In re: S.F.

In Re: S.F., No. 10, September Term, 2021. Opinion by Hotten, J. CIVIL PROCEDURE – APPEALS – MOOTNESS A case is moot when “at the time it is before the court, there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties, so that there is no longer any effective remedy which the court can provide.’” Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Levitsky, 353 Md. 188, 200 , 725 A.2d 1027, 1033 (1999) (citations omitted). This Court has discretion “to express [its] views on the merits of a moot case . . . in instances where[] the urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern is imperative and manifest. . . .” J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm’n, 368 Md. 71, 96 , 792 A.2d 288 , 302–03 (2002) (citations and quotation omitted). In the case at bar, Petitioner, a juvenile at the time, was ordered as a condition of probation to attend school regularly without suspensions.

Petitioner appealed the “no-suspension” condition of probation as impermissibly vague. Before the case reached this Court, the issue became moot because Petitioner completed probation. This Court decided to address the merits of whether a “no-suspension” condition is impermissibly vague because the number of students on probation meant the issue would recur frequently, the limited duration of juvenile probation suggested the issue would continue to evade judicial review, and providing guidance to juvenile courts when ordering conditions of probation implicated a matter of important public concern. CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCING – CONDITIONS OF PROBATION Juvenile courts have broad discretion when imposing conditions of probation, but a juvenile court abuses its discretion when a condition of probation is “vague, indefinite or uncertain[,] . . . arbitrary or capricious. . . .” Allen v. State, 449 Md. 98, 111 , 141 A.3d 194, 202 (2016) (citations and quotations omitted).

A condition of probation is not vague when it provides reasonable and specific guidance so that the probationer understands “what is required[.]” Meyer v. State, 445 Md. 648, 680 , 128 A.3d 147, 166 (2015). In the case at bar, this Court found that the condition ordering Petitioner to attend school regularly without suspensions was not vague because it reasonably informed Petitioner to abide by school rules, pursuant to the student code of conduct, while on probation. The determination by a third party, specifically a school administrator, of whether Petitioner violated a condition of probation did not render the condition of probation vague. See, e.g., Hudgins v. State, 292 Md. 342, 349 , 438 A.2d 928, 931 (1982) (holding that a condition of probation was not made vague by permitting the Maryland State Police to determine whether defendant adequately cooperated as an informant).

This Court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Petitioner to attend school regularly without suspensions as a condition of probation. Circuit Court for Frederick County Case Nos. C-10-JV-18-000271 & C-10-JV-19-000094 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS Argued: October 7, 2021 OF MARYLAND No. 10 September Term, 2021 __________________________________ IN RE: S.F. __________________________________ Getty, C.J., McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, JJ. __________________________________ Opinion by Hotten, J. Watts, J., dissents. __________________________________ Filed: February 3, 2022 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2022-02-03 14:30-05:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk S.F.1 was charged with second-degree assault and misdemeanor theft in the Circuit Court for Frederick County, sitting as a juvenile court (“the juvenile court”). S.F. was twelve years old at the time. Each charge was alleged in a separate Delinquency Petition,2 filed approximately five months apart, and the cases proceeded separately.

S.F. entered an Alford plea3 for each charge. The juvenile magistrate in each case recommended probation. An identical condition of probation for each case was for S.F. to attend school regularly without suspensions. Counsel for S.F. excepted to the no-suspension condition of probation as impermissibly vague in both cases.

A hearing for both exceptions occurred on June 5, 2019. The juvenile court denied the exceptions and ordered S.F. to “[a]ttend school regularly without any . . . suspensions. . . .” S.F. noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed. 1 “Out of respect for the privacy interests of the parties, we shall refer to them by their initials throughout this opinion.” In re: R.S., 470 Md. 380 , 386 n.1, 235 A.3d 914 , 918 n.1 (2020). 2 Delinquency proceedings are initiated when someone under the age of 18 commits an act that would be a crime if the person were an adult. Md. Code Ann., Courts and Judicial Proceedings (“Cts. & Jud. Proc.”) § 3-8A-01.

The State’s Attorney files a Delinquency Petition with the juvenile court alleging the child is delinquent. Md. Rule 11- 103. 3 “An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he [or she] is unwilling or unable to admit his [or her] participation in the acts constituting the crime.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 , 91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970). “Maryland permits acceptance of an [Alford] plea.” Banegura v. Taylor, 312 Md. 609 , 613 n.1, 541 A.2d 969 , 971 n.1 (1988) (citations omitted). S.F. filed a petition for writ of certiorari on March 17, 2021. By this point, S.F. had successfully completed probation and the juvenile court closed the cases.

