In Re Levon A.

HOLLANDER, Judge. In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Levon A., a juvenile, was found to have committed the delinquent act of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. At the time of the offense, Levon was fourteen years old. Levon was thereafter placed on probation, and he and his mother, Ruth A. 1 , were ordered to pay restitution of $443.73 to the owner of the vehicle.

In addition, Ms. A. was ordered to pay restitution of $1,690.17 to the owner’s insurance company, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”). On appeal, we are asked to consider one question: “Did the juvenile court err in ordering Levon and his mother to pay restitution totalling $2,133.90?” 2 For the reasons that follow, ¹¹¹ we are convinced that it did. Accordingly, we shall vacate the order of restitution and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. We shall also deny the State’s “Motion to Strike Appendix to Appellant’s Reply Brief”, in which the State complains about a six-page excerpt of the transcript from the exceptions hearing that was appended to the reply brief.

Factual Background Levon was charged in a delinquency petition with various offenses stemming from his alleged involvement in October 1996 in the theft and unauthorized use of a 1993 Jeep Grand Cherokee, including theft over $300, in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 342; unauthorized use, in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 349; and malicious destruction of property, in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 111. An adjudicatory hearing was conducted by a juvenile master on February 28, 1997, at which several witnesses testified. What follows is a summary of the evidence adduced at the hearing. H. Edward Andrews III, an attorney, was the owner of the Jeep.

He testified that on the morning of October 17, 1996, he drove his automobile to the District Court located on North Avenue in Baltimore City to meet with a prosecutor about a case. At about 9:15 a.m., Andrews parked his vehicle on a street behind the courthouse, secured it with “The Club,” locked the doors, and went inside. When he returned approximately forty-five minutes later, the Jeep was gone. Andrews immediately reported the missing vehicle to a policeman inside the courthouse.

Later that evening, Andrews learned that his automobile had been involved in a police chase involving two juveniles. When Andrews recovered his Jeep at a Baltimore City impoundment lot, he observed that it was damaged on the front and right side, the ignition was missing, and glass from the right rear passenger window littered the seat and floor. Moreover, audio tapes that had been in the glove compartment were damaged, and “The Club,” approximately seventy dollars in cash and coins, a wool blanket, and a mug, were missing. ¹¹² On November 27, 1996, Andrews filed a Notice of Claim for Restitution. Baltimore City Police Officer Anthony DiNunno testified that on the afternoon of October 17, 1996, he was in an unmarked car when he saw two boys who were too short “to see over the dashboard,” driving a Jeep Grand Cherokee southbound in the 4700 block of Harford Road.

After verifying that the Jeep had been reported as stolen, the officer called for backup and followed the vehicle. In an attempt to evade police, the vehicle “smashed” into a wooden fence and “crashed” into trees and shrubbery at the end of a private driveway. The “vehicle [landed] in an upright position with the front wheels off the ground.” The driver, fifteen-year-old Antonio John M. (John), ran from the Jeep but was apprehended nearby.

Appellant, who was the passenger, was arrested before he was able to exit the vehicle. Levon testified that while walking home from school on October 17, 1996, he saw his friend, John, driving a Jeep, and John offered Levon a ride home. Levon thought his friend was old enough to drive, and that the Jeep belonged to one of John’s relatives, because John’s family owned several cars, including a Cadillac, a station wagon, and a truck. When Levon entered the vehicle, he claimed he did not know it had been stolen, nor did he notice the broken window or the missing ignition.

According to Levon, before John drove Levon home, John stopped at his mother’s house. Levon claimed that John told him the car was stolen when they were leaving John’s house. Because Levon thought John was “playing with [him]”, he did not ask John to stop the car and let him out. When Levon noticed a police car following them, however, he understood that John was serious.

Levon explained: On the way from his house, he was going to drop me off at my house, so he seen the police. He’s like, the police is behind us. And I was like, so? He was like, it’s stolen.

