In Re NICK H.

WOODWARD, J. On June 27, 2006, appellant, Nick H. (DOB: 3/29/90), entered a plea of involved to one count of sexual abuse of a five-year-old boy and two counts of second degree sexual offense against the same victim in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court. 1 The juvenile court committed appellant to the Department of Juvenile Services for placement in a residential treatment center. Approximately ten months later, appellant was released from the treatment center and placed on probation with home electronic monitoring. In 2009 and 2010, the Maryland General Assembly amended the Maryland sex offender registration act (“MSORA”), requiring, among other things, that certain juveniles convicted of various sex offenses and at significant risk of committing a sexually violent offense or a Tier II or Tier III sexual offense (“at significant risk of re-offending”) to register as sex offenders upon leaving the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

See Md.Code 2001, 2008 Repl.Vol., 2010 Cum.Supp. § ll-704(a), (c) of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP 2010”). 2 As a result of these statutory changes, the State requested that ⁶⁷³ appellant be placed on the sex offender registry, and the juvenile court conducted a hearing to determine whether appellant was at significant risk of re-offending. The court concluded, based on clear and convincing evidence, that appellant was at significant risk of re-offending and thus ordered him to register as a sex offender pursuant to MSORA. Appellant now challenges the juvenile court’s order. He presents two questions for our review, which we have rephrased: 3 1.

Did the juvenile court err in ordering appellant to register as a sex offender given the Court of Appeals’ holding in Doe v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 430 Md. 535 [ 62 A.3d 123 ] (2013) (“Doe I ”), that retroactive registration is a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws? 2. Was appellant entitled to specific performance of his plea agreement, which did not include a requirement that he register as a sex offender? For the reasons set forth below, we answer both questions in the negative and affirm the juvenile court’s order requiring appellant to register as a sex offender. BACKGROUND On June 27, 2006, appellant pleaded involved to one count of sexual abuse of a minor and two counts of second degree ⁶⁷⁴ sexual offense.

The State’s proffer revealed that, while appellant babysat five-year-old A.H. and his two older brothers, appellant sodomized A.H. and forced A.H. to perform fellatio on him. Appellant initially denied sexual contact with the victim, but after further questioning admitted that he “had put it in [A.H.’s] mouth about midway down the tongue.” Appellant was fifteen years old when the abuse occurred. The juvenile court accepted appellant’s plea, and appellant was placed in a residential treatment center for about ten months. Upon release from the treatment center in June 2007, appellant was placed on probation, and for the following three and one-half years the juvenile court monitored appellant’s progress in outpatient sex offender treatment through regular review hearings.

In 2009 and 2010, the Maryland General Assembly amended MSORA. One such amendment allowed, under specific circumstances, the juvenile court to order juvenile offenders who had been adjudicated involved in certain sexual offenses to register as sex offenders when they left the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 4 See CP 2010 §§ ll-704(a), (c). In response to this change, on October 7, 2010, the State requested that the juvenile court order appellant to register as a sex offender. Based on the new law and the State’s requests, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on December 15 and 21, 2010, to determine whether appellant should be placed on the sex offender registry.

The court’s decision considered only the testimony and reports presented at the hearing. In rendering its opinion, the juvenile court noted that appellant “committed sexual acts with [A.H.] maybe 50 times. 20 times included penetration, and there were also offenses that included fellatio....” In addition, the court stated that, “I think maybe there was one event that involved [A.H.]’s broth ⁶⁷⁵ er,” and “that there was also another youngster involved by the name of [L.F.].... [T]here was denial as to [L.F.] [ ] for a long time, for 20 months or so, almost two years.” The juvenile court reviewed the testimony and reports of the three witnesses who testified at the hearing. Dr. Ronald I. Weiner, an expert in adult and juvenile sex offender risk assessments and treatment, provided an independent evaluation of appellant, the findings of which were memorialized in a detailed, thirty-page risk assessment report. Dr. Weiner testified to his findings at the hearing.

