In re Ryan W.

HARRELL, J. These combined cases 1 arose initially from a 16 June 2011 order entered by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as the juvenile court, directing the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (“the Department”) to hold in a constructive trust funds the Department received, in its capacity as representative payee, from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) on behalf of Ryan W. (“Ryan”), a Child in Need of Assistance (“CINA”). Born on 26 February 1993, Ryan entered the care of the Department at age 9 after a 4 June 2002 determination by the Circuit Court that he was a CINA. That ⁵⁸² determination rested on allegations that his drug-addicted parents neglected Ryan and his siblings.

Ryan’s parents died while he was in foster care. The Department filed an application with the SSA to be appointed his representative payee for Old Age and Survivor’s Disability Insurance (“OASDI”) benefits to which Ryan was entitled following his parents’ deaths. After being appointed as Ryan’s representative payee by the SSA, the Department received his benefit payments and applied them to reimburse itself partially for the current cost of Ryan’s foster care. Ryan challenged subsequently in the Circuit Court this allocation of his benefit funds by filing a pleading styled as a “motion to control conduct,” alleging that the Department failed to make an individualized determination of what was in Ryan’s best interests in the application of the proceeds and that the benefits should have been conserved instead for his use in transitioning by age out of foster care.

The Circuit Court agreed with Ryan’s contentions, leading to establishment of the constructive trust and subsequent appellate scrutiny of that judgment. We conclude that, under the Social Security Act and the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code, a local department of social services, acting in the capacity as an institutional representative payee appointed by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, has discretion to apply a CINA foster child’s OASDI benefits to reimburse the Department for its costs incurred for the child’s current maintenance, but must provide notice to the child and/or his or her legal representative that the Department applied to the SSA and received such benefits on the child’s behalf. Thus, we shall affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in No. 95 and dismiss No. 101 as moot. RELEVANT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY CONTEXT Social Security Act and Federal Regulations In 1939, Congress added OASDI to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., which provides for, among other ⁵⁸³ things, monthly benefit payments to certain members of a deceased wage-earner’s family.

Astrue v. Capoto ex rel. B.N.C., — U.S.-,-, 132 S.Ct. 2021, 2027 , 182 L.Ed.2d 887, 895 (2012). A dependent child who survives his wage-earning parent may be entitled to receive survivor’s benefits if the child is unmarried and under the age of 18 (or 19 if attending school full time). 42 U.S.C. § 402 (d). “An applicant qualifies for such benefits if [he or] she meets the Act’s definition of ‘child,’ is unmarried, is below specified age limits (18 or 19) or is under a disability which began prior to age 22, and was dependent on the insured at the time of the insured’s death.” Astrue, — U.S.-,-, 132 S.Ct. at 2027 , 182 L.Ed.2d at 895 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402 (d)(1)). The wages earned by the deceased parent prior to his or her death determine the amount of the benefit.

Id. A representative payee may be appointed for a child entitled to OASDI benefits if the Commissioner of the SSA determines that the interests of the beneficiary will be served by doing so. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (j)(l)(A). “[E]very beneficiary has the right to manage his or her own benefits. However, some beneficiaries due to a mental or physical condition or due to their youth may be unable to do so.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.2001 (b)(1) (emphasis added). Generally, a representative payee is appointed for child beneficiaries under the age of 18, unless the child “shows the ability to manage the benefits.” 2 20 C.F.R. § 404.2010 (b). ⁵⁸⁴ The SSA aims to select “the person, agency, organization or institution that will best serve the interest of the beneficiary” when appointing a representative payee. 20 C.P.R. § 404.2020.

In determining who will best serve the child’s interests, the SSA considers: (a) The relationship of the person to the beneficiary; (b) The amount of interest that the person shows in the beneficiary; (c) Any legal authority the person, agency, organization or institution has to act on behalf of the beneficiary; (d) Whether the potential payee has custody of the beneficiary; and (e) Whether the potential payee is in a position to know of and look after the needs of the beneficiary. 20 C.P.R. § 404.2020(a)-(e). The SSA prioritizes also categories of persons or entities whom the Administration prefers to appoint as a child’s representative payee: (1) A natural or adoptive parent who has custody of the beneficiary, or a guardian; (2) A natural or adoptive parent who does not have custody of the beneficiary, but is contributing toward the beneficiary’s support and is demonstrating strong concern for the beneficiary’s well being; (3) A natural or adoptive parent who does not have custody of the beneficiary and is not contributing toward his or her support but is demonstrating strong concern for the beneficiary’s well being; (4) A relative or stepparent who has custody of the beneficiary; (5) A relative who does not have custody of the beneficiary but is contributing toward the beneficiary’s support and is demonstrating concern for the beneficiary’s well being; (6) A relative or close friend who does not have custody of the beneficiary but is demonstrating concern for the beneficiary’s well being; and ⁵⁸⁵ (7) An authorized social agency or custodial institution. 20 C.F.R. § 404.2021 (c) (emphasis added). The SSA provides beneficiaries with written notice that the Administration will appoint a representative payee before the payee is appointed officially, 20 C.F.R. § 404.2030 (a), and before certifying payment to the payee. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (j)(2)(E)(ii). If the beneficiary is “under age 15, an unemancipated minor under the age of 18, or legally incompetent, [the] written notice goes to [the beneficiary’s] legal guardian or legal representative.” 42 U.S.C. § 405 (j)(2)(E)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404.2030 (a).

