In Re Samone H.

BATTAGLIA, J. In this action between the biological mother and the State, we have been asked to consider whether the trial court properly denied a motion for independent evaluation of the “bonding” of Katina M. with her biological children, Marchay E. and Samone H., who had been declared children in need of assistance, pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 2002 RepLVol.), § 3-816 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, during a permanency plan review hearing. At issue also is whether the trial court properly quashed subpoenas for the children to testify during the review hearing or in camera. ²⁸⁶ I. Facts and Procedural History Samone H., born on July 20, 1996, and Marchay E., born on January 19,1991, are the children of Katina M. On September 24, 1996, after investigating allegations of neglect regarding Samone H., the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (BCDSS) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Division of Juvenile Causes, requesting that Samone H. be removed from Katina M.’s care and declared a child in need of assistance (CINA) 1 because the BCDSS claimed, among other allegations, that Katina M. had a history of drug abuse and had failed to provide adequate care for Samone H. The court conducted an emergency shelter care hearing 2 and ordered “BCDSS to provide care and custody for [Samone] in shelter care, pending [an adjudicatory] hearing.” 3 On February 18, 1997, the Circuit Court ordered Samone H. to be placed with a relative who BCDSS identified as her great-grandmother. Subsequently during the adjudicatory hearing Samone H. was declared a CINA by the Circuit Court but returned to Katina M. under an Order of Protective Supervi ²⁸⁷ sion by BCDSS. 4 Six weeks after the Baltimore City Police had responded to a call to the great-grandmother’s residence because Katina M. had locked Samone H., Marchay E., and the great-grandmother in the house, BCDSS took custody of Samone H. and Marchay E. Thereafter, BCDSS petitioned to remove the children from the care of Katina M. and also to declare Marchay E. a CINA. After an emergency hearing, the Circuit Court ordered that both children be committed to the custody of BCDSS and placed in the care of the great-grandmother.

Within a month, on July 18, 1997, BCDSS requested that the Circuit Court remove the children from the great-grandmother’s care and commit them to the custody of BCDSS with placement in the foster home where they currently reside. On January 27,1998, the Circuit Court conducted an adjudicatory hearing, determined Marchay E. to be a CINA and ordered both Samone H. and Marchay E. to remain in the custody of BCDSS. The court also established a permanency plan 5 to ²⁸⁸ have both children live with relatives capable of caring for them. During this time, Katina M. was allowed one supervised visit per month with each of the children.' Thereafter, the Circuit Court conducted periodic review hearings 6 and on June 24, 1999, the court revised the permanency plan to a concurrent permanency plan of adoption or placement with a relative.

The Circuit Court again changed ²⁸⁹ the permanency plan to one of adoption after another review hearing had occurred on December 6, 2000. Katina M. then filed a motion for reconsideration seeking to change the permanency plan from adoption to reunification. During an annual review hearing held on March 1, 2002, Mary Gilliard, a BCDSS case worker assigned to the case since 1999, testified that Marchay E. and Samone H. should not be removed from their foster home because they were “very bonded” with the foster family. Ms. Gilliard further testified that the visits between Katina M. and the children were “going pretty well” and that the children were glad to see Katina M. When questioned about the detrimental effect of discontinuing the visits, Ms. Gilliard appeared to have differing opinions: [CHILDREN’S COUNSEL]: There also is some emotional attachment between the children and their biological Mother, that’s correct also? [MS.

GILLIARD]: Yes. [CHILDREN’S COUNSEL]: And it would be detrimental to cut off that relationship between the children and their Mother, is that correct? [MS. GILLIARD]: Yes, it would at this time. While in response to questioning by Katina M.’s attorney on the same subject, Ms. Gilliard testified: [KATINA M.’s COUNSEL]: Okay, do you think the children have an emotional bond with their Mother? [MS. GILLIARD]: I can’t [answer] that question for you right now. [KATINA M.’s COUNSEL]: Do you think stopping the visits between the children and the Mother would be detrimental to the children? [MS.

GILLIARD]: I don’t think so, no no. [KATINA M.’s COUNSEL]:It would be okay, you don’t think they would mind? [MS. GILLIARD]: Nah, I don’t think so at all. ²⁹⁰ [KATINA M.’s COUNSEL]: Even though they’re loving and caring with their Mother? [MS. GILLIARD]: For the time that they’re with them, they are you know, for that hour, but I don’t think it would be detrimental to them if they don’t see their biological Mom, because with the foster Mom they have been there so long so this is— [KATINA M.’s COUNSEL]: Okay, but I’m just talking about as far as the biological Mom and her children and you’re saying it would be, there would be no harm done to stop the visits today? [MS. GILLIARD]: Maybe to the biological Mom, but not to the children, no.

