In Re Patrick Y.

ROBERT C. MURPHY, Judge, Retired, Specially Assigned. Patrick Y., the appellant, was charged with being a delinquent child by virtue of committing acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute possession of a deadly weapon upon school property and possession of a pager on school property. An adjudicatory hearing was held in the District Court of Montgomery County acting as a Juvenile Court (Eric Johnson, J.). At that hearing, appellant moved to suppress physical evidence and statements that he alleged were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Judge Johnson, after hearing evidence on appellant’s motion, denied it. He subsequently found appellant to have committed both offenses and found him guilty of being a delinquent child. Appellant presents us with one question in this appeal: Did the juvenile court err in denying his motion to suppress? Perceiving no error, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court. ⁶⁰⁷ FACTS 1 At approximately 10:40 on the morning of May 23, 1997, Patrick Rooney, a school security guard, received information “that there were drugs and or weapons in the middle school area of the [Mark Twain] school.” Officer Rooney did not recall the source of the information.

Officer Rooney alerted the principal of the school, who authorized a search of every locker in the middle school area, including those of teachers. On the date in question, appellant was an eighth grade student in the middle school. His locker was searched pursuant to the principal’s authorization. When Officer Rooney searched appellant’s locker, he found a folding knife and a packet of rolling papers in appellant’s backpack. 2 Officer Rooney went to find appellant and found him being restrained by school personnel, apparently as a result of an unrelated incident.

School personnel called the police regarding the items found in appellant’s locker. Officer Rooney waited with appellant for the police to arrive. Officer Rooney did not remember if anyone else was present with them. According to Officer Rooney, he did not question appellant while waiting for the police.

Although appellant did not remember whether anyone had specifically asked him about the items, he recalled that he had admitted that the knife, rolling papers, and pager were his. Appellant also introduced into evidence a school policy statement that he and his mother had signed. The statement, titled “Policies Regarding Student Behavior,” set forth the ⁶⁰⁸ school’s behavior management policy, its policy on physical restraint of students, and a prohibition against students bringing more than $10.00 to school. In addition, the statement provided: Mark Twain subscribes to the Montgomery County Public Schools’ Search and Seizure policy, which provides that the principal or the administration’s designee may conduct a search of a student or of the student’s locker if there is probable cause to believe that the student has in his/her possession an item, the possession of which constitutes a criminal offense under the laws of the State of Maryland.

At the adjudicatory hearing, appellant moved to suppress the physical evidence found in his locker. He contended that the school’s policy statement created an expectation that school officials would not enter his locker absent probable cause and that the search of appellant’s locker was unreasonable because it was not based on probable cause. 3 In this appeal appellant contends that the search was unreasonable because the school authorities had no reasonable suspicion that appellant possessed contraband in his locker and because it was in violation of the school’s stated policy on searches. The State counters that the trial court properly balanced the intrusion into appellant’s privacy interests against the school’s interest in maintaining a safe environment, and that he acted properly in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. DISCUSSION As noted, in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider only the record of the hearing on the motion to suppress, not that of the trial itself.

Trusty v. State, 308 Md. 658 , 521 A.2d 749 (1987); Aiken v. State, 101 Md.App. 557 , 647 A.2d 1229 (1994), cert. denied, 337 Md. 89 , 651 A.2d 854 (1995). ⁶⁰⁹ We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272 , 600 A.2d 430 (1992); Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180 , 571 A.2d 1239 (1990). While we accept the findings of disputed fact unless clearly erroneous, after having given due regard to the lower court’s opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, we make our own constitutional appraisal as to the effect of those facts. McMillian v. State, supra, Riddick v. State, supra.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The purpose of this Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)). The prohibition against unreasonable searches applies to searches conducted upon schoolchildren by school officials. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333 , 105 S.Ct. 733 .

The Supreme Court noted, however, that, [although the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable depends upon the context within which a search takes place. The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of searches requires “balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.” On one side of the balance are arrayed the individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government’s need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order. Id. at 337 , 105 S.Ct. 733 (citation omitted). The Court recognized that “schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have ⁶¹⁰ necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds.” Id. at 339 , 105 S.Ct. 733 .

The Court opined, however, that the need of the schools to maintain order and a proper educational environment “requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult.” Id. at 339 , 105 S.Ct. 733 . Recognizing “the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools,” id. at 341 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , the Court stated that school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority. Id. at 340 , 105 S.Ct. 733 . The Court also concluded that, balancing the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools, school officials did not need probable cause in order to search a student.

Id. at 341 , 105 S.Ct. 733 . Rather, the legality of such a search “should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.” Id. at 341 , 105 S.Ct. 733 . The Court further explained: Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider “whether the ... action was justified at its inception”; second, one must determine “whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be “justified at its inception” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.

Id. at 341-42 , 105 S.Ct. 733 (citations and footnotes omitted). Although New Jersey v. T.L.O. involved a search based on individualized suspicion, the Court recognized that such suspi ⁶¹¹ cion is not a necessary prerequisite to a search being reasonable. Id. at 842, n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 733 . Other cases have made clear that “where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against the Government’s interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.” National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 , 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989).

Thus, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 489 U.S. 602 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), the United States Supreme Court upheld drug testing without particularized suspicion for railway employees involved in accidents and those who violated particular rules. In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, supra, the Court upheld drug tests as a condition of promotion or transfer of members of the custom service who are involved in drug interdiction and carry firearms. Noting the “almost unique mission” of the Customs Service, Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 , the court reasoned that the government had a “compelling” interest in assuring that individuals in those positions were not drug users. Id. at 670-71 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 .

In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 , 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), the United States Supreme Court addressed the reasonableness of a generalized search without individualized suspicion in the context of a public school. In that case, the Court considered whether the school district’s concern about drug use by student athletes was sufficient to justify a policy whereby all students participating in interscholastic athletics were required to consent to