In Re Marcus J.

MEREDITH, J. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as the juvenile court, dismissed the exceptions filed by Marcus J., appellant, because the exceptions purportedly failed to comply with the exceptions “policy” of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Marcus contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing the exceptions. We agree that the exceptions should not have been dismissed. Accordingly, we shall vacate the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case for further proceedings. 1 ⁷⁰⁵ Facts and Procedural Background In Juvenile Petition No. 606237011, the State alleged that Marcus was delinquent and committed the following delinquent acts: wearing/carrying/transporting a handgun, wearing/carrying/transporting a dangerous or deadly weapon, and possessing a regulated firearm.

An adjudicatory hearing was held before a juvenile master on September 14, 29, and October 5, 2006. Only two witnesses testified. The arresting police officer testified as the State’s witness, and 14-year-old Marcus testified in his own defense. Their testimony was mostly compatible, but the police officer testified he observed Marcus throw down an item that turned out to be a revolver, whereas Marcus testified he never had possession of a gun, and that the object he had jettisoned as the police officer approached was a bag containing some marijuana.

A fingerprint analysis of the gun, ordered by the State, was in progress and not completed by the conclusion of the hearing, but, to avoid further delay in completing the hearing, the State stipulated that Marcus’s fingerprints were not on the gun. In her oral findings of fact at the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the master stated: ⁷⁰⁶ The Court finds the testimony of the State’s witness to be consistent and credible. And, also, finds, quite frankly, the Respondent’s testimony to be consistent and credible, except for that one point. What was it that he threw?

And, in that area, the Court finds that the State’s witness was most consistent and credible. Therefore, finds that the State has met [its] burden beyond a reasonable doubt, [and] finds the facts sustained. The master thereafter entered a written recommended order dated October 6, 2006, and found all three counts sustained. The master’s written findings that were set forth in the support of the master’s recommendation that t he charges be sustained stated simply: [T]he following evidence was accepted: The testimony of witnesses supported the sustained counts.

Conflicting testimony concerning the sustained counts was resolved in favor of the witnesses for the State. Parties stipulated that Respondent’s fingerprints were not found on the revolver. A disposition hearing was held on November 3, 2006, at the conclusion of which the juvenile master entered a written recommendation that the court find that Marcus “is a delinquent child.” The master further recommended that Marcus be placed “under an order of probation to the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services,” and subject to a number of conditions during the indefinite period of probation. Within five business days, on November 9, 2006, Marcus filed a “Notice of Exception and Request for Hearing” that stated: Pursuant to Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, section 3-815(c) [sic] and Rule ll-lll(e) of the Maryland Rules of Procedure, please be advised that the Respondent excepts to the findings and proposed orders of Master Zakia Mahasa, on the 3rd day of November, 2006, in the above-captioned petition(s) and requests that the matter ⁷⁰⁷ be set for a hearing de novo, before the Judge of this Honorable Court and in support of the exception, notes these errors: Respondents council [sic] is excepting to Master Mahasa’s findings at the adjudicatory hearing held on 10/6/06 and the disposition hearing on 11/3/06.

Master Mahasa erred in her admission of an [sic] non experts [sic] testimony on the operability of a handgun over Respondents council [sic] objection. Moreover, Master Mahasa erred in her facts and findings in the adjudicatory and disposition hearing.[ 2 ] On December 8, 2006, the case was called for a hearing in the circuit court on Marcus’s exceptions. The Assistant State’s Attorney moved for a postponement because of a calendar mixup that precluded the prosecuting attorney who had been handling the case from being present, and stated: [T]he State is requesting a postponement.... [T]he State did not know it was in today. That in addition, Judge Edward Hargadon has issued a policy that had to be filed in all exception hearing [sic], and it is my understanding, since I don’t know the contents of the file that policy was not filed in this matter.

The pinch-hitting prosecutor was correct that no “exceptions policy” order similar to the one quoted in Forster, supra, 398 Md. at 302-03, 920 A.2d 1049 , had been filed in the present case. 3 Notwithstanding that fact, the presiding judge ⁷⁰⁸ took issue with Marcus’s failure to comply with the policy of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City regarding the filing of exceptions in juvenile matters: THE COURT: ... I reviewed the Court file, and [, counsel,] it does not look like you complied with Judge Hargadon’s policy pertaining to the filing of exceptions. [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I would object to the policy. I filed exceptions on the ninth, I believe, of November ----Specifying what I was excepting to, and the excep ⁷⁰⁹ tion request. And, what was the date of Judge Hargadon’s Order? * * * THE COURT: There’s no date in the Order ... but as I recall it went into effect early October. [Defense Counsel]: ...

Your Honor, still I did file the exception and the exception does specifically state what I’m excepting to. [Prosecutor]: But it also requires that the excepting party file a Memo concerning the specific issues raised in the exceptions. In fact, the exceptions policy order quoted in Forster v. Hargadon, supra, 398 Md. at 302-03 , 920 A.2d 1049 , only requires a memorandum to be filed “[i]f the party filing an exception requests a hearing on the record.” (Emphasis added.) The exceptions policy order does not require such a memorandum if the party filing the exception requests a hearing de novo. Nevertheless, the presiding judge noted that Marcus had not filed any memorandum, and, even though no exceptions policy order had been entered in this case, continued the discussion as if such an order had been entered: THE COURT: It says that in addition to the delivery of copies of the exception and memorandum to all parties, the party filing exceptions on [the record] shall deliver a copy of the exception and the memorandum to the presiding Judge, or if a Judge has not been designated to the Judge in charge. I checked[,] my office didn’t get anything.