The notice required by statute must include language explaining a beneficiary’s right to appeal the appointment of a particular entity as the representative payee. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (j)(2)(E)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404.2030 (a). SSA regulations explicitly provide for both administrative and judicial review of, among other things, “initial determinations” made by the agency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.902 . “Initial determinations” are defined by regulation (somewhat circularly) as decisions made by the SSA which are subject to administrative and judicial review. 20 C.F.R. § 404.902 . The SSA’s decision of who will serve as an OASDI beneficiary’s representative payee is listed as an example of an “initial determination” and is thus subject to both administrative and judicial review. 20 C.F.R. § 404.902 (q). Once appointed, a representative payee is required to use the benefit payments solely for the beneficiary’s “use and benefit in a manner and for the purposes [the representative payee] determines ... to be in [the beneficiary’s] best interests.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.2035 (a).

The SSA views costs associated with the beneficiary’s “current maintenance” to be valid expenditures satisfying the requirement that benefit payments be applied “for the use and benefit” of the beneficiary and in line with his or her “best interests.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040 (a)(1). “Current maintenance includes cost[s] incurred in obtaining food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal comfort items.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040 (a)(1). For ⁵⁸⁶ beneficiaries receiving institutional care because of a physical or mental disability, the definition of “current maintenance” expands to include “the customary charges made by the institution, as well as expenditures for those items which will aid in the beneficiary’s recovery or release from the institution or expenses for personal needs which will improve the beneficiary’s conditions while in the institution.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040 (b) (emphasis added). Past debts of the beneficiary that arose before the first benefit payment was made to the representative payee are not regarded as a legitimate expenditure of benefit funds unless “the current and reasonably foreseeable needs of the beneficiary are met.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040 (d). Conservation and investment of benefit payments is required whenever there is a surplus after all required uses of the payments are made. 20 C.F.R. § 404.2045 (a).

Maryland’s Family Law Article and Related Reyulations The Family Law Article of the Maryland Code mandates that the Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) provide “child welfare services” to foster children. Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Fam. Law § 5-524.

When a foster child is unable to return to his parent or guardian, DHR must “develop and implement an alternative permanent plan for the child.” Id. at § 5-524(3). As a last resort, the Department will commit a child to foster care when no other placements are viable, for which the Department is required to pay for the services a foster care placement provides. Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Fam.

Law § 5-526(a)(l) (“The Department shall provide for the care, diagnosis, training, education, and rehabilitation of children by placing them in group homes and institutions that are operated by for-profit or nonprofit charitable corporations.”). The Department is required to reimburse these charitable corporations for the costs of services provided to the foster children at a rate set by the Department and in line with the State budget. Id. at § 5 — 526(b)(1). ⁵⁸⁷ All of a child’s resources, including “survivor’s disability insurance,” are subject to allocation by the Department to reimburse itself for the “cost of care” of a foster child in an out-of-home placement. COMAR 07.02.11.29(A), (K)(l).

Subsection (K)(l) of this regulation identifies explicitly “survivor’s disability insurance” as an example of resources that may be tapped by the Department for self-reimbursement. Foster children over the age of 18 in an out-of-home placement, if entitled to survivor’s disability benefits, may elect either to receive the payments themselves and then reimburse the Department, or to have the Department appointed as the child’s representative payee for the benefits (assuming that the SSA has made a determination that the Department is the appropriate representative payee for the child). Id. at (K)(2). The Department may use the child’s resources subject to the following priorities: first, for the “cost of care;” 3 next, for the child’s “special needs;” and, finally, if any resources remain, for “a savings account for future needs.” Id. at (L).

Excess funds from the child’s resources not utilized consistent with regulation by the Department before the child leaves out-of-home placement must be returned to the child if he or she is 18 or older, id. at (M)(l), or “transferred to the legal parent or guardian with whom the child will reside,” if he or she is under 18 years old. Id. at (M)(2). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Determination that Ryan was a CINA and the Statutory Framework for CINA The Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as the juvenile court, determined that Ryan W. was a CINA on 4 June 2002 when he was nine years old. The Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) of the Maryland Code, § 3-801 et seq., provides the framework for determining whether a child ⁵⁸⁸ is a CINA.

