In Re: M.P.

In Re: M. P., No. 3, September Term, 2023 COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE – MOTION TO DISMISS – JURISDICTION OF JUVENILE COURT – Supreme Court of Maryland held that juvenile court’s denial of motion of M.P., Appellant, to dismiss for lack of juvenile court jurisdiction was immediately appealable under collateral order doctrine. Supreme Court further held that juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over child in delinquency proceeding where child was 10 to 12 years old at time of alleged delinquent act and petition for juvenile delinquency was filed against child, charging child with act that, if committed by adult, would not be crime of violence as specified in Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2021 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.) § 14-101, and petition was pending adjudication of delinquency in juvenile court as of effective date of Juvenile Justice Reform Act (“JJRA”), as part of which General Assembly amended Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.

Proc. (2006, 2020 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.) § 3-8A-03. Supreme Court concluded that JJRA’s change to juvenile court jurisdiction applies to cases pending adjudication of delinquency when law took effect, and, as such, juvenile court erred in denying M.P.’s motion to dismiss.

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. JA-22-0183 Argued: September 8, 2023 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 3 September Term, 2023 ______________________________________ IN RE: M. P. ______________________________________ Fader, C.J. Watts *Hotten Booth Biran Gould Eaves, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Watts, J. Biran and Gould, JJ., dissent. ______________________________________ Filed: April 23, 2024 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. *Hotten, J., participated in the hearing of the case, in the conference in regard to its decision, and in the adoption of the opinion as an active 2024.04.23 judge. She retired from the Court and was recalled to senior status prior to the filing of the 13:57:53 -04'00' opinion. Gregory Hilton, Clerk In this case, we are asked to determine whether a legislative change to the jurisdiction of juvenile courts, removing children under the age of 13, except under limited circumstances, from a juvenile court’s jurisdiction in delinquency proceedings, applies to delinquency proceedings that were pending at the time of the law taking effect and therefore requires dismissal of the proceedings. Before reaching this question, we must assess whether the interlocutory appeal that brought the case to us is permitted.

The law in question, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (2006, 2020 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.) (“CJ”) § 3-8A-03, which the General Assembly amended as part of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act (“the JJRA”), see 2022 Md. Laws ___ (Vol. ___, Ch. 41, S.B. 691); 2022 Md. Laws ___ (Vol. ___, Ch. 42, H.B. 459), removed from the juvenile courts’ jurisdiction juvenile delinquency proceedings against children under 13 years of age, with the exception of those aged 10 to 12 years old charged with committing an act that would be considered a crime of violence if committed by an adult.

See CJ § 3-8A-03(a)(1), (d)(7). The General Assembly enacted this change in juvenile delinquency law upon the recommendation of the Maryland Juvenile Justice Reform Council (“the JJRC”), which determined, among other things, that young children are harmed by involvement in the juvenile delinquency system, with evidence increasingly demonstrating that young children have limited ability to appreciate their culpability for delinquent acts or to understand delinquency proceedings. See JJRC, Final Report at 6, 17 (Jan. 2021), available at http://dls.maryland.gov/pubs/prod/NoPblTabMtg/CmsnJuvRefCncl/JJRC-Final-Report. pdf [https://perma.cc/4DS9-T5PH]. The jurisdictional change took effect on June 1, 2022, after the child in this case, M.P., Appellant, had been charged in a delinquency petition in juvenile court with the theft of a motor vehicle and related acts that were alleged to have occurred when he was 12 years old.1 On June 30, 2022, before the juvenile court held an adjudicatory hearing on the petition, M.P. filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the change in law divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction over him.

The State, Appellee, opposed the motion. On August 8, 2022, the juvenile court denied the motion, concluding that it had jurisdiction over M.P. based on the delinquency petition having been filed before June 1, 2022, the effective date of the JJRA. M.P. noted an interlocutory appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland and filed in the juvenile court a motion to stay proceedings pending appeal, which was granted. Before the Appellate Court resolved the appeal, M.P. petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari.

In an answer to the petition, the State contended that the juvenile court’s denial of M.P.’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is an interlocutory ruling that is not immediately appealable, and that M.P.’s petition should be denied. We granted the petition to resolve two questions: whether M.P.’s interlocutory appeal is permitted under the collateral order doctrine, and whether the juvenile court was correct in ruling that it maintained jurisdiction over M.P., a child charged with non-violent acts allegedly committed when he was 12 years old, before the effective date of the JJRA. On September 8, 2023, after oral argument in the case, we issued an order denying a motion 1 In the delinquency petition, M.P. was charged with theft of a motor vehicle, unauthorized removal of property, “rogue and vagabond,” theft of property having a value of at least $1,500 but less than $25,000, and driving without a license. -2- by the State to dismiss M.P.’s appeal, concluding that under the common law collateral order doctrine, an immediate appeal of the August 8, 2022 ruling of the juvenile court denying M.P.’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is permitted. In the same order, we reversed the juvenile court’s denial of M.P.’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

See In Re: M. P., 486 Md. 92 , 93-94, 301 A.3d 1254 , 1254-55 (2023) (per curiam). We now explain the basis for that order. In this Court, the parties disagree only as to whether an interlocutory appeal is allowed. M.P. contends that his interlocutory appeal is permitted under the collateral order doctrine as an exception to the general requirement that an appeal lies only from a final judgment.

The State responds that the collateral order doctrine does not apply and includes in its brief a motion to dismiss the appeal. The parties agree, however, that, should this Court determine that M.P.’s appeal is not permitted under the collateral order doctrine, the Court may exercise its discretion to address the merits to provide guidance to juvenile courts about jurisdiction in this case and others like it. As to the merits, the parties agree that the juvenile court erred in denying M.P.’s motion to dismiss. The parties agree that, under this Court’s case law, as a result of the jurisdictional change brought about by the JJRA, the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over M.P. because he was charged with committing non-violent acts when he was 12 years old and the case was pending in the juvenile court at the time that the JJRA became effective.

M.P. and the State agree that applying the jurisdictional change from the JJRA to a delinquency case that was pending, but not final, on June 1, 2022, does not involve a determination as to whether the change applies retroactively, but rather rests on -3- the prospective application of a change in juvenile law, making the new law applicable to this case and others in a similar procedural posture. In the petition for a writ of certiorari, as the second of two questions, M.P. asked this Court to determine whether an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of juvenile court jurisdiction is immediately appealable. Because challenges to jurisdiction in juvenile matters may occur for a variety of reasons, we rephrase M.P.’s question as follows: whether a juvenile court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine where the court determined that it maintained jurisdiction over a child who was 12 years old at the time he allegedly committed a non- violent delinquent act,2 because the petition for juvenile delinquency was filed before the effective date of the JJRA. We answer the question “yes” and conclude that M.P.’s appeal is permitted under the collateral order doctrine.

Addressing the merits, we agree with M.P. and the State that the juvenile court erred in denying M.P.’s motion to dismiss. We hold that a juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over a child who was 10 to 12 years old at the time of an alleged delinquent act and charged in a petition for juvenile delinquency with the commission of an act that, if committed by an adult, is not a crime of violence as specified in Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2021 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.) (“CR”) § 14-101, where the petition was pending 2 “Delinquent act” is defined as an act that “would be a crime if committed by an adult.” CJ § 3-8A-01(l). -4- adjudication of delinquency3 in the juvenile court as of the effective date of the JJRA.

See CJ § 3-8A-03(a)(1), (d)(7). Given that the petition charging M.P. with delinquent acts was pending adjudication at the time that the JJRA took effect and there is no dispute about M.P.’s age at the time of the alleged acts (he was 12 years old) or that he was charged with conduct that, if committed by an adult, would not have constituted a crime of violence under CR § 14-101, based on the plain language of the JJRA, its legislative history, and our case law, the juvenile court erred in denying M.P.’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, in this and any other case in which a juvenile delinquency petition is pending on or after June 1, 2022, in which there is no genuine factual dispute concerning the juvenile’s age or whether the juvenile was charged with having committed an act that would not be a crime of violence if committed by an adult, the juvenile court no longer has jurisdiction over the juvenile and must dismiss the case. 3 If the juvenile court determines at an adjudicatory hearing that a child committed the delinquent act alleged in the petition, CJ § 3-8A-19(b)(1) requires the juvenile court to hold a separate disposition hearing, unless the hearing is waived in writing by all of the parties. CJ § 3-8A-01(p) defines a “disposition hearing” as “a hearing under th[e] subtitle to determine: (1) Whether a child needs or requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation; and, if so (2) The nature of the guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation.” (Paragraph breaks omitted).

