In Re Leslie M.

COUCH, Judge. We shall here hold that a judge presiding-v over juvenile causes has the authority to vacate a prior order adjudicating a child to be delinquent after the successful completion of a period of probation. Preliminarily, we must consider a motion to dismiss filed by the State based on its contention that these appeals are from the denial of motions to modify and are thus not appealable. We reject this argument since we do not view the motions as requests for modification; we believe they are motions to vacate.

Accordingly, we deny the motion to dismiss. Turning to the merits, the question we decide today is common to certain juvenile matters which were consolidated for appeal purposes. These cases are titled: In Re: Leslie M. and Nathan C. In Re: Steven R. In Re: Tammy L. The four cases arose from decisions in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City where Judge David B. Mitchell, sitting in the Juvenile Division, held that a judge sitting in such division ⁴⁷⁹ lacked authority to vacate a finding of delinquency subsequent to a disposition hearing. Appeals were taken in each of the four cases to the Court of Special Appeals where they were consolidated.

We issued the writ of certiorari on our own motion in order to answer a question of public importance. The facts giving rise to the question before us may be quickly stated. In each of the four matters, after hearings on petitions, each child was adjudicated to be a delinquent child and placed on probation for six months, with the exception of Tammy L. who received a one year period of probation. Each of the orders also provided that the cases were “set for Court review” on a date certain, generally at the end of six months.

Approximately six months after the adjudicatory and disposition hearings, the cases came on for hearing before various masters. In three of the four cases the masters recommended that the previous finding of delinquency be vacated. In the case of Tammy L. the master refused to do so on the basis there was no authority therefor. When the master’s recommendations reached Judge David Mitchell, who was then presiding over juvenile causes, he held that there was no authority to “vacate a finding of delinquency subsequent to the disposition hearing.” In reaching this conclusion Judge Mitchell recognized that Md. Rule 916(a) 1 provides for the vacation or modification of an order of the court if it is found to be in the best interest of the child or the public.

Nevertheless, he then opined: “The problem, it seems, surrounds the meaning of the word ‘order’ as it is used in the rule. Black’s Law ⁴⁸⁰ Dictionary, Fifth Edition 1979 defines ‘order’ thusly; ‘Direction of a court or judge made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment.’ This definition contrasts sharply with that of the word ‘finding’. Finding is defined as a ‘decision upon a question of fact reached as the result of a judicial examination or investigation by a court ...’. Black’s supra.

These definitions make it abundantly clear that when Maryland Rule 916(a) is given its ‘natural and ordinary signification’ it cannot be reasonably construed to encompass the word ‘finding’. It is equally clear, then, that Maryland Rule 916(a) does not apply to ‘findings of delinquency’. The inquiry does not stop here, however. Maryland Rule 916(a) must be read within the context of the rest of Chapter 900 as well as the Juvenile Causes Act.

An examination of the enactments in question demonstrates that an interpretation of Rule 916(a) which gives the word ‘order’ its natural and ordinary meaning does not disrupt the harmony between that section and the remainder of Chapter 900. Nor does it conflict with either the letter or the spirit of the Juvenile Causes Act. In fact, if the proposed broader interpretation were adopted, it would make section 3-831(b), which specifies the one circumstance under which a delinquent finding may be expunged, somewhat superfluous. Further, the fact that the legislature saw fit to