In Re Roneika S.

BARBERA, J. In this appeal we discuss what a petition alleging juvenile delinquency must contain as a factual basis to support the allegation. The issue implicates the requirement of notice embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the specific dictates of Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 3-8A-13 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”) and Maryland Rule 11-103. On November 10, 2005, the State filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging that Roneika S. had made a false statement to a police officer in violation of Maryland Code (2002), § 9-501 of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”). 1 Roneika S. filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it lacked a sufficient factual basis for the allegation. The Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County, sitting as the juvenile court, conducted a hearing on the motion and, agreeing with Roneika S., dismissed the petition.

The State appealed and argues, among other things, that the petition alleged sufficient facts to support the allegation. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the petition set forth an adequate factual basis for the charged delinquency. BACKGROUND The juvenile delinquency petition alleged that “on or about April 21, 2005, at Lexington Park, St. Mary’s County,” Roneika S. “did make a false statement to DFC Cara Grumbles, a ⁵⁸¹ peace officer, knowing the same to be false, with the intent to deceive and with the intent to cause an investigation or other action to be taken, in violation of CR 9-501 of the Annotated Code of Maryland[.]” The petition listed Roneika S.’s full name, address, date of birth, her physical description, and the name and address of her parent. The petition also listed the names and addresses of witnesses.

Roneika S., by counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the petition. She claimed that the petition did not sufficiently allege the facts supporting the charged delinquent act, thereby violating the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The juvenile court entertained the motion at the scheduled adjudication hearing. Roneika S.’s counsel argued at the hearing that the petition failed to include a “to wit” clause with specific allegations: [COUNSEL]: [The petition] doesn’t say that the false statement — it doesn’t say what she said.... [I] t needs to say, she did make a false statement about the presence of [A.S.], or it needs to say, to wit, she did make a false statement about her involvement in the fight ... or, Your Honor it needs to say, to wit, she did make a false statement about [another person] breaking windows in her house, because false statements were made then, Your Honor, but, not every false statement made that night ... was made with the intent to cause an investigation or other action to be taken.

True statements were made that night or false statements were made that night, and what the accused needs ... to know, well, what statement are you talking about, because lots of things can be said, but it is what the law does not prohibit is any sort of blanket falsehood mentioned to the officer. ... And the problem with this case is Roneika did make some false statements that night, but she also made true statements. And we need to know, in order to give her a fair trial, a fair hearing, and in order to prepare for trial, we need to know what statement is — the State alleges is in fact ⁵⁸² false, because that is — that is a constitutional notice problem, Your Honor. Counsel asserted that, if the State was not prepared to amend the petition at the hearing, then “[the petition] really should be dismissed.” The juvenile court noted that the rules of procedure permitted amendment of the petition, with the court’s approval. 2 To that defense counsel replied: “[W]hat would the amendment be, what would the to wit say, because I think it needs that.” The court then heard from the State on the motion.

The State informed the court that it had provided counsel with discovery material that supplied the specific details counsel was seeking concerning the alleged false statement: [Roneika S.’s counsel] is indicating that his client made numerous false statements and he is unaware of which false statements constitutes the offense in this particular case. And I can only tell the Court that the State did provide discovery, and in the discovery the police officer indicated that she reported for a property destruction, and throughout the police report she refers to the property destruction, and quite frankly says that that is the basis for the false statement, that [Roneika S.] indicated somebody committed a property destruction, and through the police officer’s initiation,[ 3 ] that was determined not to be the case. I would also just tell the Court that the statement, we have received no bill of particulars, there was no request made by the defense to ask if there was more specific information that was provided for these charges, which clearly the Legislature provides for, and it wasn’t done. I think [Roneika S.] has been sufficiently put on notice as to what the charge is. ⁵⁸³ Counsel for Roneika S. did not reply to the State’s comment, and the court proceeded to rule on the motion to dismiss.