Then that’s when I knew, because he had told me before, ¹¹³ about his plans. Then when he started turning and stuff, that’s when I knew he was going to wreck. At the conclusion of the hearing, the master found that Levon had committed the offense of unauthorized use. As to the remaining counts, the master found “facts not sustained.” 3 The master said, in part: The evidence in this matter is fairly clear.

This young man was told that the car was stolen. He thought that [John] was joking. The window, the vent of the window was broken. The ignition was broken, although this young man said he didn’t see it.

He had an opportunity to see it from his vantage point in the front seat. The Respondent at least in this matter should have known the car was stolen. On March 25, 1997, the master held a restitution hearing at which Levon was represented by counsel. 4 Although Levon’s mother was present, she did not have an attorney. Three witnesses testified: Andrews; Patricia Welch, a Claims Specialist for State Farm; and Ms. A. Andrews and State Farm claimed a total of $2,174.40 in damages.

Welch testified that the insurer paid Andrews $1,690.17 to repair the Jeep. The repairs included 1) a new front bumper cover; 2) a new ignition lock cylinder and switch assembly; 3) new weatherstripping; 4) a new rear passenger window; and 5) replacement of a decal on the front quarter-panel. Andrews testified that the items inside the vehicle that were missing or damaged had a value of $484.23, as follows: The Club $ 42.00 Wool Blanket $ 40.00 Mug $ 7.50 Cash and Coins $ 70.00 37 Tapes $324.73 ¹¹⁴ Andrews arrived at the values of “The Club,” blanket, mug, and tapes based on the original cost of the items or by ascertaining the current replacement cost for the items. For example, he determined the price of “The Club” by going to Wal-Mart, where he had purchased the item two years before the incident, and noted that the same model now sells for $42.00.

The blanket was purchased in Scotland at a cost of $40.00. With regard to the cash that was in the vehicle when the offense occurred, Andrews testified that in August 1996, his daughter counted the money in his ashtray and found that he had $84.80. He estimated that he had used $14.80 for tolls and parking since that time, leaving a total of $70.00 in the vehicle at the time of the incident. At the time of the restitution hearing, Ms. A. lived in an apartment with Levon and three of her other children, ages 10, 12, and 16. 5 Between the time of Levon’s delinquent act and the time of the adjudicatory hearing, however, Ms. A.’s children were in foster care, because there was no room for the children at Ms. A.’s mother’s house, where Ms. A. was living at the time.

According to Ms. A., her children all have the same father, but he has no contact with them, and is “thousands” of dollars in arrears with regard to child support. Indeed, Ms. A. testified that she has never received assistance from him. Ms. A. also acknowledged that she is a former addict, and she had been incarcerated for a drug offense some three years prior to the restitution hearing. At the time of the restitution hearing, Ms. A. was employed as a housekeeper at Kernan Hospital, where she was earning $6.00 an hour.

She indicated that she did not receive any additional social service benefits or a housing subsidy. According to Ms. A., her take-home pay was $197.00 a week. From that amount she paid the following, monthly expenses: $800.00 for rent, $200.00 for food,, approximately $50.00 for the telephone, $75.00 in utility fees, and $80.00 for work-related ¹¹⁵ transportation. Ms. A. explained that what she spent for clothing and other items “varie[d] because I can’t give them things or everybody something.

Like this month, it has to be one this month and then next month and like that.” The master advised Ms. A. that the court could assess restitution against her as well as Levon. He then asked Ms. A. if there was anything she would like to add. The following colloquy ensued: MS. A.: Only that I’m struggling, you know, I am clean and that’s going on three years now.

I’m doing the best that I can trying to raise these children by myself. Their father has nothing to do with them. He sends them nothing. He don’t see them.

THE MASTER: Well, let me ask. Has there been any order of child support passed in this matter? MS. A.: Oh, yes.

I mean, I have been on Social Services. I was there the majority of the time, and I did take him downtown for all of them, you know, but I have never received a check whatsoever, no child support— THE MASTER: Do you know how much he’s in arrears, how much he owes? MS. A.: All I know is thousands, the last that I know.