During the March 1, 2002 hearing, Katina M. also testified about her visits with Marchay E. and Samone H: My visits are great. They don’t want to be leaving, they get sad. Like I said, Samone tells me to follow them and Marchay told me that any — I asked Marchay when do she rather see me, the beginning of the month or the end. She said it doesn’t really matter just as long as she [sees] me.

She just don’t want to not see me. After hearing the testimony, the judge concluded that it would be in the children’s best interests to remain in foster care: [There] is no doubt in mind as to ... what’s in the best interest of the children and that’s what I’m concerned with. Not the best interest of the Father, not the best interest of the Mother, not in the best interest of the foster parents. It’s what’s in the best interest of the children.

There’s no question in this Court’s mind that the children have been in foster care for a very, with the same family, for a very substantial time. Most of their lives. One child is only 5, the other child is 11. They have been in foster care since 1997.

So, for a good part of their lives, for one almost the whole life and the other for at least half their lives, approximately half. There is no question in the Court’s mind that they’re bonded to the foster parents. That they consider the foster family as their family. I don’t question that the ²⁹¹ Mother has turned herself around, but for many years she hadn’t turned herself around and so to disrupt the children, to remove the children from the place where they’ve lived for a good part of their lives would be detrimental to them and would serve no useful purpose....

At the same time that the court ordered the permanency plan for adoption to continue, the judge also ordered Katina M.’s supervised visits with the children to be increased to one hour two times per month and issued a separate order denying Katina M.’s motion for reconsideration, which she appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Thereafter, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s ruling and held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Katina M.’s request to change the permanency plan. The intermediate appellate court emphasized that the trial judge properly had considered the children’s best interests in reviewing the permanency plan based upon the guidelines set forth in Maryland Code, Section 5-525(e) of the Family Law Article, because he had assessed the potential harm to Marchay E. and Samone H. if removed from their current placement; the length of time the children were with their foster family; and any bond the children had with the foster family and their biological mother. As such, the Court of Special Appeals held that there was “sufficient evidence in the record to support the Circuit Court’s decision that a permanency plan of adoption [was] in the best interests of Marchay and Samone.” Within one year, on March 13, 2003, the Circuit Court held another review hearing.

Prior to the hearing Katina M. filed a motion for independent study seeking to have the children evaluated by a psychiatrist to provide an assessment of her relationship with her children and whether removing the children from foster care would be harmful; she also subpoenaed both Marchay E. and Samone H. to testify. At the hearing, before the judge who had presided at the March 2002 hearing, Katina M. argued that an independent study of her bond with her children would assist the court in determining whether to change the permanency plan: ²⁹² [KATINA M.’s COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I did file a motion for independent study concerning matters relevant to the case. In that motion, I stated that the Department had in the past alleged that there was not a sufficient bond between the children, respondents, and my clients that they are — that stated that removal of the respondents from the foster parents would be harmful to the respondents. Obviously, there is a TPR[ 7 ] pending to terminate my clients’ rights.

That the allegations regarding the bonding were made by the worker but not by any clinician, that the only way for the mother to rebut these allegations was to have an independent examination that the foregoing was sufficient good cause to order an examination, and that the examination would be conducted by our expert at a place and time convenient for the respondents, and that would not be harmful to the respondents. Just to give you a little background, Your Honor, we did have a hearing before you on March 1st, 2002. Again, Your Honor, we did not hear from any clinician about any bond. My client would like, and the court should want, an independent evaluation of the bond between the children and the mother because that would assist the court, ²⁹³ and certainly all parties, in making a decision in this matter.

This examination would not cause harm to the children. This issue had been through the appellate courts before, Your Honor. And In re Mark M., In re Adoption of Mark M., I have those cases if you’d like to take a look at them. If I could get the clerk to hand these up.

In those cases, the Department alleged that Mark was in a fragile mental state, and would be harmed by the evaluation. They claimed that the examination would have a catastrophic effect on Mark. In that case, the child had not seen his mother for over a year. Now, in this case, Your Honor, my client sees these children twice a month.

I’m not aware of any allegations that an examination would cause harm or would be, have a catastrophic effect on the children. And even if there were, Your Honor, in In re Mark M. and In re Adoption/Guardianship of Mark M., the court ordered that the mother be allowed to conduct an examination anyway. Despite the Department’s allegation. And if you look at In re Adoption/Guardianship, Your Honor, it’s very clear in that matter.

