In Re Randolph T.

Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. ⁹⁸ We shall here uphold against constitutional attack the requirement of Maryland Code (1974, 1977 Cum. Supp.) § 3-817 (c), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, that "a preponderance of the evidence” is the standard to be used by a trial judge in determining whether to waive juvenile jurisdiction. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. Randolph T. was born January 24, 1963.

Thus, he was just under seventeen years old on November 3, 1979, when an incident took place resulting in charges that he committed the delinquent acts of possessing an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in violation of Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol., 1976 Cum. Supp.) Art. 27, § 481C; carrying a handgun in violation of Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 36B; discharging a firearm within the city limits of Baltimore in violation of Baltimore City Code, Art. 19, § 112; and openly carrying a sawed-off shotgun in violation of Code (1957, 1976 Repl.

Vol.) Art. 27, § 36 (a). A petition alleging his delinquency was filed in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Division for Juvenile Causes, on December 26, 1979. On April 29, 1980, the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City invoked the provisions of Code (1974, 1977 Cum. Supp.) § 3-817, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and requested the court to waive juvenile jurisdiction. 1 ⁹⁹ A hearing was held on June 9, 1980, at which time the court’s exclusive original jurisdiction was waived and it was ordered that Randolph T. be held for action under the appropriate criminal procedure.

Among other things, in determining whether to waive jurisdiction, the trial judge took into consideration the fact that the juvenile was already incarcerated while awaiting trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on a murder charge. 2 In response to a question from counsel, the judge indicated that he was using the preponderance of the evidence standard and that the nature of the events and the public safety were serious factors which he considered in determining whether to waive juvenile jurisdiction. He expressly rejected a contention that the decision in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S. Ct. 1804 , 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979), required that he declare the Maryland act unconstitutional and that under the Due Process Clause ¹⁰⁰ of amend. XIV to the U.S. Const, the proper standard was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment in an unreported opinion. 3 We granted the writ of certiorari in order that we might address the important public issue here involved.

The present Maryland statute relative to juvenile causes is embodied in Code (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.) Subtitle 8, §§ 3-801 to -834, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 4 Pursuant to the provisions of § 3-817, a court may waive its exclusive jurisdiction if it determines "from a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing, that the child is an unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitative measures.” The statute sets forth a number of criteria to be considered by the trial judge as will be seen by reference to n.l. Although Maryland’s virtually statewide juvenile law as enacted in 1945 and ultimately embodied in Code (1957) Art. 26, § 54 contained a provision for waiver, it did not set forth the standard to be used nor did it specify the required weight of the evidence. Randolph first contends that § 3-817 (c), when it states that "[t]he court may not waive its jurisdiction unless it determines, from a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing, that the child is an unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitative measures,” does not require the preponderance standard.

He emphasizes the use of the word "may” and suggests that a higher standard of proof therefore is not forbidden. We understand the statute to be saying that if the judge finds from a preponderance of the evidence that ¹⁰¹ the child is an unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitative measures, then he is to bring his best judgment to bear in the weighing of the various factors. In other words, to borrow that said by Judge Orth for the court in Matter of Murphy, 15 Md. App. 434, 441, 445 , 291 A.2d 867 (1972), the judge then is to "exercise ... [his] sound judicial discretion.” Moreover, as Judge Orth, then Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals, observed for that court in Matter of Trader, 20 Md. App. 1 , 315 A.2d 528 , rev’d on other grounds, 272 Md. 364 , 325 A.2d 398 (1974): "Not all of the factors ... need be resolved against the juvenile to justify a waiver. Hazell v. State, 12 Md. App. 144, 155 [, 277 A.2d 639 , cert. denied, 263 Md. 715 (1971)].

The court is not required to make an arithmetic-type calculation as to the weight it assigns each factor. The general rule is that a waiver will be upheld where a preponderance of the legally sufficient evidence shows that such a determination is proper in the light of the factors to be considered. Matter of Barker, 17 Md. App. 714, 721 [, 305 A.2d 211 (1973)]; Matter of Johnson, 17 Md. App. 705 [, 304 A.2d 859 (1973)].” 20 Md. App. at 14 . A preponderance of the evidence is the standard specified by the statute.

Randolph next contends that by virtue of the Supreme Court’s holding in Addington , the State is bound to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is an unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitative measures, and that waiver of juvenile jurisdiction without such proof constitutes a denial of due process of law. 5 This contention is predicated upon the due process holdings in juvenile matters by the Supreme Court in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S. Ct. 1068 , 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S. Ct. 1428 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967); and Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 86 S. Ct. 1045 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966). ¹⁰² Addington is not a juvenile case. Chief Justice Burger opened the opinion by saying for the Court: "The question in this case is what standard of proof is required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution in a civil proceeding brought under state law to commit an individual involuntarily for an indefinite period to a state mental hospital.” 441 U.S. at 419-20 . After reviewing the background of that particular case, the Court began its discussion by saying: "The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’ In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.” 441 U.S. at 423 .

The Court then discussed the three standards of proof: "At one end of the spectrum is the typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private parties. Since society has a minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits, plaintiffs burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence. The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion. "In a criminal case, on the other hand, the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards ¹⁰³ of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.

