In Re Najasha B.

ADKINS, J. In this CINA case, 1 we decide whether a juvenile court was obligated to hold an adjudicatory hearing to consider allega ²² tions of neglect in a petition, notwithstanding the request for dismissal by the local department of social services (“DSS”), that was made with the consent of the child’s parents. The child, through counsel, objected to dismissal, but was unsuccessful. We shall hold, based upon Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol., 2008 Supp.), Title 3, Subtitle 8 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”)(hereinafter “the CINA Subtitle”), the rights of the child as a party to a CINA petition, and the inherent role of the court in protecting the rights of minors, that the juvenile court erred in dismissing the petition on the basis that DSS, as the CINA petitioner, had a unilateral right to dismiss its petition.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK In order for a child to be declared a CINA, a local DSS must first receive a “complaint from a person or agency having knowledge of facts which may cause a child to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court under [the CINA Subtitle.]” CJP § 3-809(a). Upon receipt of a complaint, “the local department shall file a petition under [the CINA Subtitle] if it concludes that the court has jurisdiction over the matter and that the filing of a petition is in the best interests of the child.” Id. If the local DSS decides not to file a petition, within five days after this decision, it “shall inform in writing” certain persons about its decision and rationale. CJP § 3-809(b) The persons entitled to notice are: “(1) A child over the age of 10 who would have been the subject of the petition, if appropriate; (2) The parent, guardian, or custodian of the child who would have been the subject of the petition; and (3) Each person or agency that requested that a petition be filed.” Id.

The person or agency that requested the petition may also request review of the local DSS’s decision not to file a petition by the Secretary of Human Resources. CJP § 3-809(c). ²³ “Within 15 days after a request for review is received, the Secretary of Human Resources or the Secretary’s designee, in consultation with the director of the local department, shall review the report and may direct the local department to file [the] petition within 5 days.” CJP § 3-809(d). If the Secretary or Secretary’s designee refuses to direct the local department to file a petition, then the person or agency that filed the complaint, or caused it to be filed, may lile the petition. CJP § 8-809(e).

The CINA Subtitle provides for two hearings when a CINA petition is filed—an adjudicatory hearing and a disposition hearing. CJP Section 3-817(a), the provision principally at issue in this case, provides: “After a petition is filed under [the CINA Subtitle], the court shall hold an adjudicatory hearing.” An adjudicatory hearing is defined as a hearing “to determine whether the allegations in the petition, other than the allegation that the child requires the court’s intervention, are true.” CJP § 8-801(c). After an adjudicatory hearing, a juvenile court shall hold a separate disposition hearing to determine whether a child is a CINA unless a petition is dismissed. CJP § 3-819(a).

A disposition hearing is defined as a hearing to determine: “(1) Whether a child is in need of assistance; and (2) If so, the nature of the court’s intervention to protect the child’s health, safety, and well-being.” CJP § 3-801 (m). The parties to a CINA proceeding may include a child who is the subject of a petition; the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; the petitioner; or an adult who is charged under CJP Section 3-828 with contributing to acts, omissions, or conditions rendering a child in need of assistance. CJP §§ 3-801(u) and 3-828(a). Under CJP Section 3-818(a) and (b), a child who is the subject of the petition is “entitled to the assistance of counsel at every stage of any proceeding” under the CINA Subtitle at State expense.

The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over CINA proceedings. See CJP § 3-803(a)(2). “In all judicial proceedings conducted in accordance with [the CINA Subtitle] ²⁴ ..., the court may direct the local department to provide services to a child, the child’s family, or the child’s caregiver to the extent that the local department is authorized under State law.” CJP § 3-802(c)(l). Juvenile courts shall exercise this authority to “protect and advance a child’s best interests.” CJP § 3-802(c)(2). FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS On February 1, 2008, the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (“DSS”), appellee, filed a CINA Petition with Request for Shelter Care (“Petition”).

The Petition alleged that on January 31, 2008, the Baltimore City Police (“Police”) conducted a drug raid in Najasha B.’s parents’ home and found five-year-old Najasha in the home without adult supervision. The Petition also alleged that (1) attempts to locate Najasha’s parents were unsuccessful, (2) the Police found marijuana throughout the home, and (3) there were no known relative resources willing to provide care for Najasha. Najasha was consequently placed in emergency shelter care. An emergency shelter care hearing was held on February 1, 2008 and Najasha’s parents, Ms. A. and Mr. B., appellees, attended the hearing.

The Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as a juvenile court, denied DSS’s shelter care request after the parties agreed to the entry of an “order controlling conduct” with the following terms: (1) Najasha “shall not be left in the custody of anyone but the parents and or relatives”; (2) Najasha’s parents “shall not have any illegal substances in the home”; and (3) Najasha’s parents “shall allow DSS to have announced and unannounced visits to the home.” The juvenile court then scheduled an adjudicatory hearing for March 31, 2008. On March 31, 2008, the juvenile court reset the adjudicatory hearing for April 28, 2008 and kept in place its order controlling conduct entered after the previous proceeding. On April 28, 2008, the court reset the adjudication hearing again and added a condition in its order that Najasha’s parents “shall ensure [Najasha] attends school on a regular basis[.]” ²⁵ The parties convened on May 9, 2008 for the scheduled adjudicatory hearing. At that time, DSS filed a motion requesting that the juvenile court dismiss their CINA petition.

DSS informed the court that the “issues that brought this matter to the attention of the Court have been resolved and no further Court intervention is necessary at this time.” The master recommended that the court grant DSS’s motion and Najasha’s parents did not object to the dismissal. Najasha’s counsel objected, however, arguing that records from the Baltimore City School System showed that Najasha was not attending school on a regular basis. The juvenile court then granted DSS’s dismissal request. Najasha filed a Notice of Exception and Request for Hearing on May 14, 2008 in which Najasha’s counsel took exception to the dismissal, contending that “an adjudicatory hearing should be held on the petition ... before the Court makes a determination as to whether to dismiss the petition.” The juvenile court held a de novo exception hearing on June 23, 2008.

At that hearing, DSS proffered what follows: Your Honor, the reason—[DSS| was prepared to dismiss that day and as indicated the allegations in the Petition had been resolved. [DSS] had been working with the family. There were no outstanding issues at that time that [DSS] felt caused the matter to continue to need the attention of the Court. [DSS] was going to continue working with the family for probably another 30 days. And, the issue that [Najasha’s counsel] raised had to do with lack of attendance at school which was not even an allegation in [DSS’s] petition nor did [DSS] intend to make an allegation. LNajasha] was—is 5 years old.

There was some lack of attendance but 1 believe as the discussion went on before the Court that the child was of the age where she really wasn’t even under compulsory education laws until the fall. The Court had a discussion with the parents before granting [DSS’s] dismissal, obviously, about the importance of education and they dismissed the case. There is absolutely no reason for this case to continue and [DSS] does not intend to proceed with this case. ²⁶ Najasha’s counsel responded by arguing that CJP Section 3-817(a) requires the holding of an adjudicatory hearing. The juvenile court denied Najasha’s exception, however, and dismissed the case, responding as follows: I’m just not persuaded.

I mean I think that when I read that section in [3-817(a) ] it does seem to indicate that after a Petition filed under this subtitle the Court shall hold an adjudicatory hearing. I’m reading that as meaning if [DSS] is continuing to pursue it. [T]here is actually a mechanism in [the CINA Subtitle] which will allow a Complainant, that’s not your case, but a Complainant to file a Petition. But I think under the statutory statement under CINA it looks to me like it is [DSS] which is the moving party and I think that if they wish to withdraw the Petition or ask the Court to dismiss it based upon their motion, I think they have that right. It doesn’t mean that if your client is concerned or wishes to file a separate Complaint and DSS then says we are not going to file a Petition in this case based upon their Complaint, I think under the statutory scheme you actually could file a Petition and just say we want to file a Petition then.

But ... it is the Complainant who files the Petition and in this case [Najasha] is not the Complainant. In its order, the juvenile court indicated that it accepted the following evidence in support of its exception denial: “[Najasha] has continued in the care of parents under an [order controlling conduct]. The issues that brought this matter to the attention of the Court have been resolved and no further Court intervention is necessary at this time.” Najasha appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. On our own initiative, we issued a writ of certiorari to consider the following question: ²⁷ Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it dismissed the Petition without holding an adjudicatory hearing as required by statute, court rules and the parens patriae doctrine?

DISCUSSION The parties invoke the rules of statutory interpretation in addressing whether a juvenile court is required to hold an adjudicatory hearing once a petition is filed. “The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” Kushell v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576 , 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005). “In order to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, we begin with the plain language of the statute, and if that language is clear and unambiguous, we look no further than the text of the statute.” Ishola v. State, 404 Md. 155, 160 , 945 A.2d 1273, 1276 (2008). “if, however, the meaning of the plain language is ambiguous or unclear, we seek to discern legislative intent from surrounding circumstances, such as legislative history, prior case law, and the purposes upon which the statutory framework was based.” Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653 , 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998). Najasha contends that the juvenile court erred when it failed to hold an adjudicatory hearing following the filing of a CINA petition, because once a petition is filed, Maryland law mandates that a court hold an adjudicatory hearing. She centers her argument on the CJP Section 3-817(a) provision directing that: “After a petition is filed under [the CINA Subtitle], the court shall hold an adjudicatory hearing.” Najasha maintains that the legislature’s use of the word “shall” in the statute manifests its intent to make mandatory the holding of an adjudicatory hearing. Najasha argues, moreover, that the broader statutory scheme of the CINA Subtitle supports this interpretation.