I had got a letter from the Bureau of Child Enforcement, but that’s been a few years ago. During her closing argument, Levon’s counsel urged the court not to assess restitution against either Levon or his mother. Moreover, relying on In re Jason W., 94 Md.App. 731 , 619 A.2d 163 (1993), defense counsel said that she did not believe the damage to the Jeep was caused by Levon’s misconduct. Thereafter, the master recommended that Levon and his mother, “along with any other responsible party,” pay $443.73 in restitution to Andrews over a period of eighteen months.

The master also recommended that Ms. A. pay restitution to ¹¹⁶ State Farm in the amount of $1,690.17. 6 Although the master found as to Levon that “the restitution amount [was] in order as to the club, the blanket, the mug, the tapes and the cash,” he reduced the value of the tapes from $324.73 to $291.43. 7 In ordering Levon to pay restitution, the master believed that Levon could soon secure employment. He said: Well, you know, I expect what’s going to happen is, he will be sixteen by the time this restitution ends up rolling around and being completed. I expect him at the time that he becomes fifteen to become employed, to search for employment. I don’t expect him to sit on his rusty-gusty and not do anything.

That gives him an adequate amount of time for him to become legally able to work. This gives him an adequate amount of time for him to make sincere attempts to pay the money, and that gives the court an adequate amount of time to make a determination as to whether he’s making those sincere attempts, and to make adjustments to the restitution if it’s necessary. Acknowledging that Ms. A.’s job “doesn’t pay that much,” and that he “[had] to decide how much food [he’s] going to take out of her children’s mouths,” the master nonetheless recommended that the restitution order against Ms. A. be reduced to judgment immediately. The master explained: The real question is why we’re here right now talking about this money.

Why? Because this young man hopped into a vehicle that he knew was stolen. That’s the reason ¹¹⁷ we’re here today. No other reason.

And now somebody has got to pay some money. There’s a causal nexus in this because the court, the legislature as a matter of public policy in unauthorized use cases is [sic] that all people involved in the vehicle diminishes [sic] in some way the use of the vehicle. The court can’t make a determination as to — the court can never under these circumstances make a determination as to who got into the vehicle, when they were driving it, et cetera. So, the court makes a determination in these matters that these people are as lawbreakers equally responsible for the damages done to the vehicle.

After the master announced his recommendation, appellant’s counsel objected, focusing on the lack of a causal connection between the damages and Levon’s participation, and the inability of Levon and Ms. A. to pay restitution. The following colloquy ensued: APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Can I ask you what causal link you find between the respondent’s actions and this damage? THE MASTER: I have already explained that, [counsel], the best way I possibly can. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: For the record, I don’t, I don’t think that’s enough.

THE MASTER: That’s fine, [counsel]. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay. And how — the respondent at age 14 with no employment, how is he expected to come up with $443.00— THE MASTER: He’s expected to use his— APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: —in eighteen months? THE MASTER: I expect he is expected to use his ingenuity in the same way that he hopped into this vehicle, just to use this person’s car, to use his ingenuity, to make an attempt to pay the money.

No attempt being made to pay ¹¹⁸ this money will cause him to be in violation of probation if he’s, in fact, placed on probation in this matter. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: In regard to the judgment against Mom, for the total insurance amount— THE MASTER: Yes? APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: —you’re saying that because— THE MASTER: What I’m saying is this. Unfortunately— APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: —of her past, you’re holding her past against her?

THE MASTER: Unfortunately, unfortunately. She straightened herself out, but it’s this court’s opinion that if you have children, they have to be properly cared for; there has to be some sort of supervision for the children so these children don’t end up in court. This young man has obviously had some problems and difficulties, but those difficulties are solely his own. He’s in court because of the actions of his mother and father.

His father is not here. I can’t do anything with his father, and I think the mother should go up here and try to get this money from this man, who decided to dump her and these children like a piece of garbage. That’s what I think. On April 1, 1997, Levon filed a Notice of Exception to the master’s recommendation “regarding restitution,” contending that the State “failed to prove that the delinquent act was the cause of the car owner’s damage or loss.” Further, he asserted that the master failed to consider Levon’s “age and circumstances” in ordering restitution.