S.F. acknowledged that the appeal was “moot as to him[, b]ut the issue [was] not moot to the many children who may be subject to no-suspension conditions of probation as a result of the Court of Special Appeals’ reported opinion.” We granted certiorari on May 11, 2021 to address the following question: “Is it improper for a juvenile court to make a school’s discretionary decision to suspend a child a violation of the child’s probation?” We answer the question in the negative and shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4 The Underlying Incidents On or about October 8, 2018 during regular school hours, S.F., followed by another student enrolled at Monocacy Middle School in Frederick, Maryland, ran into a classroom and began to punch another student, J.C., who fell into a metal desk, striking his head. S.F. claimed that he was retaliating for an earlier provocation from J.C. Thereafter, S.F. had to be pulled from J.C. during a second physical altercation that occurred in the hallway. On 4 The facts underlying the appeal are derived from the State’s recital of the proof that would have been presented at trial and other documents submitted during the juvenile court proceedings. 2 November 19, 2018, the State filed a Delinquency Petition charging S.F. with second- degree assault in violation of Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law (“Crim.

Law”) § 3-203.5 On December 9, 2018, Officer Steven Brown with the Frederick City Police Department responded to a burglary at 150 Stonegate Drive in Frederick City, Maryland. The sliding door of a home was found open and several items, including a pair of Nike Air Jordan’s with blue soles and a red Tommy Hilfiger jacket with blue lining were missing. On January 8, 2019, Officer Brown returned to 150 Stonegate Drive, where the homeowner advised Officer Brown that S.F. was seen wearing a pair of Nike Air Jordan’s with blue soles and a red Tommy Hilfiger jacket at a nearby McDonald’s restaurant. These items belonged to the homeowner’s son, who was “able to provide pictures from Snapchat showing [S.F.] was wearing the jacket.” The State explained that “if called to testify, the witnesses would identify [S.F.] as the party responsible[]” for the theft of the personal property.

On April 3, 2019, the State filed a Delinquency Petition that charged S.F. with theft of at least $100 but less than $1,500 pursuant to Crim. Law § 7-104.6 5 Crim. Law § 3-203 provides that a “person may not commit an assault[,]” which pursuant to Crim. Law § 3-201 includes the crime of battery.

See Elias v. State, 339 Md. 169, 183 , 661 A.2d 702, 709 (1995) (“In Maryland, battery is a common law misdemeanor which is generally defined as the ‘unlawful application of force to the person of another.’”) (citations omitted). 6 Crim. Law § 7-104 provides in pertinent part: (a) A person may not willfully or knowingly obtain or exert unauthorized control over property, if the person: (1) intends to deprive the owner of the property; (2) willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in a manner that deprives the owner of the property; (continued . . .) 3 Circuit Court Proceedings S.F. entered an Alford plea to the count of second-degree assault on February 12, 2019 before the juvenile court. The juvenile magistrate delayed the date of disposition so the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services (“DJS”)7 could complete a pre-disposition investigation. S.F. was also placed on pre-disposition supervision by DJS.

Amy S. Gass, the assigned Case Management Specialist for DJS, submitted a Social History Investigation & Recommendation to the juvenile court on March 29, 2019. The report documented S.F.’s medical health, behavioral history, school disciplinary record, and criminal offenses. Ms. Gass noted that S.F. “has a long history of behavioral incidents in school.” While enrolled at Monocacy Middle School from September 2018 to November 2018, S.F. was cited for twenty-two distinct disciplinary infractions ranging from disruption and disrespect to fighting and assault, the latter of which resulted in a short- (. . . continued) (3) or uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use, concealment or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the property. *** (g)(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, a person convicted of theft of property or services with a value of at least $100 but less than $1,500, is guilty of a misdemeanor. . . . 7 DJS “is an executive agency whose primary task is to appropriately manage, supervise and treat youth who are involved in the juvenile justice system in Maryland. [DJS] is involved in nearly every stage of the juvenile justice process from the moment a youth is brought into a juvenile intake center . . . to the time when a youth returns to the community after completing treatment.” About Us, Maryland Department of Juvenile Services, https://djs.maryland.gov/Pages/about-us/About.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2021), archived at https://perma.cc/E9JN-E776. 4 term suspension. S.F. transferred to Heather Ridge Middle School in Frederick for the Spring 2019 semester and was cited for sixteen distinct disciplinary infractions between January and February 2019.

In the summary and recommendations section of the report, Ms. Gass concluded that S.F. “has a history of problematic behavior in school and in the home. . . . Given the rapid accumulation of charges, [DJS] does recommend a period of supervised probation[.] . . .” (Emphasis removed). On April 2, 2019, during the disposition hearing, a juvenile magistrate recommended that S.F. be placed on probation subject to several conditions. In addition to the standard conditions of supervision, S.F. was required to “report to [his] probation officer as directed, appear in court when notified, permit [his] probation officer to come to [his] home, or if [he was] arrested, attend school regularly without any unexcused absences, suspensions or tardies . . . remain drug and alcohol free . . . and [s]ubmit to a drug and alcohol assessment. . . .” (Emphasis added).