CJ § 3-8A-01(m) defines a “delinquent child” as “a child who has committed a delinquent act and requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation.” In In re Herbert B., 303 Md. 419, 424 , 494 A.2d 680, 682 (1985), we stated that a fair reading of the relevant statutes demonstrates “that a child can be classified as a ‘delinquent child’ only after the court at the adjudicatory hearing finds that the child has committed a delinquent act and the court at the disposition hearing determines that the child is in need of the court’s assistance, guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation.” (Citation omitted). In other words, for a child to be adjudicated a “delinquent child,” there must be both an adjudicatory hearing and a disposition hearing. -5- BACKGROUND On April 9, 2022, the General Assembly enacted the JJRA, with an effective date of June 1, 2022. See 2022 Md. Laws ___ (Vol. ___, Ch. 41, S.B. 691); 2022 Md. Laws ___ (Vol. ___, Ch. 42, H.B. 459). Among other changes, this legislation established, for the first time, a minimum age restriction on the jurisdiction of juvenile courts with regard to children alleged to be delinquent.

See CJ § 3-8A-03(a)(1), (d)(7). Whereas, previously, the juvenile court had “exclusive original jurisdiction over[ a] child who is alleged to be delinquent[,]” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (2006, 2020 Repl.

Vol., 2021 Supp.) (“CJ (2021)”) § 3-8A-03(a)(1), and there was no minimum age limitation, the JJRA restricted a juvenile court’s jurisdiction in delinquency proceedings to children “[w]ho [are] at least 13 years old [and] alleged to be delinquent” or “at least 10 years old [and] alleged to have committed an act[ t]hat, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of violence, as defined in” CR § 14-101, or “[a]rising out of the same incident as” such an act, CJ § 3-8A- 03(a)(1), (d)(7).4 The JJRA also added CJ § 3-8A-03(f), which provides that “[a] child under the age of 13 years may not be charged with a crime.” On May 5, 2022, prior to the effective date of the JJRA, the State filed a juvenile petition in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, sitting as a juvenile court, alleging that on March 12, 2022, M.P. committed motor vehicle theft and related delinquent acts. M.P. was 12 years old on the date of the alleged acts. On June 30, 2022, prior to the juvenile court’s adjudication of the petition, counsel for M.P. filed a motion to dismiss for 4 Both CJ (2021) § 3-8A-01(d) and CJ § 3-8A-01(d) provide that “child” “means an individual under the age of 18 years.” 2005 Md. Laws 3303 (Vol. V, Ch. 580, H.B. 802). -6- lack of jurisdiction because the JJRA had taken effect on June 1, 2022.

The State opposed the motion. On August 8, 2022, the juvenile court held a hearing on the motion and denied it, ruling that the JJRA did not deprive the court of jurisdiction that had been established over M.P. at the time of the filing of the delinquency petition. The court stated that “the clear language of the statute[] does not appear to apply retroactively to any claims that arose prior to June 1st, 2022.” On August 12, 2022, M.P. noted an appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The same day, M.P. filed in the juvenile court a motion to stay proceedings pending the appeal, which the court granted on August 15, 2022.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari On November 23, 2022, before the State filed a brief in the Appellate Court, M.P. filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, raising two issues: whether the juvenile court retained jurisdiction over M.P. after the effective date of the JJRA, and whether a juvenile court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately appealable.5 In an answer to M.P.’s petition, although contending that the denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was not immediately appealable, the State advised 5 In the petition for a writ of certiorari, M.P. raised the following two questions: 1. As an issue of first impression, does the newly enacted statute which establishes a minimum age of jurisdiction for the juvenile court apply to cases pending at the time of the statute’s enactment? 2. As an issue of first impression, is an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of juvenile court jurisdiction immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine? -7- that, if this Court disagreed or concluded that the appealability issue merited review, the State did not oppose the granting of the petition to consider M.P.’s question concerning the applicability of the JJRA. The State filed a motion to stay proceedings in the Appellate Court as this Court was considering M.P.’s petition for a writ of certiorari, and the Appellate Court granted the motion.

On March 24, 2023, we granted M.P.’s petition. See In Re: M. P., 483 Md. 269 , 291 A.3d 779 (2023). DISCUSSION6 I. Appealability A. The Parties’ Contentions In its brief, the State brings a motion to dismiss the appeal, contending that the juvenile court’s denial of M.P.’s motion to dismiss is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. According to the State, M.P.’s appeal is not permitted under the collateral order doctrine because it fails to meet the requirement that the denial of the motion to dismiss “would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” The State likens M.P.’s contention that the denial of his motion to dismiss is immediately appealable to that of the appellant in In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 313-14 , 783 A.2d 673, 677-78 (2001), a case in which a juvenile court issued an order purporting to rescind its waiver of jurisdiction to the criminal court and the juvenile defendant unsuccessfully sought, under the collateral order doctrine, an immediate appeal of the 6 We will address in reverse order the two questions presented in the petition, one of which we have rephrased. -8- criminal court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

The State contends that, as in Franklin P., id. at 327-28 , 783 A.2d at 686 , M.P.’s argument concerning a lack of jurisdiction would be fully reviewable on appeal after final judgment. The State argues that such an outcome aligns with this Court’s case law holding that an unsuccessful challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is not immediately appealable and that an opposite conclusion would be contrary to the goal of the final judgment rule to avoid piecemeal appeals that reduce the efficiency of courts. The State also asserts that there is no basis for M.P.’s contention that he has the right to an immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine because he has a right to not be subject to delinquency proceedings in the same way that a criminal defendant has a right to not be tried twice for the same offense under the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy. The State maintains that this Court has already rejected comparisons between the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on a violation of the double jeopardy right, which is immediately appealable, and other claims that the denial of a motion to dismiss is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

Finally, although the State contends that the appeal should be dismissed, the State advises that “this case presents one of the rare times this Court’s guidance on the merits may be warranted” because “the merits issue is an uncontested matter of statutory interpretation and [] there is a need for guidance in the lower courts[.]” M.P. responds that the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because the denial of the motion to dismiss meets all four elements that this Court has established as necessary -9- for the collateral order doctrine to apply, as the denial “(1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4) would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” (Quoting Stephens v. State, 420 Md. 495, 502 , 24 A.3d 105, 109 (2011) (cleaned up)). M.P. argues that the second and fourth elements—the importance of the issue and reviewability after final judgment—are satisfied because the General Assembly concluded that preventing harm to children under age 13 from exposure to the juvenile delinquency system was so important that it merited generally excluding children under the age of 13 from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. M.P. asserts that requiring him to proceed to a final judgment before an appeal would cause him to incur the exact harm (involvement in juvenile court) that the General Assembly sought to prevent with the enactment of the JJRA and deprive him of the right to not be involved in delinquency proceedings. M.P. analogizes the circuit court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction “to the denial of a motion to dismiss pursuant to the double jeopardy clause” by a criminal defendant, which is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

Quoting Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 320 (1984), M.P. maintains that, like a defendant’s appeal of the denial of motion to dismiss based on a claim of double jeopardy, his appeal “contest[s] the very power of the Government to bring a person to trial, and that right would be significantly impaired if review were deferred until after trial.” (Alteration in original). Finally, like the State, M.P. advises that, if this Court concludes that the denial of the motion to dismiss is not immediately appealable, we should - 10 - nonetheless address the merits. B. Statutory Construction “Our goal in statutory construction is to determine legislative intent[,]” starting “with the plain meaning of the statutory language in question.” State v. Krikstan, 483 Md. 43, 65 , 290 A.3d 974, 987 (2023) (citations omitted). We begin with the normal meaning of the text “because we presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Id. at 65 , 290 A.3d at 987 (cleaned up). “If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.” Id. at 65 , 290 A.3d at 987 (cleaned up).