The court described Dr. Weiner as “neutral,” and thus determined that “his testimony and his report [were to be given] significant weight.” The court also heard testimony from Ta-Keisha Smith, appellant’s case manager, who the court also found to be “very credible.” Dr. Fred Berlin, appellant’s treating physician for his sex offender treatment, also testified. Because Dr. Berlin was appellant’s treating physician, he was not asked to perform an independent evaluation. Regarding Dr. Berlin’s opinion, the court stated: “I am forced to give his testimony far less weight. I, he came across in the Court’s opinion, as an advocate.” Based on the witnesses’ testimony, Dr. Weiner’s report, and “various psycho sexual reports” from the years appellant was supervised while in placement and on probation, the juvenile court found that appellant was “a highly sexualized young man.” The court explained that, when appellant first came into the system, both Dr. Weiner and Dr. Berlin reported the significant level of abuse and criminal activity that [appellant] was involved in, back for this four plus years.

Dr. Weiner described it as egregious and predatory. [T]hey noted that [appellant] had not only this criminal history, but there was, I guess what the Court can fairly describe as a highly, a highly sexualized young man. Not just back when he was 11 to almost 16, but thereafter.... [H]e acknowledged, I guess, maybe 20 sexual partners. I’m ⁶⁷⁶ not talking about young children, I’m talking about peers. He acknowledged having sex at least three times with someone who was drunk, masturbating in a public place, fondling the dog’s genitals, phone sex, internet sex with female peers.

So that we, and someone who, by his words, by [appellant’s] own words, was perhaps addicted to pornography. So that’s the presentation when [appellant] came into the system. And it was also the presentation, at least by history, that Dr. Weiner and Dr. Berlin were, and are working with. The juvenile court expressed concern that appellant’s behavior over the four and one-half years that he was monitored by the juvenile court raised questions about his honesty.

The court stated that [appellant] has demonstrated some challenging behavior throughout the life of this case. Behavior that has involved deception, behavior that has involved avoidance, behavior that has involved downright lying.... There seems to be a pattern in [appellant’s] behavior throughout the life of this case of denying, avoiding,— avoiding, denying, lying, polygraph, or some type of confrontation, admission, then denying again, and then admitting again. The juvenile court pointed to numerous examples of appellant’s deceptive behavior.

Principal among them was that appellant did not “until very recently ... reveal to anybody that he had been having a sexual relationship with a young girl when he was very young. He was maybe eight and the young girl was, I think, 11.” The court found it “startling and troubling” that “someone that has been under this intense level of scrutiny in this particular field of psycho social treatment, to not disclose that for that long.” In addition to appellant hiding his sexual relationship at the age of eight, the juvenile court also described numerous instances of appellant lying to his parents and to Dr. Berlin. Appellant lied about his part-time employment, and denied ⁶⁷⁷ being aroused by child pornography despite admitting that images of children, including an image of A.H., came to his mind while masturbating. The court stated that “it seems clear that [appellant] has, in the past, had an addictive, an addiction to pornography and then that became an area of deception for him.” That deception became apparent when appellant told Dr. Berlin in 2008 that he was no longer accessing pornography, but later stated that his use of pornography ended in late 2009.

Appellant also denied using illegal drugs until he tested positive in a random urinalysis. Despite the positive drug test, appellant continued to lie about the extent of his drug use, suggesting to his case manager that he had only used on his birthday, when in fact he had used regularly for a period of seven months. The juvenile court found this alarming, given that the drug use occurred “[w]hile on probation, and while under the strictest scrutiny by the Court.” Although the court recognized that there were “some unfortunate lapses in this case,” namely that appellant was not subject to random urine testing for three years of his probation, the court was particularly concerned that appellant took advantage of this lapse to regularly use drugs. Because of the extent of appellant’s deception, the juvenile court questioned appellant’s seemingly good decisions.