She highlights CJP Section 3-802(a) which states that the purpose of the Subtitle is to, inter alia, “provide for the care, protection, safety, and mental and physical development of ²⁸ any child coming within the provisions of [the CINA Subtitle]” and “provide for a program of services and treatment consistent with the child’s best interestsf.]” She argues that juvenile judges have a distinct mandate to protect the interests of minors—a duty that flows from their inherent parens patriae, or “ ‘father of the country,’ ” jurisdiction of guardianship over minors. See In re Danielle B., 78 Md.App. 41, 68-69 , 552 A.2d 570, 583 (1989)(citing Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 293 Md. 685, 702 , 447 A.2d 1244 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 , 103 S.Ct. 790 , 74 L.Ed.2d 995 (1983)). Najasha asserts that this duty is embodied in CJP Section 3-802—the CINA Subtitle purposes and construction provision—and that under CJP Section 3-804(b), the authority to terminate a CINA case lies with the court, and not DSS, due to the court’s unique role as guardian and fact-finder.

She points out that under CJP Section 3-804(b), once the “court obtains jurisdiction over a child, that jurisdiction continues in that case until the child reaches the age of 21 years, unless the court terminates the case.” This, she sees as an indication that only the court may terminate the case, not DSS. Najasha also claims the definition of an “adjudicatory hearing” as support for her position, which states: “ ‘Adjudicatory hearing’ means a hearing under [the CINA Subtitle] to determine whether the allegations in the petition, other than the allegation that the child requires the court’s intervention, are true.” CJP § 3-801(c). According to Najasha, this provision “assumes that the mere filing of a Petition requires the court’s intervention” and that the court’s “duty to intervene is then discharged upon hearing whether the allegations in the Petition are true.” She also contends that her CJP Section 3-813 right to “the assistance of counsel at every stage of any proceeding” under the CINA Subtitle confers a right to an adjudicatory hearing. In In re Adoption/Guardianship No. T97036005, 358 Md. 1, 3 , 746 A.2d 379, 380 (2000), we held that a child has a right to a hearing on the merits concerning a petition to terminate parental rights, notwithstanding the parents’ consent to the termination.

We reasoned that a child’s party status, right to ²⁹ assistance of counsel, and right to notice of the petition and opportunity to object thereto, entitle the child, when the child objects to the petition, to a hearing on the petition’s merits. Id. at 19-20 , 746 A.2d at 389 . Najasha applies this reasoning and argues that here, it is “illogical to give the child party status and grant the child the right to counsel, only to prevent the child from participating in an adjudicatory hearing.” DSS and Najasha’s parents, Ms. A. and Mr. B., (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Appellees” when advancing similar arguments) contend that the juvenile court properly dismissed the petition at DSS’s request, because CJP Section 3-809 confers on DSS the discretion to file a petition and thus, the authorization to withdraw its petition prior to an adjudicatory hearing. According to Appellees, CJP Section 3-817(a) does not address whether DSS may seek dismissal of its own petition and must be read in light of the other CINA Subtitle provisions and its purposes overall.

Najasha’s parents assert that under CJP Section 3-809, DSS not only has discretion to withdraw a petition, but must do so if the petition’s filing is not in the child’s best interests. They argue that DSS was no longer authorized to maintain a petition when it believed, after having had the opportunity to work with them and conduct further investigation, that it was no longer in Najasha’s best interest to proceed with the case. This Section 3-809 obligation on DSS, they contend, was accomplished by asking the juvenile court to grant its dismissal request. Appellees maintain that Section 3-809 manifests a legislative intent to vest in DSS the authority to determine whether to pursue court intervention.

In support of their position, Appellees reference a memorandum prepared by the Foster Care Court Improvement Project Implementation Committee, a committee of the Maryland Judicial Conference tasked with assessing and making findings regarding the judiciary’s processing of abuse and neglect cases. The Committee’s memorandum, which prompted the Legislature to enact a CINA ³⁰ statute separate from the statutory provisions addressing child delinquency, provided as follows: [T]he local department of social services will decide whether a CINA petition will be filed. The Committee believes that the local department of social services has the resources and is in the best position to investigate allegations of abuse and neglect. However, the Committee further believes that if the local department of social services makes a decision not to file a petition, the interested parties should be notified and a quick, efficient method for review should be made available.