This typically ends our analysis without resort to other rules of construction or sources outside of the statute itself, although the plain language of a statute “must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” Comptroller of Md. v. FC-GEN Operations Invs. LLC, 482 Md. 343, 379-80 , 287 A.3d 271 , 292-93 (2022) (citation omitted). C. Relevant Case Law: Interlocutory Appeals Generally, a party has a right to appeal only “from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.” CJ § 12-301. “The primary rationale is to prevent piecemeal appeals and to prevent the interruption of ongoing judicial proceedings[,]” in order “to promote judicial efficiency and economy.” Sigma Reprod. Health Ctr. v. State, 297 Md. 660, 665 , 467 A.2d 483, 485 (1983) (citations omitted).

Exceptions to this general rule exist, however, including “appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed under the - 11 - common law collateral order doctrine.” In re O.P., 470 Md. 225, 250 , 235 A.3d 40 , 55 (2020) (citing Salvagno v. Frew, 388 Md. 605, 615 , 881 A.2d 660, 666 (2005)). We have described the collateral order doctrine as “very limited,” and applying to “only a narrow class of orders that are offshoots of the principal litigation in which they are issued[.]” Stephens, 420 Md. at 502 , 24 A.3d at 109 (cleaned up). Under the collateral order doctrine, an order is immediately appealable if it “(1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4) would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” Id. at 502 , 24 A.3d at 109 (cleaned up). To qualify for immediate appealability under the collateral order doctrine, an order must meet all four elements.

See id. at 502-03 , 24 A.3d at 109 . We apply these elements “very strictly” in keeping with the narrow nature of the exception, which should apply “only in extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 503 , 24 A.3d at 109 (cleaned up). It is well settled that an immediate appeal of the denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground that the prosecution violates a defendant’s double jeopardy rights is permitted under the collateral order doctrine. See id. at 505 n.4, 24 A.3d at 111 n.4.

In Stephens, id. at 505 , 24 A.3d at 111 , we explained that the right to an immediate appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss that alleged a double jeopardy violation is based on “the serious risk of irreparable loss of the claimed right if appellate review is deferred until after final judgment.” (Cleaned up). We observed that the Supreme Court of the United States had explained - 12 - that a ruling denying a claimed violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause comes within the collateral order doctrine because the ruling constitutes a final rejection of the claim, the issue is entirely collateral to and separable from the issue of guilt or innocence, and most significantly, delay in appellate review until after a final judgment would undermine the very right accorded by the double jeopardy prohibition, that is, the “guarantee against being twice put to trial for the same offense.” Id. at 505 n.4, 24 A.3d at 111 n.4 (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977)) (emphasis in original). In Stephens, we concluded that such was not the case, though, with the right afforded by the statute at issue, which forbade the imposition of the death penalty without the State having first presented to the jury or court biological or DNA evidence linking a defendant to a murder; we determined that right, “akin to the right to a speedy trial, must await appellate review following final judgment.” Id. at 498, 506, 24 A.3d at 106-07, 111 . We stated that “[o]nly in the rarest of circumstances do we indulge a contention that an asserted right includes the right to avoid trial altogether, such that it would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.” Id. at 507 , 24 A.3d at 112 .

Similarly, in Bunting v. State, 312 Md. 472, 474-75, 482 , 540 A.2d 805, 806, 809 (1988), where the defendant in a criminal case contended that dismissal was warranted due to a violation of the interstate detainer statute, we concluded that the collateral order doctrine did not permit an immediate appeal of the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The defendant likened his situation to that of a defendant seeking dismissal of charges as violative of the right against double jeopardy and contended that he had a right to not stand trial, making the collateral order doctrine applicable. See id. at 477-78 , 540 A.2d at 807 . We disagreed because the interstate detainer statute did not create a right to - 13 - be free of trial, but instead guarded against certain transfer procedures before trial.

See id. at 478-79 , 540 A.2d at 807-08 . In Bunting, id. at 479-80 , 540 A.2d at 808 , we described a general problem that could have arisen from a holding to the contrary by observing “that numerous ‘rights’ can readily be characterized as entitling a party to avoid trial under some circumstances.” We identified the denial of a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss based on a statute of limitations as situations that could potentially be described as a right to avoid trial absent some prerequisite, and that permitting the collateral order doctrine to apply in those instances would permit the doctrine to “largely erode the final judgment rule.” Id. at 480 , 540 A.2d at 808 . We explained that it was “important that we narrowly construe the notion of an entitlement not to be sued or prosecuted.” Id. at 480 , 540 A.2d at 808 . We stated: “In sum, the idea that an issue is not effectively reviewable after the termination of the trial because it involves a ‘right’ to avoid the trial itself, should be limited to double jeopardy claims and a very few other extraordinary situations.” Id. at 481-82 , 540 A.2d at 809 .

Otherwise, “there would be a proliferation of appeals under the collateral order doctrine[,]” which “would be flatly inconsistent with the long-established and sound public policy against piecemeal appeals.” Id. at 482 , 540 A.2d at 809 (footnote omitted). In Parrott v. State, 301 Md. 411, 413, 425 , 483 A.2d 68, 69, 75 (1984), another case involving a capital murder prosecution, we concluded that the grant or denial of a motion to remove a case to another jurisdiction under Md. Const., Art. IV, § 8 was not within “the narrow class of cases excepted from the final judgment requirement” under the collateral order doctrine. We stated: - 14 - Fundamentally, Parrott’s point that his prosecution should not have been removed from Prince George’s County (or, if removed, should have been sent to a county of like demographics) will not be lost if there is a final judgment against Parrott and the point is made on appeal from that judgment. . . . Any right which Parrott asserts in opposition to the State’s suggestion of removal necessarily deals with the place of trial.

But Parrott asserts no right which could prevent the trial itself. Id. at 425-26, 483 A.2d at 75 . We explained that, under the collateral order doctrine, a defendant may appeal immediately following the denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy because implicit in the prohibition against double jeopardy is a right to be free from a second trial, and “[t]hat aspect of the right can never be restored by reversing a conviction after the second trial on the grounds that the second trial violated double jeopardy principles.” Id. at 425 , 483 A.2d at 75 . In Franklin P., 366 Md. at 313-14 , 783 A.2d at 677-78 , we determined that the collateral order doctrine did not allow an immediate appeal from a criminal court’s denial of a juvenile defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

The juvenile defendant faced adult criminal charges as a result of the juvenile court having granted the State’s motion for waiver of jurisdiction. See id. at 311-12 , 783 A.2d at 676-77 . Later, when the juvenile court granted a request for reconsideration and purported to rescind its decision to waive jurisdiction, the defendant brought a motion to dismiss the charges in criminal court for lack of jurisdiction, which the circuit court (i.e., the criminal court) denied. See id. at 312-13 , 783 A.2d at 677 .

We determined that the denial of the motion to dismiss did not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine because the denial of the motion would be fully reviewable on appeal after final judgment. See id. at 327-28 , 783 A.2d at 686 . - 15 - In discussing the rationale for not permitting interlocutory appeals of orders waiving juvenile court jurisdiction, we explained that the General Assembly had made clear that “[a]ppeals of waiver decisions are interlocutory[,] intended to be resolved after the conclusion of the proceedings in the criminal court trial[,]” and “not intended to be made before a final decision in the criminal courts[.]” Id. at 325 , 783 A.2d at 684 .7 We stated that the criminal court’s denial of the motion to dismiss was “completely reviewable on appeal[,]” as the General Assembly had provided. Id. at 328 , 783 A.2d at 686 . We noted that, “were we to hold that waiver orders are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine (or otherwise) numerous (perhaps [in]numerable) criminal proceedings would be stayed, while juvenile waivers are first litigated at the appellate level.” Id. at 328 , 783 A.2d at 686 (footnote omitted).

In addition, we pointed out that once the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction, the court no longer had the authority, i.e., the jurisdiction, to address the defendant’s motion for reconsideration and rescind the order waiving jurisdiction. See id. at 335 , 783 A.2d at 690 . Despite ordering the appeal to be dismissed, though, we addressed the merits of the case “for guidance purposes, and because of the importance of the questions and the probability that, since the question has now arisen, it might arise with some frequency in the future[.]” Id. at 314 , 783 A.2d at 678 . Recently, in O.P., 470 Md. at 232-33 , 235 A.3d at 44-45, we determined that the collateral order doctrine allowed the immediate appeal of an order denying continued 7 We pointed out that the relevant statute did not provide a right to an immediate appeal because the General Assembly had amended it to identify a waiver of jurisdiction as interlocutory rather than immediately appealable, as a previous version of the statute had stated.

