In Re Nahif A.

MARVIN H. SMITH, Judge (retired), Specially Assigned. We shall here affirm the finding of delinquency by the Circuit Court for Frederick County in a proceeding pertaining to appellant, Nahif A. (Nahif). Two juvenile delinquency petitions were filed against Nahif in that court.

The first petition, in case number 9091, accused him of distribution of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of cocaine, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to possess cocaine. The second petition, in case number 9099, accused him of theft, disorderly conduct, and disturbing school activities. The cases were consolidated for a joint adjudicatory hearing. Case number 9099 was heard first.

At the close of that case, the trial judge found that Nahif had committed theft as set forth in the first count and had disturbed school activities as set forth in the third count. The court then went on to hear case number 9091. In that case, the court found that Nahif had distributed cocaine as set forth in count one and had conspired to possess cocaine with intent to distribute as set forth in count five. 1 The court adjudicated Nahif delinquent as a result of the findings in both cases. At the subsequent disposition hearing, the court committed Nahif “to the care and custody of the ¹⁹⁹ Frederick County Department of Juvenile Justice for placement at Fairbridge,” a residential treatment facility.

In this appeal, Nahif argues, in essence, that: I. The juvenile court’s finding that he conspired to possess cocaine with intent to distribute was inconsistent with the finding that he did not conspire to possess cocaine, and was barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy, II. The evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings that he disturbed school activities, committed theft, and conspired to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and III. The juvenile court abused its discretion by permitting the State to reopen its case during closing argument to establish his age. —Case Number 9099— Case number 9099 stemmed from an altercation that occurred at Heather Ridge School, where Nahif was a student. The State presented evidence that Heather Ridge School is an “alternative school” for youngsters who are not “successful in their home schools for any number of reasons.” These reasons include, but are not limited to, behavioral problems.

The State presented two witnesses: school support counsel- or Roger Dawson and assistant principal Perry Baker. Dawson testified that Heather Ridge School provided Nahif with a lunch each day. On March 14, 1997, a lunch was taken to him in the particular school room to which he was assigned. Without requesting permission to do so, Nahif took the lunch back to the cafeteria and informed a cafeteria worker that he wanted a different lunch.

The cafeteria worker refused to make an exchange. Dawson, who had witnessed the interaction between Nahif and the worker, testified that he also told Nahif that he could not swap the lunches. Nahif nevertheless left his lunch on the counter and took a different lunch. Baker, the assistant principal, was called to the cafeteria.

Baker asked Nahif if he had paid for the second lunch. Nahif answered in the negative and explained that the first lunch ²⁰⁰ had consisted of a pork sandwich and that it was against his religion to eat pork. Baker informed Nahif that the sandwich was actually made from turkey. He then asked Nahif to accompany him back to his office.

Nahif did walk out of the cafeteria and into a hallway but, according to Baker, “there was a lot of disruption” at that point. Nahif “used lots of profanity in the hallway” and was “being loud, so that other students c[ould not] learn.” The police were called to the scene but Nahif “continued to disrupt.” Baker testified that Nahif “threaten[ed] both the staff and the police officers. Threaten[ed] to kill us.” Dawson, who was present throughout the confrontation, confirmed that Nahif “became loud and started cursing,” and that he “was not following staff requests.” Nahif testified on his own behalf in case number 9099. He explained that he could not eat the lunch he was given because it consisted of pork.

Nahif acknowledged that it “wasn’t all right” to take the second lunch because “I didn’t ask no permission.” He added, however, that he did not think he was stealing since he was entitled to a free lunch and he could not eat the lunch he was given. —Case Number 9091— Case number 9091 arose from a controlled drug transaction that occurred at about 8:30 in the evening on March 27, 1997. The state presented three witnesses: two police officers and a police informant. This time, Nahif presented no evidence in his defense. Officer Gregory Stocksdale told the court that he arranged for the informant, Curtis Lee West, to make a controlled buy.