When the Department learns that a child is being abused or neglected, or suffers from a developmental disability or mental disorder, and is not receiving proper care and attention to his or her needs, the particular locality’s Department of Social Services may file a petition seeking a determination by the respective juvenile court that the child is a CINA. Md. Code (2001, 2006 Repl. Vol.) CJP §§ 3-801(0, 3-809(a). Once a petition is filed, the juvenile court must hold an adjudicatory hearing to determine if the facts alleged can be proven.

Md. Code (2001, 2006 Repl. Vol.) CJP §§ 3-801(c), 3-817(a) and (c). If the allegations are proven to the satisfaction of the juvenile court, the court must determine whether the child needs assistance and how the court should intervene “to protect the child’s health, safety, and well-being.” Md. Code (2001, 2006 Repl. Vol.) CJP §§ 3-801(m), 3-819(a)(l).

If the court determines the child is in need of assistance, it may commit, among other things, the child to the custody of the Department. CJP § 3-819(b)(l)(iii). The Department must establish then an out-of-home placement for the CINA in foster, kinship, group, or residential treatment care. Md. Code (1984, 2012 Repl.

Vol.) 4 , Fam. Law §§ 5-501(m), 5-525(b)(1)(h). Further, the Department must prepare a “permanency plan” that outlines the goals aimed at a child’s exit from commitment to foster care. See CJP § 3-823(d).

The juvenile court must hold a hearing (called a “permanency planning hearing”) to determine this plan initially, CJP § 3-823(b)(1), and must review the plan every six months until the child exits the Department’s care. CJP § 3-823(h)(l)(i). Here, the Department filed a petition with the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on 23 January 2002, seeking a determination that Ryan was a CINA. As a basis for the determination sought, the Department cited Ryan’s mother’s drug abuse and his father’s alcohol abuse, their failure to provide adequate food and clothing for their children, their lack of supervision, ⁵⁸⁹ and their failure to ensure the children attended medical appointments and school on time.

Following a hearing, Ryan was placed in emergency shelter care by order dated 13 February 2002, and was determined on 4 June 2002 to be a CIÑA and committed to the custody of the Department. As noted previously, Ryan was nine years old at that time. Post-CINA Determination Actions Subsequent to his commitment to the Department’s custody, Ryan was placed in various group homes and non-relative foster homes. The Department paid the cost of his care.

Ryan’s mother died in August 2006. His father died in November 2008. In June 2009, Ryan’s DSS-assigned caseworker at the time, Nathan Exom, submitted copies of Ryan’s parents’ death certificates to the Department’s Foster Care & SSI Reimbursement Unit (“Reimbursement Unit”). In November 2009, the Reimbursement Unit filed an application with the SSA seeking appointment as Ryan’s representative payee for his Old-Age, Survivor’s and Disability Insurance (“OASDI”) benefits. 5 See 42 U.S.C. § 405 (j)(l)(A); see also COMAR §§ 07.02.11.29(K) and (L) (providing that the Department should seek all resources for which a child is eligible, including survivor’s insurance benefits, and apply them to the costs of foster care).

The application was approved shortly thereafter. The Department provided no notice to Ryan, his CINA counsel, or the juvenile court that it applied to be, and was approved as, Ryan’s representative payee. The SSA sent its required notice to the Department in its capacity as Ryan’s legal guardian. See 42 U.S.C. § 405 (j)(2)(E)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404.2030 (a).

A beneficiary child is entitled to OASDI benefits for each parent that dies. Here, Ryan was entitled to benefits from ⁵⁹⁰ both his mother and father. The Department received two lump sum payments for OASDI benefits covering the interim between the deaths of Ryans’ parents and the filing of the application. The Department received the first of these payments on 13 November 2009, in the amount of $8,481, which covered the benefits accrued between Ryan’s father’s death and the start of benefit payments (November 2008 to November 2009), and represents the benefits to which Ryan was entitled from his father’s wages.

The second lump sum payment, in the amount of $11,647.50, was received on 15 December 2009, and covered the period August 2006 to November 2008, representing the benefits to which Ryan was entitled based on his mother’s wage earnings. From December 2009 until February 2011, when Ryan turned 18, the Department received a monthly $771 OASDI benefit payment on Ryan’s behalf. Ultimately, as of the time of trial in this case, the Department received a total of $31,693.50 in its capacity as Ryan’s representative payee for OASDI benefits and used the entire amount to reimburse itself for some of the costs of Ryan’s foster care. In re Ryan W. Ryan W., through counsel, filed, on 5 April 2011, with the juvenile court a “motion to control conduct,” alleging that the Department, as Ryan W.’s representative payee, applied for and received his OASDI benefits without notifying the child or his CINA attorney and misused the funds in violation of its statutory and fiduciary duties.