In 2008, appellant voluntarily agreed to take depo lupron, a drug that diminishes testosterone levels. The court stated that [i]t seems to be both key to Dr. Weiner and Dr. Berlin that he stay on this medication. It’s also key to the Court that he stay on this medication. The problem with the Court is, the Court is going to lose jurisdiction in a few months, in March.

And the question is, will he stay on it? ... He went on the drug voluntarily, which I think shows some good judgment on his part. Although, that has some issues around it as to why he did. He told Dr. Weiner—no, Dr. Berlin, that he was concerned as to his penis size.

He was concerned as to ⁶⁷⁸ the medication’s affect on his weight. And he thought that it maybe would look good to the Court if he went on this medication. Thus the court concluded that it had “no way of assuring [ ] that the odds are good that he’s going to stay on [depo lupron].” The juvenile court also pointed to Dr. Weiner’s determination that “as a result of his testing, ... there was evidence that [appellant] did not either acknowledge or understand the notion of his sexual, any sexual deviant pattern on his part, and his sexual acting out, which is concerning.” Dr. Weiner “thought that all of the treatment that [appellant] had[ ] had was appropriate. He thought that the evaluations that he had[ ] were worthy and comprehensive.

But at the end of it all [Dr. Weiner] says something to the effect of, I don’t know whether [appellant] really has internalized this.” The court pointed out as evidence of appellant’s failure to internalize therapy that “at some place in this continuum of disclosure, [appellant] talked about grooming another young girl for possible molestation and then backed off of that.” These issues, plus appellant’s deceptive behavior, led the court to state that “what we have in this case is a very disturbing confluence between what we do know and what we don’t know.” This confluence caused the court to worry about appellant’s future risk of re-offending: So in terms of what we know and what we do not, Dr. Weiner was quite clear when he was talking about risk, that he saw a major issue in the fact that, as he expressed it, he had no way of assessing or determining what [appellant’s] sexual arousal patterns are because there’s no objective tools. There’s no objective tools that were used to determine this. This is also very troubling because [appellant] has been in therapy for such a long time and the issue has been child molestation. And the issue has been deviant sexual behavior.... [Appellant] has denied that he, he has denied that he has any sexual, deviant sexual arousal patterns as it revolves ⁶⁷⁹ around children.

But he’s denied a lot of things. He denied using drugs when he was using them. He denied alcohol when he, you know, has been drinking—well, not lately, hopefully, since he was 11 or 12. He has denied pornography over time, when he was with Dr. Berlin.

The juvenile court agreed with Dr. Weiner’s assessment that appellant presents “an unspecified risk,” and that “what we don’t know” is “very important.” Dr. Weiner suggested that it was the healthcare community’s duty to monitor appellant to prevent a relapse, but the court observed that appellant would no longer be monitored after he left the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. According to the court, “[h]e can do whatever he wants when he’s 21. He doesn’t have to live [at] home. He can take medicines or not.

He can live at his parentsf home]. He can live somewhere else.” The juvenile court concluded that placing appellant on the sex offender registry would be the best option for continuing treatment of appellant and ensuring the safety of the community: We must maintain leverage in the treatment. We can’t leave it up to him. That is what Dr. Weiner said, he, meaning [appellant], has a lot to overcome in terms of his offenses____ And Dr. Berlin’s testimony was: “He said he would continue [treatment], and I believe him.” Putting someone on a sex registry, it is what it is.

No one pretends that it’s a direct treatment. It is community safety. It is something that the legislature has seen fit to place into our statutes. I don’t rule out the possibility, however, that it may have some therapeutic value.

Just the fact that it is in place, may have some type of leverage on [appellant] so that he understands that, [although] not under this Court’s jurisdiction, there is a continuing interest in him and his well being, and in the community’s well being. That, in and of itself, may influence him to continue with his treatment. ⁶⁸⁰ The juvenile court also indicated that appellant would have the opportunity to be removed from the registry if he could prove to the court that he was no longer at significant risk of re-offending: [T]he statute includes an opportunity for someone on the registry to come back before the Court within the five years to modify placement on the registry. If [appellant] is serious about his treatment and he continues in his treatment; and perhaps at some future date, I don’t know what it is, whether it’s six months, or whether it’s two years, or something else entirely, coming off of the depo [lupron]; and he demonstrates pro social activities; and there is perhaps some objective evidence of non-deviant sexual arousal patterns around children; and we have some solid evidence as to what we’re looking at, he has the opportunity to come before the Court within this five year period. I think that is huge leverage in this case.