The officer searched West, fitted him with a body wire, gave him $40 in marked bills, and instructed him to drive to All Saints’ Street in Frederick to purchase a controlled dangerous substance. Stocksdale met with West after the buy and recovered two rocks of crack cocaine from him. Curtis Lee West testified that, when he pulled onto All Saints’ Street and stopped his car, one person approached the ²⁰¹ passenger door and one person approached the driver’s door. The person on the passenger side, who was later identified as Richard Thomas Spencer, opened the door and threw the drugs in.

He then instructed West to give his money to the person at the driver’s door. At trial, West identified Nahif as the person to whom he gave the $40. Another police officer, T.A. Duhan, testified that he observed the entire transaction through binoculars. Officer Duhan stated that he saw West’s car drive onto All Saints’ Street and stop.

He saw Spencer approach the passenger side of the car and Nahif approach the driver’s side. Officer Duhan testified that he saw Spencer reach his hand into the car and saw West reach toward Spencer’s hand. Spencer then gestured toward Nahif, and West handed money to Nahif. The officer radioed for an arrest team to arrest Nahif and Spencer.

After the arrest, the $40 in marked bills were recovered from Spencer’s person. I Inconsistent Verdicts and Double Jeopardy Nahif points out that, before it determined that he conspired to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, the trial court granted his motion for judgment of acquittal as to conspiracy to possess cocaine. In granting the motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial judge stated that there was no evidence of a conspiracy to possess. In finding later that Nahif had conspired to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, however, the court stated that there was sufficient evidence “with regard to the conspiracy charges as to the distribution and the conspiracy to possess.” Nahif argues that these findings were fatally inconsistent.

In addition, he argues that the finding that he conspired to possess cocaine with intent to distribute was barred by double jeopardy principles. 2 ²⁰² Neither of these arguments was raised in the court below. In fact, in moving for judgment of acquittal at the close of the case, after the trial judge had granted Nahifs motion as to conspiracy to possess cocaine, defense counsel told the court that the evidence “at best leaves us with the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.” Counsel later reiterated that “the best the Court has, based on the information — or these charges — is the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.” Under the circumstances, neither argument is preserved for appellate review. See Md. Rule 8-131(a); Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323 , 327 n. 3, 449 A.2d 1153 , 1155 n. 3 (1982) (“[A] challenge to concurrent sentences on a greater offense and on a lesser included offense must be properly raised or it is deemed waived, regardless of the ‘knowing and intelligent’ standard”); Hewitt v. State, 242 Md. 111, 114 , 218 A.2d 19, 21 (1966) (double jeopardy argument based on retrial not preserved for appeal since not raised below); Bell v. State, 220 Md. 75, 81 , 150 A.2d 908, 912 (1959) (explaining in dicta that an argument that guilty verdicts for larceny and receiving stolen goods were inconsistent might have been waived since it was not raised below); Acquah v. State, 113 Md.App. 29, 42-43 , 686 A.2d 690, 697 (1996) (argument that not guilty verdict for conspiracy to bribe was inconsistent with guilty verdict for conspiracy to gain illegal access to personal records by false pretenses, bribery, or theft was not raised below so not preserved); In Re Darnell F., 71 Md.App. 584, 592 , 526 A.2d 971, 975 (argument that court’s order that juvenile pay restitution violated double jeopardy principles, in that restitution charge had been reinstated after being dismissed by court, not ²⁰³ raised below so not preserved), cert. denied, 311 Md. 144 , 532 A.2d 1371 (1987); Howell v. State, 56 Md.App. 675, 678-82 , 468 A.2d 688, 689-91 (1983) (argument that retrial constituted double jeopardy not raised below so not preserved), cert. denied, 299 Md. 426 , 474 A.2d 218 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1039 , 105 S.Ct. 520 , 83 L.Ed.2d 408 (1984). Hence, the issue is not before us.

II Sufficiency of the Evidence Nahif next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings that he disturbed school activities, committed theft, and conspired to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. In In re Timothy F., 343 Md. 371, 379-80 , 681 A.2d 501, 505 (1996), Judge Bell explained for the Court of Appeals: Judging the weight and the credibility of witnesses and resolving conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the sound discretion of the trier of fact.... When the trier of fact is the trial court, its judgment on the evidence will be set aside only if it is clearly erroneous____ Appellate review of the court’s judgment on the evidence is limited to determining whether there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the court’s underlying factual findings. In a criminal case., the appropriate iwqairy is not whether the reviewing court believes that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather, whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt ...