Specifically, Ryan contended that the Department allocated improperly his benefits to reimburse itself for the costs of his foster care, without an individualized determination as to what other use of the funds might be in his best interests. See 42 U.S.C. 405(j)(l)(A) (mandating that representative payees apply benefits to the best interests of the beneficiary); see also 42 U.S.C. 405(j)(2)(C)(v)(III) (providing that representative payees are fiduciaries of the beneficiary). 6 ⁵⁹¹ After a hearing, the juvenile court determined that the Department violated Ryan W.’s due process and equal protection rights by failing to notify him before applying his OASDI benefits toward the current costs incurred by the Department on his behalf. In its order, dated 16 June 2011, the juvenile court required the Department to hold $31,693.50, the total amount received by the Department on behalf of Ryan W., in a constructive trust in his name, pending a permanency planning hearing. The June 16 order also declared invalid CO-MAR §§ 07.02.11.29(K) and (L), which require the Department to seek appointment as payee for all potential resources of a child committed to its care and prioritize self-reimbursement for the child’s cost of care over the child’s individualized needs, because they extended improperly the Department’s statutory authority under 42 U.S.C. § 405 (j) (2012) and violated the fiduciary obligations the Department owed to the Petitioner.

At the contemplated permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court determined that the best use of the OASDI benefits would be to continue the trust and prioritize Ryan W.’s education-related expenses; the court issued an order to that effect on 15 July 2011. The Department appealed. A panel of the Court of Special Appeals (“COSA”) reversed the juvenile court’s order in part, concluding that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to order the creation of a constructive trust, although maintaining that the Department reimburse Ryan W. in the amount of $8,075.32 for benefits received on his behalf during a period in which the Department incurred lower costs for his care. In re Ryan W., No. 1503, 2012 WL ⁵⁹² 3847359 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. Sept. 5, 2012); superseded on reconsideration by 207 Md.App. 698 , 56 A.3d 250 (2012).

The Department filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the COSA to correct the amount ordered reimbursed and, alternatively, to hold that the COSA’s rationale that “the Juvenile Court is not ... vested with broad equitable powers to supervise the Department when it is acting in its role as representative payee for foster children committed to its care” barred any order for reimbursement of the funds. While that motion was pending, counsel for Ryan W. filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, seeking review of the original COSA decision. On 21 November 2012, the COSA issued a reported opinion on reconsideration reiterating its view that the juvenile court acted outside its authority in establishing a trust, but reducing the amount to be reimbursed to Ryan from $8,075.32 to $660. 7 In re Ryan W., 207 Md.App. 698, 756 , 56 A.3d 250, 284 (2012). Because it found that a constructive trust was an improper remedy, regardless of the juvenile court’s authority, the COSA declined to decide the question of sovereign immunity raised by the Department as a defense to the claims in Ryan W.’s action.

Id. at 758 , 56 A.3d at 285 . The Department petitioned this Court to review that determination, arguing that funds for the constructive ⁵⁹³ trust would have to come from the State Treasury and the State’s sovereign immunity barred the relief sought. We granted the parties’ petitions for writs of certiorari. In re Ryan W., 429 Md. 528 , 56 A.3d 1241 (2012); In re Ryan W., 430 Md. 11 , 59 A.3d 506 (2013).

The questions presented for our consideration are: 8 1. Did COSA err in holding that a local department of social services has plenary authority to apply for and use a foster child’s OASDI benefits without seeking an express grant of authority from the juvenile court to exercise control over the benefits and without providing the foster child with notice and the opportunity to be heard? 2. Did the COSA err in rejecting the juvenile court’s exercise of its authority in determining that a total of $31,693.50 was to be conserved in Ryan’s best interests? 3. Did the COSA err in upholding state practice and regulations that require automatic, non-discretionary application of all of a foster child’s OASDI benefits and that are inconsistent with federal regulations requiring the proper exercise of discretion as a representative payee? 4.

Did the COSA err in directing the juvenile court, on remand, to revise it’s monetary award against the State by requiring the Department to deposit funds into a foster child’s trust account because, as the COSA had already concluded, the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to enter such an order and because such an order is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity? STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the juvenile court’s findings of fact in CINA proceedings under the “clearly erroneous standard.” In re Shirley B., 419 Md. 1, 19 , 18 A.3d 40, 53 (2011) (citations omitted). Therefore, the juvenile court’s factual findings will not be disturbed “[i]f any competent material evidence exists ⁵⁹⁴ in support of the trial court’s factual findings.... ” Figgins v. Cochrane, 403 Md. 392, 409 , 942 A.2d 736, 746 (2008). The juvenile court’s conclusions of law are reviewed without deference.