And without a clinical evaluation, there is no way for the mother to rebut the Department’s conclusion that there is no bond. The Court of Appeals in Adoption/Guardianship of Mark M. found that to deny such an evaluation would mean that Social Services is the only one able to present evidence on bonding. And because of that, because to otherwise not allow a mother’s ability to defend her parental and constitutional rights, ordered that she be allowed to conduct an evaluation. Also in Mark M., Your Honor, the Court of Appeals found that the mother, this is Adoption Guardianship of Mark M., the Court of Appeals found that the mother was a caring parent, had overcome her substance abuse problem, and considering the magnitude of the mother’s rights, said an evaluation was appropriate.

Here, again, Your Honor, my client has done all those things. She does care for the ²⁹⁴ children. And it would be appropriate to have an evaluation be done. I would ask the Court to apply both In re Mark M. and In re Adoption Guardianship of Mark M., and order that evaluation be done by the mother’s expert.

Your Honor, we are offering Brian Zamitsky, who is a psychiatrist who works at the Crownsville Hospital Center. He is responsible for conducting in patient and out patient juvenile forensic psychiatric evaluations for the juvenile court system. We believe that this examination can be done with no harm to the child. The only harm I’ve heard alleged so far from child’s counsel is that the children would be removed from school for the evaluation.

Certainly, we could work-I’m not sure if that rises to the level of harm, but certainly we could work around the children’s school schedule in order to accommodate the examination. (emphasis added). Both BCDSS and the children’s attorney objected to the independent study arguing that an evaluation would be harmful to the children because the psychiatrist would be unfamiliar with the children and might delve into their past. Katina M. countered that the expert’s evaluation would be limited to the “bonding issue,” without having to probe into the children’s past experience with their mother.

When the court denied the motion for independent study, the following dialogue occurred: [KATINA. M.’s COUNSEL]: In rebuttal, Your honor, I do think that there is controversy over whether the children have a bond with their mother or not. And I think that— [THE COURT]: Well, I don’t think there is because— [KATINA. M.’s COUNSEL]: Well, the other thing, Your Honor [THE COURT]: Because I heard the worker testify as to viewing the meetings between the children and the mother— ²⁹⁵ —and I was satisfied then and I’m satisfied now that there is very little bond, if any, between, very little bond with the mother.

All the bonding is with the foster family, the custodians. THE COURT: I am not going to have an independent, in the sense of having some psychologist or psychiatrist say, interview the children. I am not going to put them through that. [KATINA M.’s COUNSEL]: Your Honor, how can I rebut that, then? [CHILDREN’S COUNSEL]: It’s harmful to the children. [KATINA M.’s COUNSEL]: How can I rebut it? That is the question.

If I can’t rebut it, then we’re just saying well, the court— THE COURT: No. [KATINA M.’s COUNSEL]: — DSS rolls along without me having a say so. THE COURT: You rebutted it by the mother’s description of her relationship with the children. [KATINA M.’s COUNSEL]: Now you’re saying I can’t. I mean, how am I going to — I think that’s why we need the independent. We’ve got my client and the Department of Social Services who both clearly have biases in this case.

That’s why an independent evaluation would be appropriate. After lengthy argument between the parties, the trial judge stated: “Okay. I am not at this point going to grant an ‘independent evaluation’ by mom’s expert or anybody else’s expert. Period.

That ends it.” BCDSS thereafter, moved to quash the subpoenas to have Marchay E. and Samone H. testify or, in the alternative, to have the children testify in camera. Katina M. objected to having the children testify in camera and expressed concern about allowing the judge to question the children in her absence. In response to the motion to quash, the trial judge ruled: “I am not putting young children on the stand. Peri ²⁹⁶ od.” and stated, “[a]nd I’m not going to do-I’m not going to interview them in chambers.

I’m not going to interview them in the courtroom ... I am going to quash the subpoena.” The review hearing then proceeded to the merits of the case in which the court heard testimony from Ms. Gilliard and Katina M. regarding the children’s placement and their relationship with both their foster family and Katina M. At the conclusion of the testimony, the court reaffirmed the permanency plan of adoption and held that the children should remain committed to the custody of BCDSS. Katina M. noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court first addressed whether the lower court had erred in denying Katina M.’s request for an independent study and held that she had .failed to meet her burden of demonstrating good cause for the examination.