The court began by citing Anderson v. State, 385 Md. 123 , 867 A.2d 1040 (2005) and Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787 , 490 A.2d 1277 (1985), cases which set forth the purpose of the criminal charging document. Reciting from Williams , the court noted that the charging document must fulfill the constitutional requirement of informing the accused of the accusation, more particularly by one, put[ting] the accused on notice of what he is called upon to defend by characterizing and describing the crime and conduct, two, protecting the accused from a future prosecution for the same offense, three, enabling the accused to prepare for his trial, four, providing a basis for the Court to consider the legal sufficiency of the charging document and, five, informing the Court of the specific crime charged so that, if required, sentence may be pronounced in accordance with the right of the case. The court recognized that “cases have recently upheld charging documents that merely state that the Defendant unlawfully committed a crime, as defined by the Criminal Code, at a specific time and place within the State.” Nevertheless, the court decided that the brief description in this charging document does not satisfy the purposes listed above----The defendant in this specific case knows that she was charged with making a false statement to the police on or about April 21, 2005, but does not know what statement the State is claiming was false, which statement. This prevents the defendant from preparing for trial because until the date of the trial, the defendant has no idea what statement the state is claiming is false, notwithstanding the issue of discovery.

In addition, this charging document does not protect the accused from a future prosecution for the same offense, again, because the specific statement or the content of the specific statement is not set forth. Because the charging document does not set forth the allegedly false statement with any type of particu ⁵⁸⁴ larity to allow the defendant to prepare for trial, the Court would have to dismiss, and so your motion is granted. DISCUSSION The State mounts three arguments in support of vacating the judgment of dismissal. The State argues that the delinquency petition satisfied the requirements of the law concerning notice of the charge.

The State also argues that, even assuming the petition falls short of those requirements, the juvenile court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition, rather than amending it or granting a continuance for the purpose of amending it. Last, the State argues that the court should not have dismissed the petition given the State’s proffer, not disputed by Roneika S., that notice of the specified false statement was provided through discovery. Roneika S. counters all of the State’s arguments. She also interposes the preliminary argument that the appeal should be dismissed because the State seeks relief — reinstatement of the delinquency petition and an adjudicatory hearing — that would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

We first address Roneika S.’s double jeopardy argument. I. We begin with the settled proposition that “the provisions against being twice placed in jeopardy, contained in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and as a part of the common law of Maryland are ‘fully applicable to juvenile adjudicatory proceedings.’ ” In re: Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 531 , 601 A.2d 1102 (1992)(quoting Parojinog v. State, 282 Md. 256, 260 , 384 A.2d 86 (1978)); accord In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181, 185 , 786 A.2d 684 (2001) (stating that, “for purposes of the double jeopardy prohibition, a juvenile delinquency proceeding is treated as a criminal prosecution”). Double jeopardy principles preclude, among other things, further trial proceedings after an acquittal or equivalent adjudication on the merits in favor of the ⁵⁸⁵ accused. State v. Taylor, 371 Md. 617, 630-33 , 810 A.2d 964 (2002).

Roneika S. argues that double jeopardy principles prevent the State from prosecuting an appeal in this case because “the juvenile court made a determination that the State had insufficient proof on which to proceed with the charges.” She relies on Taylor, supra. Taylor involved appeals from two separate criminal proceedings. In each case, the trial judge had granted a pre-trial motion to dismiss for reasons relating to evidentiary insufficiency. The Taylor Court decided that, in so ruling, the trial judges had “exceeded the permissible scope of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case.” Id. at 644 , 810 A.2d 964 .

The Court explained that “[a] pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment or information may not be predicated on insufficiency of the State’s evidence because such an analysis necessarily requires consideration of the general issue.” Id. at 645 , 810 A.2d 964 . Consequently, “where there are factual issues involved, a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the State’s proof would fail is improper. This is so even when the question of subject matter jurisdiction is co-mingled with questions going to the merits.” Id. The Taylor Court emphasized that, even though the trial judges had exceeded the scope of a motion to dismiss, it could not be overlooked that their rulings were based on factual matters going beyond “the four corners of the charging documents.” Id. at 648 , 810 A.2d 964 .

The Taylor Court stated in that regard: “Determining the quality and quantum of the evidence is tantamount to trial of the general issue, and as such, dismissal of a criminal information or indictment based on an assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence is tantamount to an acquittal.” Id. at 648-49 , 810 A.2d 964 . Because the rulings dismissing the case constituted, as a matter of substance, judgments of acquittal, the rulings had to be treated as such for double jeopardy purposes. Id. at 650-51 , 810 A.2d 964 . Further, because jeopardy attached to the rulings made by the trial judges, the State’s appeals from those ⁵⁸⁶ decisions violated the defendants’ “protections against double jeopardy under Maryland common law.” Id. at 654 , 810 A.2d 964 .