At a hearing held on October 15, 1997, the circuit court considered appellant’s exceptions with regard to restitution. Neither Levon nor his mother attended the hearing, but an attorney from the Office of the Public Defender appeared on behalf of Levon. 8 The court indicated that it did not believe ¹¹⁹ the exceptions encompassed a challenge by Ms. A. to the order of restitution. “Just in case,” however, the court proceeded to consider and address the master’s recommendation as to restitution by Ms. A. The court said, in part: [Initially I thought that the defense was challenging the award of restitution as to the mother, but that does not appear to be so. But just in case — and there was no argument on that other than the award — [Levon’s counsel] raised in her argument the amount which was 1 thousand 690 dollars and 17 cents. There was extensive testimony taken by [the master] concerning the mother’s place of employment, her prior job situation, the fact that she had three children living with her---- [T]here was an extensive hearing.

There was quite a bit of testimony taken and afterwards, [the master] ruled that the mother should, in fact, because she was in custody of the respondent at the time of this incident, should be ordered to pay 1 thousand 690 dollars and 17 cents. Court [sic] concurs with that recommendation. With respect to the proposed order requiring Levon to pay $443.73 to the victim within eighteen months, the court concluded that the recommendation was “appropriate.” Accordingly, by order dated October 15, 1997, the juvenile court overruled the exceptions. The court’s order “affirmed” the master’s recommendation of March 25, 1997.

Further, the order said: “Respondent and parent to pay the restitution as stated in previous ordered [sic] made on 3/25/97.” 9 This appeal followed. We will include additional facts in our discussion. ¹²⁰ Discussion I. Preliminarily, we must determine whether Levon alone is the appellant, or whether his mother, too, is an appellant herein. Levon’s counsel noted an appeal from the judgment of restitution, but did not identify the particular parties lodging the appeal. The notice of appeal provided: “Please enter an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland from the judgment regarding restitution entered in the above-captioned case.” In a footnote in appellants’ brief, Levon and Ms. A. assert that this “appeal is, in fact, on behalf of both Levon and his mother.” The State challenges that assertion as to Ms. A., because she never filed exceptions to the master’s recommendation.

If the State is correct, our review would be limited to the propriety of the court’s order requiring Levon to pay restitution to the owner of the vehicle in the amount of $443.73; we would have no basis to review the court’s order requiring Ms. A. to pay $1,690.17 in restitution to State Farm, and making her jointly liable with Levon for the restitution due to the owner. For a variety of reasons, we disagree with the State. It is true that after the restitution hearing conducted by the master, a Notice of Exception was filed only on behalf of Levon. Ms. A.’s appellate status does not turn on her failure ¹²¹ to note an exception, however.

The only judgment from which an appeal could have been taken is the one from which the appeal was taken. In our view, the State has conflated the issue of preservation of an issue for appellate review with the right to take an appeal from a final judgment. “Appellate jurisdiction ... is [ordinarily] limited to review of final judgments.” Anderson v. Anderson, 349 Md. 294, 297 , 708 A.2d 296 (1998); see Md.Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 12-301 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art. (“C.J.”). Clearly, the report of the juvenile master was not a final order of the circuit court, In re Michael G., 107 Md.App. 257, 264 , 667 A.2d 956 (1995), and neither Levon nor Ms. A. was entitled to take an appeal from it. Maryland Rule 11 — 111(a)(2), which pertains to masters in juvenile causes, provides: “The findings, conclusions and recommendations of a [juvenile] master do not constitute orders or final action of the court.” The State has not presented us with any authority for the proposition that, in a case involving a juvenile master, no appeal may be taken from a judge’s final order adopting a master’s recommendation, unless the party previously challenged the master’s report by way of exceptions.

Our construction of Md. Rule 11-111 does not support that view. The canons and rules of construction that guide the interpretation of statutes apply equally when interpreting rules of procedure. State v. Harrell, 348 Md. 69, 79 , 702 A.2d 723 (1997); Long v. State, 343 Md. 662 , 684 A.2d 445 (1996). In ascertaining the intention of the Court of Appeals in promulgating the rule, we look first to the words used in the rule.

