In Re Lakeshia M.

LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY, J. The issue presented by the parties in this delinquency case is whether the juvenile respondent triggered the requirement for a pre-adjudicatory hearing, mental competency evaluation, as that requirement was imposed by Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol., 2005 Cum.Supp.), § 3-8A-17.1 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ). 1 We shall hold that the juvenile sufficiently raised the issue of competency to oblige ⁵⁵³ the court to make a finding whether to order an evaluation. Because this was not done, we shall vacate the adjudication of delinquency and the disposition. On November 16, 2005, appellant, Lakeshia M., was age fifteen. That evening her stepfather, Steven D., entered the home and found Lakeshia sitting in a recliner in the living room with a butcher knife lying on each leg.

An argument ensued, during which Lakeshia “took a swipe” at Steven D. with one of the knives. She was close enough to him at that time that he had to back up to avoid the blade. He called the police. The State filed a juvenile petition against Lakeshia on December 20, 2005, in the Circuit Court for Washington County.

The adjudicatory hearing was held on January 25, 2006. 2 That hearing opened with the following request by counsel for Lakeshia. “Your Honor, this is going to be a Public Defender request for a postponement. Her mother came in to qualify late, had her daughter call me yesterday. She also is diagnosed with the highest level of bi-polar disorder. It’s something I need to look into.

I can’t really, she can’t really assist me with her mental health status now. There’s a current CIÑA case, her CINA social worker is here. She’s under the jurisdiction of Judge Boone. I’d ask to postpone this matter thirty days to allow me to meet with her, review discovery and discover this diagnosed ... “THE COURT: She’s out of control.” In response, counsel said that Lakeshia’s mother believed that, if the court were to order the juvenile to take her medicine, she would remain properly medicated.

Counsel ⁵⁵⁴ further advised that, because of the pending CINA action, the social worker assigned to Lakeshia’s case could petition the court at any time “for shelter,” if that became necessary. The court denied the request for a continuance. Counsel, however, stood his ground. “[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, then I’d have to note competency because she can’t communicate with me about this process. Your Honor, you can talk to her mother, you can talk to her ... “THE COURT: Well you said that she was taking her medication. “[Defense Counsel]: With respect to her ability to conform, anger issues, but I don’t have a mental health background at all.

When I talked to her yesterday, she wasn’t able to explain to me the basic junction of my role, the prosecutor’s role. I let her know I’d talk to her today. I’ve talked to her today. I’ve talked to her DSS worker: And I let her know that I’d be seeking to postpone it to make thát evaluation.

At this point, there’s nothing I can do except ask for that postponement. I’m not comfortable not asserting competency. After having her meet with the social worker from my office, I may, based on what the mother told me in the CINA case, it screams out competency issues. The highest level of bi-polar disorder.

I’ve never heard that before. “THE COURT: Does she admit or deny her participation in the assault? “[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I’d have to deny on her behalf. I don’t think, I deny and I’d assert competency and ask that the State meet its burden with respect to her competency for this hearing.” (Emphasis added). The State took the position that competency had not been formally raised. It advised the court that, if a continuance were granted, it would seek a shelter , order because there was a bed immediately available at the Thomas B. Finan Center, ⁵⁵⁵ where medication and competency issues could be addressed.

The court observed: “Of course, that was the recommendation by the Department even if we got to disposition, was to get her to Finan and get some intervention as well as a psychological evaluation.” When the court further commented, “I mean, that’s what’s necessary, and why delay it,” defense counsel replied, “[B]e-cause I don’t think she’s capable of being adjudicated.” The court said that the matter could be bifurcated, with the court first determining whether Lakeshia committed acts that would be criminal offenses if perpetrated by an adult, and that “[ajgency is another issue.” The court repeated that “[sjhe’s out of control, and she needs to be out of the community into a professional environment that she’ll either respond to or she won’t.” After further colloquy, the court again denied the “request for a continuance” and directed that the matter proceed on the bifurcated issue and not on the issue of competency. A shelter review hearing was held on February 15, 2006. Finan Center had been unable to complete their psychological evaluation because Lakeshia was “so out of control.” Consequently, the Department of Juvenile Services (DJS) had no plan and no recommendation. Although the prosecutor initially suggested transfer to Crownsville Hospital, she learned in the course of the hearing that an independent psychological evaluation could be done by a Dr. Kane in Frederick.

The court, apparently referring to an interim report from the Finan Center that is not in the record, observed: “The Finan people say it’s all manipulative. Everything that she’s doing is her own selfishness and a manipulation. There is a history at Brook Lane. I think we do need to have an independent evaluation[.]” The court placed Lakeshia in the custody of her mother, subject to community detention and “intensive” supervision by DJS.

There were numerous conditions, including that she cooperate with Dr. Kane in his evaluation. ⁵⁵⁶ The disposition hearing was held on April 5, 2006. Dr. Kane had submitted an evaluation that the State considered to be “very thorough.” 3 The disposition was probation for an indefinite period in the custody of her mother, but supervised by DJS and subject to numerous conditions. Lakeshia timely appealed. This Court issued the writ of certiorari on its own motion, before consideration of the matter by the Court of Special Appeals.

In re Lakeshia M., 396 Md. 11 , 912 A.2d 647 (2006). Appellant presents two questions: “1. Whether the trial court erred when it refused to stay the adjudicatory hearing and order a competency evaluation after defense counsel asserted that he had concerns about the appellant’s competency? “2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defense counsel’s motion for a continuance?” Legal Background “It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 , 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2574 , 120 L.Ed.2d 353, 359 (1992).

Lakeshia submits that “[although [Maryland appellate courts have not] addressed the issue, numerous courts from across the country have recognized that juveniles have a similar fundamental, due process right not to be adjudicated delinquent if they are mentally incompetent.” Brief of Appellant at ll. 4 Because we rest our decision on ⁵⁵⁷ statutory grounds, we do not reach the constitutional level of analysis. When the delinquency petition was filed in the instant matter, there was no Maryland statute directly addressing the competence of a juvenile to stand trial for a delinquent act. Chapter 580 of the Acts of 2005 enacted substantial changes to CJ Title 3, Subtitle 8A, “Juvenile Causes—Children Other Than CINAs and Adults.” 5 Effective December 31, 2005, this legislation added, as defined terms, “Incompetent to proceed” and “Competency hearing.” The former means “that a child is not able to: “(1) Understand the nature or object of the proceeding; or “(2) Assist in the child’s defense.” CJ § 3-8A-01(q). The latter means “a hearing under this subtitle to determine whether a child alleged to be delinquent is mentally competent to participate in a waiver hearing under § 3-8A-06 of this subtitle, an adjudicatory hearing under § 3-8A-18 of this subtitle, a ⁵⁵⁸ disposition hearing under § 3-8A-19 of this subtitle, or a violation of probation hearing.” CJ § 3-8A-01(i).

Lakeshia bases her argument primarily on new § 3-8A-17.1, as enacted in 2005. It read: “(a) In general.—(1) At any time after a petition alleging that a child has committed a delinquent act is filed with the court under this subtitle, the court on its own motion, or on motion of the child’s counsel or the State’s Attorney, shall stay all proceedings and order an evaluation of the child’s mental condition and developmental levels if the court finds that: “(i) There is probable cause to believe that the child has committed the delinquent act; and “(ii) There is reason to believe that the child may be incompetent to proceed with a waiver hearing under § 3-8A-06 of this subtitle, an adjudicatory