Thus the juvenile court found “by clear and convincing evidence that [appellant], this young man, is at significant risk [of re-offending] as indicated in the statute,” and, as a result, by Order dated December 27, 2010, placed appellant on the sex offender registry. 5 Appellant timely filed this appeal challenging the juvenile court’s December 27, 2010 Order. Additional facts will be set forth below as necessary to resolve the questions presented. STANDARD OF REVIEW Maryland Rule 8—131(c) governs the standard of review in juvenile matters: Action tried without a jury. When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence.

It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly ⁶⁸¹ erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Whether the circuit court erred in ordering appellant to register as a sex offender is a question arising under the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions. “[W]here an order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law, [the appellate court] must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 , 907 A.2d 175 (2006) (quoting Garfink v. Cloisters at Charles, Inc., 392 Md. 374, 383 , 897 A.2d 206 (2006)). DISCUSSION I. EX POST FACTO CHALLENGE (A) Doe I In March 2013, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided Doe I. This Court summarized the facts and holding of Doe I in Quispe del Pino v. Maryland Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 222 Md.App. 44 , 112 A.3d 522 (2015): The pertinent facts in Doe I are as follows: In 2006, Doe pled guilty to and was convicted in the Circuit Court for Washington County of a single count of child sexual abuse arising out of an incident involving inappropriate contact with a thirteen-year-old student that occurred during the 1983-84 school year when Doe was a junior high school teacher. Doe was sentenced to ten years incarceration, with all but four and one half years suspended, and three years supervised probation upon his release.

Although Doe’s plea agreement did not address registration as a sex offender as one of the conditions of probation, Doe was ordered at sentencing to “register as a child sex offender.” He was also ordered to pay a $500 fine. Following his sentencing, Doe filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence challenging both the fine and the requirement that he register as a child ⁶⁸² sex offender. The Circuit Court agreed with Doe and issued an order striking the fine and the registration requirement. Doe was released from prison in December 2008.

On October 1, 2009, Doe’s probation officer directed him to register as a child sex offender. Doe maintained that he did not agree with the requirement, but, against the advice of counsel, he registered as a child sex offender in early October 2009. The requirement that Doe register as a sex offender was a result of the 2009 amendment to MSORA retroactively requiring offenders who were convicted on or after October 1, 1995, but committed a sexual offense before that date, to register for the first time. In October 2009, Doe brought a declaratory judgment suit in the circuit court, seeking an order that he was not required to register as a sex offender.

Doe argued that a registration requirement would make his plea invalid as involuntary, because he was not informed that he would have to register as a sex offender when he entered into the plea agreement in 2006. The State argued that the requirement did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The trial court agreed with the State and ordered that Doe “shall not be removed from the sex offender registry.” After this Court affirmed the circuit court, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed our decision. In a plurality opinion, the Court of Appeals held that “requiring [Doe] to register as a result of the 2009 and 2010 amendments violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws contained in Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” The three-judge plurality explained that “in many contexts,” the Maryland Declaration of Rights offers broader protections than the United States Constitution.