During the hearing, counsel for S.F. objected to the inclusion of the no-suspension condition of probation. The juvenile magistrate rejected the argument that the condition was vague: [S]uspensions go to behavior related issues like not fighting in school, not showing up high at school. And these are all affirmative[] behaviors on the part of the respondent. And if the respondent violates his probation as a result of a suspension, [] it [would] be at the time of the [violation of probation] hearing that [the suspension] is litigated[.] . . .

(Emphasis added). 5 Following the hearing, counsel for S.F. filed an exception, pursuant to Maryland Rule 11-111(c) (2021),8 to the condition of “‘[a]ttend school regularly without any unexcused absences, suspensions or tardiness’, specifically the part regarding suspensions.” (Emphasis omitted). Counsel for S.F. excepted to the condition because it could be violated without any willful behavior by S.F. According to counsel, “[S.F.] seeks to remove only the possibility of being found in violation in a way in which he has no control, [i.e.], being suspended from school.” The State filed a response requesting the juvenile court to deny the exception because “whether or not a suspension was due to the Respondent’s willful behavior is a factual determination to be made by the trial court[, and] it is not cause to strike a valid probation condition.” In a separate proceeding, on May 16, 2019, S.F. entered an Alford plea to the charge of theft in violation of Crim. Law § 7-104. S.F. agreed to waive the five-day waiting period before disposition, and the juvenile magistrate recommended S.F. be placed on concurrent probation for the counts of assault and theft, supervised by DJS.

Over objection from counsel for S.F., one of the conditions for probation again required that S.F. attend school regularly without suspensions. S.F. filed another exception to the no-suspension condition 8 Maryland Rule 11-111(c), as codified at the time, provided in pertinent part: Review by Court if Exceptions Filed. Any party may file exceptions to the magistrate’s proposed findings, conclusions, recommendations or proposed orders. Exceptions shall be in writing, filed with the clerk within five days after the magistrate’s report is served upon the party, and shall specify those items to which the party excepts, and whether the hearing is to be de novo or on the record.

The relevant rule is now codified at Md. Rule 11-103(e) and took effect on January 1, 2022. 6 of probation pursuant to Md. Rule 11-111(c). S.F. requested “in the interest[] of judicial economy[]” that the exceptions hearing concurrently address the identical no-suspension condition of probation for both cases. On June 5, 2019, the juvenile court considered argument on the exception to the condition of probation for both cases. The juvenile court denied the exception, explaining that: [H]onestly, I don’t think that saying no suspensions -- I just can’t go along with the argument that it’s vague or indefinite or uncertain.

I do think that - - I can see your argument by saying [“]live a correct life,[”] what does that mean? I mean, that’s vague. But I don’t think that this term of probation or condition of probation is vague in any way. So I’m going to deny the exceptions and affirm the Magistrate’s decision in putting that in there.

The juvenile court disagreed with the argument that the no-suspension condition of probation would subject S.F. to arbitrary punishment: I would hope that most schools, if not all schools would actually give an explanation as to the suspension and give the child an opportunity to contest the suspension. But even assuming that . . . there’s no explanation, if a child comes before me for a violation of probation hearing, I would want to know the basis for the suspension. So I don’t think that you’d have to fear that. Prior to the June 5, 2019 hearing, S.F. and his mother moved to Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.

The relocation to another jurisdiction did not affect the disposition of the juvenile court, and courtesy supervision was provided by Pennsylvania juvenile authorities through interstate compact.9 On October 17, 2019, S.F.’s mother requested closure of his “The Interstate Compact on Juveniles (ICJ) is a multi-state agreement that provides 9 the procedural means to regulate the movement across State lines of juveniles who are under court supervision.” Christopher Holloway, Interstate Compact on Juveniles, United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs Fact Sheet (Sept. 2000), (continued . . .) 7 cases. Pennsylvania juvenile authorities agreed and recommended discharge from supervision on April 9, 2020. Following several assessments, Ms. Gass filed a report requesting closure of S.F.’s cases on May 20, 2020. The juvenile court closed S.F.’s cases on May 22, 2020.

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals Before the closure of S.F.’s cases, S.F. timely noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals on June 7, 2019. The Court affirmed the juvenile court and held that the condition of probation was not unduly vague and did not lack procedural safeguards. In re S.F., 249 Md. App. 50, 60, 61 , 245 A.3d 30 , 36, 37 (2021). According to the Court, the condition of probation was “clear, definite and capable of being properly comprehended and understood not only by the individual upon whom they are imposed but by those responsible for their enforcement.” Id. at 55, 245 A.3d at 33 (quoting Watson v. State, 17 Md. App. 263, 274 , 301 A.2d 26 , 31–32 (1973)).