See Franklin P., 366 Md. at 323, 325 , 783 A.2d at 683-84 . - 16 - emergency shelter care in a child in need of assistance (“CINA”) proceeding. Because “shelter care is by definition temporary during the pendency of a CINA proceeding and intended to deal with a serious risk to the child’s safety and welfare during that period[,]” we concluded that an order “denying continued shelter care would be effectively unreviewable if an appeal had to await a final judgment in [a] CINA case.” Id. at 251-52, 235 A.3d at 56. We agreed with the Appellate Court of Maryland that the closest question concerning the elements of the collateral order doctrine was whether the denial of emergency shelter care was separate from the merits of the action, and concluded that it was separate because the placement issue was “neither a necessary step in a CINA proceeding nor [] part of the CINA determination.” Id. at 252, 235 A.3d at 56 (citation omitted). D. M.P.’s Interlocutory Appeal In this case, after careful review of the authorities above, we conclude that the juvenile court’s denial of M.P.’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction falls within the “narrow class of cases excepted from the final judgment requirement” and presents one of the rare circumstances in which an immediate appeal of an interlocutory order is permitted by the collateral order doctrine.

Parrott, 301 Md. at 425 , 483 A.2d at 75 . The first two elements of the collateral order doctrine are clearly met: the denial of the motion to dismiss fully resolved the jurisdictional question and the question at issue is one of great importance, as it concerns whether the juvenile court has properly exercised jurisdiction over M.P., when, under the JJRA, the juvenile court would not have jurisdiction over M.P., given his age and the acts that he is alleged to have committed. The issue is also of great - 17 - importance because it concerns the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over other children who are similar to M.P., i.e., charged in a delinquency petition when under the age of 13 at the time of the alleged act, where the act would not constitute a crime of violence, and delinquency proceedings were pending at the time the JJRA became effective. The third element is met, as the ruling on M.P.’s motion to dismiss was collateral to, and separate from, the merits of the delinquency case against him.

Unlike rulings on the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, which depend in part on an assessment of the nature of the offense, the juvenile court’s resolution of M.P.’s motion to dismiss did not require any consideration of underlying facts that would bear on whether M.P. committed the acts in question. The fourth element—whether the issue would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await entry of a final judgment—is where the controversy exists. Because M.P. phrased the question broadly to be whether a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in juvenile court is immediately appealable, we have narrowed the question to focus on whether a juvenile court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately appealable where the juvenile court determined that it maintained jurisdiction over a 12-year-old, after the effective date of the JJRA, in a pending case that did not involve an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of violence. We conclude that the denial of the motion to dismiss in question is effectively not reviewable after final judgment and embodies a decision affecting the well-being of a juvenile that is unlike other determinations with respect to jurisdiction that we have held not to be immediately appealable. - 18 - To reject M.P.’s argument that a juvenile’s court’s lack of jurisdiction under CJ § 3-8A-03 over a child under the age of 13 implies a right for the child to not be subject to delinquency proceedings would be to ignore the plain language and legislative history of the JJRA, as well as our case law.

CJ § 3-8A-03(a)(1) provides that, in addition to the jurisdiction of a juvenile court concerning CINA cases, the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a child: (i) Who is at least 13 years old alleged to be delinquent; or (ii) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, who is at least 10 years old alleged to have committed an act: 1. That, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of violence, as defined in § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article; or 2. Arising out of the same incident as an act listed in item 1 of this item[.] CJ § 3-8A-03(d)(7) provides that the juvenile court “does not have jurisdiction over[,]” “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (a)(1)(ii) of this section, a delinquency proceeding against a child who is under the age of 13 years.” In amending CJ § 3-8A-03, the General Assembly, based on extensive study, purposefully “limit[ed] the circumstances under which a child younger than age 13 is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court[.]” S.B. 691 (2022), Revised Fiscal and Policy Note at 1 (Mar. 24, 2022), available at https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2022RS/fnotes/ bil_0001/sb0691.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LJA-BQRX]. The Revised Fiscal and Policy Note demonstrates that Senate Bill 691 (2022) generally implemented recommendations of the JJRC, which was created pursuant to Chapters 252 and 253 of the session laws of 2019 to - 19 - study the handling of children in the juvenile and criminal justice systems and which issued its final report in January 2021 and a supplemental report in October 2021.

See id. at 9. In its final report, the JJRC explained that, with the assistance of the Vera Institute of Justice, it had researched “best practices regarding the treatment of juveniles who are subject to the criminal and juvenile justice systems and identif[ied] recommendations to limit or otherwise mitigate risk factors that contribute to juvenile contact with the criminal and juvenile justice systems.” JJRC, Final Report at 6. In a section of the final report concerning policy, the JJRC stated that “[a] growing body of evidence has found that pre-teens have diminished neurocognitive capacity to be held culpable for their actions” and that they similarly “have little ability to understand delinquency charges against them, their rights and role in an adversarial system, and the role of adults in th[e] system.” Id. at 17 (footnote omitted). The JJRC reported that, “[r]ecognizing this developmental science, as well as recognizing the damage inflicted by putting relatively young children into the juvenile justice system, several states have recently moved to create a minimum age of juvenile court jurisdiction.” Id.8 As such, the 8 In its final report, the JJRC included a link to a report dated September 3, 2020, which indicated that several States had created a minimum age for juvenile court jurisdiction.

See JJRC, National Practice for Raising the Age of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction (Sept. 3, 2020), available at http://dls.maryland.gov/pubs/prod/NoPblTabMtg/ CmsnJuvRefCncl/NATIONAL_CONTEXT_Under13_Presentation_VeraFormat.pdf [https://perma.cc/49JC-YHR5]. In that report, the reasons for creating a minimum age included the “[h]armful effects of [the] juvenile justice experience: To children with many adverse childhood experiences, [the] experience of the juvenile system is damaging, [and] leads to poor outcomes.” Id. at 4. Another reason was “[l]egal competence: Children have diminished ability to understand the charges against them, their rights, their role in an adversarial system, and the role of adults in this system.” Id. - 20 - JJRC recommended that the juvenile court should not have jurisdiction over children under the age of 10, that the juvenile court should have jurisdiction over a child of 10 to 12 years old only when the child is alleged to have committed specific identified acts, such as murder or rape, and that “[t]he juvenile court should have jurisdiction over a child at least 13 years old alleged to have committed a delinquent act.” JJRC, Final Report at 19. In the Racial Equity Impact Note for Senate Bill 691 (2022), the Conclusion section stated, among other things: By establishing a minimum age of juvenile court jurisdiction for which a juvenile may be subjected to formal prosecution and court processes, the bill will significantly impact youths under the age of 13.

There has been considerable discussion in the juvenile justice policy arena that preteens have diminished neurocognitive capacity to be held culpable for their actions and also lack the ability to understand legal charges against them. Specifically, Black juveniles under age 13 will benefit to the greatest extent under the bill given that they are disproportionately and disparately impacted by [Department of Juvenile Services] intakes, dispositions, and placements. While there was not sufficient data available to reliably estimate the impact of other changes made by the bill, the provisions regarding the expanded use of informal adjustments, limitations on probation, detention, and out-of- home placements, as well as the creation of a permanent commission to conduct evidence-based[] research regarding juvenile rehabilitation, will likely result in positive equity impacts in general. S.B. 691 (2022), Racial Equity Impact Note at 7-8 (Mar. 28, 2022), available at https:// mgaleg.maryland.gov/Pubs/BudgetFiscal/2022RS-SB0691-REIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 73B6-YXYL].

Generally, under our case law, the nature of a challenge to a court’s denial of a motion to dismiss counsels against allowing a ruling on such a motion to be immediately appealable where the challenge depends on a condition precedent to dismissal being appropriate or where the question is which of one or more courts has jurisdiction. See - 21 - Stephens, 420 Md. at 498, 506 , 24 A.3d at 106-07, 111 ; Bunting, 312 Md. at 477-82 , 540 A.2d at 807-09 ; Franklin P., 366 Md. at 328 , 783 A.2d at 686 .9 What makes the outcome different here is that the General Assembly, after extensive study, has enacted legislation, unprecedented in this State, unequivocally removing children who were under the age of the 13 at the time they allegedly committed a delinquent act from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, except where the child is between the ages of 10 and 12 and alleged to have committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of violence. See CJ § 3-8A-03(a)(1), (d)(7). The General Assembly’s legislative removal of children under the age of 13 from jurisdiction of the juvenile court constitutes for those children a right to not be subject to delinquency proceedings, i.e., trial.