The intermediate appellate court further opined that Katina M. had failed to show that the examination would not be harmful to the children. In reaching its decision, the Court of Special Appeals held that although Katina M. had tendered the name of the expert and had proposed that a “study” of the children would exclude a discussion of their past history, she did not “proffer how the study would be conducted.” The intermediate appellate court then addressed the trial court’s decision to quash the subpoenas for Marchay E. and Samone H., and concluded that the children had been represented by counsel at both hearings and that “their wishes ... ‘clearly [had been] before the court for its consideration’ ” without there being evidence of misrepresentation by their counsel. The intermediate appellate court emphasized that Katina M. had objected to opposing counsel’s suggestion that the children be interviewed in camera and had “not claim[ed] that the children’s wishes regarding visitation with her had been misrepresented.” Thus, the Court of Special Appeals held that the lower court had not abused its discretion in quashing the subpoenas. ²⁹⁷ Katina M. filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court to consider the following questions: 1. Is this Court’s decision in In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687 , 782 A.2d 332 (2001), approving independent examinations of children in CINA cases limited to situations where the proposed examination is the subject of other expert opinion offered in the proceeding, and, in this case, did the trial court fail to adequately balance the Mark M. considerations when it refused to grant a requested independent bonding evaluation because it “was satisfied” that “there is a very little bond, if any ... with the mother” and it was not in the children’s “best interests” “to put them through that?” 2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused to hear from the children at the permanency planning review hearing on the grounds that “I am not putting young children on the stand. Period.” and “I’m not going to interview them in chambers?” We granted the petition and issued the writ of certiorari. 8 II. Discussion In the present case, Katina M. asks us to review the trial court’s order denying her motion for independent study during a permanency plan review hearing in which the plan remained static. As a threshold matter, we must consider whether the trial court’s order is properly appealable.

In general, appeals may only be taken from a final judgment of the trial court pursuant to Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which states that “a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil ... case’ ... [whether] entered ... in the exercise of original, special, limited, or statutory jurisdiction, unless ... expressly denied by law.” Smith v. Taylor, 285 Md. 143, 146 , 400 A.2d 1130, 1132 (1979) (internal citations omitted). For the trial court’s ruling to be a final ²⁹⁸ judgment it must either determine and conclude the rights of the parties involved or deny a party the means to “prosecut[e] or defend[ ] his or her rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.” Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 , 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989). In considering whether a particular court order or ruling constitutes an appealable judgment, we assess whether any further order was to be issued or whether any further action was to be taken in the case. See Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41-42 , 566 A.2d at 774 .

An order that is not a final judgment is considered to be an interlocutory order and ordinarily is not appealable unless it falls within one of the statutory exceptions set forth in Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 12-303 of the Court and Judicial Proceedings Article. See In re Damon M., 362 Md. 429, 434 , 765 A.2d 624, 627 (2001). Relevant to our discussion is the exception embodied in Section 12-303 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which provides: A party may appeal from any of the following interlocutory orders entered by a circuit court in a civil case: (3) An order: (x) Depriving a parent, grandparent, or natural guardian of the care and custody of his child, or changing the terms of such an order.... Md.Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.) § 12-303(x) of the Court and Judicial Proceedings Article.

In In re Damon M., we assessed whether an appeal would lie from an order entered after a permanency plan review hearing in which the plan had been amended from reunification to long-term foster care, id. at 432-33, 765 A.2d at 626 , and held that “an order amending a permanency plan calling for reunification to foster care or adoption [was] immediately appealable.” Id. at 438 , 765 A.2d at 628 . In so holding, we explained that “the amendment of the permanency plan to long-term or permanent foster care and adoption [was] a change in the terms of the custody ²⁹⁹ order,” and thus, had affected the custody rights of the petitioners. Id. at 437 , 765 A.2d at 628 . We left open the question of whether “other orders that the court might pass after [permanency plan review] hearings [were] appealable.” Id. at 433 n. 4, 765 A.2d at 626 n. 4.

To be appealable under Section 12-303(x), an order denying a motion for independent study either must operate to deprive Katina M. of the care and custody of Marchay E. and Samone H. or change the terms of her care and custody of the children. Resolution of this question is at the heart of the issue before us. A. Fundamental Rights of Parents The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that a parent has a constitutionally protected fundamental right to raise his or her children. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 , 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49, 57 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 , 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-95 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 , 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 , 64 S.Ct. 438, 442 , 88 L.Ed. 645, 652 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 , 43 S.Ct. 625, 626 , 67 L.Ed. 1042, 1045 (1923).

