In re Rachel S.

MOYLAN, Judge. Like a falling row of dominoes, one procedural error in this case led to a second procedural error, which in turn caused a third procedural error. It all began on November 9, 1983, when the Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services (the Department) received a complaint about the possible physical and sexual abuse of a three-year-old child, Rachel S. Rachel was immediately taken into shelter care. On the very next day, November 10, the Department simultaneously filed two separate petitions: 1) a petition for shelter care, pursuant to Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 3-815 (1984), and 2) a petition to have Rachel S. adjudicated a child in need of assistance, pursuant to Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 3-810 (1984).

Two separate summonses were issued for two separate hearings, one on each petition. The hearing on the shelter care petition was scheduled, as is required, “on the day the petition [was] filed,” on November 10. See Md.Rule 912a 3. The adjudicatory hearing on the child in need of assistance petition was scheduled, as is required, “within thirty days,” on December 9.

See Md.Rule 914b 2. The two petitions, although dealing with the same child, serve different purposes, are dependent upon different criteria, implicate different schedules, and require different procedures. The failure to appreciate these differences triggered the series of errors in this case. At the November 10 hearing on the issue of shelter care, the Department presented its case for emergency shelter care to the extent to which a case could be marshalled within 24 hours.

Its key witness was Diane Allen, a social worker, who had examined and interviewed at some length Rachel S. Without rehearsing all of the detail of that testimony, it is enough to note that the Department presented a very adequate prima facie case. The hearing judge ordered the case to be continued until November 15, tentatively approving shelter care until that time. Rachel’s ¹⁵⁰ father, the alleged abuser, was in the meantime to take a polygraph examination. When the hearing was reconvened on November 15, all parties stipulated that the father had passed two polygraph examinations.

The Department, in the meantime, had had the opportunity to gather additional evidence of sexual and other physical abuse. The hearing judge peremptorily denied the Department the opportunity to present any additional evidence, predicating his ruling on the fact that the Department had rested its case on November 10. In clear and open reliance on the results of the polygraph tests, the judge dismissed the shelter care petition. The shelter care issue, involving at most the temporary status of Rachel S. between November 9 and December 9, 1983, is now, of course, moot.

Because of the domino effect it had upon the subsequent issues, however, the procedural error that flawed that hearing is not moot. It is unnecessary to discuss whether the denial of the opportunity for the Department to present additional evidence was an abuse of discretion. The erroneous reliance upon the polygraph tests was itself sufficient error to flaw the proceedings. Even if all parties to the adjudication had agreed to accept the results of the polygraph testing, the long settled law in this state is that the technique is considered so inherently unreliable as to preclude the admission of such test results in a trial, civil or criminal.

As was unequivocally stated in Akonom v. State, 40 Md.App. 676, 680 , 394 A.2d 1213 (1978): “It cannot logically be argued that a stipulation enhances in any significant way the inherent reliability of evidence produced by a so-called scientific process or art____ Thus, while we are generally reluctant to invalidate agreements entered into by the parties, we view this as one of the unusual occasions when we are obligated to do so.” See also Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 205 , 453 A.2d 1218 (1983) (Davidson, J., concurring and dissenting); Kelley v. ¹⁵¹ State, 288 Md. 298 , 418 A.2d 217 (1980); Lusby v. State, 217 Md. 191 , 141 A.2d 893 (1958); Mitchell v. State, 51 Md.App. 347 , 443 A.2d 651 (1982); Smith v. State, 20 Md.App. 577 , 318 A.2d 568 (1974); Rawlings v. State, 7 Md.App. 611 , 256 A.2d 704 (1969). This error led directly into the next. Aggrieved at the