The Court found “no confusion about what it means to be suspended from school. . . .” Id. at 57, 245 A.3d at 34. The code of student conduct informed S.F., like all students enrolled in Fredrick County Public Schools (“FCPS”), of behavior punishable by suspension. Id., 245 A.3d at 34. FCPS posted the student code of conduct online, and the student code of conduct appeared in the FCPS Calendar Handbook distributed at the beginning of the school year.

Id., 245 A.3d at 34. The student code of conduct explained what sort of (. . . continued) https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/fs200012.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/M7RV- QS7U. 8 misconduct warranted a suspension. Id., 245 A.3d at 34. For example, assault may lead to “‘suspension pending parent conference,’ ‘short term out of school suspension,’ ‘long term out of school suspension,’ or ‘extended out of school suspension.’” Id., 245 A.3d at 34 (citation omitted).

The Court rejected S.F.’s claim that the no-suspension condition was impermissibly vague because it vested the determination of its violation in a third party. Id. at 58, 245 A.3d at 35. The Court noted that conditions of probation often involved discretionary determinations by third parties, such as probation officers who must decide whether a party’s conduct constitutes a parole violation. Id., 245 A.3d at 35 (citing Hudgins v. State, 292 Md. 342, 344 , 438 A.2d 928, 929 (1982); Russell v. State, 221 Md. App. 518 , 523–24, 109 A.3d 1249 (2015); Wiseman v. State, 72 Md. App. 605, 608 , 531 A.2d 1311, 1313 (1987)).

A school administrator’s power to suspend, while discretionary, according to the Court, was constrained by the student code of conduct. Id. at 59, 245 A.3d at 35. The Court was also unpersuaded that evidence of Black students being disproportionately suspended rendered the no-suspension condition impermissibly vague. Id., 245 A.3d at 36.

The Court assumed the truth of S.F.’s argument that suspensions occur too frequently and disproportionately against Black students. Id., 245 A.3d at 36. Like the juvenile court, the Court reasoned that if S.F. experienced discrimination or arbitrary treatment, then the probation officer, followed by the juvenile court, would have an opportunity to assess the validity of the suspension. Id., 245 A.3d at 35.

Based on the “policies and procedures defined by [FCPS’] code of conduct,” the Court concluded that 9 the no-suspension condition of probation was sufficiently definite and certain. Id. at 60, 245 A.3d at 36. The Court also found that FCPS’ student code of conduct provided sufficient “procedural safeguards” when imposing a suspension. Id., 245 A.3d at 36.

The Court noted that the FCPS student code of conduct required prior notice and description of charges against any student facing suspension, which was also documented in the student information system. Id., 245 A.3d at 36. FCPS policy also directed school personnel to use positive behavioral interventions before suspension, and that only a school administrator may impose a suspension. Id., 245 A.3d at 36.

The Court also explained that a student suspension does not automatically violate the no-suspension condition of probation because the State must prove before a juvenile court that the student violated the terms of probation. Id. at 61, 245 A.3d at 36–37. The Court affirmed the juvenile court’s imposition of the no-suspension condition of probation. Thereafter, S.F. filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted.

In re: S.F., 474 Md. 632 , 255 A.3d 169 (2021). DISCUSSION Standard of Review A juvenile court possesses “broad authority” to impose conditions of probation. Bailey v. State, 355 Md. 287, 294 , 734 A.2d 684, 687 (1999); Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A- 19(d)(1) (“In making a disposition on a petition under this subtitle, the court may: . . . [p]lace the child on probation . . . upon terms the court deems appropriate[.] . . .”).

Similar to the discretion of a circuit court in imposing conditions of probation in a criminal matter, 10 the discretion afforded to a juvenile court is “broad but it is not boundless.” Cooley v. State, 385 Md. 165, 175 , 867 A.2d 1065, 1071 (2005) (quoting Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 62, 70 , 553 A.2d 667, 671 (1989)); In re Roger S., 338 Md. 385, 393 , 658 A.2d 696, 700 (1995) (noting “that the Juvenile Causes Act is to be construed liberally to achieve its purposes,” but “[e]ven a remedial statute should not be construed so broadly as to create the possibility of ‘results that are unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense’”) (citations and other marks omitted). The exercise of this broad authority is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Elrich S., 416 Md. 15 , 30–31, 5 A.3d 27 , 35–36 (2010) (“In a juvenile delinquency matter . . . the [juvenile] court’s ultimate decision, however, will not be disturbed unless ‘there has been a clear abuse of discretion.’”) (quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 , 819 A.2d 1030, 1051 (2003)) (other citations omitted); see also Meyer v. State, 445 Md. 648, 663 , 128 A.3d 147, 156 (2015) (applying the abuse of discretion standard of review to conditions of probation in a criminal matter). An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court, as with any court, “exercises discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner or when [the court] acts beyond the letter or reason of the law.” Cooley, 385 Md. at 175 , 867 A.2d at 1071 (citation omitted); see also In re Adoption of Jayden G., 433 Md. 50, 87 , 70 A.3d 276 , 297–98 (2013) (stating that a juvenile court abuses its discretion if its ruling “‘does not logically follow from the findings upon which it supposedly rests or has no reasonable relationship to its announced objective.’”) (quoting King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 697 , 967 A.2d 790, 799 (2009)) (citation omitted). 11 The Contentions of the Parties As a threshold issue, S.F. argues that this Court should reach the merits of the appeal because it would provide valuable guidance to the “many children who may be subject to no-suspension conditions of probation” and “to address and correct racial disparities in our justice system.” (Citation omitted).