That right is akin to the right against double jeopardy, which is expressed in the United States Constitution, and for which an immediate appeal of the denial of a motion to dismiss based on that ground has consistently been permitted. See Stephens, 420 Md. at 505 n.4, 24 A.3d at 111 n.4.10 9 See also Gruber v. Gruber, 369 Md. 540, 541-42, 547 , 801 A.2d 1013, 1013-14, 1017 (2002) (holding in a custody case that a party could not appeal from a trial court’s ruling that it had jurisdiction because Maryland was the child’s home State and the most convenient forum to determine custody, as we had previously held that “a trial court’s order denying a challenge to its jurisdiction is a nonappealable interlocutory order” where the “trial court’s decision to deny a challenge to its jurisdiction does not settle or conclude the rights of any party or deny the party the means of proceeding further” (citation omitted)). 10 In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of the United States held the prohibition against double jeopardy does not preclude a defendant from being tried by separate sovereigns (i.e., the federal government and a State government) for the same conduct. See Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678, 682-84 (2019). In Gamble, id. at 683 , the Supreme Court observed that the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy protects a defendant from being put in jeopardy twice for the same offense, but not for the same conduct.

As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not protect a defendant against trial for the same conduct by separate - 22 - Implicit in the General Assembly’s enactment of the JJRA is the premise that children under the age of 13, who are not charged with having committed a violent offense, have a right to be free of involvement in the juvenile system. The State cites Md. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bradford, 387 Md. 353, 384 , 875 A.2d 703, 721 (2005), and contends that the outcome here should be consistent with this Court’s general view that “a mere allegation that an interlocutory order exceeded the subject matter jurisdiction of the court is not an exception to the final judgment rule and that a trial court’s order denying a challenge to its jurisdiction is a nonappealable interlocutory order.” (Cleaned up).11 In the unprecedented circumstances here, we are not persuaded. The juvenile court denied M.P.’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that it retained jurisdiction over him notwithstanding the enactment of the JJRA. However, if the juvenile court no longer has jurisdiction over M.P. because he was 12 at the time of the alleged offenses and not charged with an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of violence, M.P. will not be subject to trial, i.e., an adjudication of delinquency, in juvenile court or anywhere else.

As such, this case presents one of the extraordinary situations in which the concept that a matter is not effectively reviewable after the conclusion of trial applies because a sovereigns because “where there are two sovereigns, there are two laws, and two offences.” Id. (cleaned up). This makes even more compelling the conclusion that, under the JJRA, where a juvenile who is under the age of 13 would not be subject to juvenile delinquency proceedings or any proceedings at all, an immediate appeal of the denial of a motion to dismiss a delinquency petition based on a lack of jurisdiction should be permitted under the collateral order doctrine. 11 In Bradford, 387 Md. at 384-85 , 875 A.2d at 721-22 , we indicated that an order concerning subject matter jurisdiction could potentially be immediately appealable as a final judgment under certain circumstances, but, if not, “it can certainly be reviewed in an appeal from the final judgment.” - 23 - right to avoid trial, i.e., a delinquency proceeding, altogether is at stake. It would be contrary to the General Assembly’s purpose in enacting the JJRA for this Court to conclude that M.P. and similarly situated children whose cases were pending adjudication of delinquency when the JJRA became effective must undergo adjudication and disposition in the juvenile justice system before an appeal is permitted.

In this case, there are no factual disputes about M.P.’s age at the time of the alleged delinquent acts (he was 12 years old) or whether he has or has not been alleged to have committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of violence (he has not). Nor is there any dispute concerning a condition precedent to the applicability of the JJRA to M.P. Given that legislative removal of the juvenile courts’ jurisdiction over youth under a designated age is unlikely to reoccur, this provides an important limiting factor that gives assurance that applying the collateral order doctrine exception in this instance will not swallow the general rule that an appeal must await final judgment. Further, the particular emphasis placed by the General Assembly on the harm to young children from involvement in delinquency proceedings and the juvenile justice system, from which the General Assembly has sought to protect them, is the sort of “value of a high order” or “substantial public interest”—beyond the “mere avoidance of a trial”—that the Supreme Court has described as necessary to justify application of the collateral order doctrine. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352-53 (2006) (citation omitted).12 These 12 In Will, 546 U.S. at 347, 355 , the Supreme Court held that the collateral order doctrine did not apply to a trial court’s refusal to apply the judgment bar of the Federal Tort Claims Act, and, thus, the trial court’s ruling was not immediately appealable.

The - 24 - dynamics provide a strong rationale for applying the collateral order doctrine to the facts of this case. The circumstances in Franklin P. provide little insight into the resolution of the issue here.13 To be sure, the State is correct that, in Franklin P., 366 Md. at 314 , 783 A.2d at 678 , we resolved against the juvenile defendant a question involving the immediate appealability of the denial of a motion to dismiss that contested a court’s jurisdiction. We held that the denial of the juvenile’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because it did not satisfy the last element of the doctrine—i.e., it was not effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See id. at 328 , 783 A.2d at 686 .

Supreme Court explained that the statutory judgment bar, although “arguably broader than traditional res judicata, [] functions in” a similar way, and “[t]he concern behind both rules is . . . of avoiding duplicative litigation, multiple suits on identical entitlements or obligations between the same parties.” Id. at 354 (cleaned up). The Supreme Court stated that the “rule of respecting a prior judgment by giving a defense against relitigation has not been thought to protect values so great that only immediate appeal can effectively vindicate them.” Id. at 355 . Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory judgment bar “has no claim to greater importance than the typical defense of claim preclusion” and an order rejecting such a defense “cries for no immediate appeal of right as a collateral order.” Id. 13 Likewise, the fact that M.P.’s case is not on all fours with O.P., 470 Md. 225 , 235 A.3d 40 , and Jolley v. State, 282 Md. 353 , 384 A.2d 91 (1978), is of no real consequence. The application of the collateral order doctrine is assessed on a case-by-case basis.

In other words, that this is not a case in which M.P. has been placed outside of the home during the pendency of proceedings, which would make it subject to O.P., 470 Md. at 232-33 , 235 A.3d at 44-45, is not dispositive. Similarly, that this case is different from Jolley, 282 Md. at 358 , 384 A.2d at 95 , in which we held that an order finding a defendant incompetent to stand trial was immediately appealable, as such a ruling would normally result in indefinite commitment to a mental health facility, does not preclude application of the collateral order doctrine. O.P. and Jolley serve as nonexclusive examples of the applicability of the doctrine. - 25 - In Franklin P., id. at 314, 783 A.2d at 678-80 , however, the juvenile defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction involved a waiver of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and an amended statute that expressly identified a waiver of jurisdiction as not immediately appealable. In holding that the denial of the juvenile defendant’s motion to dismiss was not immediately appealable, we observed that the analysis required for a waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction includes consideration of five factors,14 one of which is the nature of the alleged offense.

See Franklin P., 366 Md. at 316 n.8, 328, 783 A.2d at 679 n.8, 686. We explained that orders concerning the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction are not immediately appealable because the analysis could potentially involve factual circumstances related to the nature of the offense that are not completely separate from the merits of the case. See id. at 328 , 783 A.2d at 686 .15 We pointed out that were we to hold that juvenile waiver decisions are immediately appealable, the holding would affect a vast number of cases and, in the end, cause delay in juvenile proceedings. See Franklin P., 366 Md. at 328 & n.17, 783 A.2d at 686 & n.17. 14 Currently, CJ § 3-8A-06(e) sets forth the factors the juvenile court must consider for waiver of its jurisdiction as follows: “(1) Age of the child; (2) Mental and physical condition of the child; (3) The child’s amenability to treatment in any institution, facility, or program available to delinquents; (4) The nature of the offense and the child’s alleged participation in it; and (5) The public safety.” (Paragraph breaks omitted). 15 An additional point that counseled against permitting an interlocutory appeal in Franklin P. is that the General Assembly had once provided that an order pertaining to a waiver of jurisdiction was immediately appealable, but subsequently amended the relevant statute to eliminate immediate appeals.

