In Re Melanie H.

THEODORE G. BLOOM, Judge (retired), Specially Assigned. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court, found that appellant, Melanie H., had committed the delinquent act of possessing a deadly weapon on public school property and placed her on probation. Melanie noted a timely appeal and presents two questions for our review: I. Was the evidence sufficient to support the charge of possession of a deadly weapon on public school property?

II

Did the court err in refusing to suppress the butter knife recovered from Melanie’s locker? We answer the first question in the negative and reverse the judgment of the juvenile court. As a result of our holding in the first question, we need not address the second. ¹⁶⁰ FACTS At the adjudication hearing, the State presented the testimony of one witness, Patrick Rooney, who stated that he worked as a “security assistant” at the Mark Twain School in Rockville, which Melanie attended. Mr. Rooney added that he had been a police officer for seventeen years.

On November 11, 1996, Mr. Rooney was informed by “other staff members” that Melanie was late to school and that she smelled of “burnt marijuana.” Upon approaching Melanie, he also smelled the odor of burnt marijuana and noticed that she “seemed a little bit under the influence of something.” Mr. Rooney had Melanie conduct a “self search,” which required that she empty all her pockets and turn them inside out. This search did not reveal anything on Melanie’s person. Mr. Rooney and other school personnel then searched Melanie’s locker, which was thirty to forty feet from where he had stopped her. Mr. Rooney explained that the school was for students with “severe emotional problems” and that, at the beginning of the year, all parents had signed a consent form allowing school officials to search the students’ lockers.

Upon opening Melanie’s locker, Mr. Rooney removed her book bag and, inside the bag, found a “silver flatware knife.” Mr. Rooney stated that he knew that the book bag belonged to Melanie as he had seen it in her possession on prior occasions. Melanie admitted that the knife belonged to her and informed Mr. Rooney that she used it to break into the food cabinet at her group home late at night when she was hungry. DISCUSSION I. At the close of all the evidence, Melanie’s attorney argued that the knife was not a weapon as it was simply a butter knife with a “rounded edge.” Counsel further argued that there was no evidence that the knife was used as a weapon; rather, the evidence demonstrated that it was used as a tool to pry open locks in Melanie’s group home. Counsel also referred ¹⁶¹ the court to Anderson v. State, 328 Md. 426 , 614 A.2d 963 (1992), which dealt with Art. 27, § 36(a).

The juvenile court denied the motion, stating: I deny your motion. You’re arguing law that applies to section thirty-six. She’s charged with a violation of section thirty-six A ... which is very clear. No person, shall carry or possess any knife, on any school property, in this state.

Public school property in this state. She’s a person, she had a knife, she was on the school property, it’s Montgomery County School Property. Very simple. Denied.

Melanie contends that the juvenile court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal as the Legislature intended Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 36A, to proscribe only the possession of objects that are per se deadly weapons or objects that are intended for or readily adapted for use as deadly weapons. She alleges that “[a]n interpretation of the statute which views it as criminalizing possession of a butter knife, in the absence of evidence that the butter knife was intended for use as a weapon, is erroneous.” Melanie stresses the presence of knives in the school setting from the cafeteria to home economics classes to the biology lab to the drama department, none of which is listed as an exception in the statute. She argues that the Legislature “intended to proscribe the possession of deadly weapons, not the possession of all manner of knives, on school property.” She also claims that “the [Legislature intended to prohibit possession of a knife when that knife is per se a deadly weapon, or when there is evidence that the possessor had the intent to use the knife as a deadly weapon.” Citing Anderson v. State, supra, she alleges that the knife found in her book bag falls outside both classes. Article 27, § 36A provides: § 36A.

Carrying or possessing deadly weapon upon school property. (a) In general. — No person, unless otherwise excepted in this section, shall carry or possess any rifle, gun, knife, or ¹⁶² deadly weapon of any kind on any public school property in this State. (b) Exceptions. — Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to: (1) Law enforcement officers in the regular course of their duty; (2) Persons hired by the boards of education in the counties and Baltimore City specifically for the purpose of guarding public school property; (3) Persons engaged in organized shooting activity for educational purposes; or (4) Persons who, with a written invitation from the school principal, display or engage in historical demonstrations using weapons or replicas of weapons for educational purposes. (c) Penalty. — Any person who violates this section shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to pay a fine of no more than $1,000 or shall be sentenced to the Maryland Department of Correction for a period of not more than 3 years.

Any such person who shall be found to carry a handgun in violation of this section, shall be sentenced as provided in § 36B of this article. “The cardinal rule in statutory construction is to determine and effect the intent of the Legislature. The primary source for determining the Legislature’s intent is the statute itself.” McNeil v. State, 112 Md.App. 434, 450 , 685 A.2d 839 (1996) (citations omitted). “The starting point in statutory interpretation is with an examination of the language of the statute. If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.” Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261 , 647 A.2d 1204 (1994) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, in Morris v. Prince George’s County, 319 Md. 597 , 573 A.2d 1346 (1990), the Court of Appeals explained that we are not limited to examining only the statutory language in determining legislative intent: ¹⁶³ [O]ur endeavor is always to seek out the legislative purpose, the general aim or policy, the ends to be accomplished, the evils to be redressed by a particular enactment.