This same standard of review applies in juvenile delinquency cases.... In such cases, the delinquent act, like the criminal act, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ²⁰⁴ Id. at 379-80 , 681 A.2d 501 (citations omitted; emphasis in original.). See also Md.Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 3-819(b)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“Before a child is adjudicated delinquent, the allegations in the petition that the child has committed a delinquent act must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt”). —Disturbing School Activities— Nahif was found to have disturbed school activities in violation of Code (1978), § 26-101(a) of the Education Article, which provides: “A person may not willfully disturb or otherwise willfully prevent the orderly conduct of the activities, administration, or classes of any institution of elementary, secondary, or higher education.” 3 Nahifs challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding that he violated the statute is two-fold. He first contends that the conduct of which he was accused “was not what § 26-101 was intended to prohibit.” He further contends that, even if the statute were applicable, the State’s evidence failed to establish that he actually disrupted any classes or the administration of the school.

In support of his argument that the statute is not applicable to the instant case, Nahif asserts that “the predecessor statutes to § 26-101(a) ... were passed during the height of the Viet Nam War protests.” See former Code (1957, 1969 Repl.Vol.), Art. 77, § 96 (enacted by 1969 Laws of Maryland chapter 405, § 1) and former Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 123A (enacted by 1970 Laws of Maryland chapter 726). Without citation to any authority, he argues that the predecessor statutes, and hence § 26-101, “were directed towards activities such as sit-ins, protest marches and civil disobedience designed specifically to disrupt the functioning of a school.” Nahif concludes that the statute was not intended to ²⁰⁵ punish misbehavior such as that alleged in the instant case. He points out that “Heather Ridge is the only school in [Frederick] County for children with behavioral problems” and reasons that the statute could not have been intended “to punish criminally the acting out behavior of students in the one public school equipped to deal with children with behavioral problems.” “[T]he cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to effectuate the actual intention of the legislature.” Schweitzer v. Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 438 , 374 A.2d 347, 352 (1977). When we seek to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, “we look first to the words of the statute, read in light of the full context in which they appear, and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence.” ...

In doing so, we give the language of the statute its natural and ordinary signification, bearing in mind the statutory aim and objective.... Moreover, we approach the analysis from a “commonsensical,” rather than a technical perspective, ... always seeking to avoid giving a strained interpretation or one that reaches an absurd result.... We must assume that the words of the statute defining the crime ... have the meaning naturally given them in ordinary usage, in the absence of anything to indicate contrary intent; there being no room for construction, if the language is plain and unambiguous .... Richmond v. State, 326 Md. 257, 262 , 604 A.2d 483, 485-86 (1992) (citations omitted).

The language of § 26-101(a) is plain and unambiguous: “A person may not willfully disturb or otherwise willfully prevent the orderly conduct of the activities, administration, or classes of any institution of elementary, secondary, or higher education.” The prohibition is in no way limited, as Nahif suggests, to “sit-ins, protest marches and [acts of] civil disobedience designed specifically to disrupt the functioning of a school.” Nor does the prohibition exclude students with “behavioral problems.” The interpretation urged by Nahif would ²⁰⁶ give students carte blanche to disrupt their classrooms and schools by any means other than sit-ins, protest marches, and acts of civil disobedience without fear of legal recourse. 4 The State presented evidence that Nahif engaged in a heated verbal altercation with school officials. The altercation took place in a school hallway near classrooms. Nahif would not follow directions given by the school officials, and the police had to be called to subdue him. When the police arrived, Nahif continued to shout and curse at the school officials and threatened to kill both the school officials and the police.

The State furnished ample evidence to convince a rational trier of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Nahif had “willfully disturb[ed] or otherwise willfully prevented] the orderly conduct of the activities, administration, or classes” at Heather Ridge School. Id 5 -Theft- Nahif acknowledges that he was denied permission to exchange his lunch for a different lunch. He reasons, howev ²⁰⁷ er, that because he was entitled to a free school lunch and because he believed that the lunch he was given contained pork, his act of “merely substituting a lunch he could eat for one that he