The plurality further determined that ex post facto claims under Article 17 should be analyzed by using the “disadvantage” standard, under which “any law passed after the commission of an offense which ... in relation to that offense, or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his [or her] disadvantage” violates Article 17. ⁶⁸³ Specifically, under the disadvantage standard, “Article 17 prohibits the retroactive application of laws that have the effect on an offender that is the equivalent of imposing a new criminal sanction or punishment.” The plurality determined that requiring Doe to register had “essentially the same effect” as placing him on probation, that “probation is a form of a criminal sanction,” and that “applying the statute to [Doe] effectively imposes on him an additional criminal sanction” for a crime committed in the 1980s. The plurality also concluded that the dissemination of Doe’s information pursuant to MSORA was “tantamount to the historical punishment of shaming,” and thus imposed an additional sanction for Doe’s crime. Therefore, according to the plurality, the retroactive application of MSORA to Doe, which had the effect of imposing the additional sanction of probation and shaming, violated the ex post facto prohibition contained in Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Judge McDonald (joined by Judge Adkins) concurred with the plurality’s conclusion that the statute violated Article 17, but, in contrast to the plurality, read Article 17 in pari materia with Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution.

Judge McDonald’s concurrence stated further that “the cumulative effect of [the] 2009 and 2010 amendments of the State’s sex offender registration law took that law across the line from civil regulation to an element of the punishment of offenders.” Although his concurrence did not expressly state the test that was used, both the language of the concurrence and the two law review articles cited therein lead us to conclude that Judge McDonald analyzed the issue under the “intent-effects test.” The United States Supreme Court explained the “intent-effects” test in Smith v. Doe: We must “ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.” If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must ⁶⁸⁴ further examine whether the statutory scheme is “ ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’ ” Stated another way, the “intent-effects” test requires a reviewing court to engage in a two-part inquiry: “first, the court must consider the legislative intent of the statute; second, even if the statute’s stated purpose is non-punitive, the court must assess whether its effect overrides the legislative purpose to render the statute punitive.” Therefore, by declaring that the 2009 and 2010 amendments “took that law across the line from civil regulation to an element of the punishment of offenders,” Judge McDonald’s concurring opinion found a violation of the State and federal ex post facto clauses under the “intent-effects” test. Judge Harrell, writing separately, concurred in the judgment that Doe was entitled to relief, because his 2006 plea agreement “d[id] not indicate that sex offender registration was a term” of the agreement. Judge Harrell, however, would have denied Doe’s ex post facto claims under the “intent-effects” test established in Smith v. Doe.

Lastly, Judge Barbera (now Chief Judge) dissented and, using the “intent-effects” test, would have upheld the 2009 and 2010 amendments to MSORA under both the State and federal constitutions. Although the Court ultimately held that “the retroactive application to Doe of Maryland’s sex offender registration statute violated Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,” the divided Court did not reach a holding on whether to apply the “disadvantage” standard or the “intent-effects” test to future ex post facto challenges to MSO-RA. Quispe del Pino, 222 Md.App. at 52-56 , 112 A.3d 522 (italics and alterations in original) (citations omitted). Because Doe 7 is a plurality decision, we employ the Marks Rule to determine the Court’s holding: “ ‘[W]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of [four judges], the ⁶⁸⁵ holding of the court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.’ ” Wilkerson v. State, 420 Md. 573, 594 , 24 A.3d 703 (2011) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977)).

Thus the Marks Rule requires us to determine the common thread running through the plurality and concurring opinions of Doe I. See, e.g., Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 115 , 73 A.3d 254 (2013) (concluding that, under the Marks Rule, the narrowest holding of the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Illinois, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2221 , 183 L.Ed.2d 89 (2012), was the position representing the common point of agreement between the plurality and concurring opinions), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2723 , 189 L.Ed.2d 762 (2014). In Doe I, the decision that MSORA violates the Article 17 ban on ex post facto laws is the common denominator representing the position taken by five judges who agreed that Doe should be granted relief. 6 See 430 Md. at 568, 578 , 62 A.3d 123 . Because the Marks Rule directs us to the narrowest ground common to the plurality and the concurrence, Judge McDonald’s interpretation of Article 17 as read in pari mate-ria with the less expansive federal ex post facto clause represents the “position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.” See Wilkerson, 420 Md. at 594 , 24 A.3d 703 (concluding that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence represented the narrowest opinion of the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004)). ⁶⁸⁶ We recognize, however, that in reaching its holding in Doe I, three members of the Court applied the disadvantage test (the plurality opinion), while only two applied the intent-effects test (Judge McDonald’s concurrence). See Doe I, 430 Md. at 568, 578 , 62 A.3d 123 .

