacted in 1975. It followed in the wake of Matter of Trader, 272 Md. 364 , 325 A.2d 398 (1974), and its siblings, which expressed concern about the differences between the juvenile law applicable to Montgomery County and that applicable to the rest of the State. The Chief Judge of this Court in his State of the Judiciary Address before the 1975 General Assembly urged the legislature to take action to unify the juvenile court system, declaring: “No more important piece of legis ²⁰¹ lation will come before this body this session.” The then Governor had recognized “the need to reconcile the juvenile justice statutes of Montgomery County with those of the rest of the State.” He believed that such a change should be made, “combining the best features of both statutes” and that “the views of judges, official and private citizens should be taken into account in the process.” The Governor directed his Chief Legislative Officer, Alan M. Wilner, now a judge of the Court of Special Appeals, “to undertake an immediate study of the problem and make recommendations on how best to proceed.” 5 The result was the introduction in 1975 of bills representing the administration’s proposals (H.B. 726 and S.B. 291) and bills presenting other views (H.B. 726 and S.B. 618).

Extensive testimony was presented and numerous letters were received expressing “the views of judges, officials and other citizens, both in Montgomery County and elsewhere.” Much debate followed. See the bill files of the legislative committees. The result was a major revision of the former law. The focus was originally limited to uniformity throughout the State.

A number of substantive changes in the old law, however, found their way into the new law. There emerged a comprehensive legislative scheme designed and carefully tailored to promote the declared legislative purposes, CJ § 3-802(a), with the admonition that the juvenile causes law “be liberally construed to effect these purposes,” § 3-802(b). Among the stated purposes were: (1) To provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of this subtitle; and to provide for a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation consistent with the child’s best interests and the protection of the public interest; ²⁰² (2) To remove from children committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior; (3) To conserve and strengthen the child’s family ties and to separate a child from his parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public safety____ CJ § 3-802(a). See In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 106-107 , 527 A.2d 35 (1987); In re DeWayne H., 290 Md. 401, 406 , 430 A.2d 76 (1981); In re Laurence T., 285 Md. 621, 625-627 , 403 A.2d 1256 (1979).

There would be a serious interference with the legislative scheme and the purposes behind it to thrust a child into the judicial system by permitting an appeal short of a denial of authorization to file a petition. If