In the conduct of that enterprise, we are not limited to study of the statutory language. The plain meaning rule “ ‘is not a complete, all-sufficient rule for ascertaining a legislative intention....’” The “meaning of the plainest language” is controlled by the context in which it appears. Thus, we are always free to look at the context within which statutory language appears. Even when the words of a statute carry a definite meaning, we are not “precluded from consulting legislative history as part of the process of determining the legislative purpose or goal” of the law.

Id. at 603-04 , 573 A.2d 1346 (citations and footnote omitted). See also Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351, 360 , 643 A.2d 906 (1994) (citations omitted) (legislative history of a statute is “ ‘external manifestation ]’ or ‘persuasive evidence’ of legislative purpose that may be taken into consideration.”) Further, “[t]hat which necessarily is implied in the statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.” Soper v. Montgomery County, 294 Md. 331, 335 , 449 A.2d 1158 (1982). “In analyzing the statute’s language, however, ‘we seek to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.’ ” McNeil, 112 Md.App. at 451 , 685 A.2d 839 (quoting Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137 , 647 A.2d 106 (1994)). See also State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 8 , 629 A.2d 731 (1993) (“each statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense”); Barr v. State, 101 Md.App. 681, 687 , 647 A.2d 1293 (1994) (“courts must read all parts of a statute together, with a view toward harmonizing the various parts and avoiding both inconsistencies and senseless results that could not reasonably have been intended by the Legislature”). We first turn to two Court of Appeals cases.

Although they do not address § 36A, they do offer us some guidance. Brooks v. State, 314 Md. 585 , 552 A.2d 872 (1989), involved an aggravated robbery prosecution. The defendant had placed a plastic toy pistol in the waistband of his trousers. Upon the ¹⁶⁴ defendant’s arrest, the toy pistol was seized from his jacket.

The Court of Appeals determined that a plastic toy pistol could not be considered a “dangerous or deadly weapon” under Art. 27, § 488. 1 The Court adopted an objective standard in determining whether an object could be considered a “dangerous or deadly weapon” under that section. The court held that for an instrument to qualify as a dangerous or deadly weapon under § 488, the instrument must be (1) designed as “ ‘anything used or designed to be used in destroying, defeating, or injuring an enemy, or as an instrument of offensive or defensive combat,’ ” [Bennett and Flynn v. State, 237 Md. 212, 214-15 , 205 A.2d 393 (1964) ]; (2) under the circumstances of the case, immediately useable to inflict serious or deadly harm (e.g., unloaded gun or starter’s pistol useable as a bludgeon); or (3) actually used in a way likely to inflict that sort of harm (e.g., microphone cord used as a garrote). 314 Md. at 600 , 552 A.2d 872 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the Court of Appeals referred to § 36A, commenting: A more recently-adopted law, Art. 27, § 36A, proscribes the carrying or possessing of “any rifle, knife, or deadly weapon on public school property.” Section 36A was enacted by Ch. 614, Acts of 1971, the title which directs that the law is “to be under the new subheading ‘Carrying Deadly Weapons on Public School Property.’” This statute is another indication of the legislature’s use of an objective test for the definition of deadly weapons. Id. at 600 n. 9, 552 A.2d 872 .

The Court of Appeals has also adopted an objective test in determining whether an instrument is a dangerous or deadly weapon under Art. 27, § 36. In Anderson v. State, 328 Md. ¹⁶⁵ 426, 614 A.2d 963 (1992), the defendant was approached by a police officer in an area known to be an “open air drug market” and asked by the officer if he had any type of weapon or knife on his person. The defendant took a “razor knife,” a type of utility knife, from his back pants pocket and told the officer that he used the knife on his job. He did not inform the officer of the type of job he used the knife for.

He was convicted of wearing and carrying a concealed dangerous or deadly weapon under § 36(a). 2 The Court had previously determined that the items specifically listed in § 36(a), e.g., dirk knife, Bowie knife, switchblade knife, etc., were dangerous and deadly weapons per se. Mackall v. State, 283 Md. 100, 106 , 387 A.2d 762 (1978). In Anderson , the Court held that “[f]or objects not legislatively classified as dangerous and deadly per se, such as the utility knife here, the State must prove that the object is within the class described as ‘any other dangerous or deadly weapon of any kind.’” Id. at 434 , 614 A.2d 963 . In discussing the standard to be applied when an instrument is not per se a dangerous or deadly weapon, the