In re Adoption/Guardianship of Amber R., 417 Md. 701, 708 , 12 A.3d 130, 134 (2011). Errors of law are generally remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, unless the error is harmless. In re Shirley B., 419 Md. at 19 , 18 A.3d at 53 . Only where we find a “clear abuse of discretion” will we disturb a lower court’s legally sound decision that is based upon factual findings that are not “clearly erroneous.” In re Shirley B., 419 Md. at 19 , 18 A.3d at 53 .

Ryan’s Appeal Ryan asks this Court to reverse the COSA’s determination that a local department of social services possesses plenary authority to apply for and use a foster child’s OASDI benefits, without seeking an express grant of authority from the juvenile court to exercise control over the benefits. He asks further that we hold that a local department must provide a foster child with notice and an opportunity to be heard before using a child’s survivor’s benefits. Although we agree with the COSA that a local department of social services need not seek permission from a juvenile court in order to exercise its statutory and regulatory-guided discretion as a duly appointed representative payee in its use of a foster child’s OASDI benefits, we agree with Ryan W. that due process requires that notice be afforded at least to a CINA’s attorney when the Department applies to become a payee and as benefits are received. A. The Juvenile Court is without jurisdiction to direct the Department’s allocation of OASDI benefits for which it is a duly appointed representative payee by the SSA. 1.

The Social Security Act does not contemplate state court jurisdiction over the allocation of OASDI benefits by a duly appointed representative payee. The Department argues that, because federal law governs the appointment of representative payees and the alloca ⁵⁹⁵ tion of OASDI benefits, see 42 U.S.C. 405(j), the juvenile court is without authority to direct an approved representative payee how to allocate a child’s benefits. According to the Department, the proper forum for any available remedy for Ryan’s claim lies in the federal administrative and judicial review process. Ryan counters that the juvenile court is a “court of competent jurisdiction” to review SSA determinations.

See 42 U.S.C. 405(j)(l)(A) (“If the Commissioner ... or a court of competent jurisdiction determines that a representative payee has misused any individual’s benefit ... the Commissioner of Social Security shall promptly revoke certification for payment of benefits to such representative payee ... and certify payment to an alternative representative payee or, if the interest of the individual would be served thereby, to the individual.”). We conclude that the juvenile court here did not have jurisdiction over the disputes between Ryan and his representative payee regarding the application of his OASDI benefit payments. Rather, such disputes are for resolution within the federal administrative process and subject to further federal judicial review. We look first to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution to determine if state courts may exercise jurisdiction over this dispute, outside of the statutorily-prescribed administrative process for reviewing SSA determinations. “When Congress is silent concerning [concurrent] state court jurisdiction over federal causes of action, there is a ‘deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction.’ ” R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Investors’ Alert, Inc., 382 Md. 689, 715 , 857 A.2d 1, 16 (2004) (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 , 110 S.Ct. 792, 795 , 107 L.Ed.2d 887, 894 (1990)).

This presumption, however, “can be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.” Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 , 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2875 , 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981). The Social Security Act provides explicitly that an individual seeking review of a decision made by the Commissioner may do so in a civil action, and that ⁵⁹⁶ [s]uch action shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides, or has his principal place of business, or, if he does not reside or have his principal place of business within any such judicial district, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) (emphasis added). Thus, while Congress was silent as to whether state courts have jurisdiction to review SSA determinations, it directs explicitly that federal courts have jurisdiction over civil actions seeking review of the Commissioner’s determinations. The statutory language is expressed in mandatory terms that all such actions be brought in a federal district court. 9 Id.; cf. Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 460-61 , 110 S.Ct. at 796 , 107 L.Ed.2d 887 (finding that a federal statute creating a federal cause of action did not exclude state courts from hearing the claims because the statute provided that such claims “may” be brought in federal court).

Therefore, because Congress’s use of the word “shall” suggests strongly that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is exclusive, we determine that Maryland’s state courts are without concurrent subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes over the allocation of a child beneficiary’s OASDI benefits by a duly appointed representative payee. Generally, federal law governs representative payees and their use of a child beneficiary’s OASDI benefits. See 42 ⁵⁹⁷ U.S.C. 405(3); 20 C.F.R. § 404.2001 . Once appointed, a representative payee is required to use the benefit payments solely for the beneficiary’s “use and benefit in a manner and for the purposes [the representative payee] determines ... to be in [the beneficiary’s] best interests.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.2085 (a).