When the language of the rule is clear and unambiguous, we construe the words in accordance with their plain meaning. In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94 , 646 A.2d 1012 (1994). Maryland Rule ll-lll(c) expressly states that any party “may file exceptions to the master’s proposed findings, conclusions, recommendations, or proposed orders.” (Empha ¹²² sis added). But the rule does not mandate that a party who disagrees with the master must file exceptions in order to preserve a right to appeal from the judge’s subsequent order.

Indeed, Rule ll-lll(d) does not require the judge to adopt the master’s determinations, even when the master’s recommendations or proposed orders are unchallenged. Md. Rule ll-lll(d) states: “In the absence of timely and proper exceptions, the master’s proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations may be adopted by the court and the proposed or other appropriate orders may be entered based on them.” (Emphasis added). Further, even if no exceptions have been filed, Rule ll-lll(d) permits the juvenile court to remand the matter to the master for a further hearing. The court may also conduct “a further hearing supplemented by such additional evidence as the court considers relevant and to which the parties raise no objection.” What the State has overlooked is that it is the judge’s final order, not the master’s report, recommendations, or proposed order, that both Ms. A. and Levon have challenged here.

In particular, regarding the issue of restitution, Ms. A. alleges that the judge was required to exercise his discretion -with respect to Ms. A.’s financial circumstances, evidence of which was adduced at the master’s hearing. Further, she claims that, in ordering her to pay restitution, the judge abused his discretion. Ms. A.’s quarrel, then, is not with the master’s fact-finding. Our decision in Miller v. Bosley, 113 Md.App. 381 , 688 A.2d 45 (1997), is instructive.

Miller involved an order granting pendente lite custody of a child to the paternal aunt, based on the report and recommendation of a domestic master. Although the child’s mother failed to note exceptions to the master’s report, she lodged an appeal to this Court, challenging the trial judge’s decision. On appeal, the father argued that the mother’s “failure to file exceptions forecloses her objection on appeal to the master’s recommendations____”, which were the basis of the lower court’s orders. 113 Md.App. at 390 n. 8, 688 A.2d 45 . We disagreed.

"What we said in Miller is pertinent here: ¹²³ We perceive that appellant assigns error not to the master, but to the trial judge in his exercise of his judicial responsibilities. Although exceptions are the proper vehicle for review of the master’s findings, this appeal may properly consider the propriety of the judge’s actions. Id. In Re Zephrin D., 69 Md.App. 755 , 519 A.2d 806 (1987), is also pertinent.

There, we entertained a parent’s appeal and reviewed an order of restitution lodged against the mother, even though it was the juvenile, and not the mother, who filed an exception to the master’s report. Id. at 757 , 519 A.2d 806 . The Court’s recent decision in In the Matter of Tyrek S., supra, 351 Md. 698 , 720 A.2d 306 (1998), does not persuade us that Ms. A. waived her claim by failing to file exceptions. Tyrek S. is factually distinguishable from the case sub judice.

In Tyrek S., the juvenile was found to have committed the offense of unauthorized use. At the restitution hearing, the juvenile argued to the master that he lacked the present ability to pay, but the master considered the juvenile’s “potential ability.” Tyrek S., at 707, 720 A.2d 306 . The master concluded that even though Tyrek was young, unemployed, and committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice, this “does not mean that [he] will not have the ability to become employed and earn money and pay the restitution that he owes.” Tyrek S., at 707, 720 A.2d 306 . The master thus recommended that the juvenile pay restitution to several victims.

Thereafter, counsel for the juvenile noted exceptions on two grounds; one pertained to the juvenile’s inability to pay restitution. At the exceptions hearing, however, counsel for the juvenile affirmatively advised the court that “the only issue ... in the case for review” concerned the juvenile’s contention that restitution could not be awarded to a victim who was not named in the petition. Thus, the judge never considered the inability to pay issue. On appeal to this Court, Tyrek claimed that the lower court erred in finding an ability to pay restitution.