The person or agency that filed the complaint may file a CINA petition if the local department decides not to file a CINA petition. Memorandum from the Foster Care Court, Improvement Project Implementation Committee and Members of the House Judiciary Committee, Summary of Senate Bill 660 and House Bill 754 (February 14, 2001). Appellees also argue that Section 3-802, the “[p]urposes and construction” provision of the CINA Subtitle, supports DSS’s right to dismiss a petition without an adjudicatory hearing. This provision states that the purposes of the CINA Subtitle are: (1) To provide for the care, protection, safety, and mental and physical development of any child coming within the provisions of this subtitle; (2) To provide for a program of services and treatment consistent with the child’s best interests and the promotion of the public interest; (3) To conserve and strengthen the child’s family ties and to separate a child from the child’s parents only when necessary for the child’s welfare; (4) To hold parents of children found to be in need of assistance responsible for remedying the circumstances that required the court’s intervention; (5) Except as otherwise provided by law, to hold the local department responsible for providing services to assist the ³¹ parents with remedying the circumstances that required the court’s intervention; (6) If necessary to remove a child from the child’s home, to secure for the child custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which the child’s parents should have given; (7) To achieve a timely, permanent placement for the child consistent with the child’s best interests; and (8) To provide judicial procedures for carrying out the provisions of this subtitle.

CJP § 3-802(a). The CINA Subtitle is to be “construed liberally to effectuate these purposes.” CJP § 3-802(b). Appellees assert that the CINA Subtitle, in short, seeks to promote the best interests of the child and that this standard favors the maintenance of parental rights. See In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 571 , 819 A.2d 1030, 1042 (2003)(stating that “[t]he best interests of the child standard embraces a strong presumption that the child’s best interests are served by maintaining parental rights”).

This purpose, Appellees posit, is served by allowing DSS to work with parents and remedy the circumstances that caused it to become involved, through settlement and a petition’s dismissal, without resort to a contested adjudication. A mandatory hearing would promote an adversarial environment, they say, reducing the incentive for communication among the parties, and would waste departmental and judicial resources by requiring an adjudication on a petition that is lacking a factual basis. In addition to arguing that DSS had discretion to withdraw its petition without a hearing, Appellees maintain that the juvenile court had discretion to dismiss the petition prior to the adjudicatory hearing under CJP Section 3—804(b). This provision states that a court, after obtaining jurisdiction over a child, has continuing jurisdiction “until the child reaches the age of 21 years, unless the court terminates the case.” Appellees interpret this provision as providing authorization for the court to terminate a ease at any stage and DSS regards the Section 3—817(a) language that “the court shall hold an adjudi ³² catory hearing” as directory, rather than mandatory, in light of 3-804(b).

We discussed the guidelines for determining whether a statute’s use of “shall” is mandatory or directory in In re James S.: “Certain forms and types of statutes are generally considered mandatory. Unless the context otherwise indicates the use of the word ‘shall’ (except in its future tense) indicates a • mandatory intent.... The directory character of a statute may likewise be indicated by the purpose of a statute and the manner in which its purpose is expressed. Thus it was said: ‘Where words are affirmative, and relate to the manner in which the power or jurisdiction vested in a public officer or body is to be exercised, and not to the limits of the power or jurisdiction itself, they may and often have been construed as directory; ... ’ Likewise, where the time, or manner of performing the action directed by the statute is not essential to the purpose of the statute, provisions in regard to time or method are generally interpreted as directory only.

Something in the nature of a presumption favoring a mandatory interpretation is suggested by judicial expressions that a statute is to be so interpreted unless its directory or discretionary character ‘clearly appears.’ Finally, it deserves to be noted that the differences between mandatory and directory, or between prohibitory and permissive, represent a continuum involving matter of degree instead of separate, mutually exclusive characteristics. It has been said, for example, that because a statute has been classified for some purposes as directory does not mean that for all purposes it can ‘be ignored at will.’ ” 286 Md. 702, 706-07 , 410 A.2d 586, 588 (1980)(quoting 1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 25.04 (4th ed. 1972)). Consistent with these guidelines, we have stated “ ‘that in the absence of a contrary contextual indication, the use of the word ‘shall’ is presumed to have a mandatory meaning ... and thus denotes an imperative obligation incon ³³ sistent with the exercise of discretion.’ ” Id. at 709, 410 A.2d at 589 (citation omitted). There are cases, however, in which we held the use of the word “shall” to be directory.

In Maryland State Bar Association, Inc. v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 532 , 325 A.2d 718, 720 (1974), for example, we considered the nature of code provisions which required a bar association or state’s attorney “ ‘to prosecute [attorney disciplinary] charges ... on a day specified [by order of court]