The SSA considers costs associated with the beneficiary’s “current maintenance” to be valid expenditures satisfying the requirement that benefit payments be applied “for the use and benefit” of the beneficiary and in line with his or her “best interests.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040 (a)(1). “Current maintenance includes cost[s] incurred in obtaining food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal comfort items.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040 (a)(1). For beneficiaries receiving institutional care because of a physical or mental disability, the definition of “current maintenance” is expanded to include “the customary charges made by the institution, as well as expenditures for those items which will aid in the beneficiary’s recovery or release from the institution or expenses for personal needs which will improve the beneficiary’s conditions while in the institution.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040 (b) (emphasis added). The SSA Commissioner is responsible for promulgating rules and regulations for implementing and executing the provisions of the Social Security Act, in addition to monitoring payees. See 42 U.S.C. 405(a).

Because this authority is vested solely with the Commissioner, the Maryland juvenile court does not have authority under Maryland law to monitor the allocation of social security benefits by a representative payee. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 2570 , 180 L.Ed.2d 580 (2011) (holding that the Supremacy Clause requires that “[w]here state and federal law directly conflict, state law must give way”). If a child beneficiary suspects misuse of his or her OASDI benefits by his or her representative payee, the Social Security Act, as amended in 2004, provides the beneficiary with avenues for federal administrative and judicial review. The 2004 amendments include more stringent monitoring of institutional representative payees’ use of benefits, as well as broader avenues in which to seek remedy for misuse of benefits by such institutional payees.

See Social Security ⁵⁹⁸ Protection Act of 2004, Pub.L. No. 108-203, 118 Stat. 493, 493 (2004). The amendment, as enacted, defines “misuse” as occurring in any case in which the representative payee “receives payment under this title for the use and benefit of another person and converts such payment, or any part thereof, to a use other than for the use and benefit of such other person.” Id. at sec. 101(a)(2), § 405(j), 118 Stat. at 495 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 405 (3X9)). If a beneficiary is not satisfied with an initial determination made by the Commissioner as to either misuse, eligibility for benefits, or the appointment of a representative payee, the first step in the SSA’s internal review process is reconsideration. 20 C.F.R. § 404.907 . The SSA provides written notice to all parties of its reconsidered determination, and that decision is appealable to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).

Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.922 . The decision of the ALJ is binding unless one of the parties requests and receives review of the decision by the Appeals Council. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967 , 404.955(a). The decision of the Appeals Council is reviewable in federal district court, and if the Council declines to review a case, the ALJ’s decision is likewise reviewable in a federal district court. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 . Notwithstanding these provisions, Ryan contends that the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Department’s allocation of his OASDI benefits pursuant to the COSA’s 2001 decision in Ecolono v. Division of Reimbursements of Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 137 Md.App. 639 , 769 A.2d 296 (2001).

In Ecolono , the COSA determined that it had “subject matter jurisdiction to decide a dispute between the beneficiary of social security benefits and his representative payee with respect to the allocation of those benefits.” 137 Md.App. 639 , 654, 769 A.2d 296 , 305.’ At the time Ecolono was decided, the Social Security Act and implementing regulations required only that the SSA provide restitution to a beneficiary for payee misuse if the SSA had been negligent in appointing that payee, or if the SSA recovered the misused funds from the payee. See Social Security Protection Act of 2004, Pub.L. No. 108-203, 118 Stat. 493, 493 (2004). ⁵⁹⁹ The appellee in Ecolono argued that, because there was an administrative review process for appointment of representative payees and a remedy for their breach of duty, state courts were without jurisdiction to interfere with a representative payee’s allocation of social security benefits. COSA rejected this argument, reasoning that “nothing in federal law ... indicated] an intent by Congress to limit interested parties to the federal administrative and judicial review process and to prohibit State courts from exercising jurisdiction ... when the relief requested is not the removal of the payee but a reallocation of the benefits.” Id., 137 Md.App. at 654 , 769 A.2d at 305 . Notably, however, the 2004 amendments to the Social Security Act now permit the beneficiary to recover full restitution from the SSA where an institutional representative payee misuses the beneficiary’s funds.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.2041 (a). Therefore, unlike the cases relied on by the COSA in Ecolono, see, e.g., Jahnke v. Jahnke, 526 N.W.2d 159, 163 (Iowa 1994) (“Although the federal government may prosecute a payee who converts a beneficiary’s funds, there is no federal mechanism to prevent such a conversion from occurring. Moreover, once the SSA pays the benefits to the proper representative payee, it has no liability to the beneficiary for misuse of the payments.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405 (k) (1988))), 10 we are not presented with a scenario in which Ryan has no federal ⁶⁰⁰ remedy upon a finding that his representative payee allocated his funds in a manner contrary to federal law and regulations. Because the 2004 amendments to the Social Security Act enhanced the monitoring of institutional representative payees and made available federal remedies for misuse of benefits, the rationale underlying the result in Ecolono and cases from other jurisdictions which held that state courts possessed subject matter jurisdiction over disputes regarding the allocation of benefits by representative payees no longer exists.