Recently, in In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551 , 819 A.2d 1030 (2003), we iterated this principle and stated that a parent’s interest “occupies a unique place in our legal culture, given the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility. ‘[Far] more precious ... than property rights,’ parental rights have been deemed to be among those ‘essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men Id, at 567, 819 A.2d at 1039 , quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 112 , 642 A.2d 201 (1994), in turn quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981); see also, Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 372 Md. 639, 650 , 814 A.2d 543, 550 (2003); In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 705 , 782 A.2d 332, 342-43 (2001); Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 218 , 721 A.2d 662, 669 (1998). Likewise, in In re ³⁰⁰ Mark M., we emphasized the importance of parenting as a fundamental right: A parent’s interest in raising a child is, no doubt, a fundamental right, recognized by the United States Supreme Court and this Court. The United States Supreme Court has long avowed the basic civil right encompassed by child rearing and family life. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 , 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49, 57 (2000) (stating that “the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”); See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 , 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-95 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606 (1982) (discussing “the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 , 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212-13 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558-59 (1972)(stating that “[t]he rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ and that ‘[t]he integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... and the Ninth Amendment .... ’Xinternal citations omitted).

Maryland, too, has declared a parent’s interest in raising a child to be so fundamental that it ‘cannot be taken away unless clearly justified.’ ” Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 218 , 721 A.2d 662, 669 (1998)(citing In re Adoption No. 10W, 335 Md. 99, 112 , 642 A.2d 201 (1994)). 365 Md. at 705 , 782 A.2d at 342-43 . A parent’s right to raise his or her children, however, is not absolute, and there may be countervailing considerations that the State, pursuant to its parens patriae authority, must protect. Indeed, in In re Mark M. we stated: That fundamental interest, however, is not absolute and does not exclude other important considerations. Pursuant to the doctrine of parens patriae, the State of Maryland has an interest in caring for those, such as minors, who cannot care for themselves.

See Boswell, 352 Md. at 218-19 , 721 A.2d at 669 . We have held that “the best interests of the ³⁰¹ child may take precedence over the parent’s liberty interest in the course of a custody, visitation, or adoption dispute.” Boswell, 352 Md. at 219 , 721 A.2d at 669 ; see also In re Adoption No. 109141, 335 Md. at 113 , 642 A.2d at 208 (stating that “the controlling factor ... is ... what best serves the interest of the child”). That which will best promote the child’s welfare becomes particularly consequential where the interests of a child are in jeopardy, as is often the case in situations involving sexual, physical, or emotional abuse by a parent. As we stated in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538 , 640 A.2d 1085 (1994), the child’s welfare is a consideration that is of transcendent importance’ when the child might otherwise be in jeopardy.

Id. at 561 , 640 A.2d at 1096 (citation omitted). We have recognized that in cases where abuse or neglect is evidenced, particularly in a CINA case, the court’s role is necessarily more pro-active. See In re Justin D., ( 357 Md. 431, 448 , 745 A.2d 408, 417 (2000) ]. A trial court, acting under the State’s parens patriae authority, is in the unique position to marshal the applicable facts, assess the situation, and determine the correct means of fulfilling a child’s best interests.

Id. at 365 Md. at 705-07 , 782 A.2d at 343-44 . B. Permanency Plans in CINA Proceedings In response to concerns that children were being lost in the foster care system without belonging to a permanent family, Congress enacted Public Law 96-272, the “Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,” codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-79 (1988), which required states, among other things, to “provide a written case plan for each child for whom the state claims federal foster care maintenance payments.” 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(16); see also In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 574-75 , 819 A.2d at 1044 . Pursuant to Congress’s mandate, Maryland created a statutory scheme directing the department of social ³⁰² services to “develop and implement a permanency plan that [was] in the best interests” of those children committed to the local department of social services. In re Yve S., 873 Md. at 574, 819 A.2d at 1044 , quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10W, 335 Md. at 103-06 , 642 A.2d at 203-05 (1994); Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2002 Cum.Supp.), § 5-525(e) of the Family Law Article.

In In re Damon M., we identified the importance of a permanency plan: The permanency plan is an integral part of the statutory scheme designed to expedite the movement of Maryland’s children from foster care to a permanent living, and hopefully, family arrangement. It provides the goal toward which the parties and the court are committed to work. It sets the tone for the parties and the court and, indeed, may be outcome determinative. Services to be provided by the local social service department and commitments that must be made by the parents and children are determined by the permanency plan.