Thus neither test commanded a majority of the Court. Nevertheless, we decide that the intent-effects test is the proper test to determine whether MSORA violates Article 17 as applied to appellant. The Court of Appeals used the intent-effects test in Young v. State to review a due process challenge to MSORA. 370 Md. 686, 711 , 806 A.2d 233 (2002). The Court based its decision to use this test on two Supreme Court cases that employed the intent-effects test to determine whether civil regulations connected to criminal activity could be construed as punishment for double jeopardy and ex post facto purposes.

Id. at 711-12 & n. 11, 806 A.2d 233 (referencing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (double jeopardy claim), and Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (double jeopardy and ex post facto claims)). Although the plurality opinion in Doe I points to various Maryland cases that have used the disadvantage test in the ex post facto context since the Young decision, Young is the only decision in this jurisdiction prior to Doe I that considered the constitutionality of MSORA specifically. See Doe I, 430 Md. at 553-55 , 62 A.3d 123 (plurality opinion). Young is thus the most relevant precedent available to us in determining which test to use in the case sub judice.

We note, however, that the precedent set in Young extends only to the test to be applied. The Young decision interpreted the 2000 version of MSORA, prior to the enactment of the 2009 and 2010 amendments. Young, 370 Md. at 690 , 806 A.2d 233 . As Judge McDonald pointed out in his concurrence in Doe I , the sex offender registration scheme has changed significantly in recent years, and thus an analysis of MSORA under the intent-effects test has changed dramatically.

See Doe I, 430 Md. at 578 , 62 A.3d 123 (McDonald, J., concurring). With this point in mind, we turn to the application of MSORA to appellant under Doe I . ⁶⁸⁷ (B) Retroactive Application of MSORA to Appellant “To prevail in an ex post facto claim, [appellant] must first show that the law that [he is] challenging applies retroactively to conduct that was completed before the enactment of the law in question____” Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Demby, 390 Md. 580 , 593 n. 10, 890 A.2d 310 (2006) (emphasis omitted).

In the case sub judice, appellant entered a plea of involved in June of 2006 to one count of sexual abuse of a minor and two counts of second degree sexual offense. At the time of his plea in 2006, appellant was sixteen years old and, because he was a juvenile, was not required to register as a sex offender in Maryland. See CP 2005 § 11-704 (lacking a juvenile sex offender registry and not requiring that former juvenile offenders register on the adult sex offender registry upon leaving the jurisdiction of the juvenile court). In 2009 and 2010, the Maryland General Assembly amended MSORA to require certain juvenile offenders to register as sex offenders once they left the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

See CP 2010 § ll-704(c). 7 CP 2010 § ll-704(c) requires: (c) Registration by person who was adjudicated delinquent at time of act.—(1) A person who has been adjudicated delinquent for an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a violation of § 3-303, § 3-304, § 3-305, or § 3-306 of the Criminal Law Article, or § 3-307(a)(1) or (2) or § 3-308(b)(l) of the Criminal Law Article involving conduct described in § 3—301(f)(2) of the ⁶⁸⁸ Criminal Law Article, shall register with the person’s supervising authority if: (i) the person was a minor who was at least 13 years old at the time the delinquent act was committed; (ii) the State’s Attorney or the Department of Juvenile Services requests that the person be required to register; (iii) 90 days prior to the time the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the person terminates under § 3-8A-07 of the Courts Article, the court, after a hearing, determines under a clear and convincing evidence standard that the person is at significant risk of committing a sexually violent offense or an offense for which registration as a tier II sex offender or tier III sex offender is required; and (iv) the person is at least 18 years old. (Emphasis added). The framework of CP 2010 § ll-704(c) clearly applies to appellant. He was adjudicated delinquent of second degree sexual offense, which is prohibited by Section 3-306 of the Criminal Law Article; 8 he was over thirteen years old at the time of the offense; the State requested that appellant be required to register as a sex offender; the juvenile court determined by clear and convincing evidence that appellant was at significant risk of re-offending; and appellant was over eighteen years old when his registration began.