The appropriate forum for seeking review of disputes regarding SSA matters lies within the federal administrative and court systems. Accordingly, the juvenile court erred in directing the Department to establish a constructive trust on Ryan’s behalf for funds it had received on his behalf. Having determined that the exercise of discretion by a representative payee in its use of a beneficiary’s OASDI benefits is reviewable only in the federal administrative and judicial processes described in the applicable federal statute and regulations discussed supra, we hold that a state court does not have jurisdiction to direct a representative payee to allocate funds in a way that, while permitted under federal law, conflicts directly with a valid exercise of the payee’s discretion under the federal law. 11 See Washington Department of Social and Health Services v. Guardianship Estate of Danny Keffeler, ⁶⁰¹ 537 U.S. 371, 390 , 123 S.Ct. 1017, 1028 , 154 L.Ed.2d at 972 (“Keffeler II”) (finding that the anti-attachment provision in 42 U.S.C. 405(j) prohibits a state from directing a representative payee, or a beneficiary, to pay their benefits over to the state). Because we conclude that Maryland state courts lack jurisdiction over disputes regarding a representative payee’s allocation of OASDI benefits, we do not reach the issue of whether the Department’s allocation of Ryan’s benefits complied with federal law, to the extent that the COSA decided that question. 2.

The Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code does not grant to the juvenile court the authority to consider and resolve disputes regarding the allocation or use of OASDI benefits for CINA children. Ryan argues that the juvenile court, in directing the Department to conserve benefits received already and spent ⁶⁰² on his behalf, acted within its statutory authority over children deemed CINA and the Department as their fiduciary. CJP § 3 — 802(c) (providing that “the court may direct the local department to provide services to a child, the child’s family, or the child’s caregiver to the extent that the local department is authorized under State law”); see also CJP § 3-823(e) (providing for the juvenile court’s authority over the child’s permanency plan, including transition needs); accord In re Damon M., 362 Md. 429, 436 , 765 A.2d 624, 627-28 (2001) (“Services to be provided by the local social service department and commitments that must be made by the parents and children are determined by the permanency plan.”) Ryan contends further that, because CJP § 3-821 permits the juvenile court to “direct, restrain, or control” the conduct of a person or entity whenever the court finds that such conduct is not in the child’s best interests, the court acted within its statutory authority. The Department contends that the juvenile court misinterpreted its authority to “control the conduct” of a party, and, alternatively, that the “support” of a CINA should be interpreted as meaning “child support” only.

As a court of limited jurisdiction, the juvenile court may exercise only those powers granted to it by statute. In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 334 , 783 A.2d 673, 689 (2001) (“[W]hen a court proceeds by way of a special statute rather than under its general common-law authority, that court has only the powers given to it under the special statute.”); see also Smith v. State, 399 Md. 565, 574 , 924 A.2d 1175, 1180 (2007). Pursuant to the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, the juvenile court possesses exclusive original jurisdiction over CINA petitions, CJP § 3-803(a)(2), as well as concurrent jurisdiction over the “[cjustody, visitation, support, and paternity of a child whom the court finds to be a CINA.” CJP § 3-803(b)(l)(i). The Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article does not provide explicitly that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to consider disputes in the allocation of federal OASDI funds as to CINA persons.

In support of his position, Ryan argues that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the Department’s use of ⁶⁰³ benefits derives from the court’s powers over the “support” of a CINA. See CJP § 3-803(b)(l)(i); see also CJP § 3-819(c)(2) (providing the juvenile court with powers to determine custody, visitation, support or paternity of a CINA). He contends that, because OASDI benefits are meant to replace the “support” a child loses from his wage-earning parent(s) when the parent(s) die, O’Brien v. O’Brien, 136 Md.App. 497 , 510 n. 5, 766 A.2d 211 , 218 n. 5 (2001), the juvenile court’s power to determine support of a CINA allows it to “make orders regarding support” of a CINA. In construing whether the term “support,” as used in CJP § 3-819, includes federal survivor’s benefits, we must consider the use of the word in the context of the entire CINA statute and the word’s “ordinary meaning, absent indications of a contrary intent by the Legislature.” In re Roger S., 338 Md. 385, 391 , 658 A.2d 696, 699 (1995) (internal citations omitted); See also City of Baltimore Dev.