S.F. acknowledged his case was moot in the petition for writ of certiorari, but the State failed to contest the issue of mootness in its answer. In the past, according to Petitioner, this Court rejected belated efforts by the Respondent to dismiss a case for mootness. According to S.F., the State also misstated the scope of the record by arguing this Court should avoid addressing the issue of a no-suspension condition of probation until a more complete factual record is presented on appeal. The State agrees that Black students and students with disabilities are disproportionately targeted for suspension, and according to S.F., the record reflects that S.F. is a Black student, was diagnosed with a disability, and received accommodations at school through an individualized education program.10 Addressing the merits of the case, according to S.F., would allow this Court to determine whether the no-suspension condition of probation impermissibly exposes S.F. and similarly situated students to arbitrary and capricious punishment. 10 “The terms ‘individualized education program’ or ‘IEP’ means a written statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with [ 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)].” John A. v. Bd. of Educ. for Howard Cty., 400 Md. 363 , 371 n.8, 929 A.2d 136 , 141 n.8 (2007) (citation omitted). 12 S.F. also asserts that the Court has been fully briefed on the issue by both parties.

In addition, a total of twenty national and local organizations have filed two amicus briefs on the merits. According to S.F., this Court should reach the merits. On the merits, S.F. contends that the condition of probation requiring S.F. to attend school “without suspension” was unduly vague because “it failed to adequately apprise him (or the authorities responsible for enforcing the conditions) of what actions he must take or refrain from to avoid a violation.” According to S.F., a term of probation must be clear, definitive, and capable of being understood by both the probationer and the person(s) responsible for monitoring compliance. Suspensions, S.F. contends, lack procedural safeguards and may be imposed with “essentially unfettered discretion [by] the school authorities.” Once a school official suspends a student, according to S.F., “the State only needs to prove that the child was suspended[,]” and “need not prove that the child engaged in any particular behavior[.]” S.F. argues that because school suspensions disproportionately impact Black students and students with disabilities, the no-suspension condition of probation “import[s] this discriminatory treatment into juvenile court proceedings[.]” According to S.F., a child faces a “virtually impossible” challenge to affirmatively prove during a juvenile court hearing that the suspension was imposed arbitrarily.

S.F. recommends that this Court reject no-suspension conditions of probation as not only impermissibly vague, but also a flawed practice to be avoided by juvenile courts. The State counters that the case should be dismissed as moot pursuant to Md. Rule 8-602(c)(8), because S.F. successfully completed probation and there is no longer a 13 controversy between the parties regarding the no-suspension condition of probation. The State acknowledges several exceptions to the general rule that moot cases are dismissed, but argues the only exception potentially relevant to the case at bar—an issue of public importance which recurs frequently and evades judicial review—does not apply. While no-suspension conditions of probation recur frequently, according to the State, the issue will not evade judicial review because juvenile probation can last “years”, and a juvenile court termination of probation will not necessarily moot the case.

The State also argues that this Court should dismiss the case because the record lacks evidence regarding how FCPS imposes suspension generally or specifically against S.F. Without a suspension in this case, there is no opportunity for this Court to determine how the juvenile court would assess an alleged violation of the no-suspension condition of probation. The State asks this Court to dismiss the case for mootness. Assuming this Court reaches the merits, the State argues that the no-suspension condition of probation is neither inherently vague, nor rendered vague by permitting a third party, like a school administrator, to determine whether the behavior of a student warrants suspension. The State notes that determining compliance with probation conditions are routinely vested with third parties.

Law enforcement officers may determine whether a probationer violated a law, or an employer may determine whether a probationer maintained gainful employment. In the case at bar, S.F. was to obey “all house rules” which necessitated a third party, the parent or guardian, to determine whether S.F. complied with the condition of probation. A no-suspension condition of probation, according to the State, is no more vague. 14 The State further contends that S.F. has conflated vagueness with process. According to the State, “[w]hether the ‘no suspensions’ condition is impermissibly vague does not depend upon whether a student is entitled to appeal the imposition of a suspension.” Even if the process following a suspension weighed upon the determination of vagueness, the State argues that school suspension does not “ipso facto result in a violation of probation, and a violation of probation does not ipso facto result in the revocation of probation.” According to the State, the juvenile court must determine, following a hearing, whether the student in fact violated the terms of probation, and whether a violation warrants revocation of probation.