The 2010 amendments to MSORA also state that “this subtitle shall be applied retroactively to include a person who ... is under the custody or supervision of a supervising authority on October 1, 2010.” CP 2010 § ll-702.1(a)(l). “Supervising authority” is defined as, among other entities, “the Secretary of Juvenile Services, if the registrant was a ⁶⁸⁹ minor at the time the act was committed for which registration is required.” CP 2010 § ll-701(n)(10). On October 1, 2010, appellant was on probation under the supervision of the Department of Juvenile Services, as well as under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. While on probation, appellant was subject to ongoing review hearings before the juvenile court and active home electronic monitoring; he was required to attend various treatment clinics, to submit to frequent and random drug tests, and to meet regularly with his juvenile probation officer. Appellant was therefore clearly “under the custody or supervision of a supervising authority on October 1, 2010.” CP 2010 § 11—702.1(a)(1).

Because the 2010 amendments apply retroactively, and appellant was subject to the requirements of CP 2010 § 11-704(c) based on conduct that occurred in 2005, prior to the 2010 amendments, we conclude that appellant has satisfied the first step in an ex post facto analysis. See Demby, 390 Md. at 593 n. 10, 890 A.2d 310 . We next turn to whether the application of CP 2010 § ll-704(c) to appellant violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws in light of Doe I . (C) Intent-Effects Test Appellant contends that he is entitled to relief based on the Doe I Court’s conclusion that the retroactive application of MSORA is unlawful.

Arguing that Doe and appellant were both subject to “punishment” under MSORA, appellant contends that nothing distinguishes his case from the Doe I plurality and Judge McDonald’s concurring opinion. Although we note some similarities in the two cases, we conclude that the retroactive application of MSORA as applied to appellant is not “punishment” under the intent-effects test, and therefore is not a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws contained in Article 17. We shall explain. 1. Legislative Intent As stated above, to determine whether MSORA violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto ⁶⁹⁰ laws, we apply the intent-effects test.

The intent-effects test is a two-step process: We must ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish civil proceedings. If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it civil. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[Wjhere a legislative restriction is an incident of the State’s power to protect the health and safety of its citizens, it will be considered as evidencing an intent to exercise that regulatory power, and not a purpose to add to the punishment.” Id. at 93-94 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Although no statement of purpose is expressly set forth in MSORA, its history and language suggest that it is not intended to be punitive. In Young , the Court of Appeals discussed the legislative purpose of a previous version of MSORA, then set forth in former Article 27, § 792: As enacted, § 792 contained no express statement of purpose. Although it was placed within Article 27 and recodi-fied in the Criminal Procedure Article, its location within the criminal procedure laws does not necessarily indicate an intent on the part of the General Assembly to punish sex offenders.... Therefore, in examining the purpose of the statute, we look primarily to the plain language.

With respect to the determination of legislative intent, we conclude that the plain language and overall design of § 792 clearly indicate that it was not intended as punishment, but rather was intended as a regulatory requirement aimed at protection of the public. There is no indication in the statutory scheme that the General Assembly intended regis ⁶⁹¹ tration or notification as a device to punish convicted sex offenders. 370 Md. at 712 , 806 A.2d 233 (italics in original). When the requirement of registration for certain juvenile sex offenders was added to MSORA by the 2009 amendment, there was nothing in the language of that provision, nor in its legislative history, to indicate a legislative intent different from that which was articulated by the Court of Appeals in Young. See 2009 Md. Laws, Chap. 524.