Corp. v. Carmel Realty Associates, 395 Md. 299, 318 , 910 A.2d 406, 417-18 (2006) (“The plain language of a provision is not interpreted in isolation. Rather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole and attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect.”). We have held consistently that the CJP uses the term “support,” in regard to CINAs, synonymously with “child support,” or the parental obligation to support a child financially. Although CJP § 3-819(c)(2) permits the juvenile court to determine support, subsection (1) of § 3-819 provides that the court may order parents to “pay a sum in the amount the court directs to cover wholly or partly the support of the child.” CJP § 3-819C); see also Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl.

Vol.) Fam. Law § 5-203(b) (providing that “the parents of a minor child ... are responsible ... for the child’s support”). Cases involving the “support” of CINA children also illuminate the plain meaning of the term as parental obligations to support their minor child. See, e.g., Rosemann v. Salsbury, Clements, Bekman, Marder & Adkins, LLC, 412 Md. 308, 319-20 , 987 A.2d 48 (2010); In re Katherine C., 390 Md. 554, 566-67 , 890 A.2d 295 (2006); In re Joshua W., 94 Md.App. ⁶⁰⁴ 486, 494-95 , 617 A.2d 1154 (1993).

Because the Department was not collecting or applying for “child support” from the Social Security Administration, we find no merit in Ryan’s “support” argument. Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article § 3-821 also does not provide authority for the juvenile court to act as it did here. CJP § 3-821 permits the juvenile court, where a party is before the court otherwise properly, to “direct, restrain, or control” the conduct of a person or entity whenever the court finds that such conduct is not in the child’s best interests. 12 Although the juvenile court is empowered generally to issue orders to control the conduct of the Department, it may do so only regarding issues over which it otherwise has jurisdiction. Here, the agency was not before the court properly because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the particular dispute between Ryan and his representative payee regarding the use of OASDI benefit payments.

The COSA held, and we agree, that “a motion to control conduct is not a means by which a Juvenile Court may expand its statutorily enumerated powers.” In re Ryan W., 207 Md.App. at 756-57 , 56 A.3d at 256 . 3. Because the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this particular dispute, the Department’s sovereign immunity defense is moot. The Department, in No. 101, contends that the COSA erred in directing the juvenile court, upon remand, to order that $660 be returned to Ryan because of an error in the Department’s accounting for the costs of foster care in May 2010. 13 ⁶⁰⁵ Because we determine that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the OASDI benefits dispute, the COSA was not entitled to direct the Department to return the benefits it had applied. We therefore decline to reach the Department’s sovereign immunity defense because, without subject matter jurisdiction, the defense is moot.

We therefore reverse the COSA’s judgment to the extent that it ordered that Ryan be reimbursed for any of the OASDI benefit funds in dispute. B. The challenged COMAR regulations are valid and in accordance with federal law and policy. Ryan W. contends that COMAR 07.02.11.29(E) and (L) are invalid because they require “automatic, non-discretion[ary] taking of OASDI benefits without considering transition needs, among others.” Specifically, he argues that, because the federal statute and accompanying regulations require that funds be spent in accordance with a beneficiary’s “best interests,” automatic application of a foster child’s benefits to the costs of care violates federal law. In riposte, the Department contends that the COMAR regulations are in accordance with federal law regarding a representative payee’s allocation of benefits because the uses of the benefits prescribed in the COMAR sections are permitted explicitly by the federal statute and regulations.

SSA regulations mandate that all representative payees use the OASDI benefits they receive “in a manner and for the purposes he or she determines, under the guidelines in [sub- ⁶⁰⁶ part U of 20 C.F.R. § 404 ] to be in [the beneficiary’s] best interests.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.2035 (a) (emphasis added). Costs of a beneficiary’s “current maintenance,” which includes “food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal comfort items,” are considered by the SSA to be appropriate uses of benefit funds. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040 (a)(1). Additionally, institutional payees are permitted explicitly to use a beneficiary’s OASDI benefits for “the customary charges made by the institution, as well as expenditures for those items which will aid in the beneficiary’s recovery or release from the institution or expenses for personal needs which will improve the beneficiary’s conditions while in the institution.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040 (b).

The Department was duly appointed as representative payee by the SSA to receive OASDI benefit payments on Ryan’s behalf, and thus was obliged to use the benefits according to federal regulations. Ryan argues that Maryland regulations, in requiring automatic allocation of funds, are inconsistent with the discretionary nature of the allocation provisions in federal regulations. COMAR 07.02.11.29(K) provides: (1) Other resources available for the child may be in the form of cash assets, trust accounts, insurance (including survivor’s disability insurance), or some type of benefit or supplemental security income for the disabled child. (2) While in out-of-home placement, if the child is 18 years old or older and is the beneficiary of insurance or survivor’s benefits, the child shall choose whether to: (a) Receive benefits and pay the local department; or (b) Designate the local department as the payee.

(3) The local department shall seek a representative payee for an incompetent child 18 years old or