It also says, — well, go ahead. [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I filed my exceptions[.][T]he law i[s] very clear that my Client is allowed an exception de novo hearing based on filing in the exceptions with the Clerk’s office, which was properly done within five ⁷¹⁰ days. That is the law. The law that my Client is entitled to an exception de novo, as long as I file the exception within five days. That is what the law states.

THE COURT: But what does the Court — what does Judge Hargadon’s policy say? [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, see the policy v.[sic] law. The law states that my Client is given the right to an exception de novo hearing— THE COURT: No doubt about it, but as part of the law, administrative bodies also promulgate policies for the efficient administration of the law, and Judge Hargadon as the Judge in charge of Juvenile decided to implement a policy to make the law operate more efficiently. I realize your office sought a stay. The Court of Appeals has not acted and so the policy of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, according to Judge Hargadon and Judge Holland, unless and until the Court of Appeals stays the policy, the policy implementing the law will remain in effect. [Defense Counsel]: Well Your Honor, then I would argue that my Memorandum is included in the Notice of Exception, I filed.

THE COURT: All right. Let’s cut to the chase. This will be reset for [the prosecutor who had been handling the case] to be here. It will be reset for the State to summons [its] witnesses and it’ll even be reset for [defense counsel] to comply with the policy.

Pick a date, please. [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I will be objecting to the reset, because in essence aren’t you granting the State’s postponement? THE COURT: Yes, I am, but I’m doing you a favor, because you didn’t comply with the— [Defense Counsel]: I understand that, Your Honor. THE COURT: Let me make it easy for you. You failed to comply with the policy, your exceptions [sic] dismissed.

Thank you. I’ll make it real easy for you. Your exceptions [sic] dismissed. [Defense Counsel]: And, I object on the record. ⁷¹¹ THE COURT: Well object for the record. [Defense Counsel]: I’m going to object for the record. THE COURT: Have a good day.

Your exceptions [sic] dismissed. [Defense Counsel]: (inaudible) Postponement policy. THE COURT: I gave you half a loaf of bread. You didn’t want it, you’re [sic] exceptions [sic] dismissed. In the court’s written order dated December 12, 2006, adopting the findings and disposition recommended by the master, the court recapped the ruling made at the hearing on Marcus’s exceptions as follows: As a result of the Exception hearing in the above case(s), the Court finds: ...

This Court ruled that the Exception request was not filed according to the [prosedures/guide lines] [sic] outlined by the Juvenile Administrative Judge. [Defense counsel] objected and requested that the Court proceed. The Court agreed to postpone the Exception due to the unavailability of the State and the fact that Counsel for the respondent had not complied with the Court’s exception policy. Exception is dismissed by Court for failure to comply with the Court’s exception policy. On December 14, 2006, Marcus noted an appeal to this Court from the circuit court’s final order.

Discussion The single “question presented” in appellant’s brief is: “Whether [the court] erred in dismissing the exceptions.” 4 ⁷¹² Because we view the statement of exceptions filed by Marcus as sufficient to preserve his right to a de novo hearing, we answer appellant’s question “yes.” We hold that the circuit court erred in basing its dismissal of the exceptions on the juvenile’s alleged failure to comply with a local “exception policy” that — as applied in this case — purportedly imposed requirements beyond those set forth in Rule 11-111 and CJP § 3-807(c). 5 Because appellant does not challenge the validity of either Rule 11-111 or CJP § 3-807 — and indeed, did not challenge either the rule or the statutory provision at the circuit court level — there is no dispute of the fact that both provisions are properly applicable to this case. 6 And, because ⁷¹³ no scheduling order was entered in this case — either in the Hargadon exceptions policy format or otherwise — we do not reach the issue of whether dismissal of the exceptions would have been an appropriate sanction for a party’s failure to comply with a properly crafted scheduling order. 7 Upon measuring Marcus’s notice of exceptions against the plain language of the controlling State statute and rule, we conclude that Marcus was entitled to a de novo hearing on his exceptions. In the words of Rule 11 — 111(c) and CJP § 3-807(c)(4), Marcus was entitled to be heard de novo with respect to “the matters to which exceptions have been taken.” The right to a de novo hearing before a judge is important ⁷¹⁴ because, as the Court of Appeals put it bluntly in State v. Wiegmann, 350 Md. 585, 599-600 , 714 A.2d 841 (1998), “it [is] clear from the rules and case law that masters have no judicial authority----In concise summation, masters are not judges, nor are they judicial officers.” This is not to belittle the extremely valuable contribution masters make to the efficiency of the juvenile justice system, but, as the Court of Appeals stated in Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486, 492 , 593 A.2d 1133 (1991): “ ‘Litigants ... in all judicial proceedings[ ] are entitled to have their cause determined ultimately by a duly qualified judge of a court of competent jurisdiction.’ ” (Quoting Ellis v. Ellis, 19 Md.App. 361, 365 , 311 A.2d 428 (1973).) Although the State contends that “Marcus J. merely filed a bald exception and failed to ‘specify those items to which [he] objected]’ as required by Section 3-807(c)(l) and Rule 11-lll.c,” our review of the Notice of Exception and Request for Hearing filed by Marcus leads us to conclude otherwise. Using language similar to the wording of the first sentence in Rule 11 — 111(c) that provides “[a]ny party may file exceptions to the master’s proposed findings, conclusions, recommendations or proposed orders,” appellant’s timely notice of exceptions stated: “the Respondent excepts to the findings and proposed orders of Master Zakia Mahasa, on the 3rd day of November, 2006.” The notice further stated: “Respondent[’]s coun[se]l is excepting to Master Mahasa’s findings at the adjudicatory hearing held on 10/6/06 and the