Because that ¹²⁴ issue was not raised at the exceptions hearing, we concluded that the issue was not preserved. In re Tyrek S., 118 Md. App. 270, 277 , 702 A.2d 466 (1997). The Court agreed. In the Matter of Tyrek S., at 708, 720 A.2d 306.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals declined to exercise its discretion to excuse the waiver. Id., at 709 , 720 A.2d 306 . It is significant that, in Tyrek S., counsel for the juvenile essentially waived the inability to pay issue at the exceptions hearing. Moreover, because the restitution dispute concerned the juvenile’s “present versus potential ability to pay,” Tyrek S., at 707, 720 A.2d 306 , it involved disputed factual contentions concerning such matters as the juvenile’s anticipated release to the community, his future employability, and his ability to earn money.

Under these circumstances, counsel’s statement to the court at the outset of the hearing, and the court’s resulting failure to consider the issue, certainly constituted a waiver under Md. Rule 8-131(a). The issue as to Ms. A.’s restitution, however, did not involve any controverted facts. Rather, Ms. A. focuses on the judge’s discretionary determination in regard to the uncontested factual evidence adduced at the master’s hearing. She “assigns error to the trial judge in the exercise of his independent judgment as to the propriety of his disposition of the case from those facts” elicited at the master’s hearing.

Miller, 113 Md.App. at 393 , 688 A.2d 45 . (Emphasis added). Additionally, in contrast to Tyrek S., Ms. A.’s failure to lodge exceptions does not offend Md. Rule 8-131(a). That rule guards against a party’s assertion of an issue on appeal that was not raised or considered below.

The “primary purpose” of Rule 8-131(a) is “ ‘ “to ensure fairness for all parties in a case and to promote the orderly administration of law.” ’ ” State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 189 , 638 A.2d 107 (1994) (citations omitted); see Davis v. DiPino, 337 Md. 642, 647-48 , 655 A.2d 401 (1995). To that end, Maryland Rule 8-131(a) provides that “ordinarily” we will not decide any issue that ¹²⁵ does not “plainly appear[ ] by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court.” (Emphasis added). Here, although the circuit court did not believe that Ms. A. had lodged exceptions, it nonetheless proceeded to consider the issue of restitution as to the mother, “just in case.” As a result of the court’s commendable desire to be thorough, the question of restitution by Ms. A. was squarely considered and “plainly decided” by the circuit court. Accordingly, we conclude that Ms. A.’s claim is preserved under Rule 8-131(a).

Therefore, we may review the judge’s final order as to Ms. A., even though she did not file exceptions. We acknowledge that the failure to file exceptions may have serious consequences. Ordinarily, challenges to a master’s report that are not raised by exceptions are waived. See Tyrek S., at 708, 720 A.2d 306 ; Miller, 113 Md.App. at 393 , 688 A.2d 45 .

Indeed, Tyrek S. suggests that even when an exception is noted in writing, waiver may result if that exception is abandoned at the exceptions hearing. Tyrek S., at 703, 708, 720 A.2d 306 . What we said in Miller is pertinent here: “[I]n all cases lacking timely exceptions, any claim that the master’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous is waived.” Id. at 393 , 688 A.2d 45 . In other words, if no exceptions are filed, the parties and the court must accept the master’s first-level findings of fact.

The mother’s failure in Miller to file exceptions “would have proven fatal” had she sought to challenge the master’s factual findings. Id. In this case, as in Miller , the underlying factual evidence has not been challenged; the facts regarding the mother’s economic circumstances are undisputed. Furthermore, in the context of this case, we do not attach significance to the failure of the notice of appeal to identify the particular parties bringing the appeal.

In In re Jason W., 94 Md.App. 731 , 619 A.2d 163 (1993), the notice of appeal only mentioned the child, but we considered the mother as an appellant, because we understood “from the brief and ¹²⁶ from counsel’s assertion at oral argument that the appeal [was] on behalf of both [the child] and his mother.” Id. at 732 n. 1, 619 A.2d 163 . When we couple the text of the notice of appeal, which challenges “the judgment regarding restitution,” with the court’s entry of a judgment of restitution against Ms. A, we are readily satisfied that the appeal was lodged by both Levon and his mother. Finally, even if the mother’s claims were not preserved, we would exercise the discretion conferred on us by Md. Rule 8-131(a) and consider Ms. A.’s contentions. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178 , 638 A.2d 107 (1994); Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439 , 463 A.2d 819 (1983).