The hearing also provides the student an opportunity to argue that the suspension did not arise from willful conduct. The State also points to several procedural safeguards at the state and local level that “provide detailed information about the due process afforded to a student accused of violating the code of conduct.” State regulation pursuant to COMAR 13A.08.01.11(C)(2)(b) requires that students must be informed of reasons for a suspension and given an opportunity to respond prior to the suspension. FCPS codified its discipline policy at FCPS Regulation 400-08, which provides specific guidance on what behaviors may trigger a suspension. These publicly available documents demonstrate, the State asserts, that a suspension does not arise from “unfettered discretion” of school administrators, rather it follows from a specific set of proscribed behaviors that is provided to students and families every year. 15 Finally, the State agrees with S.F. that suspensions disproportionately impact Black students and students with disabilities, but disputes whether it renders the condition of probation impermissibly vague.

Analysis A. We exercise our discretion to reach the merits of the case despite S.F.’s completion of probation. The decision to dismiss a case for mootness is discretionary. Md. Rule 8-602(c) (“The court may dismiss an appeal if: . . . (8) the case has become moot.”). “A question is moot ‘if, at the time it is before the court, there is no longer any existing controversy between the parties, so that there is no longer an effective remedy which the court can provide.’” Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Levitsky, 353 Md. 188, 200 , 725 A.2d 1027, 1033 (1999) (quoting Attorney Gen. v. Anne Arundel Cty.

School Bus Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 286 Md. 324, 327 , 407 A.2d 749, 752 (1979)). “We have the constitutional authority [] to express our views on the merits of a moot case . . . in instances where[] the urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern is imperative and manifest.” J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland- National Capital Park and Planning Comm’n, 368 Md. 71, 96 , 792 A.2d 288 , 302–03 (2002) (citations and quotations omitted); see also In re: O.P., 470 Md. 225, 249 , 235 A.3d 40 , 54 (2020) (“there are several exceptions to the mootness doctrine[]”). We have exercised discretionary authority to reach the merits of a moot case when “the matter involved is likely to recur frequently, and its recurrence will involve a relationship between government and its citizens, or a duty of government, and upon any recurrence, the same 16 difficulty which prevented the appeal at hand from being heard in time is likely again to prevent a decision[.] . . .” Lloyd v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections of Balt. Cty., 206 Md. 36, 43 , 111 A.2d 379, 382 (1954). In Coburn v. Coburn, this Court decided to address a moot issue involving an expired protective order issued pursuant to Maryland’s domestic violence statute, because protective orders occur frequently but often “escape judicial review by this Court due to [their] limited duration.” 342 Md. 244, 250 , 674 A.2d 951, 954 (1996) (noting that protective orders, according to then Md. Code Ann., Family Law § 4-506 (g), do not exceed 200 days in duration).

This Court also explained that the mooted controversy “involves construction of a statute routinely applied by courts of this state, and our interpretation of it will assist judges in determining whether victims of abuse are in need of protection.” Id., 674 A.2d at 954 . This Court concluded that the issue of domestic violence protective orders concerned an issue of public importance that would recur frequently and warranted review on the merits. Id., 674 A.2d at 954 . Similar to Coburn, the issue of a no-suspension probation condition will likely reoccur, involve the same parties within the juvenile justice system (e.g., students, public school systems, probation officers, the State’s Attorney, and the juvenile court), likely evade judicial review, and concerns a matter of public interest—the nexus between juvenile justice and the public education system, sometimes referred to as “the school-to-prison pipeline.”11 In the 2018–19 school year, Maryland Public Schools recorded 67,608 11 “The term ‘school to prison pipeline’ refers to the link between school failure, (continued . . .) 17 suspensions, and at any given time, there are approximately 2,000 juveniles on probation in Maryland.

Maryland Office of the Public Defender, Probation, http://dls.maryland.gov/pubs/prod/NoPblTabMtg/CmsnJuvRefCncl/MOPDProbationRec ommendations.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2021), archived at https://perma.cc/YA9S-6H2T. Attending school regularly, along with not “[b]eing suspended from school[,]” are “standard” conditions of probation. Paul J. Hirschfield, The Role of Schools in Sustaining Juvenile Justice System Inequality, 28 Future of Children 11, 19 (2018), https://futureofchildren.princeton.edu/sites/futureofchildren/files/media/vol28issue1.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/UW3A-EBCT. While the parties did not supply the exact number of juveniles in Maryland who have a no-suspension probation condition, these figures indicate the issue is likely to reoccur.