In the administration of criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself. This is accomplished by requiring under the Due Process Clause that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, supra. "The intermediate standard, which usually employs some combination of the words 'clear/ 'cogent/ 'unequivocal’ and 'convincing/ is less commonly used, but nonetheless 'is no stranger to the civil law.’ Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).

See also C. McCormick, Evidence § 320 (1954); 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d ed. 1940). One typical use of the standard is in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant. The interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff s burden of proof. Similarly, this Court has used the 'clear, unequivocal and convincing’ standard of proof to protect particularly important individual interests in various civil cases.

See, e.g., Woodby v. INS, supra, at 285 (deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) (denaturalization); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 159 (1943) (denaturalization).” 441 U.S. at 423-24 . In proceeding with its analysis and examination, the Court observed that it "must be mindful that the function of legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions”; that "civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection”; that "involuntary commitment to a mental hospital after a finding of probable dangerousness to self or others ¹⁰⁴ can engender adverse social consequences to the individual” and "can have a very significant impact on the individual”; that the state "has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves”; and that "the state ... has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.” 441 U.S. at 425-26 . The Court rejected the preponderance standard because it "creates the risk of increasing the number of individuals erroneously committed____” 441 U.S. at 426 . It said, "The individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the state.” Id. at 427 .

Addington argued to the Court "that the rationale of the Winship holding that the criminal law standard of proof was required in a delinquency proceeding applies with equal force to a civil commitment proceeding.” Id. at 427 . The Court pointed out, "In a civil commitment state power is not exercised in a punitive sense.” Id. at 428 . In "concluding] that it is unnecessary to require states to apply the strict, criminal standard,” the Court reasoned: "[T]he initial inquiry in a civil commitment proceeding is very different from the central issue in either a delinquency proceeding or a criminal prosecution. In the latter cases the basic issue is a straightforward factual question — did the accused commit the act alleged?

There may be factual issues to resolve in a commitment proceeding, but the factual aspects represent only the beginning of the inquiry. Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists. Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state could ever ¹⁰⁵ prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.” 441 U.S. at 429 (emphasis in original). The Court then "turn[ed] to a middle level of burden of proof that strikes a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of the state,” that of "clear and convincing” evidence, saying, "To meet due process demands, the standard has to inform the factfinder that the proof must be greater than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable to other categories of civil cases.” Id. at 431-33 .

Randolph has correctly referred to Winship, Gault, and Kent . They do not dictate, however, the result he desires here. Winship , as petitioner notes, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt at the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile proceeding where the juvenile is charged with an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult. Gault , as summarized by Justice Brennan for the Court in Winship , "decided that, although the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that the hearing at [the adjudicatory] stage [of a juvenile proceeding] conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative proceeding, the Due Process Clause does require application during the adjudicatory hearing of ' "the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” ’ Id., at 30.” 397 U.S. at 359 .

Kent involved a waiver under the District of Columbia juvenile statute. The holding of the Court was "that it is incumbent upon the Juvenile Court to accompany its waiver order with a statement of the reasons or considerations therefor” and "that an opportunity for a hearing which may be informal, must be given the child prior to entry of a waiver order,” which "hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” 383 U.S. at 561, 562 . Although a number of courts since Addington have referred to its standard of proof in various situations, we have been referred to no case nor have we encountered one ¹⁰⁶ in which the standard of proof in juvenile waiver proceedings has been changed because of Addington . The cases decided since Addington , when coupled with the examples given by the Supreme Court in Addington , do help to make a picture of the proper circumstances for the use of its standard, however.

See, e.g., Decker v. Securities & Exch. Com’n, 631 F.2d 1380, 1384 (10th Cir. 1980) (Addington "establishes a balancing approach for determining the appropriate standard.” Preponderance of the evidence is the proper standard for determining whether an investment advisor has aided and abetted a violation of a section of the Investment Company Act prohibiting receipt of compensation in exchange for purchase or sale of property to or for an investment company.); Duncan v. State, 394 So. 2d 930, 932 (Ala. 1981) (On appeal from an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction, without discussion of Addington , the court said, "Since the purpose of a hearing of this type is not to determine guilt or innocence, the strict standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has been held not to apply. Brown [v. State, 353 So. 2d 1384 (Ala. 1977)]. The only standard which must be met is whether a reasonable man would believe the crime occurred and that the defendant committed it.... [T]his hearing was not one at which guilt had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Matter of C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518, 525-26 (Alaska 1979) (Due Process Clause does not require a standard of proof greater than clear and convincing evidence when the State seeks to terminate parental rights because of unfitness.); People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127, 1134-36 (Colo. 1980) (A trial court held that in a hearing to decide whether a person should be detained for short-term treatment at a mental hospital for a period not to exceed three months the "clear and convincing” standard of proof specified in the Colorado statute was inadequate to protect a person’s right to procedural due process.

The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding to the contrary.); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1339 (D.C. 1981) (Contention that procedural due process required proof beyond a reasonable doubt for a pretrial detention hearing was rejected.); People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 303-04 , 391 N.E.2d 366 (1979) (Case ¹⁰⁷ was