In In Re Don Mc., 344 Md. 194 , 686 A.2d 269 (1996), the Court concluded that the propriety of the juvenile court’s order of restitution was not preserved, because it was not raised below. In its discretion, however, the Court determined to consider the matter and then found that the juvenile court had abused its discretion in ordering the minor and his mother to pay restitution. Id. at 200 , 686 A.2d 269 . 10 II. Appellants contend that the trial court’s award of restitution was improper for three reasons.

First, they argue that the delinquent act of unauthorized use did not cause the damage for which restitution was ordered. Second, they complain that the court erred by valuing the personal items in the Jeep ¹²⁷ according to their replacement value or purchase price, rather than their fair market value. Third, appellants contend that the master did not adequately consider the age and circumstances of either Levon or Ms. A. when ordering restitution. Before analyzing these assertions, we shall briefly review the principles that undergird juvenile restitution.

In October 1996, when Levon committed the offense of unauthorized use, restitution in juvenile causes was governed by Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 808 (“Liability for acts of child”). 11 Effective October 1, 1997, the provisions of Art. 27, § 808 were repealed. At that time, the Legislature combined into a single statute what had been separate adult and juvenile restitution provisions. The restitution provisions for adults and juveniles are now combined and codified at Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1998 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 807. See 1997 Md. Laws Chs. 311, 312 (“Victims’ Rights’ Act of 1997”); In the Matter of Tyrek S., at 704 n. 4, 720 A.2d 306 .

Therefore, when the exceptions hearing was held on October 15, 1997, and the court made its determinations as to restitution, the revised statutory provisions had just become effective. The parties have not addressed in their briefs whether Art. 27, § 807 applied to this ease when the court held the exceptions hearing, even though Art. 27, § 808 was in effect when Levon committed the delinquent act of unauthorized use. Nor have the parties suggested that the outcome of this case turns on which version of the statute governs. We observe, however, that appellants and the State repeatedly cite to Art. 27, § 808.

Moreover, appellants argue that at the exceptions hearing held on October 15, 1997 — two weeks after the new restitution statute went into effect — the court erred by failing to consider Levon’s “age and circumstances.” Yet Art. 27, § 807, which is the current version of the statute, does not ¹²⁸ contain the “age and circumstances” language that had appeared in Art. 27, § 808. We also note that, at the exceptions hearing, neither counsel for the State nor counsel for Levon noted the legislative change or raised any issue with respect to which statutory version should govern the court’s decision as to restitution. Moreover, because the trial court’s order of October 15, 1997, does not refer to either Art. 27, § 807 or Art. 27, § 808, we do not know which version of the statute the court applied. In our analysis of the court’s order of restitution, we shall refer to both Art. 27, § 808, the statute in effect when the offense was committed, and the current statute, which was in effect by the time the exceptions hearing was held.

Our comparison of both versions of the statute leads us to conclude that, with respect to the particular issues before us, the outcome of this case does not hinge on the legislative changes regarding restitution. We explain. Art. 27, § 808, the earlier version of the statute, which applied only to juvenile offenders, provided, in relevant part: § 808. Liability for acts of child.

(a) In general — (1) The juvenile court may enter a-judgment of restitution against the parent of a child, the child, or both in any case in which the court finds a child has committed a delinquent act and during or as a result of the commission of that delinquent act has: (i) Stolen, damaged, destroyed, converted, unlawfully obtained, or substantially decreased the value of the property of another; (b) Restitution to wronged person personally. — Considering the age and circumstances of a child, the juvenile court may order the child to make restitution to the wronged person personally. (e) Judgment against parent. — A judgment of restitution against a parent may not be entered unless the parent has ¹²⁹ been afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present appropriate evidence in the parent’s behalf.... (Emphasis added). The current statutory version, Art. 27, § 807, which applies to both adult and juvenile offenders, provides, in part: § 807.