The issue of no-suspension conditions of probation also implicates the overlapping duties of the government “to assist children in becoming responsible and productive members of society[,]” while holding young offenders accountable for offenses committed in order to promote “[p]ublic safety and the protection of the community[.]” Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-02(a). Public schools are entrusted with the educational and character (. . . continued) zero-tolerance discipline policies, exclusionary discipline, school-based arrest and the likelihood that youth who have these experiences in school will become involved in the juvenile, and later, adult criminal justice systems.” Nicole Joseph, The Civil Rights Crisis in Our Schools, 49 Oct. Md. B.J. 12, 13 (Sept./Oct. 2016), https://nicolejosephlaw.com/wp- content/uploads/2020/06/Civil-Rights-in-School-MD-Bar-Journal-2016.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/UA7X-UWB4 (citing School to Prison Pipeline, NAACP Legal Defense Fund (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.naacpldf.org/case-issue/school-prison-pipeline/, archived at https://perma.cc/VG68-STR5). 18 development of young people, while the juvenile justice system, including probation officers, the State’s Attorney, and juvenile courts, is tasked with the rehabilitation of young offenders. Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275 , 208 A.2d 575, 580 (1965).12 The case at bar clearly addresses a significant “relationship between government and its citizens[.]” In re: O.P., 470 Md. at 249 , 235 A.3d at 54 (citation omitted).

We reject the State’s argument that “there is no reason to believe that this issue will continue to evade review[]” because juveniles can be on probation for years. While it is true that some juvenile conditions of probation may last for years, there are countless others, including the case at bar, which are terminated before the case reaches this Court. According to the Urban Institute, “the vast majority of youth probation terms can be completed in six months or less.” Urban Institute, Transforming Juvenile Probation (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.aecf.org/resources/transforming-juvenile-probation-terms, archived at https://perma.cc/CRD7-CYCM. Given the time it takes to resolve an appeal 12 Cts. & Jud.

Proc. § 3-802(a) defines the purposes of the juvenile justice system in pertinent part: (1) To provide for the care, protection, safety, and mental and physical development of any child coming within the provisions of this subtitle; (2) To provide for a program of services and treatment consistent with the child’s best interests and the promotion of the public interest; (3) To conserve and strengthen the child’s family ties and to separate a child from the child’s parents only when necessary for the child’s welfare[.] 19 before the Court of Special Appeals and come before this Court,13 it is likely that many no- suspension conditions for probation will evade review. This issue also concerns a matter of public importance. The intersection between school discipline and the criminal justice system has captured the attention of the General Assembly, social science researchers, and in part, the Maryland Judiciary. In 2017, the General Assembly established the “Commission on the School-to-Prison Pipeline and Restorative Practices.” Maryland Commission on the School-to-Prison Pipeline and Restorative Practices, Final Report and Collaborative Action Plan at 10 (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.law.umaryland.edu/media/SOL/pdfs/Programs/ADR/STPP%20%20RP%20 Commission%20Final%20Report.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/XF5C-548H.

The report examined the “school-to-prison pipeline” that pushes a “student out of school and into the juvenile or criminal justice system[.]” Id. at 22 (citation omitted). Contributing factors include overly harsh discipline, biased disciplinary decisions, and segregated and under-resourced schools. Id. The report highlighted how exclusionary discipline, like suspension, “has a disparate impact on students of color and students with disabilities.

Black students in kindergarten through 12th grade nationwide were 3.8 times as likely to receive one or more out-of-school suspensions as White students [].” Id. (citation omitted). In response to the work by the Commission, the General Assembly enacted Md. Code Ann., Education § 7 - 13 In the case at bar, S.F. first appeared before the circuit court sitting as a juvenile court on February 12, 2019. This Court granted certiorari on May 11, 2021, more than two years after a juvenile magistrate recommended the no-suspension condition of probation. 20 306, which requires each county board of education to review its disciplinary practices and policies and to encourage “restorative approaches” to student discipline.

The action taken by the General Assembly was consistent with empirical social science research that has found both implicit bias in how suspensions are administered and its disproportionate impact on Black students and students with disabilities. See Brief for The National Center for Youth Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, In re S.F., 474 Md. 632 , 255 A.3d 169 (2021) (No. 10, Sept. Term 2021) (“Black students are overrepresented in suspensions for all types of behaviors, and are more likely to be disciplined for ‘less serious and more subjective reasons.’ . . . White students tend to be disciplined for ‘more objectively observable’ offenses, like smoking or vandalism, [while] Black students tend to be disciplined for behaviors that are more ‘subjective in nature[]’ like disrespect, defiance, or noncompliance[,] . . . which do not require exclusion from school or justice system involvement.”) (footnote and citations omitted).14 The issue also implicates ongoing efforts by the Maryland Judiciary to eliminate discrimination on the basis of race, background, or identity in the administration of justice. In 2020, the Maryland Judiciary formed the Committee on Equal Justice, whose purpose is to “build the knowledge and proficiencies of judges and judiciary personnel to strengthen 14 We note that the record reflects that S.F. is a Black student and a student with a diagnosed disability.