See Franklin P., 366 Md. at 321 , 783 A.2d at 682 (discussing the legislative history of the statute that formerly permitted immediate appeal from a waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction). In addition, we observed that, once the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction, the court no longer had authority to take any action with respect to the case, including rescinding its waiver decision. See id. at 331-32 , 334- 35, 783 A.2d at 688, 689-90 . - 26 - The appeal in Franklin P. involved an issue that will continue to present itself in the foreseeable future in juvenile delinquency cases, as long as juvenile courts are permitted to waive jurisdiction. In contrast, the question before us is uniquely limited to application of the recent amendments to CJ § 3-8A-03.

In Franklin P., 366 Md. at 335 n.25, 783 A.2d at 690 n.25, we expressly left open resolution of the type of question we face here: we observed that the collateral order doctrine “might apply” in instances in which “no discretion at all is involved and where a court lacks the power to legally try the case in the first instance and the child has the right not to be tried under any circumstances in the criminal court” due to the age of the child in question being outside the parameters for waiver of jurisdiction. (Emphasis omitted). In this case, we agree with M.P. that the collateral order doctrine applies and the denial of his motion to dismiss is immediately appealable. Even though we agree with M.P. that the collateral order doctrine applies, as in Franklin P., id. at 335 n.25, 783 A.2d at 690 n.25, we caution that our holding is limited.

Our holding in this case should not be read to extend the collateral order doctrine to instances of the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under CJ § 3-8A- 03(a)(1) and (d)(7) that involve factual disputes about the age of a juvenile, or disputes concerning the nature of the offense charged, such as disagreements about whether alleged conduct would constitute a crime of violence under CR § 14-101 if committed by an adult. Our holding is limited to M.P.’s challenge to the jurisdiction of juvenile courts over delinquency proceedings involving children under the age of 13 for non-violent offenses that were pending on the effective date of the JJRA. Our determination that M.P.’s - 27 - interlocutory appeal is permitted does not foreclose the possibility that, under different circumstances, a jurisdictional challenge under CJ § 3-8A-03 might not result in the allowance of an immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.

II

Applicability of CJ § 3-8A-03 to Juvenile Proceedings Pending as of June 1, 2022 A. The Parties’ Contentions M.P. contends that, because his case was pending when the JJRA became effective on June 1, 2022, its new jurisdictional limitations divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction over him. M.P. asserts that this is because neither the plain language of the JJRA nor its legislative history expressly indicates that the General Assembly did not intend it to apply to cases pending at the time of its enactment. M.P. relies on Waker v. State, 431 Md. 1, 11 , 63 A.3d 575, 580-81 (2013), for the proposition that, unless the statute states otherwise, when the General Assembly amends a statute to decrease a criminal penalty, the new penalty applies to cases in which the defendant has not yet been sentenced. M.P. contends that the same principle applies to his case.

M.P. points out that the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, took a similar approach in In re David C., 267 Cal. Rptr. 3d 766 , 767, 770-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2020), in which it determined that a statutory amendment that created a jurisdictional minimum age for juvenile courts of 12 years old ended the court’s continuing jurisdiction over a child not alleged to have committed certain offenses and who was younger than 12 years old when the offenses were originally committed. M.P. asserts that the analysis in David C. was grounded in a rule from another California case, which this Court favorably cited in Waker, 431 Md. at 13 , 63 A.3d at 582—namely, a rule from In re - 28 - Estrada, 408 P.2d 948, 951 (Cal. 1965) (en banc), which, according to M.P., is that, “when the legislature amends a statute to lessen a punishment, that action itself is an express determination that the former penalty was too severe and the new penalty should apply as broadly as possible.” (Citing David C., 267 Cal.

Rptr. 3d at 768-69). M.P. argues that this Court should apply the same logic and conclude that, because his case was pending at the time that the JJRA became effective, the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over him. M.P. contends that the body of law concerning retrospective versus prospective applicability of statutes does not apply because this case does not involve a retroactive application of an amended statute to a previously adjudicated case. Nonetheless, M.P. asserts that, even under a retroactivity analysis, his case should be dismissed because applying the JJRA “retrospectively comports with the legislative intent to exclude young children as a class from the juvenile courts.” (Bolding omitted).

M.P. asserts that any question about the applicability of the JJRA’s jurisdictional limits to his case under a retroactivity analysis should be resolved in his favor because the JJRA constitutes a procedural and remedial change in the law that does not impact substantive rights. The State agrees that the change to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under CJ § 3- 8A-03 ended the court’s jurisdiction over M.P. The State contends that, although the juvenile court “obtained exclusive original jurisdiction over the action” when the State filed the delinquency petition against M.P. on May 5, 2022, jurisdiction ended as a matter of law when the JJRA and its changes to juvenile court jurisdiction took effect on June 1, 2022. The State agrees that this case does not involve an issue of retroactive application of changes in juvenile court jurisdiction, and states that applying “CJ § 3-8A-03(d)(7) to - 29 - prevent future judicial action is the same as applying a statute prospectively.” The State contends that, under John Deere Constr. and Forestry Co. v. Reliable Tractor, Inc., 406 Md. 139, 147-48 , 957 A.2d 595, 599-600 (2008), which incorporates the Supreme Court’s holding in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269-70, 280 (1994), applying the JJRA’s new jurisdictional requirements to M.P.’s case would not involve a retroactive application of the law, as retroactivity does not turn on when the conduct at issue occurred, but rather the “relevant event for retroactivity purposes” is when the juvenile court conducts a delinquency proceeding, and, because an adjudication of delinquency has yet to occur in this case, the JJRA would be applied prospectively. B. Standard of Review Because the question of whether the change to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under CJ § 3-8A-03 applies to M.P. is an issue of statutory interpretation, we review the juvenile court’s decision without deference, i.e., de novo.

See Krikstan, 483 Md. at 64 , 290 A.3d at 987 . C. Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court Statutory Jurisdiction under CJ § 3-8A-03 and the Effect of the JJRA The juvenile court is a court of limited jurisdiction that can exercise only authority specified by statute. See Smith v. State, 399 Md. 565, 574 , 924 A.2d 1175, 1180 (2007). With regard to a delinquency petition, a juvenile court’s jurisdiction is governed by CJ § 3-8A-03.

Prior to the effective date of the JJRA, the juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over, with exceptions not relevant here, all children (i.e., persons under 18 years of age) “alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervision or who ha[ve] received a - 30 - citation for a violation” without a minimum age restriction. CJ (2021) §§ 3-8A-03(a)(1), 3-8A-01(d); 2001 Md. Laws 2443 (Vol. IV, Ch. 415, S.B. 660). Through the JJRA, the General Assembly amended CJ § 3-8A-03 by restricting the juvenile court’s jurisdiction in delinquency cases to children who are at least 13 years old, with the exception of those who are 10 to 12 years old and alleged to have committed an act that would be classified as a crime of violence if committed by an adult.

See 2022 Md. Laws ___ (Vol. ___, Ch. 41, S.B. 691); 2022 Md. Laws ___ (Vol. ___, Ch. 42, H.B. 459). A provision in the same subtitle that predated the JJRA, and was unaffected by the new law, provides that “the age of the person at the time the alleged delinquent act was committed controls the determination of jurisdiction under this subtitle.” CJ § 3-8A-05(a). Thus, under CJ § 3-8A-05(a), the child’s age on the date of the alleged delinquent act is the determinative point for establishing a juvenile court’s jurisdiction in a delinquency case. Relevant Case Law In the absence of instruction otherwise from the General Assembly, our precedent establishes that newly-enacted statutes generally apply prospectively, not retroactively.

See Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 406 , 754 A.2d 389, 394 (2000). In this context, the word “retroactive”—and its interchangeable synonym, “retrospective”—mean that the statute in question “operate[s] on transactions which have occurred or rights and obligations which existed before passage of the act.” Id. at 406 , 754 A.2d at 394 (cleaned up). “The question [of] whether a statute operates retrospectively, or prospectively only, ordinarily is one of legislative intent.” Id. at 406 , 754 A.2d at 394 (citation omitted). - 31 - Among the exceptions to the general rule of prospectivity is that statutes that are procedural or remedial apply retroactively. See id. at 406-08 , 754 A.2d at 394-95 . Another exception to the general rule of prospectivity “is that a statute which affects a matter still in litigation when the statute becomes effective will be applied by a reviewing court even though the statute was not then law when the decision appealed from was handed down, unless the legislature expresses a contrary intent.” State v. Johnson, 285 Md. 339, 343 , 402 A.2d 876, 878 (1979) (citations omitted). “Thus many courts adhere to the proposition that in the absence of a contrary expression of intent, a cause of action or remedy dependent upon a statute falls with the repeal of [the] statute.” Id. at 344 , 402 A.2d at 878 (citations omitted).

This conceptual framework was laid out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70, 280 , and has been adopted by this Court. See John Deere, 406 Md. at 147-48 , 957 A.2d at 599-600 . A statute is retroactive when it “would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280 . However, “[a] statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment[.]” Id. at 269 (citation omitted).

Significantly, in Landgraf, id. at 274 , the Supreme Court observed that it had “regularly applied intervening statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was filed.” A statutory change to a court’s jurisdiction does not affect substantive rights, and thus does not implicate retroactivity, but rather should be applied prospectively because it “speak[s] to the power of the court” to act on the case in question. Id. at 274 (cleaned up). Put - 32 - differently, “when a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation as to pending cases, all cases fall with the law[.]” Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112 , 116- 17 (1952). We have held that, when the General Assembly lessens a penalty for a particular criminal offense after the defendant’s alleged conduct occurred but before conviction and sentencing, the new, lesser penalty applies.

See Waker, 431 Md. at 12 , 63 A.3d at 581 . In Waker, id. at 2-3, 12 , 63 A.3d at 575-76, 581 , we concluded that, because the General Assembly raised the monetary threshold for felony theft from $500 to $1,000, after the defendant was charged with theft of $615 worth of goods but before he was convicted and sentenced, his sentence for felony theft was illegal. The State had argued, based on Johnson, 285 Md. 339 , 402 A.2d 876 , that Maryland’s general saving clause (now codified at Md. Code Ann., Gen. Prov.

(2014, 2019 Repl. Vol.) (“GP”) § 1-205) prevented the statutory change from affecting the outcome of the case. See Waker, 431 Md. at 9-10 , 63 A.3d at 579-80 . We disagreed, distinguishing Johnson because that case concerned a sentence that had been imposed prior to the statutory change at issue, whereas Waker had not been convicted or sentenced when the statute concerning his offense was amended.

See Waker, 431 Md. at 11 , 63 A.3d at 580 . We concluded that the statutory change applied to Waker’s sentence, rendering it illegal, because the saving clause preserved only “any penalty, forfeiture or liability, either civil or criminal, which shall have been incurred under” the prior version of the statute, whereas Waker had incurred no such penalty or liability prior to his conviction, meaning he was entitled to the new, lesser penalty. Id. at 12 , 63 A.3d at 581 (cleaned up). - 33 - As M.P. points out, an appellate court in another jurisdiction has tackled a statutory change to juvenile court jurisdiction and considered application of the statutory amendment to cases that arose before the law changed. See David C., 267 Cal.

Rptr. 3d at 767. In David C., id., a child challenged his delinquency adjudication for conduct that occurred when he was 11 years old and the validity of subsequent proceedings against him for a probation violation after the California legislature removed children under 12 years of age from juvenile court jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, concluded that, by operation of law, when the statutory change became effective, the juvenile court lost its jurisdiction over the child in relation to the conduct that occurred when he was 11 years old. See id.

The Court relied on precedent of the Supreme Court of California under which the legislature’s change to a statute that lessens penalties leads to “an inevitable inference” that such “ameliorative changes” are intended, absent contrary instruction, “to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.” Id. at 768-69 (quoting Estrada, 408 P.2d at 951 , and People v. Conley, 373 P.3d 435, 440 (Cal. 2016)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Court declined to overturn the adjudication of delinquency, which occurred before the jurisdictional change became effective, the Court determined that “any and all actions taken by the juvenile court after” the effective date of the jurisdictional change “that were based on the original petition — including the findings [that the] minor violated probation — were void for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. at 770 (footnote omitted). - 34 - D. The Juvenile Court’s Jurisdiction over M.P. We hold that, under the plain language of the JJRA, the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over M.P. on June 1, 2022, when the jurisdictional limits of the JJRA became effective. Leaving aside the question of retroactivity, under the plain language of CJ § 3- 8A-03(d)(7), the court lacked jurisdiction over the delinquency proceeding against M.P., who was under the age of 13 years at the time of the alleged delinquent acts—as CJ § 3- 8A-05(a) provides that jurisdiction is to be determined by the age of the person at the time the alleged delinquent act was committed, and the JJRA’s exception for 10- to 12-year- olds charged with an act that, if committed by an adult, would be a crime of violence does not apply. Nothing in the JJRA provides that its change in juvenile court jurisdiction does not apply to pending cases.

Thus, based on the plain language of the statute, the juvenile court erred in failing to grant M.P.’s motion to dismiss. By way of analogy, we note that in Parojinog v. State, 282 Md. 256, 258, 264 , 384 A.2d 86, 87, 90 (1978), this Court addressed whether 1975 (Reg. Sess.) Md. Laws 2677 (Ch. 554, H.B. 483), which amended Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.

(1974) § 3-80716 “to provide that the juvenile court ‘has exclusive original jurisdiction, but only for the purpose of waiving it, over an adult (i.e., a person over 18 years of age) who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act while a child[,]’” resulted in the juvenile court losing jurisdiction over a defendant who was 18 years old at the time that delinquency petitions 16 The relevant provision is now CJ § 3-8A-07(e), which states that a juvenile “court has exclusive original jurisdiction, but only for the purpose of waiving it, over a person 21 years of age or older who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act while a child.” - 35 - were filed but was 17 years old at the time of the alleged delinquent acts. (Emphasis omitted). The juvenile petitions had been filed before the statutory provision restricting the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over an adult alleged to have committed a delinquent act while a child had become effective. See Parojinog, 282 Md. at 257, 264 , 384 A.2d at 87, 90 .

The juvenile court, without deciding first whether to waive its jurisdiction, as requested by the State, made what we determined to be an adjudication and disposition, and six months later issued an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction, which resulted in an indictment being filed against the defendant in the trial court based on the same acts. See id. at 258- 59, 262, 384 A.2d at 87-89. The defendant alleged double jeopardy. See id. at 259, 384 A.2d at 88.

The State contended that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to make an adjudication or disposition and, as such, jeopardy could not attach. See id. at 265, 384 A.2d at 90-91. We concluded that the juvenile court had jurisdiction. See id. at 265, 384 A.2d at 91.

In assessing whether the new provision—i.e., Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1974, 1975 Supp.) (“CJ (1975)”) § 3-807(b)—divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction, we stated that “[i]t is the time the petition is filed, not the time of adjudication, which determines the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and the applicability of” CJ (1975) § 3- 807(b). Id. at 265, 384 A.2d at 91 (citations omitted).

In describing the statutory scheme relating to juvenile causes, we explained that, under CJ (1975) § 3-805(a), “where a person is alleged to be delinquent, ‘the age of the person at the time alleged delinquent act was committed controls the determination of jurisdiction[.]’” Id. at 260, 384 A.2d at 88. The same standard for determining a juvenile court’s jurisdiction exists today in CJ § 3-8A- - 36 - 05(a) and applies to the JJRA—“the age of the person at the time the alleged delinquent act was committed controls the determination of jurisdiction under this subtitle.” CJ § 3- 8A-05(a).17 Parojinog and the cases cited in it endorse the principle set forth in CJ § 3-8A-05(a), that the age of the child at the time that the alleged delinquent act was committed controls the determination of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This is just as the State indicates in its brief in this Court. Quoting Parojinog, 282 Md. at 260 , 384 A.2d at 88 , the State explains that, “[w]hen a delinquency petition is filed, the circuit court, sitting as a juvenile court, obtains ‘exclusive original jurisdiction’ over the action[,]” and, under CJ § 3-8A- 05(a), the age of the person at the time the alleged delinquent act was committed controls the determination of jurisdiction. 17 In Parojinog, 282 Md. at 265 , 384 A.2d at 91 , we cited two additional cases—In re Appeals No. 1022 and No. 1081, Sept. Term, 1975 from Cir. Ct. for Kent Cnty. sitting as a Juv.