Roneika S.’s argument that the present appeal must be dismissed is based on the premise that the juvenile judge granted her motion to dismiss for reasons of legal insufficiency of the evidence, as the trial judges had done in Taylor . The argument fails in its premise. It is clear from the court’s ruling, and the discussion among the court and counsel that preceded the ruling, that the court dismissed the petition because the court believed it to be legally inadequate on its face. Because the court’s dismissal of the juvenile petition was not substantively an acquittal, jeopardy did not attach to that decision.

The rule of Taylor simply does not come into play. 4 We have said in the past that, “ ‘[bjefore we can even consider double jeopardy, we must first establish single jeopardy.’ ” Giddins v. State, 163 Md.App. 322, 328 , 878 A.2d 687 (2005) (quoting West v. State, 52 Md.App. 624, 626 , 451 A.2d 1228 (1982)), aff'd, 393 Md. 1 , 899 A.2d 139 (2006). Roneika S. has not yet been placed in “single jeopardy,” as the court had yet to hear the merits of the case. See In re Darnell F., 71 Md.App. 584 , 526 A2d 971 , cert. denied, 311 Md. 144 , 532 A.2d 1371 (1987). The State may pursue its appeal. ⁵⁸⁷ II.

We turn now to the State’s complaint that the juvenile court erred or abused its discretion when it dismissed the delinquency petition. The State’s lead argument is that, contrary to the court’s assessment of the petition, it satisfied the requirement of factual specificity. We shall focus our attention upon that argument. A. Juvenile causes are civil, not criminal proceedings.

Nonetheless, “ ‘many of the constitutional safeguards afforded criminal defendants are applicable to juveniles.’ ” In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 69 , 763 A.2d 136 (2000) (quoting In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 91 , 646 A.2d 1012 (1994)). For example, a juvenile is entitled as a matter of due process to adequate notice of the allegations brought against him. The Supreme Court made that clear in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). The Court declared in Gault that juvenile delinquency proceedings must comport with “the essentials of due process and fair treatment” that are “part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our Constitution.” Id. at 30-31 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 (footnote omitted).

With regard to notice of the alleged delinquency, the Court stated: “Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.” Id. at 33 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 . Roneika S. did not invoke the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in her motion to dismiss the juvenile petition. She did invoke, however, the Maryland Declaration of Rights, by which we presume she more particularly meant Article 21. Article 21 specifically addresses criminal prosecutions and provides: That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in due time (if required) to ⁵⁸⁸ prepare for his defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have process for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath; and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty.

The Court of Appeals has held that the right to a speedy trial contained in Article 21 is applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50, 70 , 811 A.2d 310 (2002). The Court reasoned that the rights recognized in Gault and later, in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), which held that due process demands that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof be required in delinquency proceedings, “were determined to stem from fundamental fairness[.]” Thomas, 372 Md. at 70 , 811 A.2d 310 . The Court concluded that the right to a speedy trial in a juvenile proceeding is “consistent with the protections enumerated in Gault.” Id.

In light of Gault, Winship, and Thomas , the notice provision of Article 21, i.e., the right of a criminal defendant “to be informed of the accusation against him,” must apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings. We therefore hold that juveniles are entitled to fair notice under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The notice protections afforded juveniles under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 21 are embodied in CJ § 3-8A-13. 5 That section is located in subtitle 8A, “Juvenile Causes-Children Other Than CINAs and Adults.” CJ § 3-8A-13 addresses the form and content of the delinquency petition and provides in pertinent part: (a) Allegations generally. — A petition shall allege that a child is either delinquent or in need of supervision. If it alleges delinquency, it shall set forth in clear and simple ⁵⁸⁹ language the alleged facts which constitute the delinquency, and shall also specify the laws allegedly violated by the child.... * * * (d) Applicability of Maryland Rules. — The form of petitions, peace order requests, and all other pleadings under this subtitle, and except as otherwise provided in the subtitle, the procedures to be followed by the court under this subtitle, shall be as specified in the Maryland Rules.

Maryland Rule ll-103(a) implements the mandate of CJ § 3-8A-13(a) and addresses the requirements of a juvenile petition. The rule provides in pertinent part: a. Form — Contents. The juvenile petition shall be by the State of Maryland.

It shall be in writing and shall comply with the requirements of this Rule. 1. Caption. The petition shall be captioned “Matter of 2. Contents.