And, because it may not be changed without the court first determining that it is in the child’s best interest to do so, the permanency plan must be in the child’s best interest. These are the reasons, no doubt, that the court is charged with determining the plan and with periodically reviewing it, evaluating all the while the extent to which it is being complied with. 362 Md. at 436 , 765 A.2d at 627-28 . Most recently, in In re Yve S. we explained the need for trial courts to review permanency plans to ensure that children are being cared for in the best possible manner: As In re Damon M. observes, the purpose of a permanency plan is to set the direction in which the parent, agencies, and the court will work in terms of reaching a satisfactory conclusion to the situation. Once set initially, the goal of the permanency plan is re-visited periodically at hearings to determine progress and whether, due to historical and contemporary circumstances, that goal should be changed.

It is not the purpose of the initial permanency plan hearing, however, to resolve all issues involved in that final resolution. If that were the case, there would be no need for ³⁰³ review of how, on a regular basis, the plan is progressing or not. Also as In re: Damon M. indicates, the initial permanency plan hearing is to be held and conducted expeditiously. Protracted proceedings in establishing the initial plan defeat the purpose of the statute.

The statute presumes that, unless there are compelling circumstances to the contrary, the plan should be to work toward reunification, as it is presumed that it is in the best interest of a child to be returned to his or her natural parent. 378 Md. at 582, 819 A.2d at 1049 . In In re Yve S. quoting from In re Damon M., we also delineated the requirements a trial court must follow when implementing a permanency plan: [T]he court has the responsibility for determining the permanency plan, § 3-826.1(a)(l) and justifying the placement of children in out of home placements for a specified period or on a long-term or permanent basis, § 3-826.1(d), in addition to conducting periodic, six month reviews. § 3-826.1(f). Section 3-826.1 [now codified as Section 3-823 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article] requires the court, not later than 11 months after a child found to be in need of assistance has been placed in foster care, see also Md.Code (1989, 1991 Repl.Vol., 1997 Cum.Supp.) § 501(m) of the Family Law Article, to hold a permanency planning hearing to determine the permanency plan for that child. § 3-826.1(a)(1) [now § 3-823(b)(l) ]. At that hearing, for each child in placement and in determining the plan, the court is required to make certain decisions and findings, § 3-826.1(c), [now § 3-823(e) ] specifically, whether the child should be: returned to the parent or guardian, § 3-826.1(c)(l)(i) [now § 3-823(e)(l)(i) ]; placed with relatives to whom adoption or guardianship is granted, § 3-826.1(c)(l)(ii) [now § 3-823(e)(l)(ii)]; placed for adoption, § 3-826.l(c)(l)(iii) [now § 3-823(e)(l)(iii) ]; emancipated, § 3-826.1(c)(l)(iv) [now deleted]; or because of the child’s ³⁰⁴ special needs or circumstances, continued in placement on a permanent or long-term basis or for a specified period. § 3-826.1(c)(l)(v) and (vi) [now § 3-823(e)(l)(v) and (vi) ].

There are restrictions on the court’s ability to continue a child in placement because of the child’s special needs or circumstances. § 3-826.1(d) [now § 3 — 823(f) ]. That section prohibits the court from using that option unless it finds that the agency to which the child is committed has documented a compelling reason for determining that it would not be in the best interest of the child to: (1) Return home; (2) Be referred for termination of parental rights; or (3) Be placed for adoption or guardianship with a specified and appropriate relative or legal guardian willing to care for the child. Id. at 577-81, 819 A.2d at 1046-48 (additions in original). We explained: Section 3-826.1(f) [now § 3-823(h) ] mandates periodic reviews of the permanency plan by the court.

Subsection (f)(l)(i) provides [now § 3-823(h)(l)(i) ] that such reviews will be “no less frequently than every six months until commitment is rescinded.” If, however, at the permanency planning hearing or a subsequent review hearing, the court, inter alia, orders a child continued in permanent foster care, the court is no longer required to hold the review hearings at six month intervals. Subsection (f)(l)(ii) [now § 3-823(h)(l)(ii), is revised to require review hearings every 12 months.]. As is true of the initial permanency planning hearing, the court must make some determinations at the hearing to review the permanency plan. § 3-826.1(f)(2) [now § 3-823(h)(2) ]. Among other things, in addition to determining whether the commitment remains necessary and appropriate, subsection (f)(2)(i) [now § 3-823(h)(2)(i)], and evaluating the progress made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes of the commitment, subsection (f)(2)(iii) [now § 3 — 823(h)(2)(iii) ], the court is required to “determine the extent of compliance with the permanency ³⁰⁵ plan,”