Ct., 278 Md. 174, 175 , 359 A.2d 556, 557 (1976) and In re Appeal No. 1038(75) from Cir. Ct. for Cecil Cnty., 32 Md. App. 239, 241-42 , 360 A.2d 18, 20 (1976)—in which this Court and the Appellate Court addressed the applicability of CJ (1975) § 3-807(b). In Appeals No. 1022 and No. 1081, 278 Md. at 176 , 359 A.2d at 558 , the juvenile court dismissed juvenile petitions, ruling that CJ (1975) § 3-807(b) precluded it from exercising jurisdiction where the individual was under 18 years old at the time of the alleged delinquent act but was over 18 years old when the delinquency petitions were filed, and where the juvenile court determined that a waiver of jurisdiction would be inappropriate. This Court affirmed the juvenile court’s judgments and rejected the State’s contention that CJ (1975) § 3-807(b) did not apply because the alleged offenses occurred before the statutory provision became effective, stating that the time of the filing of the petitions— which, in those cases, was after the new statutory provision became effective—was determinative of when the jurisdiction of the juvenile court attached. See id. at 176, 179- 80, 359 A.2d at 558, 560 .

In Appeal No. 1038(75), 32 Md. App. at 243 n.5, 360 A.2d at 20 n.5, the Appellate Court explained that, in cases where an allegation is made that a child is delinquent, “the age of the child at the time the alleged delinquent act was committed controls the determination of jurisdiction of the juvenile court[.]” (Citation omitted). - 37 - CJ § 3-8A-07(a) provides that, “[i]f the court obtains jurisdiction over a child under this subtitle, that jurisdiction continues until that person reaches 21 years of age unless terminated sooner.” Jurisdiction can continue only where jurisdiction exists. As explained in detail herein, a juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over a child who was under the age of 13 at the time of an alleged non-violent delinquent act where a petition was pending an adjudication of delinquency when the JJRA took effect. By contrast, under circumstances very different than those of this case, in In re Valerie H., 310 Md. 113, 116-17 , 527 A.2d 42, 43-44 (1987), a CINA case, this Court observed that, under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.

(1974, 1984 Repl. Vol.) (“CJ (1984)”) § 3-806(a) (which is now CJ § 3-8A-07(a)), “jurisdiction, once acquired, terminates [] only if the juvenile court so orders.” At that time, all juvenile causes—those involving children alleged to be delinquent, in need of supervision, or in need of assistance—were governed by the same statutory scheme, and CJ (1984) § 3-806(a) provided that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over those cases continued until the person reached 21 years of age unless terminated sooner. See id. at 117, 527 A.2d at 44 . Today, separate statutory subtitles govern juvenile causes involving children in need of assistance, see CJ §§ 3-801 to 3-830, and juvenile causes involving children other than those in need of assistance, i.e., delinquency cases, see CJ §§ 3-8A-01 to 3-8A-35.

With respect to children in need of assistance, i.e., CINA cases, CJ § 3-804(b) differs from CJ § 3-8A-07(a) by providing: “If the court obtains jurisdiction over a child, that jurisdiction continues in that case until the child reaches the age of 21 years, unless the court terminates the case.” (Emphasis added). In other words, in CINA cases, CJ § 3- - 38 - 804(b) contemplates that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, once acquired, continues until the child is 21 unless the juvenile court terminates the case, i.e., so orders. In contrast, CJ § 3-8A-07(a), which applies to delinquency cases, provides that, “[i]f the court obtains jurisdiction over a child under this subtitle, that jurisdiction continues until that person reaches 21 years of age unless terminated sooner.” CJ § 3-8A-07(a) does not expressly require that jurisdiction be terminated by the court and jurisdiction can be terminated by operation of law where, as here, there is a change in the law or by order of the court.18 In Valerie H., 310 Md. at 114, 117 , 527 A.2d at 43-44 , our observation that jurisdiction continues until a child is 21 unless terminated by order of the juvenile court was made as we interpreted an earlier version of CJ § 3-8A-07(a) in a case in which a child had been found to be CINA. The child’s care and custody had been committed to the Department of Social Services for Baltimore City.

See id. at 114, 527 A.2d at 43 . Later, the juvenile court discharged the department from responsibility for the child’s custody, but did not expressly terminate the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the child. See id. at 115-16 , 527 A.2d at 43-44 . Subsequently, the department returned the child to foster care placement but did not petition for recommitment until after the child turned 18, and this Court determined that the juvenile court retained jurisdiction over the child until age 21 (permitting recommitment and assistance for the child).

See id. at 116, 120 , 527 A.2d at 43, 45 . In Valerie H., our statement that jurisdiction did not terminate until age 21 unless 18 In making this observation, we do not rule out the possibility that under CJ § 3- 804(b) jurisdiction may also be terminated by operation of law. That question, however, is not before this Court today. - 39 - ordered by the court was not made in the context of interpreting CJ § 3-8A-07(a) in a delinquency case, let alone where new legislation had been passed limiting a juvenile court’s jurisdiction in delinquency cases. In this instance, retroactive application of a jurisdictional amendment is not at issue because the jurisdictional question here concerns the authority of the juvenile court to take the action at issue subsequent to the effective date of the JJRA.

The issue does not involve a question of retroactivity “merely because [CJ § 3-8A-03(d)(7)] is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment[.]” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269 (citation omitted). When interpreting a jurisdictional statute, for purposes of retroactivity, the relevant event “is the moment at which that power is sought to be exercised. Thus, applying a jurisdiction-eliminating statute to undo past judicial action would be applying it retroactively; but applying it to prevent any judicial action after the statute takes effect is applying it prospectively.” Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). In this case, M.P. does not seek to apply CJ § 3-8A-03 to any of the juvenile court’s actions prior to June 1, 2022, but rather to prevent the court from exercising jurisdiction over him after that date, when the juvenile court no longer possesses jurisdiction.

Our precedent requires the outcome we reach because, without “a contrary expression of intent, a cause of action or remedy dependent upon a statute falls with the repeal of [the] statute.” Johnson, 285 Md. at 344 , 402 A.2d at 878 (citations omitted). With no indication in the JJRA that the General Assembly intended for the changes to CJ - 40 - § 3-8A-03 not to apply19 to pending cases, jurisdiction over the delinquency petition and proceeding fell with the repeal of the juvenile courts’ jurisdiction over children charged with nonviolent conduct that occurred when they were under 13 years old. In Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274 , the Supreme Court explained that it had applied intervening statutes removing jurisdiction, regardless of whether jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when an action was filed. The Supreme Court explained that, in Bruner, 343 U.S. at 116-17 , relying on its “consistent practice,” the Court “ordered an action dismissed because the jurisdictional statute under which it had been (properly) filed was subsequently repealed.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274 (cleaned up).

We adopted the same approach in John Deere, 406 Md. at 147-48 , 957 A.2d at 599-600 , with respect to jurisdictional statutory changes. And, our holding in Johnson, 285 Md. at 344 , 402 A.2d at 878 , parallels the rationale expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bruner, 343 U.S. at 116 - 17, on this point: “[W]hen a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation as to pending cases, all cases fall with the law[.]” Our conclusion is also consistent with our holding in Waker and a long line of precedent providing that, where a statute is amended or repealed “after an alleged offense or after an event giving rise to some alleged liability, a court, including an appellate court, would generally apply the law as it existed when the court was considering the case and not the law in effect when the alleged offense or event occurred.” Waker, 431 Md. at 9 - 19 The General Assembly could have instructed that the change would not apply to pending cases, just as it could have explicitly directed that the jurisdictional change apply to such cases. But the General Assembly did neither—hence, our reliance on principles of statutory construction and case law. - 41 - 10, 63 A.3d at 580 (citations omitted). Although a juvenile delinquency proceeding is not a criminal proceeding, there are basic similarities between the two, and, as M.P. points out, that a delinquency proceeding does not result in a criminal conviction