While no suspension occurred while S.F. was on probation in the case at bar, the general inequities of school suspension policies found by the Commission remain relevant for S.F., and similarly situated students, presently enrolled in public schools. See, e.g., In re: S.F., 249 Md. App. at 59 n.3, 245 A.3d at 35 n.3 (citing Lena V. Groeger et al., Miseducation: Is There Racial Inequality at Your School?, Pro Publica (Oct. 16, 2018), https://projects.propublica.org/miseduation/district/2400330, archived at https://perma.cc/X85C-63X6. 21 the judiciary’s commitment to equal justice under law for all.” Maryland Judiciary, Equal Justice Committee Information (last visited Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.courts.state.md.us/equaljustice/committee, archived at https://perma.cc/V2C7-PDB4. One of the specific objectives is to “[d]evelop considerations for how judges can improve sentencing to ensure equal justice.” Maryland Judiciary, Sentencing Subcommittee Draft Interim Report and Recommendations for Equal Justice Committee’s Consideration (June 2021), https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/ejc/pdf/sentencingupdate. pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/K3ZZ-NREY. Amid ongoing efforts throughout state and local government to reform student disciplinary policies and procedures, this case could assist juvenile courts in assessing whether a suspension policy is impermissibly vague, thereby subjecting a student to arbitrary or capricious punishment. “Accordingly, we decline to dismiss this appeal” for mootness.

In re O.P., 470 Md. at 250 , 235 A.3d at 55. B. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering no school suspensions as a condition of probation. The juvenile court system was developed in the twentieth century following “a national outcry against the resulting barbarism, as it appeared . . . to be, of treating children and juveniles the same as adults.” In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 90 , 646 A.2d 1012, 1014 (1994) (quoting In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517 , 521–22, 255 A.2d 419, 421 (1969)) (quoting Fortas, Equal Rights—For Whom? 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 401 , 405–06 (1967)). Unlike the adult system, the juvenile court was designed to be more “informal and flexible in nature, 22 psychiatric and psychological assistance was sought, the rules of evidence were relaxed, and many proceedings were not open to the public.” Id. at 91, 646 A.2d at 1014 .

The purpose of the juvenile court system, when adjudicating cases involving children who have committed delinquent acts, was codified at Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A- 02, which provides in pertinent part: (a) The purposes of this subtitle are: (1) To ensure that the Juvenile Justice System balances the following objectives for children who have committed delinquent acts: (i) Public safety and the protection of the community; (ii) Accountability of the child to the victim and the community for offenses committed; and (iii) Competency and character development to assist children in becoming responsible and productive members of society; *** (4) To provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of this subtitle; and to provide for a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation consistent with the child’s best interests and the protection of the public interest[.] *** (8) To provide judicial procedures for carrying out the provisions of this subtitle. One of the judicial procedures expressly provided by the statute is ordering probation: In making a disposition on a petition under this subtitle, the [juvenile] court may . . . [p]lace the child on probation or under supervision in his own home or in the custody or under the guardianship of a relative or other fit person, upon terms the court deems appropriate, including community detention. Cts. & Jud.

Proc. § 3-8A-19(d)(1) (markings omitted) (emphasis added). Juvenile courts have broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-19(d)(1); see also Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 680 , 814 A.2d 557 , 23 568 (2003) (discussing the jurisdictional provisions applicable to juvenile cases, which “should be construed in a manner to maximize the juvenile court’s flexibility and ability to exercise its discretion”). “[A] juvenile court may place a child on probation . . . ‘upon terms the court deems appropriate. . . .’” In re W.Y., 228 Md. App. 596, 611 , 142 A.3d 602, 611 (2016) (citation omitted); Md. Rule 11-101(b)(5) (2021)15 (“‘Probation’ means a status created by a court order under which a child adjudicated to be delinquent . . . is to remain subject to supervision of the Court under conditions the Court or the agency designated by it deems proper, but is not removed from his home.”).

Similar to probation for adults, probation for juveniles represents a bargain.16 See Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275 , 208 A.2d 575, 580 (1965) (noting probation permits a defendant to retain his or her freedom so long as the defendant conforms “with established communal standards and the safety of society”). As with any juvenile delinquency disposition, juvenile probation must 15 Effective January 1, 2022, the definition of probation applicable to delinquency proceedings is codified without substantial change at Md. Rule 11-402(b)(5) (“‘Probation’ means a status created by a court order under which a child adjudicated to be delinquent is to remain subject to supervision of the court under conditions the court, or the agency designated by it, deems proper, but is not removed from his home.”). 16 Unlike adult probation, juvenile probation is not considered a punishment for a crime, nor does juvenile probation follow a conviction. Compare Doe v.