We therefore conclude that CP 2010 § ll-704(e) is intended to be civil, rather than penal. 2. Punishment or Non-Punitive Effect The intent-effects test next directs us to determine whether the statute’s effect “overrides the legislative purpose to render the statute punitive.” Doe I, 430 Md. at 570 , 62 A.3d 123 (Harrell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Factors derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy v. Mendozar-Martinez assist us in analyzing whether an otherwise regulatory statute becomes punitive. 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). These factors include, but are not limited to: [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment^ 3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned....

Id. at 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554 (footnotes omitted). In Doe I , Judge McDonald concluded that “the cumulative effect of [the] 2009 and 2010 amendments ... took that law across the line from civil regulation to an element of the punishment of offenders.” 430 Md. at 578 , 62 A.3d 123 (McDonald, J., concurring). The question before us is whether the cumulative effect of the MSORA amendments regarding juvenile sex ⁶⁹² offenders codified in CP 2010 § ll-704(c) has caused the statute to cross the line drawn in Doe I . We conclude that the statute has not crossed such line.

(a) Affirmative disability or restraint We turn first to whether MSORA involves an affirmative disability or restraint. Appellant argues that many of the registration requirements outlined in Doe I are also applicable to him, including: [R]eport[ing] in person to law enforcement every three months, giv[ing] notice to law enforcement of his address and any changes of address, and notifying] law enforcement before being away from his home for more than seven days. Furthermore, he must disclose to the State a significant amount of information, some of which is highly personal, including: his employment address; information about his conviction; his social security number; his email address and computer log-in names; information about vehicles he often uses, including those not owned by him; his finger prints and palm prints; all “identifying factors, including a physical description,” and an updated digital image of himself. Additionally, other than to vote, [appellant] is prohibited from entering onto real property that is used as a school or a family child care center ... without first obtaining permission.

If [appellant] fails to comply with these requirements, he faces terms of imprisonment, depending on the violation, of up to three or five years. Doe I, 430 Md. at 562 , 62 A.3d 123 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). The State counters that, despite these significant requirements, appellant’s situation is distinguishable from Doe I . As the State correctly points out, appellant’s “period of registration is much less than that required of Tier III offenders who committed similar offenses after they reached the age of majority.” Appellant was adjudicated delinquent by the juvenile court for committing two counts of second degree sexual offense. ⁶⁹³ Because of appellant’s adjudication as a delinquent, appellant’s registration term is limited to five years.

See CP 2010 § 11-707(a)(4)(iv). If appellant had been charged with second degree sexual offense as an adult, however, he would have been categorized as a Tier III offender and thus would have been subject to a lifelong registration requirement. See CP 2010 §§ 11—701(q)(l)(ii), —707(a)(4)(iii). Both Doe and appellant experienced an increase in the length of their respective registration requirements as a result of the 2009 and 2010 MSORA amendments.

Doe’s registration requirements, which initially did not exist, automatically increased to lifelong registration. Doe I, 430 Md. at 540 , 62 A.3d 123 (plurality opinion). Appellant’s registration requirements, which initially did not exist, increased to a five-year period of registration after the juvenile court determined that appellant was at significant risk of re-offending, but also allowed appellant to petition the court to reduce his registration term. See CP 2010 § ll-707(a)(4)(iv).

The difference between the length of Doe’s and appellant’s registration terms is stark, and only a former juvenile sex offender has the opportunity to be removed from the sex offender registry prior to the expiration of his registration term. 9 Nevertheless, because any period of registration imposed on appellant constitutes an affirmative disability, and the ex post facto prohibition applies to any increase in punishment or sanction, see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), we conclude that the first factor weighs in favor of appellant. (b) Historical perspective Second, we consider whether the regulation has been regarded historically as punishment. As the plurality in Doe I ⁶⁹⁴ noted, “requiring [Doe] to register has essentially the same effect on his life as placing him on probation. It is well-settled in this State that probation is a form of a criminal sanction.” 430 Md. at 561 , 62 A.3d 123 (plurality opinion).

In addition, according to the plurality, “the dissemination of [Doe’s] information ... is tantamount to the historical punishment of shaming.” Id. at 564 , 62 A.3d 123