Restitution for crimes. (a) Restitution upon conviction, acceptance of plea of nolo contendere, etc.; priority of payment; reasons for not ordering restitution. — (1) A court may issue a judgment of restitution directing a defendant to make restitution in addition to any other penalty for the commission of a crime, if: (i) Property of the victim was stolen, damaged, destroyed, converted, unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased as a direct result of the crime; (3) (i) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the defendant is a child, the court may order the child, the child’s parent, or both to pay restitution to a victim. (in) A court may not enter a judgment of restitution against a parent under this section unless the parent has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present appropriate evidence on the parent’s behalf. A hearing under this section may be held as part of the sentencing or disposition hearing.

(4) A court need not issue a judgment of restitution under this section if the court finds: (i) That the defendant or liable parent does not have the ability to pay the judgment of restitution; or (ii) Good cause to establish extenuating circumstances as to why a judgment of restitution is inappropriate in a case. (Emphasis added). Prior to 1987, the juvenile restitution statute provided that only property damaged “during” the commission of a delin ¹³⁰ quent act could be the subject of a restitution order. In 1987, the Legislature broadened the causation nexus by allowing restitution for damage caused “during or as a result of’ a delinquent act. 1987 Md. Laws Ch. 344 (emphasis added).

In contrast, the statute now authorizes restitution when property is damaged “as a direct result of the crime.” Art. 27, § 807(a)(l)(i). The case of In re Jason W., 94 Md.App. at 736-37 , 619 A.2d 163 , interpreting the “during or as a result of’ language, established that “three findings (and the evidence to justify them) are required to support a restitution judgment.” Specifically, the court said a juvenile court must find: (1) that the child committed a delinquent act; (2) that the child damaged, destroyed, or decreased the value of another’s property; and (3) that such damage, destruction, or diminution in value caused by the child occurred during or as a result of the delinquent act. Even if the above criteria were satisfied, however, a court could not order restitution under Art. 27, § 808 unless it considered “the age and circumstances” of the child, and provided the parent with an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. Art. 27, § 808(b); § 808(e); see In Re Don Mc, 344 Md. at 202 , 686 A.2d 269 .

The current version of the statute deletes the “age and circumstances” language. Instead, the statute now focuses expressly on the “ability to pay” of the juvenile and the parent. See Art. 27, § 807(a)(4)(i). Moreover, the statute now expressly provides that the court “need not issue a judgment of restitution” when “good cause” is shown, establishing “extenuating circumstances as to why a judgment of restitution is inappropriate in a case.” Art. 27, § 807(a)(4)(h). 12 Moreover, the revised statute maintains the right of a parent to be heard and to present evidence.

Art. 27, § 807(a)(3)(iii). It also continues the “absolute limit” of $10,- ¹³¹ 000 that may be imposed upon the parent or child for restitution. Compare Art. 27, § 808(c)(2); Art. 27, § 807(a)(3)(h). As we see it, the text of Art. 27, § 807(a)(4)®, which concerns “ability to pay,” and the text of Art. 27, § 807(a)(4)(h), concerning “good cause,” codify the case law that has developed over many years.

With respect to restitution, our courts have repeatedly stressed the vital importance of the ability to pay, even when that language did not appear in the statute. Further, we have long recognized the broad discretion vested in the judge regarding an order of restitution. In In Re Don Mc., 344 Md. at 201 , 686 A.2d 269 , for example, the Court said that “Maryland law confers upon a juvenile court broad discretion to order restitution.” Similarly, the Court recognized that the minor and the parent must have the ability to comply with an order of restitution. Id. at 203 , 686 A.2d 269 ; see Coles, 290 Md. at 306, 429 A.2d 1029 .

Given that “the fundamental objective of promoting rehabilitation” is often “frustrated” when the amount of restitution exceeds the offender’s ability to pay, Coles, 290 Md. at 306 , 429 A.2d 1029 , the appellate courts have also made