The petition shall state: (a) The respondent’s name, address and date of birth. If the respondent is a child, it shall also state the name and address of his parent. (b) Allegations providing a basis for the court’s assuming jurisdiction over the respondent (e.g., that the respondent child is delinquent, in need of supervision, or in need of assistance; that the respondent adult violated Section 3-831 of the Courts Article; that the action arises under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles; or that the action arises under the compulsory public school attendance laws of this State). (c) The facts, in clear and simple language, on which the allegations are based.

If the commission of one or more delinquent acts or crimes is alleged, the petition shall specify the laws allegedly violated by the respondent. (d) The name of each witness to be subpoenaed in support of the petition. ⁵⁹⁰ (e) Whether the respondent is in detention or shelter care; and if so, whether his parent has been notified and the date such detention or shelter care commenced. In the present appeal, the State argues that the petition satisfied the statute and rule by setting forth the “required alleged facts” concerning the violation at issue. The State maintains that the petition “need not address every single fact or potential detail surrounding an alleged delinquent act.” The State also intimates that the juvenile court erred by measuring the adequacy of the delinquency petition in this case by reference to the requirements of a criminal charging document.

We agree with the State, for reasons we explain a bit later in this opinion, that the petition satisfied the requirements of CJ § 3-8A-13 (a), Rule ll-103a.2. (c), and Article 21, that the petition set forth the alleged facts on which the charged delinquency is based. We disagree, however, with the State’s suggestion that the juvenile court was wrong to refer to two criminal cases, Anderson and Williams , for explication of the purposes that underlay the statute and the rule. We explain.

Regarding the constitutional requirement of fair notice, no less can be required of a juvenile delinquency petition than is required of a criminal charging document. The Supreme Court made that clear in Gault . The Court characterized the notice required in juvenile delinquency proceedings as “notice of the sort we have described — that is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding.” 387 U.S. at 33-34 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 . In a footnote that followed that sentence, the Court collected a number of criminal cases representing “application of the due process requirement of adequate notice in a criminal context.” Id. at 33 n. 53, 87 S.Ct. 1428 .

Following citation to those criminal cases, the Court noted: “The Court’s discussion in these cases of the right to timely and adequate notice forecloses any contention that the notice approved by the Arizona Supreme Court, or the notice actually given the Gaults, was constitutionally adequate.” Id. ⁵⁹¹ In light of what the Supreme Court stated in Gault , and our holding that the right to notice afforded criminal defendants under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights applies equally to juveniles, the notice that must be provided in delinquency proceedings is identical to that required in criminal cases. The juvenile court was not wrong to look to criminal cases as a benchmark for assessing the adequacy of the notice provided by the delinquency petition that was filed in Roneika S.’s case. B. We now turn to the question of whether the delinquency petition that was filed in this case passes muster under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Article 21, CJ § 3-8A-13(a), and Rule ll-103(c). We hold that it does.

The purposes underlying the notice requirements in criminal cases were explained in Williams , one of the two cases that the juvenile court cited in the present case: A primary purpose of a charging document is to fulfill the constitutional requirement contained in Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights that each person charged with a crime must be informed of the accusation against him.... More particularly, the purposes served by the constitutional requirement include (1) putting the accused on notice of what he is called upon to defend by characterizing and describing the crime and conduct; (2) protecting the accused from a future prosecution for the same offense; (3) enabling the accused to prepare for his trial; (4) providing a basis for the court to consider the legal sufficiency of the charging document; and (5) informing the court of the specific crime charged so that, if required, sentence may be pronounced in accordance with the right of the case.... We have repeatedly emphasized that every criminal charge must, first, characterize the crime; and, second, it must provide such description of the criminal act alleged to have been committed as will inform the accused of the specific conduct with which he is charged, thereby enabling him to ⁵⁹² defend against the accusation and avoid a second prosecution for the same criminal offense. 302 Md. at 790-91 , 490 A.2d 1277 (footnote and citations omitted). “Unquestionably, a charging document that fails to give adequate notice of the charges is deficient and subject to dismissal,” at least in a criminal case. 6 See Denicolis v. State, 378 Md. 646, 661 , 837 A.2d 944 (2003). But that argument “does not necessarily translate into the failure to show jurisdiction or to allege [a delinquent act].” See id. at 662 , 837 A.2d 944 .

Indeed, Roneika S. did not argue for dismissal of the petition